Court Filings

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Shaquille Berod Solomon from a decision of the Circuit Court for Escambia County. The appellate court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the lower court's decision without published opinion on April 20, 2026. The court provided no extended reasoning in the opinion beyond the single-word disposition and noted concurrence by the three judges. The decision is subject to any timely post-judgment motions under Florida appellate rules.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in the criminal case of Marlo Michelle Lauritzen. The appeal, from the Circuit Court for Escambia County, was decided per curiam on April 20, 2026, with Judges Lewis, Rowe, and Nordby concurring. The opinion contains a single-line disposition: AFFIRMED. No additional reasoning, issues, or factual background is provided in the published entry.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed Michael Shawn Hastings's appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for Escambia County. In a per curiam opinion filed April 20, 2026, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The opinion is brief and provides no extended reasoning; the panel unanimously affirmed the trial court's ruling and noted that the decision is not final until any timely authorized post-judgment motion is resolved.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in the criminal case of Shawn Faulk. The appeal arose from a decision by the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County, and the appellate court, in a per curiam opinion, concluded there was no reversible error and left the lower court's ruling in place. No separate written opinion explaining the court's reasoning was published; the court simply issued an affirmance with three judges concurring and noted that the decision is not final until any timely rehearing motions are resolved.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed Jerry Lee Dupree's appeal from a Walton County circuit court decision and affirmed the lower court's ruling. The opinion is per curiam, unanimous, and short: the appellate court found no reversible error and therefore left the trial court's judgment in place. The written disposition notes the appeal number, parties, counsel, the judge below, and warns that the decision is not final until any timely motions under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure are resolved.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in the appeal brought by David Eugene Brannen against the State of Florida. The appellate court issued a brief per curiam opinion on April 20, 2026, affirming the judgment of the Baker County Circuit Court. No extended opinion or separate reasoning was published; the panel of judges Lewis, Roberts, and Kelsey concurred. The decision is subject to any timely post-judgment motions under Florida appellate rules.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed De’erik Bell’s appeal from a Bay County circuit court decision. The panel issued a short per curiam opinion on April 20, 2026, affirming the lower court’s judgment. No additional opinion or published reasoning accompanied the disposition; the court simply affirmed the judgment below and noted concurrence by all three judges. The opinion advises that the decision is not final until resolution of any timely, authorized post-judgment motions under Florida appellate rules.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of John Anthony Bertsch and Jeffery Lee Hronis for the 1985 murder, rape, and kidnapping of Linda Canady. The court affirmed the death sentence for Bertsch but reversed Hronis’s death sentence and remanded for further penalty-phase proceedings because Hronis was allowed to represent himself at penalty phase without the trial court applying current law assessing competency to self-represent. Both defendants’ convictions remain affirmed. The court also vacated any remaining unpaid balances of $10,000 restitution fines under the statutory 10-year enforcement limit and ordered amended abstracts of judgment.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Lewis Carl Hunt’s appeal of his conviction for murder because the trial court certified that the case was resolved by a plea bargain and that Hunt waived his right to appeal. Under Texas appellate rules, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest pursuant to a plea agreement and the trial court certifies no right to appeal (or the defendant waives appeal), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Frank Estrada III’s conviction for one count of violating a protective order. Estrada was tried on three counts (two assault counts and one protective-order violation); the jury acquitted or deadlocked on the assault counts (mistrial and later dismissal) but convicted on the protective-order violation. Estrada challenged the admission of a 911 recording and EMS medical records and the trial court’s granting of the State’s challenge for cause to Juror 53. The court held the evidentiary rulings were not reversible error and that, although the trial court abused its discretion in excusing Juror 53 for cause, that mistake did not harm Estrada’s substantial rights, so the conviction stands.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s judgment that had adjudicated Debrah Elizabeth East guilty of possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine after she violated terms of deferred adjudication community supervision. The State proved she used controlled substances and failed to complete restitution; after a hearing the trial court imposed a nine-month state jail sentence. Appellate counsel found no nonfrivolous issues and filed an Anders brief; the appeals court independently reviewed the record, concluded the appeal was frivolous, and affirmed, granting counsel permission to withdraw.

