Court Filings

The appellate court reviewed Michael Southall’s convictions for attempted residential arson and related domestic-violence offenses. Southall argued the Will County Sheriff’s Office violated his due process rights and Supreme Court Rule 412 by destroying a seized Kingsford charcoal lighter fluid container, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent or a substantial step toward arson. The court held the destruction did not violate due process because it was routine, not shown to be in bad faith, and the missing item was not shown to be clearly exculpatory. The court affirmed the arson and aggravated battery convictions but vacated two domestic-battery convictions under the one-act, one-crime rule.

A jury convicted Jazz Bradley of multiple sexual offenses, including forcible rape of two victims (one aged 16) and unlawful sexual intercourse with another 16-year-old. The trial court imposed heavy sentences under California’s One Strike law, the Habitual Sexual Offender law, and Three Strikes, including consecutive life terms and determinate terms for robbery and unlawful intercourse. On appeal Bradley challenged several sentencing decisions. The court affirmed the judgment but modified it: it rejected the dual-use claim about the robbery upper term, but held that the trial court erred by imposing and staying additional sentences under the Habitual Sexual Offender statute and by imposing stayed additional One Strike terms on the same counts; those stayed/duplicative sentences were stricken.

The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of Pedro Thomas DeLeon Tzul for the murders of Martha and Antonio Garcia and directed a new trial. The trial court had excluded a handwritten note found at the scene—in which the author said he found the victim having sex with her brother and that this filled him with rage—during the People’s case under Evidence Code section 352, effectively forcing Tzul to testify to get the note admitted. The appellate court held the note was highly probative of provocation and should not have been excluded; admission during the People’s case likely would have produced a more favorable result for Tzul.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas considered a criminal appeal by Kevin Villatoro. The court previously paused the appeal so the trial court could hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Villatoro then moved to reinstate and dismiss his appeal. The appellate court granted his motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The opinion was issued April 7, 2026, and is unpublished.

The First District of Texas court grants the appellant's motion to reinstate and dismiss his criminal appeal. The court had previously paused the appeal for the trial court to hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Because no opinion had issued and the appellant moved to dismiss, the court dismissed the appeal and any other pending motions as moot, citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's adjudication of guilt and 14-year sentence for Gaige Porter after a hearing on the State's motion to adjudicate his deferred-adjudication community supervision. Appellate counsel moved to withdraw under Anders, and the court independently reviewed the record, finding no reversible error. Because the trial court's written judgment did not match its oral findings, the appellate court reformed the judgment to reflect that Porter violated supervision by contacting the complainant, leaving the state without permission, and removing his ankle monitor, then affirmed as reformed and granted counsel's withdrawal.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Anthony Cooper-King’s motion for leave to file a petition for postconviction relief. Cooper-King had been convicted of several drug-possession offenses and filed the postconviction materials more than 365 days after the trial transcript was filed in his direct appeal. The appellate court held the petition was untimely, Cooper-King failed to show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts supporting his claims, and his claim that retained appellate counsel failed to timely file postconviction documents did not excuse the statutory deadline.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Preston D. Jefferson's convictions after a jury trial for possession of over 100 grams of cocaine with a major drug offender specification and operating a vehicle while under the influence. The stop, inventory search of Jefferson's truck, body-camera footage, narcotics testing, and field-sobriety observations supported the convictions. The court found the evidence — including a large brick of cocaine in a compartment behind the driver's seat, drug paraphernalia within reach, traffic infractions, and poor performance on sobriety tests — did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Stark County Common Pleas Court's dismissal without a hearing of Nicole Perenkovich's petition for post-conviction relief. Perenkovich argued trial counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing a stepsister to testify, for failing to use Snapchat photos to impeach police testimony about an unoccupied bedroom, and for not using a phone record to impeach testimony about a jail-call. The appellate court found the submitted affidavits and exhibits did not provide sufficient, authenticated operative facts showing counsel's performance was deficient or that the outcome would likely have changed, so no evidentiary hearing was required.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District and held that a police officer lawfully extended a traffic stop to verify the driver’s license status even after the original basis for the stop (a believed inoperable headlight) was shown to be mistaken. Officer Rose stopped Quentin Fips for a presumed faulty headlight, learned Fips did not have his license, obtained identifying information, and then confirmed through dispatch that Fips’s license was suspended and a warrant existed. The Court ruled the additional inquiry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that Fips’s failure to produce a license gave new reasonable suspicion to continue the stop.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of sentence imposed on Kevin Lee Steager after he pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses against his daughter. Steager received an aggregate term of 4½ to 9 years’ imprisonment and 4 years’ probation, and was later designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). Appellate counsel sought to withdraw under Anders; the court found counsel’s submission compliant and conducted an independent review. The court held that challenges to the plea, merger, sentencing legality, SVP designation, and discretionary sentencing were either waived or lacked merit, so the appeal was frivolous and the sentence was affirmed.

