Court Filings

The Appellate Division dismissed an appeal and cross-appeal in an Erie County civil action between Sycamore Maple Family Ltd. Partnership and James F. Jerge. The parties filed a stipulation of discontinuance on April 2, 2026, and the court ordered the appeals dismissed without costs on April 24, 2026. No opinion on the merits was issued because the case was discontinued by the parties.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed a lower court order denying plaintiff Jeremiah Smith's motion for leave to amend his complaint against the City of Buffalo, its police department, and unnamed officers. The appeal challenged Supreme Court (Erie County)'s November 12, 2024 decision refusing permission to amend, but the appellate court found no reversible error and denied relief. The appellate decision is brief and affirms the trial court's exercise of discretion without further elaboration in the slip opinion.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed an order of the Court of Claims that granted the administrator of Kaazim Freeman’s estate leave to amend her wrongful-death claim against the State and denied the State’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the proposed amendments related back to the original claim for statute-of-limitations purposes because they arose from the same occurrence — Freeman’s unexplained death in state custody — and that the State failed to show prejudice from the delay. Consequently, amendment was properly allowed under CPLR 3025 and CPLR 203(f).

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted defendant Rochester Rev Holdings summary judgment in a dispute over ownership of real property under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) articles 6 and 15. The court held that defendant failed to meet its initial burden for summary judgment because its own submissions (including a lease with a purchase option and an affidavit indicating knowledge that plaintiff was a tenant) created triable issues of fact about plaintiff's title claims and defendant's counterclaims. The case was sent back with the complaint reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court (Erie County) order granting summary judgment to defendants in a dispute brought by plaintiff-appellant Colleen Pandy, as executor and individually, against Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America and individual defendants. The appellate court agreed with the lower court that the moving defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, resolving the appeal against the plaintiff. The decision is brief and affirms the dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining claims without further comment or costs awarded to the appellant.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the Chief Administrator of the Courts has the exclusive constitutional authority to appoint Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogates' Courts. The case arose from Erie County Surrogate Acea M. Mosey seeking a declaration that she had appointment power under the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. The court concluded those statute-based appointment provisions are superseded by New York Constitution article VI, § 28 and implementing law and regulations vesting appointment authority in the Chief Administrator because the positions are nonjudicial officers within the Unified Court System.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order granting summary judgment to two third-party defendants and denying NYAC summary judgment on its indemnification claim. Plaintiff sued for injuries from a scaffold fall. The court held that Next Level was not contractually obligated to indemnify NYAC because the indemnity language covered only claims arising from Next Level's work and there was no evidence plaintiff’s injury related to Next Level’s work. The court also held that an indemnity agreement between NYAC and Anderson, signed after the accident, could not be applied retroactively because NYAC failed to show the parties intended an earlier effective date.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed claims against The William Powell Company for lack of personal jurisdiction in an asbestos-exposure wrongful-death action. The court held that the defendant, which moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on absence of long-arm jurisdiction, failed to meet its initial burden on the summary judgment standard. Because the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that plaintiff could not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3), the motion was denied and the complaint against The William Powell Company was reinstated.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a lower-court order that denied a final extreme risk protection order (ERPO) against a state correction officer, Mathew J. Galliher. The court held that petitioner New York State Police proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent participated in a violent assault on a restrained inmate that caused serious injury and death, and thus met the statutory definition of a substantial risk of physical harm to others. The Fourth Department concluded the trial court applied the wrong standard and remitted the case for further proceedings consistent with issuance of the ERPO.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed the Town of Floyd Zoning Board of Appeals' denial of three variances sought by petitioner Jeffrey Kotary to incorporate two shipping containers into a new barn and to exceed height and setback limits. Kotary sought judicial review under CPLR article 78 after the ZBA granted only a height variance and denied the other variances. The court held the ZBA properly applied the statutory balancing test, relied on safety concerns, feasible alternatives, and the largely self-created nature of petitioner’s need, and concluded there was a rational basis for denying the variances.

