Court Filings

The District Court of Appeal, Second District, dismissed Denice Ranee Reavely’s appeal from a Hillsborough County Court decision. The filing shows the case was before a three-judge panel, and the court’s one-line per curiam disposition simply states “Dismissed.” No reasoning, factual background, or legal analysis appears in the published entry, and the opinion is marked subject to revision before official publication.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Steven Donald Lemery’s appeal from the trial court’s February 10, 2026 denial of his extraordinary motion for new trial. The court found it lacked jurisdiction because Lemery’s notice of appeal was filed 41 days after the order and therefore untimely under OCGA § 5-6-38(a), and because appeals from denials of extraordinary motions for new trial must proceed by discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(7). Because both timeliness and the required procedural route were lacking, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jerome Locke’s appeal challenging the trial court’s dismissal of his 2024 request for credit for time served. Locke had pled guilty in 2018 and was sentenced to 20 years with 12 to be served in confinement. The trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the Department of Corrections computes credit under OCGA § 17-10-12. The Court of Appeals held the appeal improper because the correct remedy is a mandamus action against prison officials; a motion filed in the criminal case is a nullity and not appealable.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas granted the appellant's unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal of a trial court order adjudicating him guilty of theft of a firearm and sentencing him to seven months confinement. The motion complied with the appellate rule requiring signature by both the appellant and his attorney. Because no opinion had been issued in the case, the court dismissed the appeal, denied any rehearing motions, and directed that the court's mandate issue immediately.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Troy Rimes's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rimes was convicted after a jury trial and the trial court denied his motion for a new trial on August 17, 2023. After Rimes moved for an out-of-time appeal, the trial court vacated and re-entered its denial order on January 26, 2026. Rimes filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 2026, but because Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order's entry and his notice was filed 64 days after re-entry, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely.

The State of Texas, as appellant, moved to dismiss its own appeal in a criminal case from the County Court at Law No. 9 of Travis County. The motion to dismiss was signed by the Travis County Attorney and filed under the applicable Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the State’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum decision, noting the procedural compliance with the rule and disposing of the appeal accordingly.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Efrain Rodulfo Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rodulfo, who pleaded guilty under a plea bargain and was sentenced to 25 years on November 18, 2025, filed a pro se motion construed as a notice of appeal on April 14, 2026. The appellate court found the notice untimely because it was filed well after the 30-day deadline (or 90 days only if a timely motion for new trial is filed), and no extension was sought. The trial court also certified that Rodulfo waived and did not have a right to appeal, which required dismissal as well.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Jonathan D. Reed’s appeal challenging parts of his 2007 convictions and sentence. Reed had previously litigated the same challenge to his hijacking sentence and earlier appeals were dismissed or resolved, so the court found it lacked jurisdiction to relitigate those issues. The court also held that claims attacking the validity of a conviction or asserting merger of sentences are not properly raised in a motion to vacate as void, and Reed’s consecutive-sentence challenge did not present a colorable voidness claim because each sentence was within statutory limits.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Gustavo Cisneros’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his 2026 motion to vacate a void sentence. Cisneros argued several convictions should have merged (attempt with armed robbery, sexual battery with aggravated battery, and burglary with armed robbery). The court held that merger challenges attack convictions, not sentences, and therefore are not properly raised in a motion to vacate a void sentence. Because the motion did not present a colorable void-sentence claim, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Austin Eugene Spargo's direct appeal from a trial court order revoking his probation because such appeals must be pursued by applying for a discretionary appeal under state law. The court explained that compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional, cited statute and precedent, and concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Brian K. Woofter’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Woofter, criminally charged in municipal court for purchasing and selling alcohol to minors, had the charge dismissed and then sought return of six cases of alcohol seized by the sheriff. The trial court denied his motion but said it could be reconsidered if Woofter produced proof of purchase. The appellate court held that the denial was not a final, appealable order because it anticipated further action and did not affect a substantial right or foreclose effective relief on the motion.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Da’vhon Young’s appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. The per curiam opinion consists only of the single-word disposition “DISMISSED” with concurrence from three judges. No substantive reasoning or discussion of issues appears in the published entry, and the opinion notes that it is not final until any timely authorized motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure is resolved.

