Court Filings

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Dwayne Eugene Jackson’s direct appeal of his March 2026 guilty plea and 20-year sentence because the appeal was not filed under the state’s newly amended discretionary review procedure required for guilty pleas entered on or after May 14, 2025. The court explained that OCGA § 5-6-35 now requires such appeals to begin by application for discretionary review and that failure to follow that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Jackson did not comply, the court concluded it lacks jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application filed by Fulton County Sheriff Patrick Labat seeking review of a trial court order that denied his summary-judgment immunity defense in a lawsuit by Ralph Gershom challenging a sheriff's deed. The court concluded the superior-court order is directly appealable under new OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(15), effective July 1, 2025, so an interlocutory application was unnecessary. Because Sheriff Labat already filed a notice of appeal docketed as Case No. A26A1678, the Court dismissed the duplicative application as superfluous and directed further filings to proceed under the existing appeal number.

The First Department dismissed as moot an appeal by a father challenging a Supreme Court Bronx County temporary custody order that gave physical custody to the mother and visitation to the father. The court granted the father's appellate counsel's motion to withdraw under Anders v. California after concluding there were no nonfrivolous issues to raise. The panel held the temporary visitation order was not an appealable final disposition under the Family Court Act and, in any event, the temporary order expired and has been superseded by later custody and visitation orders that were not appealed, rendering this appeal moot.

The Appellate Division dismissed plaintiff David Gennett's appeal challenging Supreme Court's refusal to fix his second attorney Ronald Benjamin's charging lien before the case concluded. The case had settled while the appeal was pending, making the request for an immediate fee determination moot. The appellate court also held that whether the second attorney's compensation should be measured by quantum meruit instead of the contingency agreement is not yet ripe because Supreme Court has not resolved the fee allocation and has placed a portion of settlement funds in escrow pending that determination. The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Ernest Garcia’s appeal from a December 4, 2025 judgment because his March 5, 2026 notice of appeal was untimely and he failed to provide a required reasonable explanation or file a motion for extension of time after the court ordered him to do so. The court concluded the late notice could only be excused by an implied extension under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 if Garcia supplied a reasonable explanation, which he did not, so the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal and dismissed it under Rule 42.3(a).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Minor sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment, but the appellate court concluded such a denial is an interlocutory order not immediately appealable. The court also noted the clerk’s record did not include an order denying the motion, and that Minor failed to respond to an order to show cause about jurisdiction. Because the appeal was from a non-appealable interlocutory ruling and procedural requirements were not met, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor's appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for a default judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that denials of default judgments are ordinarily interlocutory and not appealable before entry of a final judgment. The court ordered Minor to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal. The decision rests on Texas law that interlocutory orders denying default judgment cannot be appealed until the underlying case is finally resolved.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Latoya Lavasiee Hopkins’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County for want of prosecution because she repeatedly failed to file her appellate brief or request extensions despite notices and a court order. The appellate court gave deadlines and warnings under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure but Hopkins did not respond. Because she did not comply with the court’s order to file a brief by the specified date, the court exercised its authority to dismiss the appeal.

The court dismissed an appeal by Ivie Fenoi-Lynch for lack of jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch filed a notice of appeal from a justice court judgment, but the appellate record shows the case continued in the county court at law and no final judgment was signed by that county court. The Fourth Court of Appeals explained it only has jurisdiction over appeals from district or county courts in its district and only over final judgments; a notice of appeal from a justice court does not invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch’s response to a show-cause order did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal in a child-support modification case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant filed a notice of appeal after the trial court had entered and then vacated an order dismissing his motion and granted a new trial date; no final, signed order was in the clerk’s record. The appellate court warned the appellant to show cause and to file any supplemental clerk’s record by a deadline, but the appellant did not respond. Because there was no final judgment or appealable order, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Giovani Aveleno Kitts’s criminal appeal after he filed a motion to dismiss that complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The motion was signed by Kitts and his counsel, and the court granted it, ending appellate review. The opinion is a short per curiam dismissal with no discussion of the merits and is not for publication.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed EFT Express SA de CV's appeal from a Webb County district court for want of prosecution because the clerk's record was not filed and the appellant failed to pay the fee required for preparing the record. The appellate court notified the appellant and ordered a written explanation, but the appellant did not respond by the deadline. Citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court dismissed the appeal and taxed appellate costs against the appellant.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Capital Fund I, LLC’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had entered a default judgment against Capital Fund but expressly labeled it interlocutory. The plaintiff then obtained a severance order moving the entire dispute against Capital Fund (both defaulted and still-pending claims) into a new cause. The appellate court concluded that severing the entire case did not convert the interlocutory default judgment into a final, appealable judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant A.C.'s attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.C., proceeding pro se, filed an application for a protective order and appealed after the trial court orally denied relief; the court later signed an order denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation. Because A.C. acknowledged that related proceedings (a foreign custody/support registration from Ohio and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship) remain pending, the appellate court concluded the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable under Texas law, and A.C. did not respond to a show-cause order.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed McGarvey-Wilkins’s appeal from a Georgia State-Wide Business Court order denying her request to proceed as an indigent. The appellant repeatedly failed to file a compliant affidavit of indigency, pay the filing fee, or provide an adequate certificate of service despite the Court’s orders to do so. Because she did not file a timely initial brief and did not show good cause for the defaults required by Court of Appeals Rule 23(a), the Court dismissed the appeal for noncompliance with procedural rules.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kyle Ramsey’s direct appeal of a twelve-month protective order granted to Kristina Ramsey under Georgia’s Family Violence Act for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that appeals in domestic relations and Family Violence Act matters must be pursued by filing an application for discretionary appeal in the appellate court rather than by a trial-court notice of appeal. Because Kyle did not follow the mandatory discretionary-appeal procedure, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thelma Peake's late request to file her appellate brief after the deadline and quashed her appeal in a dispute over Shaun Griffith’s nomination petition for Pennsylvania’s 3rd Congressional District. The court acted on an application for leave to file the brief nunc pro tunc and concluded the application must be denied. Because Peake failed to file a timely brief, the Court ended the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying nomination-petition dispute.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thelma Peake's late request to file her appellate brief out of time and quashed her appeal for failure to file a timely brief in a case challenging the nomination petition of Shaun Griffith for Pennsylvania's 3rd Congressional District. The court's order, issued per curiam, concluded that leave to file nunc pro tunc was not warranted and that the procedural default (no timely brief) required dismissal of the appeal. No substantive merits were reached because the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed as moot the appeal by Sebastian C., who challenged a juvenile court’s denial of his request to transfer from a secure youth treatment facility to his adult sister’s home as a "less restrictive program" under Welfare & Institutions Code section 875. The appellate court concluded that clarification of the statutory meaning was warranted: a family home can qualify as a less restrictive program when supervision and services are provided or coordinated by a community-based nonresidential program. Because Sebastian was later placed in less restrictive settings and the challenged order no longer affects him, the court dismissed the appeal without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in this case.

