Court Filings

The Court of Appeals dismissed EZ Automotive and Towing SVC LLC's appeal from the trial court's summary judgment because the judgment was not final or appealable. Recaman Auto Group obtained summary judgment on its declaratory-judgment claim about ownership of a Chevrolet Silverado, but the trial court expressly left Recaman's request for attorney’s fees undecided. Because the fee claim remained pending and the order lacked finality language, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas struck Kevin McBride’s appellate brief for failure to substantially comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure after multiple notices and an opportunity to cure. McBride’s March 30, 2026 brief was deficient—containing conclusory, bulleted statements without citation to the record or legal authority—so the court treated the filing as if no brief had been filed and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court explained that liberal construction of procedural rules does not require the court to perform a party’s legal research or factual hunting.

The court granted the parties' agreed motion to dismiss the appeal and the plaintiff's underlying claims with prejudice. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing Appellant Eric Erdeljac's claims against appellees Kalahari Development LLC, KR Acquisitions, LLC (d/b/a Kalahari Resorts & Conventions), and Gerson Velasquez with prejudice, dismissed the appeal with prejudice, and denied as moot any other pending motions. Court costs are taxed against the party incurring them. No opinion was issued.

The court dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by David Disraeli challenging a justice court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration clause. The Third Court of Appeals concluded it lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a justice of the peace or justice court unless issuance is necessary to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction, and the relator did not show that necessity. Because the jurisdictional prerequisite was not met, the court dismissed the mandamus petition and all pending motions as moot.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Sean Harper’s appeal from his conviction for failing to comply with sex-offender registration requirements because the trial-court certification in the record indicated Harper waived his right to appeal. The clerk’s record showed a not-guilty plea and a jury verdict of guilty, while a separate punishment plea agreement limited appeals and contained Harper’s written waiver. The court reviewed both clerk’s and reporter’s records, concluded the certification did not show a right to appeal, gave Harper an opportunity to supply an amended certification, and dismissed the appeal after no amended certification or response was filed.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ram Country of Fort Stockton, LLC’s interlocutory appeal from a county court’s order appointing an arbitrator because the court lacks jurisdiction to review orders that merely appoint an arbitrator under the Federal Arbitration Act. Ram Country alternatively asked the court to treat the filing as a petition for a writ of mandamus; the court considered that request but denied mandamus because Ram Country failed to show it lacked an adequate appellate remedy and did not meet procedural certification requirements. The court relied on Texas precedent holding appointment orders are not appealable interlocutory orders.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Lawrence Jeanpierre's appeal against Discover Bank for want of prosecution. Jeanpierre repeatedly missed the briefing deadline, filed a late brief and an amended brief that violated the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and failed to file a compliant second amended brief or request further extensions after the court struck his filings and set deadlines. Because he did not file a timely, compliant brief or request an extension, the court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio granted a joint motion to dismiss and dismissed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Flex, and Amazon.com Services, LLC. The petition was originally filed March 10, 2026, and the court had set an April 7, 2026 deadline for responses. After the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss, the court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and dismissed the mandamus proceeding. No merits decision was reached.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Russell Carl Nast’s direct appeal of the trial court’s October 8, 2025 order confirming an arbitration award and granting a divorce because appeals in divorce cases must proceed by discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). The court concluded the proper procedure was an application for discretionary appeal, and that procedure is jurisdictional, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the respondent’s request for a frivolous-appeal penalty.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Tamera Montgomery’s appeal of a trial court order granting summary judgment to Milton Ruben Toyota of Augusta because Montgomery failed to file her appellant brief by the April 13, 2026 deadline and did not request an extension. The appeal had been docketed March 23, 2026, and under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) the court dismissed for failure to prosecute. The order is procedural — the appellate court did not address the merits of the summary judgment ruling.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted direct appeal by Olufeyijimi Awofadeju from a final divorce decree entered December 22, 2025. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35, and the appellant did not follow that procedure. Because use of the discretionary-appeal process is jurisdictional, the improperly filed direct appeal could not proceed and was dismissed on April 22, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal from an April 2, 2026 trial-court entry requiring the State to disclose exculpatory evidence. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s order was interlocutory and not a final, appealable order under Ohio law. The court also concluded, alternatively, that Jones lacked standing because the trial court’s ruling granted him the relief he sought, so he was not an aggrieved party. All pending motions were ruled moot and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Jones had appealed a March 13, 2026 trial-court entry denying his motions to dismiss a death-penalty specification. The appellate court held the denial was an interlocutory order that did not qualify as a final, appealable order under Ohio law and R.C. 2505.02(B), so it could not be reviewed now. Because no final judgment disposed of all claims, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were overruled as moot.

The Appellate Division dismissed John Evelyn's appeals from two Supreme Court orders in a mortgage foreclosure action because the right to a direct appeal ended when the court entered the final order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss these appeals, noting the issues raised are properly considered on the existing appeal from the final foreclosure judgment. The panel therefore dismissed the appeals without costs and treated related issues as preserved for review on the appeal from the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale.

The Second District Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of certiorari from plaintiffs Carolyn Hoskins and Lolita Johns challenging a trial court order that dismissed without prejudice their direct-liability medical-malpractice claim against Women's Care of Florida for failure to satisfy presuit notice under chapter 766. The appellate court concluded the petitioners failed to show the required irreparable harm from the without-prejudice dismissal. Because certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and jurisdictional prerequisites were not met, the court dismissed the petition without addressing the trial court's legal ruling on presuit notice.