A Lamar County jury convicted Andrew McCarty of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment and the written judgment also included a $50 payment to the Children’s Advocacy Center and listed the offense as a second-degree felony. The Court of Appeals held the oral sentence—life imprisonment with no fine—controls, so the $50.00 entry must be deleted from the written judgment. The court also corrected the degree entry to reflect that the second-degree conviction was enhanced to first degree. The judgment was affirmed as modified.

The Court of Appeals ordered that the defendant Curtis Tyner’s direct appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate sentence in a murder and related convictions case be transferred to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court concluded it lacks jurisdiction because the Georgia Constitution and state law give the Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, and that jurisdiction extends to post-judgment motions in murder cases. The transfer was granted so the Supreme Court can decide the appeal and any issues raised by Tyner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendant Tonya Newberry a new trial after a jury convicted her of furnishing contraband and crossing a guard line. The State argued the grant was premature because no judgment had been entered, that the trial court misapplied the thirteenth-juror standard, and that the judge should have been recused. The court held the premature order was not void, found no abuse of discretion in granting a new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds given conflicting witness credibility and lack of video, and declined to review the recusal denial because it was entered after the State’s appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed James Fields's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court record lacks a written disposition as to Count 2 (a firearm charge). Fields was convicted on Count 5 (attempted armed robbery) and Count 6 (firearm during a felony) and acquitted on Count 1, while Count 3 resulted in a mistrial and Counts 3 and 4 were dead-docketed. Under Georgia law, an appeal from a multi-count indictment is only ripe when each count has a written judgment; because Count 2 remains unresolved in the record, Fields needed to seek interlocutory review and did not, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted James Lampru's application for discretionary appeal on April 17, 2026. The court allowed the appellant to file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order and directed the Superior Court clerk to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order is procedural: it accepts review and sets steps for the appeal record and filing, without addressing the merits of the underlying case.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court's denial of Raymond Warren’s application for postconviction DNA testing of three shell casings. Warren had sought testing for touch DNA after his 1995 murder conviction; the trial court initially denied testing, this court remanded for further factfinding about whether the casings remained suitable for testing, and on remand the trial court again denied the application. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion because testing authorities concluded the casings were at substantial risk of contamination and the record did not show the parent samples remained scientifically suitable for testing.

The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Greene County Common Pleas judgment. William J. Sawyer, bound over from juvenile court, pleaded guilty to rape and related sexual-offense charges and received a four-to-six year prison term and Tier III sex-offender classification. On appeal he argued the juvenile court erred by transferring him for adult prosecution and the trial court erred by denying suppression motions. The court held Sawyer waived suppression challenges by pleading guilty and concluded the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding him not amenable to juvenile rehabilitation based on the statutory factors and expert testimony.

The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s restitution order requiring Jermaine Reynolds to pay $3,067 to his domestic-violence victim for medical expenses. Reynolds had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic violence; the felony strangulation count was dismissed. The trial court relied on the presentence investigation report (which included the victim’s impact statement and three medical bills showing $3,067.54 owed) when ordering restitution. Because Reynolds did not object below, the appeals court reviewed only for plain error and concluded the PSI provided competent, sufficient evidence to support the restitution award.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a misdemeanor charge against Nathan Hake for illegally disposing of construction and demolition debris and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court had dismissed the charge as unconstitutionally vague, focusing on terms like “disposal,” “storage,” “temporary period,” and “substantially unchanged.” The appellate court held that the statutory and regulatory definitions give fair notice and are not impermissibly vague as applied to Hake’s alleged conduct (digging a pit, burying construction debris and household waste), so the dismissal was improper.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Dennis Crowley's motion to suppress evidence found during a traffic stop. Officer Webb stopped Crowley on May 7, 2025 for a loud muffler in violation of Ohio law, and an inventory search of the towed vehicle uncovered powdered cocaine. The appellate court held the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion because Officer Webb observed and the body-camera recorded an audible rumble from the exhaust consistent with R.C. 4513.22(A). The conviction (no contest plea) and community-control sentence were left intact.

