Court Filings

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Efrain Rodulfo Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rodulfo, who pleaded guilty under a plea bargain and was sentenced to 25 years on November 18, 2025, filed a pro se motion construed as a notice of appeal on April 14, 2026. The appellate court found the notice untimely because it was filed well after the 30-day deadline (or 90 days only if a timely motion for new trial is filed), and no extension was sought. The trial court also certified that Rodulfo waived and did not have a right to appeal, which required dismissal as well.

The Court of Appeals dismissed two consolidated direct appeals by Google, LLC and its employee Laura Revenko seeking review of a trial court order compelling them to comply with deposition notices and subpoenas in a divorce case. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because discovery orders in domestic relations cases listed in OCGA § 5-6-35 must be pursued by discretionary application, even if the order otherwise meets the collateral order criteria for immediacy. Because Google and Revenko did not file the required application for appeal, the appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an application for interlocutory appeal by guardians of a minor bitten by a dog because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was untimely. After the trial court granted summary judgment for the homeowner (Jerry) on March 10, 2026, the court issued the required certificate only on April 2, 2026 — 23 days later. Because Georgia law requires the certificate be issued within ten days of the order and that requirement is jurisdictional, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the application. The plaintiffs must wait for a final judgment to pursue appeal rights.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Vernard K. Carter, Jr.'s appeal from a superior court writ of possession because the appeal was subject to discretionary-appeal procedures. The case began as a dispossessory action in magistrate court, was reviewed de novo by the superior court, and then appealed directly to this Court. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because Carter did not follow the statutory discretionary-appeal process required for appeals from superior-court de novo reviews of magistrate-court rulings (OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1) and controlling precedent). The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Susanne E. Krupa’s direct appeal from a final divorce decree because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations cases must be pursued by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35. Krupa filed a notice of appeal rather than the required discretionary application, and the court held that compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional. Because Krupa did not follow that procedure, the court granted Timothy E. McLane’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Jonathan D. Reed’s appeal challenging parts of his 2007 convictions and sentence. Reed had previously litigated the same challenge to his hijacking sentence and earlier appeals were dismissed or resolved, so the court found it lacked jurisdiction to relitigate those issues. The court also held that claims attacking the validity of a conviction or asserting merger of sentences are not properly raised in a motion to vacate as void, and Reed’s consecutive-sentence challenge did not present a colorable voidness claim because each sentence was within statutory limits.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Gustavo Cisneros’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his 2026 motion to vacate a void sentence. Cisneros argued several convictions should have merged (attempt with armed robbery, sexual battery with aggravated battery, and burglary with armed robbery). The court held that merger challenges attack convictions, not sentences, and therefore are not properly raised in a motion to vacate a void sentence. Because the motion did not present a colorable void-sentence claim, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Austin Eugene Spargo's direct appeal from a trial court order revoking his probation because such appeals must be pursued by applying for a discretionary appeal under state law. The court explained that compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional, cited statute and precedent, and concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Brian K. Woofter’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Woofter, criminally charged in municipal court for purchasing and selling alcohol to minors, had the charge dismissed and then sought return of six cases of alcohol seized by the sheriff. The trial court denied his motion but said it could be reconsidered if Woofter produced proof of purchase. The appellate court held that the denial was not a final, appealable order because it anticipated further action and did not affect a substantial right or foreclose effective relief on the motion.

The court dismissed Hasan Howard’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a Lake County judge’s failure to quash a warrant or promptly hold a community-control violation hearing while Howard remains in federal custody. The judge granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), concluding Howard cannot show a clear legal right to relief because Ohio law tolls community control while an offender is confined, and the interstate detainer statute does not require a prompt hearing for probation or community-control violations. The court also relied on due-process precedent holding no right to an immediate hearing before custody on the detainer has occurred.

The court dismissed H&S Investment Properties, LLC’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to force the Ashtabula County Auditor to change the owner name on the county tax list to match an affidavit recorded under R.C. 5301.252. The court held that the recorder’s affidavit statute does not itself create a right to change tax-roll entries and that the auditor’s duty under R.C. 319.28 is to compile the tax list, not to alter it based on a recorded affidavit. Because Relator cannot show a clear legal right or corresponding clear legal duty by the auditor, mandamus relief was unavailable and the petition was dismissed; the summary-judgment motion was denied as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Thomas Crain’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Crain had appealed from post-trial documents related to a magistrate’s decision and a later trial-court entry adopting that decision. The appellate court found the filings attached to the notice of appeal were irregular: the magistrate’s paper was a dispositive magistrate’s decision, and the trial-court paper merely incorporated that decision but did not itself enter a separate, signed judgment specifying relief. Because the trial court failed to enter a final, independent judgment determining all claims, the appeal cannot proceed.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Da’vhon Young’s appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. The per curiam opinion consists only of the single-word disposition “DISMISSED” with concurrence from three judges. No substantive reasoning or discussion of issues appears in the published entry, and the opinion notes that it is not final until any timely authorized motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure is resolved.

The First District Court of Appeal dismissed Johnnie Peacock's appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for Escambia County. The opinion is a brief per curiam entry, announces dismissal, and notes that the panel judges concurred. The order informs the parties that the decision is not final until any timely authorized motion under Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.330 or 9.331 is resolved. No written opinion explaining the reasons for dismissal is included in the document.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed appellant Marshay Coggins's appeal as untimely. The appeal arose from a decision of the Circuit Court for Jefferson County and was reviewed by a three-judge panel. The court issued a short per curiam order dismissing the appeal for failure to file within the required time, with all three judges concurring and noting the decision is not final until any timely, authorized motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure is resolved.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Chuka Anene’s discretionary application for review of a February 3, 2026 divorce judgment because it was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. Anene filed the application on March 27, 2026 — 52 days after entry of the decree — and the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider untimely applications under OCGA § 5-6-35(d). The court therefore dismissed the application as untimely, noting a prior direct appeal by Anene had already been dismissed as improper in divorce cases.

The defendant appealed from a Supreme Court (Onondaga County) order denying his motion to vacate a default judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. While the appeal was pending, the defendant and plaintiff’s attorney signed a stipulation of discontinuance in February 2026. The Appellate Division consequently dismissed the appeal without costs on April 24, 2026. The court did not reach the merits of the underlying motion to vacate because the parties stipulated to discontinue the action.

The Appellate Division dismissed an appeal and cross-appeal in an Erie County civil action between Sycamore Maple Family Ltd. Partnership and James F. Jerge. The parties filed a stipulation of discontinuance on April 2, 2026, and the court ordered the appeals dismissed without costs on April 24, 2026. No opinion on the merits was issued because the case was discontinued by the parties.

The Appellate Division dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a divorce action concerning the equitable distribution of marital property. The appeals arose from a September 19, 2024 Supreme Court order in Livingston County that, among other things, distributed the parties' marital assets. The appellate court issued a unanimous order dismissing both matters without costs and referenced a companion memorandum decision in a related appeal. No substantive reversal or modification of the lower court's distribution is contained in this short order.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed an appeal by defendant Bradford Morse challenging a Supreme Court order that, among other things, approved compensation for the Attorney for the Children in a matrimonial action. The court held the appeal could not proceed as of right because the challenged order did not decide a motion made on notice under CPLR 5701(a) and therefore is not immediately appealable. The panel declined to treat the notice of appeal as a permission-to-appeal application and denied discretionary review.

The Fourth Department dismissed as moot Anthony Flowers's appeal from a CPLR article 78 judgment that had sought to annul the Parole Board's denial of parole. The court explained the challenged parole determination expired while the appeal was pending and the Board later denied Flowers a subsequent parole request, removing any live controversy. The court also found that the exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply and therefore affirmed dismissal without reaching the merits of the underlying parole decision.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed as moot a CPLR article 78 proceeding brought by petitioner Oscar Asencio challenging a Department of Corrections determination finding he violated incarcerated individual rules after a tier III hearing. The court concluded the challenge no longer presented a live controversy and cited controlling precedent on mootness. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition without costs and did not reach the merits of the disciplinary determination.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus petition by Zachary Brice Knox challenging a temporary restraining order that denied him possession and access to a child. After the petition was filed, the trial court modified and partially vacated the TRO and set a hearing for temporary orders. Because the complained-of provisions were vacated, the appellate court found Knox’s complaints moot and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under the appellate rules.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal from the trial court’s verbal denial of his pretrial habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court found no written order ruling on the habeas application in the record, and Texas law requires a written order to invoke appellate jurisdiction in habeas matters. The court also noted the underlying criminal charge was dismissed after Newson filed his habeas application, rendering the pretrial habeas petition moot. Because Newson did not show cause why the appeal should proceed, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal from the trial court’s verbal denial of his pretrial habeas application for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court explained that an oral pronouncement is not appealable absent a signed written order, and the record contained no written ruling. The court also noted the underlying criminal charge was dismissed after Newson filed his habeas application, rendering the habeas petition moot. Because there was no appealable written order and the case was dismissed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal of a pretrial habeas corpus ruling for lack of jurisdiction. Newson sought review after an oral denial of his pretrial writ under Texas law, but no written trial-court order appears in the record. The court also found the issue moot because Newson entered a plea bargain, was tried and convicted, and therefore the pretrial relief he sought (including bail reduction) could no longer be granted. Because there was no appealable written order and the matter is moot, the appeal was dismissed.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal dismissed Johnny Antonio Thomas’s appeal from a county-court order that struck his six counterclaims and setoff defenses in a small-claims action by Chaney’s Used Cars to recover a loan deficiency after repossession and sale. The panel concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the dismissed counterclaims arose from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim and therefore were compulsory; orders dismissing compulsory counterclaims are not immediately appealable while the original claim remains pending. The court also rejected alternative bases for interlocutory review and ordered the appeal dismissed.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Container Corporation and Hartford Fire Insurance Company's petition for a writ of certiorari seeking relief in an original proceeding brought against James Way. The court issued a brief per curiam decision on April 24, 2026, stating only “DISMISSED” and noting the opinion is not final until any timely motions under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330 or 9.331 are resolved. No substantive reasoning or legal analysis appears in the published entry beyond the dismissal and concurrence by the three judges.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Brian Bacchus’s appeal from a judges of compensation claims decision concerning an April 20, 2021 accident. The court issued a brief per curiam order simply stating 'DISMISSED' without published opinion or extended reasoning. The dismissal ends this appeal at the appellate level unless the appellant timely files an authorized motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to challenge that procedural disposition.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal dismissed Raul A. Campoverde’s appeal because he filed a pro se notice of appeal while he was represented by retained counsel in the trial court. The court concluded that a defendant cannot proceed both pro se and by counsel at the same time, and under Florida precedent such pro se filings while represented are unauthorized and treated as nullities. Because no authorized notice of appeal was filed within the 30-day deadline and no order permitted counsel to withdraw, the appellate court found it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without prejudice to a petition for belated appeal.