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, granted appellant Chadwick Edward Lambert’s joint motion to dismiss his criminal appeal. The motion was signed by Lambert and his appellate counsel and cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). Because the motion complied with the rule, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The decision is a brief memorandum opinion filed April 14, 2026, and the dismissal was entered on appellant’s motion.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruben Dario Almela’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and also granted attorney’s fees but did not set the fee amount, so the order did not resolve all claims or parties and was not a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court previously questioned jurisdiction and gave Almela time to show cause; he did not respond. Because the judgment was not final and Almela failed to justify appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terry Akwue’s appeal from a small claims judgment because his notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court entered final judgment on September 26, 2025; Akwue filed a motion for new trial which extended his deadline to December 26, 2025, but he did not file his notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction for a late-filed notice, gave Akwue notice that the appeal would be dismissed, received no response, and therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Terran Doral Green’s appeal of the trial court’s February 24, 2026 denial of his pro se pretrial habeas application as moot. Green, who had filed a pro se habeas application challenging a limitations issue while represented in the trial court, was denied in a handwritten ruling. By the time of appeal, he had been convicted and sentenced (judgment signed March 4, 2026), so he was no longer in pretrial confinement. Because the habeas relief sought was tied to pretrial release, the court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Christina Keller's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, because she failed to provide or pay for the reporter’s record and then failed to file her appellate brief by the court-ordered deadline. The court notified Keller of the missing reporter’s record and limited consideration to issues not requiring that record, gave her time to file a brief, warned that dismissal could follow, and received no response. The court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed this interlocutory appeal because the parties informed the court they reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss. Both parties agreed to bear their own appellate costs, counsel signed the motion, and no cross-appeal was filed. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs taxed against the parties who incurred them, and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Roy Boone Bright's appeal from the trial court's denial of a December 2025 motion that sought to vacate his 2019 convictions and recidivist sentence. The court held Bright had no right to appeal because his filing improperly attempted to collaterally attack the validity of his convictions through a post-conviction motion that is not a permitted procedure in a criminal case. The court relied on Georgia Supreme Court precedent establishing that such efforts to set aside convictions by post-conviction motion are not appealable and therefore must be dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Antique Fields’ application for discretionary review of a magistrate court writ of possession because the application was filed too late. The magistrate court entered judgment on 2026-02-27, and Antique Fields filed for review on 2026-03-24, which exceeded the seven-day deadline for filing under Georgia law. The Court explained that its jurisdiction to review magistrate court orders exists only after review by a state or superior court, and because the application was untimely and filing deadlines are jurisdictional, the Court could not transfer the matter and therefore dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeals denied Thomas Jones’ request for a writ of mandamus seeking to force Judge Lisa L. Sadler to serve him with an entry of dismissal and to rescind a bill for court costs. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that the duty to serve judgment and note service on the docket lies with the clerk of court under Civ.R. 58(B), not with the judge. The court also held Jones has an adequate remedy at law (e.g., Civ.R. 60(B) or appeal) and thus cannot meet mandamus requirements.

The court dismissed Prince Charles Cotten Sr.’s procedendo petition as moot. Cotten sought an order requiring Franklin County Common Pleas Judge Carl A. Aveni to proceed to judgment in Cotten’s underlying civil case, alleging delay and failure to rule on a motion. The magistrate and appellate panel found the trial judge had already dismissed Cotten’s complaint without prejudice on August 11, 2025 (thereby resolving pending motions), so there was no remaining duty to compel. Because the act Cotten sought had been performed, the procedendo claim was moot and the motion to dismiss was sustained.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.