The State of Ohio appealed two Lucas County trial-court judgments that allowed cash seized in investigations to be applied toward fines imposed on defendant Shakur Ishmail Shabaa. The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that (1) $122 forfeited through a civil forfeiture consent judgment could not be used to pay criminal fines because R.C. 2981.12(G) expressly forbids using forfeited property to pay fines; and (2) $4,460 that Shabaa forfeited by plea agreement could not be applied to his fines because the trial court lacked authority to alter the parties’ negotiated plea terms that specified disbursement to the State and Sylvania Township Police.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals denied Frederick Mundt’s application for reconsideration and request for en banc review of its prior opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition under Ohio’s serious mental illness (SMI) statute. The court reaffirmed that Mundt had clinical diagnoses of Bipolar Disorder and Schizoaffective Disorder but found the record lacked sufficient evidence that those conditions significantly impaired his capacity to make rational judgments at the time of the offense. Because the trial court reasonably credited the state expert’s interpretation of Mundt’s conduct, the panel found no basis to overturn or rehear the decision.

The Superior Court vacated a April 29, 2025 revocation-of-probation sentence imposed on Leroy Kenneth Thomas and remanded to re-impose his earlier October 25, 2021 revocation-of-probation sentence. The PCRA court had entertained an untimely collateral petition and resentenced Thomas without jurisdiction because the petition did not satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or an exception. Because the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction, its resentencing was void ab initio. The court therefore vacated the 2025 sentence and ordered reinstatement of the 2021 sentence, leaving any discretionary-sentencing challenges unreviewed.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a Philadelphia County PCRA court order granting Jamal R. Sanders a new trial. Sanders had been convicted in 1998 of third-degree murder and related offenses based largely on testimony that he had access to the gun later used by a co-defendant. After decades in custody, a witness (Shawn Clark) submitted an affidavit recanting trial testimony and stating detectives coerced him; Clark later died. The PCRA court found the recantation admissible under the statement-against-interest exception and likely to produce a different verdict; the Superior Court agreed and affirmed.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the convictions and sentences of Kylen Pratt, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, possession of an instrument of crime, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence for the death and burning of Naasire Johnson. The court rejected challenges to (1) admission of a detective’s chart summarizing voluminous cell-phone timing data, finding the summary met the rules for admissibility; (2) admission of appellant’s Google searches, finding they were relevant to his state of mind and not unduly prejudicial; and (3) the discretionary imposition of consecutive sentences, finding no abuse of sentencing discretion.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition by Angel Navarro and remanded for second-stage proceedings. Navarro had been convicted of first-degree murder in 2004 based primarily on three eyewitness identifications and police testimony; he later obtained Chicago Police Department records via FOIA that included officer Meer’s professional complaints. The court held Navarro’s petition raised newly discovered, noncumulative evidence that could materially affect officer credibility and thus created a colorable claim of actual innocence. The court declined to reassign the case sua sponte on remand.

The Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Charles F. Watts’s postconviction petition after a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Watts argued he made a substantial showing of actual innocence, that trial counsel was ineffective for not calling an alibi witness (Terrance Linear), and that postconviction counsel failed to comply with Rule 651(c). The court held the petition was decided after a third-stage hearing, rejected the actual-innocence claim as forfeited for lack of a proper third-stage argument, found no Strickland error because counsel’s choice not to call Linear could be strategic in light of surveillance video, and determined Rule 651(c) claims about second-stage pleading are moot once a claim receives a full evidentiary hearing.

The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed a county court judgment in a criminal/procedural matter. The appeal was brought pro se by Rosea Maria White and was argued on the record from Pinellas County before Judge Diane M. Croff. The panel, in a per curiam decision, unanimously affirmed the lower court’s ruling without published opinion, and the judgment stands as decided by the county court. No additional reasoning or substantive analysis was provided in the published entry.

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, issued a brief per curiam decision affirming the lower court. The appeal was brought by Jennifer Suzanne Waters against the State of Florida following a proceeding in the Circuit Court for DeSoto County. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment without a published opinion, and all three judges concurred. No new legal analysis or changes to the trial-court outcome were announced in this short entry.