Court Filings

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court’s May 17, 2024 order that modified a 2015 Texas custody and visitation order and granted the mother sole physical and legal custody. The court held that, under New York’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), New York lacked authority to modify a prior Texas custody order because Texas retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and the father continues to reside in Texas. The court also found that Family Court failed to properly invoke temporary emergency jurisdiction because it did not communicate with the Texas court or limit the duration of its order, so the order was vacated and the case remanded for proper UCCJEA procedures.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Family Court order granting the petitioner nonparent guardianship of A.G., a child placed with the petitioner at birth in August 2018, and dismissed the parents' petitions for custody. The court found the petitioner demonstrated extraordinary circumstances and had been the child’s exclusive caregiver, meeting the child’s needs and fostering a strong bond. The parents had only sporadic or supervised contact, failed to provide financial support or stable housing, and did not show they could plan for the child's return. The court held the guardianship was in the child’s best interests.

The court dismissed an appeal from a county court-at-law involving matters concerning M.P. and A.P. because the appellant failed to pay the required $205 filing fee after her claim of indigence was rejected by the trial court. The appellate court gave notice and a deadline to pay, warned dismissal would follow under the appellate rules, and the fee was not paid by the deadline. The court denied as moot the appellant's pending motions and ordered the appellant to pay all costs of the appeal.

The court granted the father's request to dismiss his own appeal in a child custody case. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the child and filed to terminate parental rights; instead the parties reached an agreed judgment appointing the Department permanent managing conservator while mother and father remained possessory conservators. The father, incarcerated at the time, initially appealed but after new appellate counsel secured a hearing and the father waived his motion for new trial and the appeal, he moved to dismiss the appeal, which the court granted under the appellate rules.

The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because her notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court signed the final order on 2025-06-24, and the notice of appeal was required within 20 days (by 2025-07-14) for this accelerated appeal pathway. Mother did not file her notice until 2026-03-17, and she did not respond to the court's request to show grounds to retain the appeal. Because no timely notice or extension was filed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals of the Second Appellate District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s December 10, 2025 order terminating Father’s parental rights to A.M. The Department of Family and Protective Services had petitioned to terminate under multiple statutory grounds. Father challenged one predicate ground and alleged due-process defects in the Department’s timelines and service plan, but he did not challenge the other independent predicate findings or preserve the service-plan complaint for appeal. Because at least one unchallenged statutory ground and the best-interest finding supported termination, the appellate court affirmed.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a nonfinal order entered by the Martin County circuit court in a family-law appeal brought by Maschelle Adrianne Pugh. The opinion is short: the panel reviewed the nonfinal order and, without published opinion or extended discussion, affirmed the lower court's decision. The opinion notes the disposition is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved. The appellant appeared pro se; appellee was represented by counsel.

The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Raymond T. DeMeritt’s motion to terminate child-support withholding. DeMeritt, declared the father in a 1985 legitimation decree, sought termination claiming he had overpaid and that garnishment was improper. The Office of the Attorney General submitted accounting reports showing DeMeritt owed arrears and interest; the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found DeMeritt owed $30,990.57 as of January 6, 2025. The appeals court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, noting DeMeritt failed to rebut the OAG’s accounting or meet his burden of proof.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s modification appointing J.A.V.S. as sole managing conservator and C.R. as possessory conservator of two children. The mother, C.R., appealed but repeatedly failed to follow appellate briefing rules, including providing record citations and legal argument. The court struck her initial brief, accepted an inadequate amended brief, and found no reporter’s record for the November 20, 2025 modification hearing, so the appellate record did not show what evidence the trial court considered. Because C.R.’s submissions provided nothing for review, the court affirmed the modification order.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Russell Carl Nast’s direct appeal of the trial court’s October 8, 2025 order confirming an arbitration award and granting a divorce because appeals in divorce cases must proceed by discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). The court concluded the proper procedure was an application for discretionary appeal, and that procedure is jurisdictional, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the respondent’s request for a frivolous-appeal penalty.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted direct appeal by Olufeyijimi Awofadeju from a final divorce decree entered December 22, 2025. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35, and the appellant did not follow that procedure. Because use of the discretionary-appeal process is jurisdictional, the improperly filed direct appeal could not proceed and was dismissed on April 22, 2026.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal filed by Nathaniel Blackmon, III in case A26D0445 (LC 19FM3068) and denied the application on April 22, 2026. The order is a short administrative disposition: the court declined to grant permission for the case to be heard as a discretionary appeal. No opinion or reasoning is provided in the document beyond the denial itself.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Family Court order that, after a hearing, granted the mother's petition for sole legal and physical custody of the parties' child (born 2022) and denied the father's petition for joint physical custody. The appellate court found the Family Court's best-interest analysis — emphasizing the mother's greater ability to provide stability, overall well-being, and to foster the child's relationship with the other parent — had a sound and substantial basis in the record. The court also held the Family Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to appoint an attorney for the very young child.

