Court Filings

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed a nonfinal trial-court order in a landlord-tenant dispute. The court affirmed the portions of the order that related to the landlord’s summary proceedings for possession, but dismissed the appeal as to the trial court’s determination on a tenants’ motion to determine rents for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The panel held that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) limits interlocutory appeals to orders determining the right to immediate possession, and an order resolving rents is not an enumerated, appealable nonfinal order.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed Neely Petrie-Blanchard’s conviction for first-degree murder but reversed her mandatory life sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before sentencing. Although Petrie-Blanchard validly waived counsel and proceeded pro se at trial after an adequate Faretta inquiry, the court did not re-offer counsel at the separate, critical sentencing stage. The panel held that failing to renew the offer of counsel at sentencing is fundamental error and requires resentencing with appointed counsel or an explicit waiver.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of J.J.A.’s motion to suppress but reversed the juvenile disposition order adjudicating him delinquent for possession of a firearm by a minor. The appellate court found the disposition order failed to state the statutory maximum penalty and did not award or specify predisposition credit for time served, as required by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.115(d)(2). Because the commitment at issue is effectively determinate (it will end before the department’s authority expires), the court ordered the trial court to enter a corrected disposition specifying the maximum penalty and the amount of credit.

The Third District affirmed most of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of FAM Productions and Herrera, holding that plaintiff Saldana's claims based on four successive loans are limited to a single claim against FAM Productions (Washington) on the fourth loan and that neither FAM (Florida) nor Herrera are liable on the notes. The panel reversed the portion of the judgment dismissing Saldana’s claim against FAM (Washington) without prejudice to arbitration because the trial court did not resolve Saldana’s argument that FAM (Washington) waived arbitration by its litigation conduct. The case is remanded for the trial court to decide waiver in the first instance.

The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed George Madison’s challenge to his enhanced sentences for kidnapping, carjacking, robbery, and two identity-fraud counts. Madison argued the trial judge, rather than a jury, made the factual findings that triggered statutory enhancements and that the findings were made by a preponderance standard. The court held that any constitutional error under Erlinger was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the State presented unrebutted evidence at sentencing that plainly supported the enhancements. The court affirmed the enhancements but reversed and remanded to correct errors in the written sentencing order so it matches the oral pronouncements.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed a final judgment in a divorce case. The court affirmed most issues raised by Husband but reversed two rulings affecting Wife: the denial of retroactive child support and the omission of family photographs and videos from equitable distribution. The court found the record contained uncontroverted evidence of the child’s needs and Husband’s ability to pay, and held that family photographs and videos created or acquired during the marriage are marital assets. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine the retroactive support amount and to include and distribute the photographic materials.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed a dissolution of marriage judgment after both parties appealed. The appellate court found multiple deficiencies in the trial court’s final judgment — missing asset and liability designations, insufficient factual findings (including valuation of the husband’s law practice, temporary support modification, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees) — but concluded many issues were preserved by a timely motion for rehearing. The court also held the trial court erred in treating a premarital Wells Fargo brokerage account as marital property because the record shows marital funds used to pay a secured margin loan were traceable and did not commingle the account except possibly for a de minimis amount. The matter was remanded for specific findings and correction of errors.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal partially reversed and partially affirmed Devonte Baker’s convictions related to multiple tire-slashing incidents. The court held the State failed to prove Baker’s identity for the first incident and failed to prove he was armed for two armed-trespass counts. It reversed counts 1 and 2 (identity insufficiency), reduced counts 4 and 6 from armed trespass to simple trespass, and ordered vacation of counts 8 and 9 from the judgment because they had already been acquitted. The court affirmed convictions for counts 3, 5 (criminal mischiefs), and 7 (stalking), and remanded for amended judgments and resentencing.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Christopher J. Porter’s convictions for sexual battery and related lewd offenses but reversed part of his sentence. The court found the trial judge had orally imposed life imprisonment for the sexual-battery count and concurrent mandatory minimums for two molestation counts, but the written judgment mistakenly listed a 25-year minimum for the sexual-battery count. The court ordered correction of the written sentence to strike the improper 25-year mandatory minimum for the sexual-battery count and also directed removal of misdemeanor costs; it upheld a $65 county ordinance court cost as properly imposed.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed Troy William Armstrong’s convictions for multiple counts of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. The State conceded that one count (Count II), charging sexual battery under section 794.011(2)(a) based on 'union' with the victim’s anus by the defendant’s mouth, required proof of penetration and there was no evidence of anal penetration. The court reversed Count II on that basis, affirmed the remaining convictions, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that partial reversal.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed a probation revocation and five-year prison sentence imposed on Carliovis Bandera-Valier. The court affirmed the finding that Bandera-Valier violated probation, concluding the earlier Faretta (self-representation) inquiry was adequate for the violation hearing. However, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before sentencing as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5). The court certified conflict with a Fifth District decision that treated similar error as harmless.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded a final judgment for the property owner against Berman Construction arising from a fire that destroyed a home during renovation. The trial court had denied the contractor’s requested interrogatory asking whether the contractor was excused from performance under a contract risk-of-loss clause allocating certain perils to the owner. The appeals court held the denial was an abuse of discretion because the affirmative defense tied to section 15.9 was unresolved and the jury should have been able to decide whether the fire was caused by an owner-borne peril, such as arson or other events beyond the contractor’s reasonable control.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed part of a trial court order in a parenting-plan relocation case because the trial court granted permanent relocation relief after a hearing that had been noticed only for temporary relief. The appellant had requested both temporary and permanent relief, but the notice for the July 17, 2024 hearing specified only temporary relief. The appellate court held that granting permanent relief without proper notice violated due process. The court affirmed the temporary relief, reversed the permanent-relief portion, and remanded for a proper final hearing on permanent relocation.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed part of a trial court order in a parenting-plan modification case. Ellen-Rose Fitzgerald sought temporary and permanent relief to relocate with her children; the hearing was noticed only for temporary relief. The trial court nonetheless entered an order granting permanent relief. The appellate court held that granting relief beyond the noticed subject violated due process, affirmed the portion granting temporary relief, reversed the portion granting permanent relief, and remanded for a properly noticed final hearing on permanency.