Court Filings

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s consolidated appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Brown pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and to aggravated robbery in two others, and in each case he signed plea paperwork and certifications expressly waiving his right to appeal. The court found the trial-court certifications and the record show a knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal and that the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five felony cases, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he gave up his appeal rights, and the judgments expressly state appeal was waived. Because a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver bars appeal absent trial-court permission, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas affirmed Nicholas Darris Marshall’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine. Marshall pleaded guilty after the State waived two enhancement paragraphs; evidence at sentencing included police testimony, lab results showing 2.1152 grams of methamphetamine, and Marshall’s own testimony about how the drugs came to be in his car. The court held Marshall failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment challenge and, even if preserved, the sentence—being within the statutory 2–20 year range—was not grossly disproportionate under the relevant precedent.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order revoking Q.W.’s probation and committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for seven years. The juvenile had been placed on probation after pleading true to two counts of aggravated robbery. The State sought modification alleging truancy, a positive marijuana test, and unlawful carrying of a handgun. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Q.W. violated probation, including committing a new-law offense by being found with a handgun in a vehicle, and concluded the evidence supported revocation.

The First District of Texas dismissed Donald Wayne Herod’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus because it was a collateral attack on his final felony conviction and thus must be pursued through a post-conviction habeas application under Article 11.07 in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The court explained that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging a final felony conviction and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over such post-conviction felony relief. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and any pending motions were denied as moot.

The Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Sergio Guadal Maresmartinez’s appeal of his convictions for two counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child because his notice of appeal was untimely. His sentence was imposed June 29, 2023, and without a motion for new trial his notice of appeal was due July 31, 2023. He filed his notice on February 27, 2026. The court concluded that timely filing of a notice of appeal is essential to its jurisdiction and that Maresmartinez’s response did not show any grounds for continuing the appeal or authorization for an out-of-time appeal.

The court dismissed Ross Thomas Brantley’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no signed trial-court order denying his statutory request for postconviction DNA testing (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01). The appellate court gave Brantley ten days to show grounds to continue the appeal but received no response. Citing its rules and prior precedent, the court concluded there was no appealable order and therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed Reginald Dewayne Taylor’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine (4–200 grams) and the jury’s punishment verdict of 35 years’ imprisonment. The court rejected Taylor’s three appellate challenges: (1) the trial court properly denied his motions to suppress because the search-warrant affidavits and reasonable inferences supplied a substantial basis for probable cause to search two residences and vehicles; (2) Instagram records were properly authenticated through a records certificate and corroborating testimony and circumstances; and (3) including a limiting instruction listing all permissible Rule 404(b) purposes was not reversible error and in any event benefited Taylor. The court affirmed the judgment.

The court reviewed an appeal by Oliver Perry Harris from the trial court’s revocation of his deferred adjudication and seven-year sentence after the court found a supervision violation true. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. After its independent review, the appellate court found no arguable grounds for reversal but identified an unsupported $1,743.00 reparations assessment in the written judgment and related inmate trust withdrawal order. The court deleted that reparations assessment from the judgment and the withdrawal order, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of guilt and three-year prison sentence for Joey Sullivan. Sullivan had been placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to evading arrest with a vehicle. The State later petitioned to adjudicate, alleging Sullivan fled from a peace officer; after a hearing the trial court found the violation true, adjudicated guilt, and imposed sentence. Sullivan’s appointed appellate attorneys concluded the appeal was frivolous, submitted an Anders brief, and the court agreed there were no arguable grounds for relief.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas affirmed Logan Tyler Blanton’s sentences after he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Blanton argued the trial court abused its discretion by imposing concurrent 30-year terms without adequately considering his intellectual and psychological limitations, low risk of reoffending, and compliance with bond. The court held Blanton failed to preserve these complaints because he did not make timely, specific objections or file a motion for new trial, and noted that the sentences fall within the statutory punishment range.

The Court of Appeals of the Seventh District of Texas affirmed the trial court judgments convicting Jarod Dajon Howell of four counts of possession with intent to deliver various controlled substances. Howell was sentenced to concurrent terms (42 years on two counts, 35 years on two counts). Appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous. The court independently reviewed the record, found no non-frivolous issues preserved for appeal, granted counsel’s motion, and affirmed the convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant Lauro Eliud Salinas’s conviction and sentence for third-degree assault by impeding breath or circulation. Salinas appealed only the trial court’s refusal to redact a portion of a 911 call in which the caller said Salinas left the scene with a gun. The court held the statement was relevant contextual evidence explaining why witnesses called 911, was probative of consciousness of guilt and Salinas’s state of mind, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court therefore found no abuse of discretion in admitting the recording and affirmed the judgment.