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's denial of petitioner Karen Anthone's motion for summary judgment in a proceeding to enforce a judgment lien against real property owned by George Carlo and the Carlo Family Trust. The court held that the trust is a self-settled trust and therefore its assets are available to satisfy the settlor's creditors, so petitioner did not need to prove a fraudulent conveyance. However, the court found a triable issue whether the homestead exemption applies to the property sale, so summary judgment was improper and the matter remains for further fact-finding on that exemption issue.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department denied plaintiff-appellant Hoi Trinh's motion for reargument or for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in his action against defendant-respondent Joseph Thien Nguyen. The court's one-paragraph memorandum and order, issued April 24, 2026, simply denies both requested forms of relief, leaving the prior appellate disposition in place and refusing further review by the state's highest court or reconsideration by this panel.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order in a medical malpractice and wrongful death case that compelled defendants TLC Health Network and Lake Shore Health Care Center to produce electronic medical record audit trails and related discovery. The court concluded the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion because new deposition evidence—developed after an earlier appeal—suggested audit-trail data might exist, had not been fully disclosed, and that defendants' representatives lacked knowledge about retention policies. The appellate court held the new evidence justified additional discovery and found no conflict with its prior decision.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of Deutsche Bank's summary judgment motion in a mortgage foreclosure. The loan was originated by Ameriquest, later placed into a trust under a pooling and servicing agreement that named Deutsche Bank as trustee, and an assignment to Deutsche Bank was executed in 2009 by the servicer acting under a limited power of attorney. The appellate court held Deutsche Bank met its burden to show standing by producing the assignment and mortgage documents, and directed the trial court to appoint a referee to compute the amount due.

The Appellate Division modified a Supreme Court order in a breach-of-contract dispute over who must pay an additional tax attributable to a cell tower installed on plaintiffs' property. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross-motion to dismiss; the Appellate Division affirmed in part by denying defendant's cross-motion and reinstating the complaint. The court held the lease language about who pays "real estate taxes and assessments" versus "personal property taxes on the Communications Facility" is ambiguous, so the parties did not meet their burdens to show a single reasonable interpretation and summary judgment was improper.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to multiple defendants and reinstated the City of Rome’s amended complaint. The City sued after a chlorine gas leak at a new water filtration facility damaged property; defendants were involved in design and construction. Supreme Court had held the plant operator’s removal of a frosted chlorine tank was a superseding, unforeseeable event absolving defendants. The appellate court ruled defendants failed to prove that the operator’s conduct broke the causal chain, so summary judgment was improper and issues of foreseeability must go to a factfinder.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in full. Plaintiff sued for breach of an option agreement that allegedly gave him an exclusive right to repurchase company interests; he attempted to exercise the option in November 2023. The court held the written option was clear and expired on December 31, 2020 (and could only be extended by plaintiff before that date), so the attempted exercise was untimely and there was no breach. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative strained reading that the option barred any sale or never expired.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department denied plaintiff James R. Caputo’s motion for reargument or for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in his action against multiple defendants including Nathan Holt and others. The court issued a brief memorandum and order on April 24, 2026, declining both reliefs without published opinion. No change was made to the underlying appellate disposition by this decision; the motion was simply denied.