The First District Court of Appeal dismissed Johnnie Peacock's appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for Escambia County. The opinion is a brief per curiam entry, announces dismissal, and notes that the panel judges concurred. The order informs the parties that the decision is not final until any timely authorized motion under Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.330 or 9.331 is resolved. No written opinion explaining the reasons for dismissal is included in the document.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed appellant Marshay Coggins's appeal as untimely. The appeal arose from a decision of the Circuit Court for Jefferson County and was reviewed by a three-judge panel. The court issued a short per curiam order dismissing the appeal for failure to file within the required time, with all three judges concurring and noting the decision is not final until any timely, authorized motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure is resolved.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal dismissed Raul A. Campoverde’s appeal because he filed a pro se notice of appeal while he was represented by retained counsel in the trial court. The court concluded that a defendant cannot proceed both pro se and by counsel at the same time, and under Florida precedent such pro se filings while represented are unauthorized and treated as nullities. Because no authorized notice of appeal was filed within the 30-day deadline and no order permitted counsel to withdraw, the appellate court found it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without prejudice to a petition for belated appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Walter Green Jr.’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Green had previously been convicted of continuous family violence and later filed an Article 11.07 habeas application challenging his conviction and sentence. The trial court recommended dismissal as a subsequent application and forwarded its findings to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which dismissed the application. Green attempted to appeal the trial court’s findings that were sent to the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the appellate court concluded it lacks jurisdiction over postconviction matters and dismissed the appeal after Green failed to show grounds to proceed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of USMAN MOHSIN for failure to comply with filing rules. The appellant did not file the required enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days after docketing and ignored the court's March 31, 2026 order to file by April 10, 2026. Because the appellant still had not filed the materials as of April 23, 2026, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and dismissed it under the court's procedural rules.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Andre Latrell Burton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Burton filed a notice of appeal on March 2, 2026 challenging the trial court’s November 5, 2025 denial of his 2024 motion to set aside his sentence. Because Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the order and Burton’s notice was filed about four months late, the Court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Willie Clarence Lee Jr.'s appeal from the trial court's December 4, 2025 dismissal of his motion to vacate, set aside, or reverse judgment because his notice of appeal, filed January 7, 2026, was untimely. The court explained that Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment or order being appealed and that timely filing is an absolute jurisdictional requirement. Because Lee filed his notice 34 days after the order, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without reaching the motion's merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Michael Dean Samuelson’s pro se appeal from his convictions for theft and possession with intent to deliver because the trial-court certifications, which Samuelson signed, state his case was a plea bargain and that he has no right of appeal. The court gave Samuelson until March 27, 2026 to show grounds to continue the appeal and received no response. Relying on the trial-court certifications and applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent, the panel dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Sean Harper’s appeal from his conviction for failing to comply with sex-offender registration requirements because the trial-court certification in the record indicated Harper waived his right to appeal. The clerk’s record showed a not-guilty plea and a jury verdict of guilty, while a separate punishment plea agreement limited appeals and contained Harper’s written waiver. The court reviewed both clerk’s and reporter’s records, concluded the certification did not show a right to appeal, gave Harper an opportunity to supply an amended certification, and dismissed the appeal after no amended certification or response was filed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal from an April 2, 2026 trial-court entry requiring the State to disclose exculpatory evidence. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s order was interlocutory and not a final, appealable order under Ohio law. The court also concluded, alternatively, that Jones lacked standing because the trial court’s ruling granted him the relief he sought, so he was not an aggrieved party. All pending motions were ruled moot and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Jones had appealed a March 13, 2026 trial-court entry denying his motions to dismiss a death-penalty specification. The appellate court held the denial was an interlocutory order that did not qualify as a final, appealable order under Ohio law and R.C. 2505.02(B), so it could not be reviewed now. Because no final judgment disposed of all claims, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were overruled as moot.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were untimely. Coleman was convicted and sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year prison terms for sexual assault (cause no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (cause no. 1824734). Texas rules require a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing unless a timely motion for new trial is filed; no such motions were in the clerk’s records and Coleman did not file notices until February 11, 2026. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and denied pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were filed late. Coleman was sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year terms following convictions for sexual assault (case no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (case no. 1824734). Because no motion for new trial was filed and the standard 30-day deadline to appeal expired on October 26, 2025, Coleman's notices filed February 11, 2026 were untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jimmy Wallace's appeal as premature. Wallace was convicted and filed a timely motion for new trial, then filed a motion to withdraw that motion and the next day filed a notice of appeal. Because the trial court had not yet ruled on the motion for new trial or the motion to withdraw it, the case remained pending below and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction under Georgia law. The court relied on statutory timing rules for appeals and precedent holding that the appellate clock does not start until the trial court finally disposes of a motion for new trial.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Lewis Carl Hunt’s appeal of his conviction for murder because the trial court certified that the case was resolved by a plea bargain and that Hunt waived his right to appeal. Under Texas appellate rules, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest pursuant to a plea agreement and the trial court certifies no right to appeal (or the defendant waives appeal), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed James Fields's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court record lacks a written disposition as to Count 2 (a firearm charge). Fields was convicted on Count 5 (attempted armed robbery) and Count 6 (firearm during a felony) and acquitted on Count 1, while Count 3 resulted in a mistrial and Counts 3 and 4 were dead-docketed. Under Georgia law, an appeal from a multi-count indictment is only ripe when each count has a written judgment; because Count 2 remains unresolved in the record, Fields needed to seek interlocutory review and did not, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals denied Frederick Mundt’s application for reconsideration and request for en banc review of its prior opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition under Ohio’s serious mental illness (SMI) statute. The court reaffirmed that Mundt had clinical diagnoses of Bipolar Disorder and Schizoaffective Disorder but found the record lacked sufficient evidence that those conditions significantly impaired his capacity to make rational judgments at the time of the offense. Because the trial court reasonably credited the state expert’s interpretation of Mundt’s conduct, the panel found no basis to overturn or rehear the decision.

The Court of Appeals dismissed William Antoine Thomas’s appeal from a conviction entered pursuant to a plea bargain because the trial-court certification, signed by the judge, Thomas, and his trial counsel, states the case is a plea-bargain case, that the defendant has no right of appeal, and that Thomas waived his right to appeal. The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion, holding the certification deprived it of jurisdiction to hear the appeal under applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent.