Court Filings

The First District of Texas dismissed two appeals brought by John Lewis Jr. challenging (1) a January 5, 2026 writ committing him to Kingwood Pines for up to 45 days and (2) a January 5, 2026 order authorizing medication. Counsel had filed a notice of dismissal, which the court treated as a motion to dismiss. After the court ordered a hearing to confirm whether appellant abandoned the appeals, appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue them because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement, granted the dismissal motion, and dismissed the appeals as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.

The First District of Texas dismissed Ashlee Walker's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute after she did not file an appellate brief or respond to the court's notice and directive to file a brief and motion for extension. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring briefs and authorizing dismissal for failure to comply, and it also dismissed any pending motions as moot. The dismissal was issued as a memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Angel Fuentes's appeal from a County Civil Court at Law in Harris County because the appellant failed to file a brief by the deadline, did not seek an extension, and did not respond to the court's notice that the brief was overdue. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and treated any outstanding motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a ruling on the merits of the underlying case.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by Affordable Ready Mix.com and Grace Raven because they failed to establish indigence or pay the required appellate filing fee, and they did not respond to the Court's notice directing them to either pay or explain why they should not. The court cited Texas appellate rules and statutory fee provisions, concluded appellants did not comply with the Court's directive, and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by With Strength We Lead 2018, LLC for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file or pay for the clerk's record. The court notified appellant of intent to dismiss and granted a 30-day extension to arrange payment and file the record, warning that failure to do so by April 2, 2026 would result in dismissal. Because no clerk's record was filed and no proof of payment was shown, the court dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for new trial and upheld the default judgment in favor of Business Unlimited. Business Unlimited sued to quiet title after a lien sale and obtained a default judgment when U.S. Bank failed to answer. U.S. Bank sought a new trial under the three-part Craddock standard for setting aside defaults, claiming an administrative mistake and asserting meritorious defenses. The appellate court found U.S. Bank proved mistake but failed to adequately set up factual support for meritorious defenses, so the Craddock test was not satisfied and the denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against U.S. Bank (USB) in a quiet-title action because USB failed to prove entitlement to a new trial under the Craddock standard. USB was served but did not answer, a default judgment was entered, and USB later sought a new trial supported by a late affidavit from a bank vice president. The court held the affidavit was conclusory and lacked personal knowledge about the registered agent’s handling of service, so USB did not show its failure to answer was an accident rather than intentional or due to conscious indifference.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) dismissed Tonia Lynn Edwards’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after giving notice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited its prior notices (March 3 and March 18, 2026), the appellant’s noncompliance with procedural rules and a Texas Supreme Court fee order, and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c) and 43.2(f). The opinion also orders the appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court reversed a trial-court order that denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case. Josh Adams sued his former employer, The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC, for unpaid cash and phantom-stock commissions. Bridge moved to compel arbitration under an employment agreement clause that referenced wage-related statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration clause was governed by the federal act, that the phrase “wages” reasonably includes commissions, and that the clause’s broad “arising from/relating to” language covers Adams’s claims.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for attorneys Leslie Hyman and Pullman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP in Susan Harriman’s legal-malpractice suit. Harriman sued claiming the lawyers mishandled a 2017 hearing to unseal certain sealed court records and that their actions forced her into an unfavorable settlement in an underlying defamation case. The appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment arguing Harriman offered no proof that their conduct proximately caused her damages. The appellate court held Harriman produced only speculation and no more than a scintilla of evidence on proximate cause, so summary judgment was proper.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment committing Edward Lincoln Goff as a sexually violent predator under the Texas SVP Act. On appeal Goff argued the evidence was legally insufficient to show he currently suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to commit predatory sexual violence. The appellate court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury, relied chiefly on the jury’s credibility determinations, and found the expert testimony (diagnosing pedophilic disorder and identifying risk factors) plus Goff’s history of multiple child-victim offenses, continued offending after detection, lack of insight, and certain coercive acts supported the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Cornelius Hudson’s survival-action suit filed on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Hudson had sued multiple transportation-related defendants for injuries his mother allegedly sustained before her death. The appellate court held Hudson’s petition sufficiently alleged that the decedent’s estate had standing to pursue the survival claim, and it explained that a plea to the jurisdiction is not the correct procedural vehicle to challenge a plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The case is remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

The court affirmed the trial court’s final divorce decree enforcing a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) that divided the marital estate. The wife, Soo Jin, argued the MSA should be set aside because she signed under duress and did not sign voluntarily, citing health issues, language barriers, a panic attack, and pressure from counsel and the mediator. The appellate court held the MSA met Texas Family Code §6.602 requirements and found competent evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Soo Jin’s testimony did not show fraud, coercion, or incapacity that would void the agreement. The judgment enforcing the MSA was affirmed.