The Appellate Division affirmed a trial court order that, after reargument, denied plaintiff’s challenge to defendant’s motion (converted to summary judgment) dismissing certain claims and awarding defendant unpaid alternative rent. The dispute arose from a lease cotenancy clause requiring a single anchor tenant; when the anchor space was filled by two tenants, the landlord sought full rent while the tenant claimed entitlement to an offset under the cotenancy provision. The court held the tenant could enforce the alternative rent under the lease amendments and that the landlord could not rely on an estoppel certificate to negate that rent offset obligation.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendants in a medical malpractice case and granted a new trial. Plaintiffs alleged the radiologist defendant failed to identify a potentially cancerous abnormality on chest X-rays. The court held the trial judge erroneously gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction, which is appropriate only when a doctor chooses among several medically acceptable alternatives. Because the evidence showed only an alleged failure to meet the standard of care (a failure to diagnose), giving that charge risked confusing the jury and was not harmless, requiring reversal and reinstatement of the complaint.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument and denied leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in the case where Joseph D. Burgdorf sought further review of a prior decision against Betsy Ross Nursing and Rehabilitation Center and various individual defendants. The court affirmed its earlier disposition by refusing to revisit the matter or permit an appeal to New York’s highest court. No extended opinion or new legal analysis was provided in this memorandum and order.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiff Shawn Broton's second amended complaint. Broton, formerly Deputy Chief of Syracuse Police, alleged constitutional and statutory claims after being denied reinstatement to a rank-and-file position in December 2017 and after an ethics investigation later found his allegations unfounded. The court held most claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations because they accrued on the December 18, 2017 denial, and alternatively found no triable issues of fact as to defendants’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a trial court order denying summary judgment to defendants Dr. Saurin Popat and Delaware Medical Group in a medical malpractice suit brought by Meg and Brian Bray. The court found defendants initially showed they met the standard of care, but plaintiffs submitted an expert affirmation—establishing medical licensure and board certification in endocrine surgery—that raised triable issues as to whether Dr. Popat's assessment, diagnosis, and treatment fell below the accepted standard. Because the parties’ experts conflicted, summary judgment was inappropriate and the case must proceed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department unanimously affirmed a Supreme Court (Steuben County) order that denied plaintiff Maura Bianco's motion for summary judgment in her suit against defendant Jacqueline S. Johnson. The appellate court reviewed the lower court's December 27, 2024 order and concluded there were issues precluding summary disposition, so the matter remains for further proceedings in the trial court. The appellate decision was issued April 24, 2026 and affirmed without costs.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a trial court judgment awarding Amber Well Drilling money damages based on a jury verdict in quantum meruit. The court held that the written home-improvement contract failed to comply with General Business Law § 771, so the contractor could not enforce the contract for breach or recover contractually stipulated interest and attorneys' fees. The court nonetheless allowed recovery for completed work under unjust enrichment/quasi-contract and awarded prejudgment interest at a statutory/alternative rate. Plaintiff's broader arguments to revisit precedent and to sever the fee/interest clause were rejected.

The Texas Supreme Court (Justice Hawkins, joined by two justices) concurred with the Court’s opinion holding that the plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s fees under a specific Texas statute. The concurrence explains that although the trial court labeled the relief a "temporary injunction," the statutory scheme at issue makes such relief effectively final because disclosure of information cannot be undone. Because the defendants complied and the information was disclosed, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief and thus prevailed for fee-shifting purposes.

The Texas Supreme Court held that two former Webb Consolidated ISD board members who obtained a trial-court temporary injunction ordering the district to produce requested board materials qualified as "prevailing" under Texas Education Code § 11.1512(c-2) and may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the relief obtained. The court explained that although temporary injunctions normally preserve the status quo and do not confer prevailing-party status, the injunction here effectively granted the only relief the statute authorizes — production of requested information — and the district complied. The court also held board members need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing under § 11.1512(c-2). The case is remanded for determination of recoverable fees limited to the injunction-related claims.

The Texas Supreme Court granted two petitions for review in competing claims over a 1933 deed that reserved an “undivided one-fourth of the usual one eighth” royalty. The court held the court of appeals erred in declining to address the presumed-grant doctrine on jurisdictional grounds, vacated the court of appeals’ merits decision, and remanded for reconsideration of both deed construction and the presumed-grant doctrine. The Court emphasized that the presumed-grant issue was fairly included in the permissive appeal and instructed the court of appeals to resolve both paths without expressing a view on the ultimate ownership outcome.

Justice Young dissented from the Court’s denial of a petition for writ of mandamus by Warwick Construction, Bustamante Construction, and DLC General Construction Services. The relators asked the trial court for limited reopening of discovery under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 190.5(b); the trial court denied that request and the relators sought mandamus relief. Justice Young would have stayed the upcoming trial so the Court could fully consider whether the denial of discovery implicated Rule 190.5(b) and risked mooting review. He explains that proceeding to trial could vitiate relators’ ability to present their case and waste judicial resources if an appellate remedy were later required.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment for Bell Helicopter. The family of a pilot who died in a 2017 helicopter crash sued Bell, claiming the flight manual failed to warn adequately about flying with a loose engine cowling. Bell invoked the federal General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), which bars suits against manufacturers brought more than 18 years after delivery unless a "new" part that is alleged to have caused the accident was added or replaced within 18 years. The Court held the manual revisions did not restart GARA’s 18-year clock because none of the changes constituted a new part alleged to have caused the crash.