Court Filings

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's denial of Dearek Randy Williams's motion to withdraw a nolo contendere plea to trafficking in fentanyl. Williams argued his plea was involuntary because trial counsel misadvised him that he could later appeal and "be out," which induced him to accept a mandatory 15-year sentence. The appellate court held that affirmative misadvice of counsel can create a manifest injustice rendering a plea involuntary, cited controlling precedent, and remanded the case for further proceedings on Williams's withdrawal motion.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District and remanded the case. The court held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution (the state right-to-counsel clause) did not apply to Morris’s preindictment investigatory interview, because that provision applies to trials in court. The court also considered whether Morris invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the recorded interrogation after an initial waiver. It concluded Morris did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his federal right to counsel at the relevant point, so suppression under the federal Constitution was not required.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed defendant Mauro Vivar's conviction for attempted assault in the second degree, vacated his guilty plea, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The court found Vivar's appellate-waiver invalid because the trial court failed to explain appellate rights separately from rights lost by pleading guilty and relied only on defense counsel to confirm the written waiver. The court also held the suppression court should have granted Vivar's motion to suppress custodial statements to the arresting officer, and that that error was not harmless because the statements could have affected his decision to plead.

The Florida Supreme Court reversed a circuit court order that denied death-row inmate James Aren Duckett access to the underlying DNA testing data from a private laboratory. Duckett had obtained a court-ordered DNA test of a 1987 swab but sought the raw data so a qualified bioinformaticist could perform further statistical analysis (SNP/Y-SNP data). The Court held the statute and rule permitting postconviction DNA testing require production of the underlying data once testing is ordered and completed. The Court affirmed denial of Duckett’s public-records requests for the lab’s testing process and protocols and remanded for provision of the underlying data, with an evidentiary hearing if disputes over scope arise.

The Court of Appeal reversed two convictions and affirmed one from defendant Wayne Hansen Hsiung’s convictions arising from “open rescue” animal-rights protests at Sonoma County poultry farms. The court held the trial court erred by barring a mistake-of-law defense based on defendant’s good-faith (though mistaken) reliance on legal advice that a necessity justification made trespass lawful for rescuing or treating suffering animals; that defect required reversal of the conspiracy count and one trespass count and remand for further proceedings. The court rejected challenges to Penal Code section 31 and to section 602(o) and affirmed the remaining conviction.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded the case of Robert Lopez, convicted in 2007 of murder and related offenses, for further proceedings under Penal Code section 1172.6 (Senate Bill 1437/775). The trial court had denied his resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing; the Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground Lopez forfeited his instructional-ambiguity claim by not raising it on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that section 1172.6 does not categorically bar petitions based on jury instruction ambiguity that may have permitted conviction by imputed malice, and ordered the appellate court to consider Lopez’s claims on the merits.

The Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s denial of pretrial release for Toni R. Kelly, who was charged with multiple methamphetamine delivery offenses. The trial court found Kelly dangerous and concluded no conditions could mitigate the threat. The appellate court held the lower court erred because the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that no combination of conditions (for example, inpatient treatment followed by GPS/home confinement) could mitigate any danger. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine appropriate conditions of release.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court order that summarily denied Traves Malcolm’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion claiming newly discovered evidence (a previously unknown 20-year plea offer). The appellate court agreed the motion was facially deficient because it lacked a proper oath and did not include an affidavit from trial counsel as required by rule 3.850(c)(7) (or explain why one could not be obtained). Because the trial court denied the motion without giving Malcolm an opportunity to amend those defects, the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI) because officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to extend a traffic stop and administer field sobriety tests. Ingram was pulled over for an unlit rear license plate, admitted having a drink earlier, and officers testified to smelling alcohol from the vehicle, but there was no erratic driving, no notable eye or speech impairment, and body-cam statements conflicted about odor and signs of impairment. The appellate court held the totality of circumstances did not justify prolonging the stop, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a conviction entered after defendant pleaded guilty to weapons and drug possession because the court improperly required defendant to waive his right to appeal as a condition of a court-initiated plea and because the trial court erred in denying suppression of physical evidence. The panel found the waiver invalid and concluded that the prosecution failed to prove defendant voluntarily consented to the frisk and search; body-worn camera footage contradicted the officer's testimony. The plea was vacated, the suppression motion granted, the indictment dismissed, and the case remitted for CPL 470.45 proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a resentencing of Phillip Owens, who had been resentenced after his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The court unanimously concluded the resentence was incorrect as a matter of law and sent the case back to Monroe County Supreme Court for a new resentencing. The opinion is brief and references an identical memorandum issued in a companion appeal, indicating the appellate court found legal error in the prior resentencing proceeding warranting reversal and remand.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a capital defendant cannot use Civ.R. 60(B) to reopen a prior state postconviction judgment; instead, R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 provide the exclusive statutory mechanism for collateral attacks on criminal convictions or sentences. The court reversed the appellate court’s decision that permitted Hill to proceed under Civ.R. 60(B) and remanded for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of error. The court reasoned that postconviction relief is a special statutory proceeding and the Civil Rules are clearly inapplicable where the legislature has prescribed an exclusive remedy.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that had found defendant J.P. to presently suffer from a dangerous mental disorder and committed him to a secure psychiatric facility for six months. The court held that although the initial hearing met statutory and due process requirements despite the examining witnesses not testifying, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to meaningfully challenge the People's examiner reports, secure the examiners' testimony, obtain a defense expert, or present any defense evidence. The matter is remitted for a new CPL 330.20(6) hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had dismissed the indictment against defendant Diamond Haggan under CPL 30.30. The People had filed a certificate of compliance for discovery and the court held that the prosecution was not required to obtain third-party employment and medical records as part of initial automatic discovery, so withholding them did not invalidate the certificate. Although the People improperly withheld a victim entity report as duplicative, there was no bad faith and the People had otherwise met their discovery obligations, so the dismissal was improper and the indictment was reinstated for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may not be required, as a condition of a negotiated guilty plea, to waive a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). N.H. accepted a plea conditioned on waiving a § 60.12 hearing; the Court concluded such a waiver is not enforceable and reversed the Appellate Division, remitting the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings. The majority emphasized the DVSJA’s remedial purpose to afford survivor-defendants a judicial opportunity to establish eligibility for alternative, less severe sentences and treated the hearing right as unwaivable in plea bargaining.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, vacated Warren Burgess's guilty plea to misdemeanor criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and remitted the case to Criminal Court for further proceedings. Burgess had pleaded to a misdemeanor after felony counts were crossed out at arraignment, but the accusatory instrument lacked any factual allegation that the recovered firearm was operable — an element required to sustain the weapon possession charge. Because a facially sufficient accusatory instrument is a jurisdictional prerequisite that survives a guilty plea, the Court concluded the misdemeanor information was jurisdictionally defective and could not support the plea.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed defendant-appellant Joshua Mounts’s felony-murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. Mounts had reopened his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) to claim ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court found trial counsel performed deficiently by abandoning key expert testimony (Dr. Wiens) about histology slides, failing to object to undisclosed expert opinion testimony from Dr. Makoroff, and not objecting to improper prosecutorial remarks in closing. Because those errors undermined confidence in the verdict and appellate counsel should have raised them, the conviction was reversed and the cause remanded.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed part of the First District Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the municipal trial court’s denial of J.B.’s applications to seal five misdemeanor convictions prosecuted by the county. J.B. sought sealing of seven misdemeanor convictions; two prosecuted by the city were sealed by the court of appeals and not appealed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding J.B. had not shown rehabilitation and that the government’s interest in public records outweighed hers. The Court rejected the court of appeals’ substitutions of judgment and novel limitations on what a trial court may consider under R.C. 2953.32.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Stanley Randolph’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after police detained and searched him. Officers found Randolph sitting in a parked sedan in a high-crime cul-de-sac at night, blocked the car, and required the occupants to exit; officers later saw a backpack with suspected marijuana and then searched. The appellate court held the encounter was a detention requiring particularized, objective suspicion, which the record did not supply prior to the restraint, so the stop and subsequent evidence collection were unlawful and suppression was required.

