Court Filings

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, issued an order on April 30, 2026, quashing Pedro Luis Gavilan-Cruz’s Notice of Appeal. The court relied on Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 910(a)(5), indicating that the appeal did not comply with the requirement that only the questions in the jurisdictional statement (or those fairly comprised therein) will ordinarily be considered. As a result, the court declined to consider the appeal and dismissed the appeal process by quashing the notice.

The Second District Court of Appeal dismissed J. Stanford Lifsey’s petition for writ of certiorari as moot. The court concluded that changed circumstances meant it could not provide any effective relief, citing precedent that moot appeals must be dismissed. The petition had sought review of a circuit court decision, but because subsequent events eliminated the possibility of judicial relief, the appeal was terminated without reaching the merits.

The court dismissed Hasan Howard’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a Lake County judge’s failure to quash a warrant or promptly hold a community-control violation hearing while Howard remains in federal custody. The judge granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), concluding Howard cannot show a clear legal right to relief because Ohio law tolls community control while an offender is confined, and the interstate detainer statute does not require a prompt hearing for probation or community-control violations. The court also relied on due-process precedent holding no right to an immediate hearing before custody on the detainer has occurred.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed as moot a CPLR article 78 proceeding brought by petitioner Oscar Asencio challenging a Department of Corrections determination finding he violated incarcerated individual rules after a tier III hearing. The court concluded the challenge no longer presented a live controversy and cited controlling precedent on mootness. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition without costs and did not reach the merits of the disciplinary determination.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Container Corporation and Hartford Fire Insurance Company's petition for a writ of certiorari seeking relief in an original proceeding brought against James Way. The court issued a brief per curiam decision on April 24, 2026, stating only “DISMISSED” and noting the opinion is not final until any timely motions under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330 or 9.331 are resolved. No substantive reasoning or legal analysis appears in the published entry beyond the dismissal and concurrence by the three judges.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Brian Bacchus’s appeal from a judges of compensation claims decision concerning an April 20, 2021 accident. The court issued a brief per curiam order simply stating 'DISMISSED' without published opinion or extended reasoning. The dismissal ends this appeal at the appellate level unless the appellant timely files an authorized motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to challenge that procedural disposition.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by James and Cynthia Lundeen and Sir Isaac Newton Enterprises seeking to force Cuyahoga Common Pleas Judge Sherrie Miday to vacate her order dismissing the Lundeens’ counterclaim for false-light invasion of privacy. The court held Judge Miday had subject-matter jurisdiction after the case was transferred to common pleas court and that any error in her ruling would make the judgment voidable, not void, meaning mandamus was not an appropriate remedy because an appeal is an adequate remedy at law. The court also declared the Lundeens vexatious litigants and barred pro se filings without leave.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Monica G. Justice’s request for a writ of mandamus that would have ordered the Franklin County clerk to serve her a July 22, 2025 amended sentencing entry. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the State’s motion to dismiss because Justice, an incarcerated pro se relator, failed to comply with statutory procedural requirements for inmate litigants. Specifically, she did not file the required affidavit listing prior civil actions, did not provide the certified inmate-account statements/affidavit of indigency needed to waive fees, and did not caption the petition in the name of the State on her relation.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals dismissed Mao Ju’s mandamus action seeking to force a Xenia Municipal Court magistrate to further process her citizen criminal affidavit charging her former spouse with interference with custody. The court held that the magistrate properly reviewed the affidavit and determined it did not establish probable cause for a misdemeanor, and that Ohio statutes do not require the magistrate to docket the affidavit, assign a case number, refer misdemeanor allegations to a prosecutor, or hold a formal probable-cause hearing. Because Ju could not show a clear legal right or a mandatory duty owed by the magistrate, the writ was denied.

The court dismissed Brenton Autwavious Smith’s appeal from his murder conviction because the trial court certified this was a plea-bargain case in which the defendant has no right of appeal. The appellate court gave Smith a month to show grounds to continue the appeal after notifying him of the certification, but he did not respond. Because the trial-court certification showing no right to appeal was part of the record and Smith had waived appeal rights in his plea paperwork, the appellate court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The court dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by David Disraeli challenging a justice court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration clause. The Third Court of Appeals concluded it lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a justice of the peace or justice court unless issuance is necessary to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction, and the relator did not show that necessity. Because the jurisdictional prerequisite was not met, the court dismissed the mandamus petition and all pending motions as moot.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio granted a joint motion to dismiss and dismissed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Flex, and Amazon.com Services, LLC. The petition was originally filed March 10, 2026, and the court had set an April 7, 2026 deadline for responses. After the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss, the court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and dismissed the mandamus proceeding. No merits decision was reached.