The appellate court reversed orders detaining Kevin Bagby pending a probation-violation hearing. Bagby had been placed on mental-health probation after a retail-theft conviction, and the State later filed a violation petition based on a newly charged retail-theft offense. The court held that because the new retail-theft charge is not a detainable offense under Illinois’s Pretrial Fairness Act (it is a probationable, nonforcible felony that does not carry mandatory imprisonment), Bagby was entitled to pretrial release pending the violation hearing. The case is remanded for a hearing to set appropriate release conditions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Lavell Tyrone Player’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The resentencing court, after an evidentiary hearing, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Player was the actual killer (and alternatively a major participant acting with reckless indifference), making him ineligible for resentencing. The appellate panel held that a jury’s earlier “not true” findings on a personal firearm enhancement and robbery special circumstance did not collaterally estop the resentencing court from finding Player was the shooter, relying on People v. Santamaria and subsequent authority. The court also found substantial evidence—principally the testimony of accomplice Walter Fonteno and corroborating witnesses—supports the actual-killer finding.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Marvin Hillman III’s discretionary application challenging the denial of his 2025 extraordinary motion for a new trial because the application was untimely. Hillman sought review of the trial court’s December 17, 2025 order but filed his discretionary application to this Court on March 20, 2026, which was 93 days after the order. The Court held it lacks jurisdiction where a discretionary application is not filed within the 30-day period required by OCGA § 5-6-35(d), and therefore dismissed the application for failure to comply with the statute's jurisdictional deadline.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application by defendant Calvin Lewis Neal challenging a trial court’s December 22, 2025 order that vacated a prior suppression ruling and denied his motion to suppress. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was not entered within ten days of the December 22 order as required by OCGA § 5-6-34(b). The Court explained the ten-day certificate requirement is jurisdictional and instructed the trial court on how to allow interlocutory review (vacate and re-enter the order and then promptly issue a certificate).

The Court of Appeals dismissed Victor Oswald Robinson Jr.'s original mandamus petition because the court lacks jurisdiction. Robinson filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia seeking an order requiring the trial court to rule on pretrial pro se motions; the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that a party seeking mandamus against a superior court judge must first pursue relief in the superior court itself and that this case does not present the extremely rare circumstances that would justify invoking the Court of Appeals' original jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Todd D. Campbell Sr.’s petition for postconviction relief. Campbell, who pleaded guilty in 2022 to aggravated vehicular homicide and OVI, sought to vacate his convictions in a 2025 filing asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, discovery violations, evidence tampering, and competency issues. The trial court found the petition untimely under Ohio R.C. 2953.21 and that Campbell failed to meet the statutory exceptions in R.C. 2953.23, and that his claims were barred by res judicata. The appellate court concluded Campbell did not show error in that ruling and affirmed.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 17-month prison sentence of Allen Ochier for felony domestic violence arising from an altercation with his mother. The jury rejected Ochier’s self-defense claim and found prior domestic-violence conduct; the trial court sentenced within the statutory range. On appeal, the court rejected challenges that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, that the prosecutor’s remarks deprived Ochier of a fair trial, that trial counsel was ineffective, and that the sentence was contrary to law. The court found the jury’s credibility determinations reasonable and the sentence supported by the record.