The Second District Court of Appeal dismissed Neelam Uppal’s petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a Pinellas County circuit court decision. The petition named multiple respondents including a condominium association, management companies, mortgage entities, and individual defendants. The court issued a short per curiam order simply stating “Dismissed” without extended reasoning, and three judges concurred. The filing indicates counsel appearances for some respondents and no appearance for others; the opinion is subject to revision before official publication.

The First District of Texas Court of Appeals granted the appellant's unopposed motion to dismiss an appeal. The appellant had filed a notice of nonsuit and later a motion to dismiss the appeal; the court requested clarification and held the motion for the required period for a response, but none was filed. The court therefore granted the motion, dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision disposed of the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by WC 4th and Colorado, LP and WC 4th and Rio Grande, LP for want of prosecution after the appellants failed to file their brief by the extended deadline and did not respond to the court's notice. The court explained the brief was originally due October 27, 2025, an extension to December 1, 2025 was granted, and the appellants failed to file a brief or request a further extension. Because of that failure and no response to a December 11, 2025 dismissal notice, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terrell Samuels’ appeal from a judgment of the County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County, because Samuels failed to timely file an appellant’s brief and did not provide a reasonable explanation after being warned. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing deadlines and the court’s authority to dismiss appeals for failure to prosecute. Any pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ray Jackson's appeal for want of prosecution because Jackson did not establish indigence, did not pay for or arrange payment for the clerk's record, and failed to respond to the court's notice that dismissal was possible. The court invoked the appellate rules permitting dismissal when the clerk's record is not filed due to the appellant's fault and when an appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. All pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The court dismissed an appeal by Delanie Perkins from a County Civil Court at Law judgment because Perkins failed to file an appellant’s brief by the deadline and did not respond to the court’s notice to file the brief or request an extension. The First District applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that permit dismissal for want of prosecution and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute between Perkins and West Lake Park Apartments.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were untimely. Coleman was convicted and sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year prison terms for sexual assault (cause no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (cause no. 1824734). Texas rules require a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing unless a timely motion for new trial is filed; no such motions were in the clerk’s records and Coleman did not file notices until February 11, 2026. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and denied pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were filed late. Coleman was sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year terms following convictions for sexual assault (case no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (case no. 1824734). Because no motion for new trial was filed and the standard 30-day deadline to appeal expired on October 26, 2025, Coleman's notices filed February 11, 2026 were untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas consolidated two duplicate appeals filed after the trial court granted partial summary judgment and later severed the case, making that interlocutory order final and appealable. The court found the notices of appeal filed in two appellate dockets were identical and stemmed from the same October 2, 2025 severance order, so it granted the unopposed motion to consolidate and ordered the consolidated appeal to proceed under cause number 01-26-00052-CV. Because the appellate record is incomplete, the court declined to set a briefing schedule and dismissed the duplicate appellate docket 01-25-01093-CV.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Reginald Charles Harvey’s appeal from various trial-court orders in a dispute with U.S. Nature-Invest Holdings, LLC because the notice of appeal was filed late. The underlying dispute began with the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment in January 2025 and multiple post-judgment motions by Harvey, the last of which the trial court denied on February 6, 2026. Harvey filed his notice of appeal on March 16, 2026 — 38 days after the February 6 order — and the Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory under state law.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kentay Smith’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Smith sought review of post-October 17, 2025 orders after filing a notice of appeal on March 2, 2026. The court held that the controlling final order was entered October 17, 2025, and Smith’s notice of appeal was not filed within the 30-day statutory deadline. The February 19, 2026 order merely stated the case was closed and made no new substantive custody ruling, so it was not appealable. Motions to expedite and for emergency consideration were also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal in Phan v. Lee because appellants failed to file their enumerations of error and brief by the court-imposed deadline and did not request an extension. The appeal had been docketed March 6, 2026, and appellants were required to file within 20 days (by March 26, 2026). Citing Court of Appeals Rules 7 and 23(a) and precedent (Britton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n), the court ordered dismissal on April 21, 2026 for noncompliance with filing requirements.

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed a disciplinary proceeding charging attorney Darryl J. Ferguson with violating parts of Rule 1.15(I) for failing to protect a chiropractor’s asserted interest in two clients’ settlement proceeds. The Review Board had recommended a 60-day suspension conditioned on restitution, but the Court concluded the Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ferguson violated Rule 1.15(I)(b), (c), or (d). The Court held that Ferguson reasonably could conclude the chiropractor’s form was an unperfected lien or attempt at a statutory lien that he could disregard under Rule 1.15(I)(b), and therefore no discipline was imposed and the matter was dismissed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed (quashed) Ajani Posey’s appeal because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court relied on Pennsylvania appellate procedure rules defining final orders and explaining limits on appeals from certain interlocutory orders, including transfer orders under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103. Because the challenged order did not meet the rules for an appeal as of right, the Supreme Court ended the case without addressing the underlying merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed Ajani Posey’s notice of appeal on April 21, 2026, because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court concluded the appealed order did not meet the state rules' definition of a final order and noted that certain interlocutory transfer orders are not appealable as of right. Consequently, the appeal cannot proceed in the Supreme Court at this time.