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed a disciplinary proceeding charging attorney Darryl J. Ferguson with violating parts of Rule 1.15(I) for failing to protect a chiropractor’s asserted interest in two clients’ settlement proceeds. The Review Board had recommended a 60-day suspension conditioned on restitution, but the Court concluded the Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ferguson violated Rule 1.15(I)(b), (c), or (d). The Court held that Ferguson reasonably could conclude the chiropractor’s form was an unperfected lien or attempt at a statutory lien that he could disregard under Rule 1.15(I)(b), and therefore no discipline was imposed and the matter was dismissed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed (quashed) Ajani Posey’s appeal because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court relied on Pennsylvania appellate procedure rules defining final orders and explaining limits on appeals from certain interlocutory orders, including transfer orders under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103. Because the challenged order did not meet the rules for an appeal as of right, the Supreme Court ended the case without addressing the underlying merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed Ajani Posey’s notice of appeal on April 21, 2026, because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court concluded the appealed order did not meet the state rules' definition of a final order and noted that certain interlocutory transfer orders are not appealable as of right. Consequently, the appeal cannot proceed in the Supreme Court at this time.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal dismissed Molly Dorsey’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found the trial court’s December 6, 2024 orders (an Amended Order of Summary Administration and an Amended Order Determining Homestead Status) were final, but Dorsey filed her notice of appeal on February 12, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline. Because no timely appeal of any final order was filed, the appellate court also lacked jurisdiction over earlier nonfinal orders and motions. The court rejected attempts to toll the appeal period and concluded the appeal must be dismissed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thelma Peake's late request to file her appellate brief out of time and quashed her appeal for failure to file a timely brief in a case challenging the nomination petition of Shaun Griffith for Pennsylvania's 3rd Congressional District. The court's order, issued per curiam, concluded that leave to file nunc pro tunc was not warranted and that the procedural default (no timely brief) required dismissal of the appeal. No substantive merits were reached because the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed as moot the appeal by Sebastian C., who challenged a juvenile court’s denial of his request to transfer from a secure youth treatment facility to his adult sister’s home as a "less restrictive program" under Welfare & Institutions Code section 875. The appellate court concluded that clarification of the statutory meaning was warranted: a family home can qualify as a less restrictive program when supervision and services are provided or coordinated by a community-based nonresidential program. Because Sebastian was later placed in less restrictive settings and the challenged order no longer affects him, the court dismissed the appeal without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in this case.

The court dismissed Prince Charles Cotten Sr.’s procedendo petition as moot. Cotten sought an order requiring Franklin County Common Pleas Judge Carl A. Aveni to proceed to judgment in Cotten’s underlying civil case, alleging delay and failure to rule on a motion. The magistrate and appellate panel found the trial judge had already dismissed Cotten’s complaint without prejudice on August 11, 2025 (thereby resolving pending motions), so there was no remaining duty to compel. Because the act Cotten sought had been performed, the procedendo claim was moot and the motion to dismiss was sustained.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Applicant Katrina Cooper's motion to withdraw her application for discretionary appeal in case A26D0439. The court ordered that the application is deemed withdrawn and issued a formal minute entry reflecting that decision on April 13, 2026. There is no opinion on the merits because the procedural request to withdraw was uncontested and dispositive of the application.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Trumbull County Children Services Board’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition as moot. The Board had asked the court to force the juvenile judge to comply with the appellate mandate in In re A.W. (which returned legal custody of A.W. to the maternal aunt) and to bar the judge’s ex parte order granting the father temporary custody. After a pretrial conference the parties represented that the aunt now has legal and physical custody in accordance with the mandate and the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry clarifying the record, so the appellate court found the requested relief obtained and dismissed the petition.

The City of Edinburg filed a petition for writ of mandamus claiming the trial court abused its discretion by freezing discovery deadlines. The city later moved to withdraw the petition because the parties reached an agreement about the disputed discovery, rendering the mandamus request moot. The court treated the withdrawal as a motion to dismiss, found the matter moot under controlling authority, and dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District dismissed Genie Delia Cavazos’s pro se appeal for want of prosecution after she repeatedly failed to comply with the clerk’s requests to pay the filing fee and to cure defects in her notice of appeal. The court sent five notices between October 28, 2025 and March 19, 2026 but received no response. Because Cavazos did not diligently prosecute the appeal or follow procedural rules, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the appellee’s motion to dismiss as moot.

The court dismissed Gil Rojas III’s appeal because his conviction and thirty-year sentence resulted from a plea-bargain in which the trial court certified he had no right to appeal. The appellate clerk’s record contained the Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and the written plea agreement showing the sentence did not exceed the agreed recommendation. Because the record contained no pretrial written motion preserved for appeal, no trial-court permission to appeal, and no amended certification granting appeal rights, the court concluded it must dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The court dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by Davontez Otis seeking an order compelling a judge to calculate jail-time credit in his underlying criminal case. Otis argued the calculation was ministerial and that appeal would be inadequate because his 90-day jail term would expire before appellate review. The court held that the statute governing jail-time credit grants the sentencing court discretion to grant or deny credit, so mandamus is not available to control that discretion; furthermore, an appeal (with a stay request) is an adequate remedy. The writ was dismissed and costs were assessed to Otis.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Jeffrey A. Swiecicki’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Swiecicki appealed a February 6, 2026 magistrate’s decision, but the court determined the decision was not a final, appealable order because the trial court had not yet adopted the magistrate’s decision or entered judgment disposing of all claims. Under Ohio law, only a judge’s final order is appealable; magistrate decisions remain interlocutory until the trial court acts. The court granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss and noted the appellant may appeal after a final judgment is entered in the trial court.