The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Marion Municipal Court conviction and sentence of Marquis D. Montgomery for telecommunications harassment. Montgomery had been charged after repeatedly sending unwanted texts to the mother of his children and her boyfriend despite warnings from them and police. He represented himself at trial after counsel withdrew, was convicted by a jury, and received community control with jail time. The appeals court rejected claims that the court lacked jurisdiction due to service defects, that the waiver of counsel and standby/hybrid representation were invalid, that evidence was insufficient, and that the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Marion Municipal Court’s denial of Nicholas Meads’ 2025 request to expunge a 2019 disorderly conduct conviction. Meads had pleaded no contest in 2019 and later violated community control, resulting in a 10-day jail term. At the expungement hearing the prosecutor did not object, but the victim opposed expungement and described continued harassment. Meads presented no testimonial or documentary evidence. The trial court found the government’s interest in maintaining the record outweighed Meads’ interest, and the appeals court held the decision was supported by the record.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the Marion Municipal Court’s denials of Nicholas Meads’s requests to seal two dismissed misdemeanor matters (domestic violence and violation of a civil protection order). The appeals arose after the trial court denied sealing following a hearing where the victim spoke and the State took no position. The appellate court held the trial court applied the wrong statute and improperly considered the victim’s statements when R.C. 2953.33 governs sealing of dismissed cases and limits the court to considering the movant’s submissions and any prosecutor objection. The matters are remanded for further proceedings under the correct statute.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the Bellefontaine Municipal Court conviction of Eric Lochtefeld for driving under an administrative suspension (R.C. 4510.14). The appeal challenged the weight of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and exclusion of evidence that Lochtefeld held a valid Florida license. The court found the Florida license irrelevant because Ohio suspension rules apply to Ohio driving privileges and are triggered when an arresting officer reads the suspension notice after a chemical-test refusal. The court concluded the jury reasonably found Lochtefeld had been told his Ohio privileges were suspended and counsel’s performance caused no prejudice.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's grant of a three-year civil stalking protection order (CSPO) against appellant William Thomas after he posted repeatedly about appellee Brittney Thomason on his public Facebook page. The appellate court found sufficient credible evidence that Thomas engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused Thomason mental distress, so it affirmed the issuance of the CSPO. However, the court concluded one provision was an unconstitutional, overbroad prior restraint on speech because it effectively barred Thomas from posting anything concerning Thomason, and it vacated that portion and remanded for a narrower order.

The Court of Appeals reviewed an appeal by Shiviez Montrel Howard from his conviction in Butler County Common Pleas. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding no nonfrivolous issues exist but identified two potential arguable errors and sought permission to withdraw. The appellate court independently reviewed the record, found no prejudicial error or infringement of appellant's rights, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal as wholly frivolous. The court ordered the trial-court mandate issued and costs taxed to appellant.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendants' convictions for robbery, kidnapping, grand theft, and possession of criminal tools, but reversed sentencing in part and remanded for limited resentencing. The court held that the kidnapping and robbery convictions merge for sentencing because the victim's movement through the store was instrumental to the theft and did not create an independent risk or purpose. By contrast, possession of criminal tools (bags, gloves, masks) did not merge with robbery because those items facilitated but did not constitute the instrument of the robbery. The court also found procedural sentencing errors: the trial court failed to provide oral postrelease-control advisals and failed to make required consecutive-sentence findings at the sentencing hearing.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed Geoffery Barrow's conviction for fifth-degree theft arising from four shoplifting incidents at a Nike outlet totaling $2,334.44. The court reviewed Barrow's speedy-trial, sufficiency, and evidentiary challenges. It held Barrow forfeited some speedy-trial claims by failing to move to dismiss in the trial court and by absconding, which reset the speedy-trial clock. The court found the evidence (surveillance video, store receipts, witness testimony, and items recovered from Barrow's vehicle) sufficient to prove the aggregate value exceeded $1,000. Any evidentiary errors were harmless.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Clay A. Hammond’s conviction and sentence after he pled guilty to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor (fourth-degree felony) and received a five-year term of community control. The appellate court found counsel complied with Anders procedures and, after independent review, identified no meritorious issues. The court held the plea colloquy complied with Crim. R. 11, the jointly recommended sentence is not reviewable under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Hammond’s medical marijuana use as a condition of community control because R.C. 2929.17(H) authorizes drug-use monitoring. The appeal was found wholly frivolous and counsel’s withdrawal was permitted.

The California Supreme Court reversed the defendant Omar Richard Deen’s death-row conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial. Deen was convicted of murdering his mother and a police chief, and a capital trial proceeded in competency, guilt, sanity, and penalty phases. The Court found reversible error in the trial court’s handling of a defense challenge for cause to a prospective juror (Juror No. 5). The trial court applied an unduly narrow standard, accepted the juror’s self-assessment without properly weighing the totality of circumstances, and failed to make the findings necessary for meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment revoking Miguel Whitney’s community control and sentencing him to 18 months in prison for violating the terms of his supervision. Whitney argued the trial court had failed to give the full statutory warnings under R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) when it imposed community control in 2021. The appellate court held that although some statutory warnings were omitted, Whitney suffered no prejudice because he had been explicitly told at the original sentencing that a violation could result in an 18-month prison term, and the trial court imposed that exact sanction after the violation.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed Jeffrey Roscoe Sharpe’s convictions following a jury trial for cocaine possession, one count of having a weapon while under disability, and two counts of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. The court rejected Sharpe’s claims that his speedy-trial rights were violated, that a mistrial was required after the jury heard about a separate indictment, that the evidence was legally insufficient or against the weight of the evidence, that allied-offense merger was required, and that trial counsel was ineffective. The court concluded statutory speedy-trial procedures and evidentiary rules supported the convictions and found no plain or structural error that would justify reversal.