The Appellate Division reviewed Family Court proceedings in which the Administration for Children's Services alleged the father neglected two children. The appeals from the fact-finding and dispositional orders were dismissed in part, and the court affirmed the order of disposition insofar as reviewed. Because the dispositional order was entered on the father's default and has expired by its own terms, appellate review was limited to whether the father neglected the children. The court held that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the father's lack of insight into ongoing mental-health issues and his bizarre and irrational behavior placed the children at imminent risk, supporting the neglect finding.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Family Court order finding that the mother neglected her child by inflicting excessive corporal punishment. ACS brought an Article 10 neglect proceeding alleging the mother repeatedly physically, verbally, and emotionally abused the child and on one occasion bit the child's finger, causing an infected human bite mark. The court concluded ACS proved neglect by a preponderance of the evidence, crediting the Family Court's credibility findings and finding the child's out-of-court statements were corroborated by medical records and ACS observations.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Family Court order of protection that found the appellant—who had previously surrendered parental rights and agreed to an adoption—committed harassment in the second degree and fourth-degree stalking against the adoptive child. After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court directed the appellant to stay away from the child except pursuant to a court-ordered visitation, through December 15, 2026. The appellate court upheld the Family Court’s credibility findings and concluded the evidence met the fair preponderance standard for the charged family offenses.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Family Court disposition finding that the mother abused and neglected her child based on her criminal convictions for shooting the child's father, but it modified the disposition because the Family Court improperly delegated to ACS the authority to decide the mother's therapeutic supervised parental access. The panel held collateral estoppel applied to give preclusive effect to the mother's guilty pleas, supporting summary judgment on abuse and neglect. The court remanded for the Family Court itself to decide whether to allow therapeutic supervised access and, if so, to set a specific schedule.

The Appellate Division reversed a Family Court order that denied the mother's objections to two Support Magistrate orders. The Support Magistrate had ordered the father to pay spousal support and ordered the mother to pay child support, based on findings that included the father's approximately $161,000 income and an imputed income to the mother. The appellate court held the Family Court erred: the father's deferred income must be included in calculating combined income, and the Support Magistrate abused discretion by imputing income to the mother above her reported earnings. The case is remitted for recalculation and further proceedings.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that granted the mother sole legal and physical custody of the parties' child and directed the father to pay temporary child support arrears. The appellate court held the Supreme Court erred by deciding custody without a plenary hearing and without making specific findings about the child's best interests. The case is remitted for a hearing and a new determination; meanwhile, the custody provision of the August 8, 2022 order remains in effect pending that hearing. The child-support arrears directive was vacated pending further proceedings.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court order adjudicating 14-year-old Gabriel G. a juvenile delinquent for third-degree robbery and conditionally discharging him for 12 months. The court dismissed as academic the portion of the appeal challenging the 12-month conditional discharge because that period expired, but it reviewed and rejected Gabriel's motion to dismiss the indictment for due process and statutory speedy-trial violations. The court found the five-month pre-arrest delay and the prosecution's discovery timing did not violate constitutional or statutory speedy-trial rights, so dismissal was not required.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Family Court order denying a mother's 2023 petition to modify a 2018 custody order to permit her to relocate with her child from New Jersey to Michigan. The parents share joint legal custody and the mother has physical custody. After a hearing, the Family Court found the mother failed to show the move would improve the child's economic or educational circumstances and that it would not harm the child's relationship with the father. The appellate court held that the Family Court's best-interest determination had a sound and substantial basis in the record and upheld the denial.