The State filed five related appeals from criminal cases involving Brent William Curry. The court granted the State's motion to consolidate the appeals, ordered the issues and records from four appeals merged into cause number 03-26-00312-CR, and dismissed the four now-duplicative docketed appeals. The consolidated appeal will proceed under cause number 03-26-00312-CR. The court cited prior practice in Reece v. State and explained that the trial court had already effectively consolidated the matters by taking judicial notice of related docket documents.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of Tyler Andrew Montoya for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. Montoya argued the trial court erred by admitting a video of his police interview without Miranda warnings and by denying his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held the interview was noncustodial because Montoya came voluntarily, was told he could leave, was not restrained, and the questioning was not the functional equivalent of an arrest. The court also found no reasonable probability counsel’s choices altered the guilty verdict.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Ricardo Isaac Alonso’s conviction for deadly conduct, a Class A misdemeanor, after a jury found him guilty of the lesser-included offense following a collision while he was fleeing law enforcement. Alonso argued the evidence was insufficient because the complainant’s vehicle, with bright lights, may have caused the crash. The court applied the standard that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, upheld the jury’s credibility determinations, and found the combined evidence supported a reasonable inference that Alonso recklessly endangered the victim by driving into oncoming traffic while evading officers.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Guy Dean Peele’s conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact. Peele was tried by jury after a 2021 incident in which the complainant, then 14, accused him of touching her breasts while riding a four-wheeler and making sexually explicit remarks. On appeal Peele challenged sufficiency of the evidence, several evidentiary rulings, and the State’s closing argument. The court found S.S.’s testimony sufficient to support the verdict, held any hearsay error harmless because S.S. later testified, and deemed the remainder of Peele’s complaints unpreserved for appellate review.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Giovani Aveleno Kitts’s criminal appeal after he filed a motion to dismiss that complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The motion was signed by Kitts and his counsel, and the court granted it, ending appellate review. The opinion is a short per curiam dismissal with no discussion of the merits and is not for publication.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Cody Tyler Morrow’s conviction for second-degree felony possession of fentanyl after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle. Officers found Morrow unconscious in his running car outside a closed store, smelled and observed marijuana in plain view, and then observed a baggie of hundreds of pills. The court held the officer was performing a community caretaking function in securing aid for an apparently incapacitated person and, based on the officer’s observations and experience, the contraband was in plain view and gave probable cause to seize it.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking Antonio Lee Grey's deferred adjudication community supervision and adjudicating him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Grey had pleaded true to a supervision violation at the revocation hearing; the trial court revoked supervision and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal and moved to withdraw; Grey did not file a pro se brief. The appellate court reviewed the record and concluded the appeal is frivolous and without merit, granted counsel's motion, and affirmed.

The court reviewed Antonio Lee Grey’s appeal after the trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of attempted assault of a family/household member with a prior conviction, and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. The State conceded the sentence was illegal because attempted assault (as an attempt to a third-degree felony) is a state jail felony with a statutory maximum of two years. The court held the sentence exceeded the authorized range, reversed the punishment portion of the judgment, remanded for a new punishment hearing within the proper statutory range, and otherwise affirmed the conviction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Josue Antonio Gurrola’s conviction for first-degree sexual assault of a child. Gurrola argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from a clinical supervisor at a children’s advocacy center about the victim’s therapy, symptoms, and feelings during the guilt-innocence phase. The appeals court concluded Gurrola failed to preserve that complaint because he did not make contemporaneous, sufficiently specific objections at each contested point or obtain a running objection, so the court declined to address the merits and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, granted appellant Chadwick Edward Lambert’s joint motion to dismiss his criminal appeal. The motion was signed by Lambert and his appellate counsel and cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). Because the motion complied with the rule, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The decision is a brief memorandum opinion filed April 14, 2026, and the dismissal was entered on appellant’s motion.

The Court of Appeals of the Seventh District of Texas affirmed Tara Zoe Rios’s conviction for driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. Rios asserted she wanted to represent herself at a pretrial hearing but also demanded trial proceed that day; the visiting judge declined to allow self-representation that day and offered either to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or revisit self-representation later. Rios chose to proceed with counsel and went to trial, where she was convicted. The court held the trial judge did not abuse discretion and Rios effectively waived self-representation; assessed fines and costs were waived for indigence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences of Justin Wayne Ortego, who was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact based largely on text-message evidence recovered by his estranged wife and testimony from the victim. Ortego argued the phone evidence should have been suppressed and that the trial court erred by denying requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court upheld the denial of suppression and concluded there is no general statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right to admit live remote testimony absent a specific statutory exception or proper procedure, so exclusion did not constitute reversible error.

The Court of Appeals of the First District of Texas affirmed the convictions of Justin Wayne Ortego for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact. Ortego challenged (1) denial of his motion to suppress text-message evidence his former partner, Jennifer, retrieved from his phone and (2) the trial court’s refusal to allow two defense witnesses to testify remotely via Zoom. The court held the phone-search evidence was admissible and that no statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right compelled admission of live remote testimony here, so exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant Justin Wayne Ortego’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact, and the trial court’s sentence (life plus three 20-year terms). The defendant challenged (1) denial of his motion to suppress evidence his wife found on his phone and (2) denial of his requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court held the wife’s search did not trigger suppression and that trial courts have no general, enforceable right to admit live remote testimony absent a rule or statute, so denying Zoom testimony was not an abuse of discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of Justin Wayne Ortego for continuous sexual abuse of a child and three counts of indecency by contact. Ortego challenged (1) the denial of his motion to suppress evidence his wife found on his phone and the trial court’s refusal to give an Article 38.23 jury instruction, and (2) the denial of his requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court held the phone-search evidence was admissible and that there is no general statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right to require live remote testimony in criminal trials absent a specific statutory exception or agreement of the parties, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion.