Court Filings

A jury convicted Gabriel Gallegos of continuous sexual abuse of a child and two counts of indecency with a child. On appeal to the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio), Gallegos argued the evidence was insufficient for one indecency count, alleged multiple jury-charge errors, and contested assessment of court costs. The court upheld the convictions, finding Amy Doe’s outcry and other evidence sufficient for the indecency conviction, that any potential jury-charge defects did not cause the egregious harm required to reverse unpreserved errors, and that Gallegos forfeited his complaint about the court-cost inquiry by not objecting at sentencing.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Edward Arnold Few’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure. Few challenged multiple trial rulings — late disclosure of cell-phone extraction reports, admission of photos/videos from phones, hearsay/outcry testimony, extraneous-offense testimony, a ChildSafe interview video excerpt, and a double-jeopardy claim. The court rejected each argument, finding Few waived many objections by failing to timely and specifically object at trial, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the applicable evidentiary rules and statutory provisions, and that the two convictions punished distinct acts involving different body parts (anus vs. genitals).

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment sentencing Carlos Zepeda Gonzales to nine years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine after the court adjudicated guilt on an online solicitation of a minor conviction following violations of deferred adjudication. Gonzales argued his sentence was excessive, that the court improperly made a “42A” finding affecting parole, and that the court failed to inquire into his ability to pay costs. The appellate court found each complaint forfeited for failure to object at trial and explained that, even if preserved, the sentence was within the statutory range and not grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment convicting Paul Dillon Brown of possession with intent to deliver fentanyl and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Brown argued the appointment order incorrectly found he could pay for counsel and that his life sentence was cruel and unusual. The court held no modification to the appointment order was needed because Brown later retained private counsel and was not ordered to pay appointed-counsel fees. The Eighth Amendment claim was not considered because Brown failed to present his motion for new trial to the trial court, so the issue was unpreserved.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the conviction of Jacoby Latraille Brown, who pleaded guilty to failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements and was sentenced to eight years in prison. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no nonfrivolous appellate issues; the court independently reviewed the record and found no reversible error. The court did find nonreversible errors in the bill of costs: a prematurely assessed $60 time-payment fee, which it struck under Dulin, and a contested assessment of $682.50 in attorney fees, which the concurrence would also delete but the majority did not.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking Gary Ladale Criston's community supervision for possession offenses and sentencing him to five years' imprisonment with a $1,550 fine. Criston had originally pleaded guilty to possessing less than one gram of cocaine and received a ten-year sentence suspended in favor of five years' community supervision. After the State alleged multiple violations, the trial court found the allegations true and revoked supervision. Counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no arguable appellate issues; the appellate court independently reviewed the record and found no reversible error, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and affirmed.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s award of legal custody of two-year-old D.W. to the child’s paternal grandmother and her partner. The juvenile court had previously adjudicated D.W. dependent and placed the child in temporary custody after concerns about Mother’s methamphetamine use, unstable housing, and association with a drug-using boyfriend. The appellate court found the record shows Mother failed to comply with her case plan (substance use and mental health treatment, drug screens, and housing stability), while custodians provided a stable, supportive home and facilitated parental visitation. The court concluded the award was supported by the greater weight of the evidence and was in the child’s best interest.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Akron Municipal Court conviction of Clifford Atkinson for domestic violence. Atkinson argued on appeal that the City presented insufficient evidence that the victim, L.H., was a family or household member. The appellate court reviewed the record de novo, applied Ohio precedent defining "cohabitation" and family/household status, and concluded L.H.'s testimony that Atkinson had lived with her for about a month or two, that they were boyfriend/girlfriend, and that she provided transportation and support, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the relationship met the ordinance's definition. The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Tonya Redmond’s conviction for felonious assault with a firearm specification and her aggregate seven-to-nine year prison sentence. Redmond was convicted after a jury trial for shooting a 62-year-old man who had been housing her; she claimed the gun discharged accidentally while she was trying to turn on a light. The appellate court rejected her challenges to limits on displaying a written definition of “knowingly” during opening statement, found the trial court erred in declining to instruct that accident can negate knowledge but held that error harmless, and concluded the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence given contradictory testimony and other evidence suggesting a knowing shooting.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s August 28, 2025 denial of Charles McRae’s motion for leave to file an untimely petition for postconviction relief. McRae sought to challenge his 2023 convictions and sentence based on various ineffective-assistance, plea, competency, and record-related claims. The appellate court held the petition was untimely under R.C. 2953.21, McRae did not show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts or rely on a new retroactive right under R.C. 2953.23, and his claims were barred by res judicata. The court also found no evidentiary materials showing entitlement to a hearing.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Martin Holloman’s convictions after a jury trial for failure to comply with a police order and theft. Holloman argued the trial court should have instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of duress because he fled when an officer allegedly used force during an attempted arrest. The appellate court held the evidence did not support duress: Holloman initiated the struggle by pulling away and reentering his vehicle, any alleged force was not constant or imminent, and his fear of future harm was not objectively reasonable. The court therefore found no abuse of discretion in refusing the instruction.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ryan Karr's pro se complaint against the Estate of Dianna Sayre and Joseph Aaron Sayre. Karr had alleged perjury, abuse of a disabled person, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other misconduct tied to a prior CPO proceeding, but his nine-page complaint failed to plead distinct causes of action, facts, dates, or the elements required to give defendants adequate notice. The appellate court held the complaint did not satisfy Civ.R. 8(A) and affirmed dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), noting Karr also failed to meaningfully brief his assignments of error on appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Edward Zealor’s convictions for fifty counts of possessing child sexual abuse material. Zealor had moved to suppress evidence obtained after the Commonwealth used administrative subpoenas under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5743.1 to obtain subscriber and router log information tying his shared IP/port to torrent files containing child pornography. The court held Zealor lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber, payment, and IP/port/torrent connection data, and even if some non‑constitutional statutory overreach occurred, suppression is not an available remedy under the Act. The convictions and sentence were therefore affirmed.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of Jason Harding’s first PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing. Harding sought post-conviction relief asserting layered ineffective-assistance claims (trial, direct-appeal, and PCRA counsel) and other errors stemming from trial events (jury delay/mistrial, admission of a statement to police, counsel’s witness choices, and his decision to testify). The court found the claims either procedurally waived, meritless, or unprejudicial: the delay did not prejudice Harding, his custodial statement was a spontaneous utterance not requiring Miranda warnings, failure to call a particular witness would not have helped his self-defense case, and his decision to testify was knowing and voluntary.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Hakime Cooper’s conviction and sentence after a bench trial. Cooper was convicted of retaliation against a witness/victim and harassment for threatening the victim in a courthouse hallway after the victim testified against her. The court held the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence because Cooper and two companions together made multiple threats, satisfying the statute’s requirement of a course of conduct or repeated threatening acts. The court therefore upheld Cooper’s six- to twelve-month sentence for retaliation; no additional penalty was imposed for harassment.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice of United Equitable Insurance Company’s 2022 declaratory judgment complaint. UEIC sought a declaration it owed no coverage beyond a $25,000 policy limit and that it breached no duties to its insured; Walker moved to dismiss arguing res judicata and lack of an actual controversy. The court held the policy limit was undisputed and that UEIC improperly sought retrospective clearance from liability for alleged past bad-faith conduct—matters properly litigated in Walker’s separate bad-faith lawsuit—so there was no justiciable controversy for a declaratory judgment.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff Myles Watson's employment-discrimination suit against the Metropolitan Transit Authority and NYCTA. The Supreme Court had dismissed the case based on a broad release the plaintiff signed after disciplinary proceedings, but the appellate court found factual disputes about the circumstances of signing and therefore rejected dismissal on that ground. The court nonetheless affirmed because the complaint failed to state a viable disability discrimination claim under New York State law and the evidence showed no available safe and reasonable accommodation under the New York City law; the hostile-work-environment claim was also inadequately pleaded.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the bank's foreclosure complaint against 972 Gates Avenue, LLC as time-barred. Chase earlier commenced a foreclosure in August 2010 that accelerated the mortgage, starting the six-year statute of limitations. US Bank filed a new foreclosure in June 2022, over 11 years later, and did not plead or prove it was acting on behalf of Chase. Under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act's CPLR 205-a, a successor/assignee cannot use the six-month savings rule unless it pleads and proves it acts for the original plaintiff, so US Bank was not entitled to tolling and the dismissal was proper.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The dispute concerned whether John Evelyn, who conveyed his interest in the mortgaged Brooklyn property in 2015, remained a necessary defendant in a 2008 mortgage foreclosure. The court held that because Evelyn had made an absolute conveyance and the plaintiff waived any deficiency claim against him, he was no longer a necessary party and could be dropped from the caption under CPLR 1003. The foreclosure and sale order was therefore affirmed as to Evelyn.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order that denied the plaintiff’s renewed attempt to obtain summary judgment on liability against defendant Olson E. Van Rossum in a pedestrian-vehicle negligence case. The court held the plaintiff failed to show new facts with reasonable justification required for renewal, and on reargument the evidence still did not establish the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to judgment on liability. Because the plaintiff’s submissions did not prove the defendant breached a duty proximately causing her injuries, the court adhered to the original denial of summary judgment.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' negligence complaint against the Town of North Hempstead. The plaintiffs sued after Yelena Sharbani allegedly tripped on an uneven sidewalk; the Town moved for summary judgment arguing it had no prior written notice of the defect. The court held the Town showed it lacked prior written notice and the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue that an exception (affirmative creation of the defect or special use) applied, so the Town was entitled to dismissal as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Kings County judgment dismissing Rios's personal-injury complaint after a jury found the bus driver’s negligence was not a substantial factor in the crash and that the other vehicle’s driver was solely at fault. The plaintiff had moved to set aside the liability verdict as against the weight of the evidence, but the court denied that motion. The court also found any claimed errors in admitting certain defense expert testimony to be harmless because the outcome would not have changed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claim against Garden City Public Schools. The plaintiff sued under the Child Victims Act alleging the school negligently failed to prevent sexual abuse by a teacher. The school moved for summary judgment arguing it had no actual or constructive notice of the teacher's propensity for sexual abuse; the personnel file showed an earlier accusation was investigated and deemed unfounded. The court held the plaintiff's speculative allegations about bias or a cover-up did not create a triable issue of fact, so dismissal was proper.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order dismissing two counts of a grand jury indictment against defendant Rony Zino. The charges—criminally negligent homicide and reckless driving—arose from an October 11, 2023 vehicle-pedestrian accident that resulted in the pedestrian's death. The court held the grand jury evidence, even viewed in the People’s favor, did not provide the prima facie proof required for those crimes because it failed to show the defendant engaged in the degree of blameworthy conduct or reckless disregard of consequences necessary for conviction.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order designating Benjamin Williams a level two sex offender under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act. Williams pleaded guilty to possessing child sexual performance material; after a SORA hearing the court scored him 80 points on the risk instrument, denied his request for a downward departure from the presumptive risk level, and imposed the level two designation. The appellate court held the trial court properly exercised its discretion because the quantity, nature, duration of viewing, and sharing of images supported the assessed risk, and other claimed mitigating factors were either unpreserved or already accounted for by the Guidelines.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed defendant Troy Williams's conviction for first-degree manslaughter after a jury trial but reduced his sentence in the interest of justice. The court found the guilty verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, denied claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and held a claim that the People withheld Brady material must be raised in a CPL 440.10 motion because the supporting facts are dehors the record. Exercising its discretion, the court reduced the prison term from 15 years to 8 years (postrelease supervision unchanged) and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the County Court judgment convicting Brian Whittaker, who pleaded guilty to first-degree reckless endangerment and criminal possession of a firearm and was sentenced. The court held Whittaker validly, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his appellate rights and his written waiver of prosecution by indictment was valid. Although he argued the plea allocution was factually insufficient and thus involuntary, that claim was unpreserved and without merit because the allocution demonstrated he understood the charges and knowingly entered the plea.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed two County Court judgments that convicted Orlando Ramsay on multiple drug- and weapon-related charges after he pleaded guilty. Ramsay argued his pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and raised ineffective-assistance claims, but the court found those claims unpreserved because he never moved to withdraw his pleas or raised the issue below. The court also held his plea allocution did not cast significant doubt on guilt, and the record independently shows the pleas were valid. Any ineffective-assistance claims not directly related to plea negotiations or sentencing were forfeited by the guilty pleas.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the judgment adjudicating the defendant a youthful offender following his guilty plea to attempted second-degree robbery, but modified the judgment by vacating the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee. The court concluded those monetary assessments must be set aside because recent legislative amendments (and subsequent state appellate authority) apply retroactively to youthful-offender dispositions and repeal mandatory surcharges and victim assistance fees for youthful offenders. All other aspects of the judgment, including the youthful offender adjudication and sentence, were left intact.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the County Court's denial without a hearing of Valery Latouche's 2024 CPL 440.47 motion to vacate his sentences and be resentenced under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (Penal Law § 60.12). The court held Latouche failed to submit the required corroborating evidence—at least two pieces, one of which must be a specified form of record—showing he was subjected to substantial domestic abuse at the time of the offenses and that such abuse significantly contributed to his criminal behavior. The panel modified the order to state the denial was without prejudice.