The Court of Appeals held that defendant's written speedy-trial motion under CPL 30.30(1)(b), filed on the day trial was to begin, was timely and provided reasonable notice to the People. The Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court's summary refusal to consider the motion as untimely and for lack of notice. Because the motion complied with the specific statutory deadline in CPL 170.30(2) and included detailed calculations of chargeable days, the Court reversed and remitted the case for further proceedings on the motion so the People may be given a fair opportunity to respond and the trial court may exercise its discretion how to proceed.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that dismissed multiple burglary, theft, and identity-theft charges after a defendant, Keena Landrine, was placed on mental health diversion. Although Landrine made substantial progress while in custody, the appellate court held the diversion statute requires defendants to substantially comply with diversion conditions before charges may be dismissed. Landrine repeatedly violated diversion requirements—relapsing on drugs, refusing recommended detox/treatment, and committing dozens of new criminal offenses—so the trial court abused its discretion by finding satisfactory performance. The matter is remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed charges.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed a trial court’s order detaining defendant Quadajah Johnson pending trial on six first-degree murder counts under the Pretrial Fairness Act and remanded for the trial court to set conditions of release. The panel majority found the State failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Johnson posed a continuing, unmitigable danger to any person or the community. The court emphasized her limited nonviolent criminal history, cooperation with police, a prior protective order against the victim, her pregnancy, and the prospect that conditions (including a firearms ban) could mitigate risk. A dissent would have affirmed detention.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a misdemeanor charge against Nathan Hake for illegally disposing of construction and demolition debris and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court had dismissed the charge as unconstitutionally vague, focusing on terms like “disposal,” “storage,” “temporary period,” and “substantially unchanged.” The appellate court held that the statutory and regulatory definitions give fair notice and are not impermissibly vague as applied to Hake’s alleged conduct (digging a pit, burying construction debris and household waste), so the dismissal was improper.

The State of Ohio appealed two Lucas County trial-court judgments that allowed cash seized in investigations to be applied toward fines imposed on defendant Shakur Ishmail Shabaa. The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that (1) $122 forfeited through a civil forfeiture consent judgment could not be used to pay criminal fines because R.C. 2981.12(G) expressly forbids using forfeited property to pay fines; and (2) $4,460 that Shabaa forfeited by plea agreement could not be applied to his fines because the trial court lacked authority to alter the parties’ negotiated plea terms that specified disbursement to the State and Sylvania Township Police.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition by Angel Navarro and remanded for second-stage proceedings. Navarro had been convicted of first-degree murder in 2004 based primarily on three eyewitness identifications and police testimony; he later obtained Chicago Police Department records via FOIA that included officer Meer’s professional complaints. The court held Navarro’s petition raised newly discovered, noncumulative evidence that could materially affect officer credibility and thus created a colorable claim of actual innocence. The court declined to reassign the case sua sponte on remand.

The District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's dismissal of a misdemeanor information charging Christine Heidi Scott with resisting or obstructing officers without violence. The trial court had required ever-more specific allegations about the exact legal duties the deputies were performing and dismissed the second amended information as vague. The appellate court held the original information was legally sufficient because it tracked the statute, gave date and place, and provided adequate notice; any further detail was a matter for proof or for a statement of particulars, not a required element of the charging document.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that had authorized involuntary antipsychotic medication for defendant C.F., who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. At the renewal hearing the trial court proceeded without a court reporter because defense counsel failed to request the no-cost reporter available under local rules; the hearing lasted about 13 minutes and the transcript of testimony is therefore missing. The appellate court found defense counsel’s failure to secure a reporter was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because it eliminated any meaningful appellate review, and because the medication order will expire before a settled statement could be produced, the case is remanded for a new hearing.

The Court of Appeals reviewed James Chadleigh Schrotel’s conviction for misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury against a family member. The court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction but found reversible error in jury selection: a prospective juror (venireperson six) admitted a bias favoring victims of family violence and could not guarantee that bias would not affect his decision. The trial court denied the defendant’s challenge for cause and also denied an additional peremptory strike, resulting in an objectionable juror sitting. Because that denial was erroneous and harmful, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kenneth Humphries Jr.’s 2025 misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction. Humphries had been indicted in 2025 for offenses arising from an August 2020 incident; his trial counsel moved to dismiss for preindictment delay but did not argue the two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. The State conceded counsel’s failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense was ineffective assistance. The appellate court agreed with the concession, found the conviction must be reversed, and remanded for further proceedings, rendering the weight-of-evidence claim moot.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted the defendant's motion to suppress a statement obtained after his arrest. The People relied on an NYPD "probable cause I-card" and the fellow officer rule to justify the arrest, but presented no testimony from the arresting officers and did not show the I-card's contents or that the arresting officers actually received or relied on it. Because the prosecution failed to prove that the officers who arrested the defendant had been communicated probable cause, the court held the arrest unlawful and suppressed the statement as its fruit, remitting the case for further proceedings.