The court dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellee (the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs) executed a writ of possession and obtained physical possession of the premises. The trial court had entered judgment for the appellee and set the statutorily required supersedeas bond amount under Texas law, but there is no indication the appellants posted a bond to stay possession. Because the appellee already recovered possession and the appellants did not respond to the appellee’s motion to dismiss, the appellate court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) dismissed an appeal brought by Dale Cole against Discover Bank after Cole filed an unopposed motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and entered an order dismissing the appeal. No substantive ruling on the underlying merits was made; the dismissal was procedural and based solely on the appellant's request.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Wes and Tina Dobransky's appeal from the County Court at Law, Cooke County, because the appellants repeatedly failed to pay the required filing fee despite two warnings and deadlines. The court gave notice on February 19 and March 11, 2026, allowed at least ten days to cure, and concluded the deadlines passed with no payment. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay all costs of the appeal.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Tumininu Banwo's appeal from the 325th District Court for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file the required appellate brief. The court had notified appellant after the March 16, 2026 brief deadline and gave a grace period until March 30, 2026 to file the brief and explain the delay, but received no response. Because the appellant did not comply with Texas appellate rules or offer an explanation, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court denied the appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a replacement opinion that reaches the same result: the Texas Department of Public Safety’s plea to the jurisdiction was sustained and the employee’s disability-discrimination and retaliation claims against DPS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act were dismissed with prejudice. The court found Sanders failed to plead facts establishing a prima facie discrimination or retaliation claim (and thus failed to invoke the TCHRA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity). Because Sanders had multiple opportunities to amend and the defects were incurable, dismissal was proper.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas reviewed an interlocutory appeal by Nidal T. Baem from a trial court’s temporary injunction freezing all First National Bank of Texas accounts in his name. Western Frontier Trading alleged Baem embezzled customer payments and sought to freeze accounts where those funds were deposited. The appellate court found sufficient evidence to support a temporary injunction in part but held the injunction was overbroad: it unlawfully froze all Baem’s bank accounts and did not limit the freeze to the dollar amount tied to Western’s disputed funds. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a narrowly tailored injunction and further hearing.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas dismissed James Kristopher Limon's appeal for want of prosecution. Limon failed to file his brief by the March 21, 2026 deadline, did not request an extension, and did not comply with the clerk's ten-day notice. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(b), the court dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum concluding dismissal is warranted where a party fails to prosecute and does not seek an extension after notice.

The Court of Appeals (Seventh District) granted the appellants' unopposed motion for voluntary dismissal of their appeal from an Agreed Final Judgment in the probate matter Estate of Eliot Carmi. The court found the motion complied with the appellate rule, that dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no decision had been issued, so the appeal was dismissed. Because the motion did not allocate costs, the court taxed appellate costs against the appellants and declined to entertain a motion for rehearing, issuing its mandate immediately.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Robert Sydow acquired title to a disputed strip of land by adverse possession as a matter of law. Sydow had fenced, used, and maintained the land continuously from 2008 to 2020, and successive purchasers and owners had actual or constructive notice of his possession. The court rejected the defendant Douglass Properties’ defenses based on the common grantor doctrine and equitable estoppel because the deed line was not a visible boundary on the ground and Douglass had actual knowledge of the encroachment. The case is remanded for entry of partial summary judgment for Sydow and determination of attorney fees under RCW 7.28.083.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Scott Bolles’s appeal of a trial court award of attorney fees to GEICO Indemnity Company because the appellant failed to pursue the required discretionary-review procedure. Under Georgia law, orders granting fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 must be appealed by application for discretionary review; ordinary appeals are not permitted. Because Bolles did not follow that jurisdictional procedure, the Court concluded it lacked authority to hear the case and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of the fee award.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application filed by Fulton County Sheriff Patrick Labat seeking review of a trial court order that denied his summary-judgment immunity defense in a lawsuit by Ralph Gershom challenging a sheriff's deed. The court concluded the superior-court order is directly appealable under new OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(15), effective July 1, 2025, so an interlocutory application was unnecessary. Because Sheriff Labat already filed a notice of appeal docketed as Case No. A26A1678, the Court dismissed the duplicative application as superfluous and directed further filings to proceed under the existing appeal number.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Tajul Islam’s motion to continue a domestic-relations hearing and related rulings. Islam’s counsel was unavailable due to a criminal trial and Islam argued this denied him counsel and due process when the hearing proceeded in his absence. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the late continuance request, that no constitutional right to counsel existed in this civil contempt/post-decree proceeding, and that Islam failed to show cumulative error or timely objections. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and awarding permanent custody of twin infants A.N. and L.N. to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (CCDCFS). The agency had sought permanent custody in its original complaint after the children were removed at birth because of Mother’s unresolved mental-health problems, inconsistent engagement with services, and prior involuntary termination of parental rights to older siblings. The appellate court found the juvenile court’s findings supported by clear and convincing evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City of Euclid’s motion to dismiss a negligence complaint. Frederico sued the city after a tree fell from private property onto his car, alleging the city owned and failed to maintain the tree. The appellate panel held that under Ohio law the city is generally immune from tort liability unless an exception applies, and the complaint did not plead facts showing the tree was an “obstruction” on the roadway as required to overcome immunity. Because the complaint could not state a viable exception, dismissal was required.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Citywide RX after Citywide prevailed on contract claims against multiple nursing-home defendants, including Selfridge Leasing. Citywide sought $434,252.95 in fees (primarily for a New York law firm plus local counsel); the trial court found Citywide the prevailing party under the contract’s fee provision, reviewed affidavits and itemized bills, and held the rates and hours reasonable. On appeal Selfridge argued the fees were excessive and duplicative, but the court rejected new arguments raised for the first time on appeal and found no genuine issue of material fact.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Pike County Common Pleas Court's denial of a motion to set aside a sheriff's sale of real property sold for delinquent taxes. Gary Damron argued he (and other known heirs) did not receive proper notice because the Notice of Sale was sent by email to his then-attorney during the holiday period rather than by regular mail. The appellate court held service on Damron's attorney by e-mail complied with Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(f), was complete upon transmission, and was reasonably calculated to provide notice, so the trial court did not err in denying the motion to set aside the sale.