The court reviewed an appeal by C.H. challenging the actions of the Department of Children and Families and the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program in a dependency matter involving children J.H. and G.B. After considering the record and arguments, the district court issued a brief per curiam decision affirming the lower court's ruling. The decision affirms the circuit court's handling of the dependency-related proceedings without further comment, and the panel of three judges concurred. No additional factual findings or legal analysis are included in the published entry.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to her infant child, E.T. The Department removed the child shortly after birth when both tested positive for amphetamine and later showed Mother’s continued methamphetamine and other drug use, untreated bipolar disorder, failure to complete court-ordered services, and periods of incarceration and mental-health treatment. The court applied the statutory best-interest factors (Holley factors) and concluded that Mother’s instability, ongoing substance use, untreated mental-health issues, and failure to complete services supported a finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kentay Smith’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Smith sought review of post-October 17, 2025 orders after filing a notice of appeal on March 2, 2026. The court held that the controlling final order was entered October 17, 2025, and Smith’s notice of appeal was not filed within the 30-day statutory deadline. The February 19, 2026 order merely stated the case was closed and made no new substantive custody ruling, so it was not appealable. Motions to expedite and for emergency consideration were also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County trial court’s March 27, 2025 judgment that granted intervenor Kelly Moore’s motion for relief from judgment, ordered genetic testing of the older child (L.M.), and denied plaintiff-appellant Joyce Wilson’s motion for reconsideration. Joyce had sought custody of her two grandchildren and argued the court lacked jurisdiction because a 2010 paternity affidavit for the older child established paternity. The appeals court held that Ohio law (R.C. 3119.962) allows challenge to an acknowledgment of paternity via genetic testing and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Moore to intervene despite procedural shortcomings.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County domestic relations court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decisions that established paternity, named Jessica L. Jackson sole residential parent and legal custodian of the minor child J.J., granted parenting time to Rajael H. Tyler, and ordered Tyler to pay about $140 per month in child support. Jackson appealed, alleging evidentiary error and perjury at a child-support hearing, but she did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision. The appellate court declined to consider the hearing transcript not before the trial court and found any unobjected-to errors waived absent a showing of plain error, which Jackson did not raise.

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that 11-year-old K.W. was neglected by his sole custodial parent, M.W., because K.W. suffered physical injuries (including a black eye) while in M.W.’s care and was exposed to an injurious home environment. The court also affirmed the dispositional order making K.W. a ward of the court and setting a 12‑month reunification goal, based largely on M.W.’s refusal to complete a court‑ordered substance abuse assessment despite admissions of recent drinking and past substance abuse and his failure to obtain timely physical and mental health care for K.W. The court credited school and DCFS testimony and found the rulings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Family Court order finding that appellant Carlos M.-J. committed a family offense amounting to second-degree harassment by intentionally bumping into the petitioner, Pascal W. The court upheld the Family Court's credibility findings and sustained the six-month suspended judgment and corresponding six-month order of protection. The appeal was not moot despite the protection order's expiration because the underlying finding can have future legal consequences. The court concluded the evidence met the fair preponderance standard and the protection order was a proper exercise of discretion.

The Appellate Division reviewed a Family Court disposition that adjudicated 17-year-old Jesus G. a juvenile delinquent after he admitted to taking a car and driving it a short distance before abandoning it. The court affirmed the delinquency finding and 15-month probation but vacated the $1,000 restitution award. The panel held the victim's statements were sufficient to establish replacement cost, but vacated restitution because the juvenile's written admission did not include an agreement to pay restitution and restitution was not sought in the charging document prior to disposition.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed an appeal by husband Jerome Dewald from a post-trial family court order that denied him spousal maintenance and awarded the wife $5,500 in counsel fees. The appellate court affirmed the denial of maintenance, finding the trial court permissibly deviated from statutory guidelines after considering factors such as the husband’s age, assets, prior fraud conviction, pendente lite payments, and the short time the parties lived together. However, the court vacated the counsel-fee award because the trial court failed to provide the written findings and reasons required by court rules before imposing such fees.