Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had announced a settlement at an on-the-record hearing in which it expressly stated it would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, but its subsequent journal entry omitted that retention of jurisdiction and did not incorporate the settlement terms. The appellate court held the journal entry did not reflect what occurred in open court and directed the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry conforming the record to the hearing so the court can enforce the settlement terms.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District and remanded the case. The court held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution (the state right-to-counsel clause) did not apply to Morris’s preindictment investigatory interview, because that provision applies to trials in court. The court also considered whether Morris invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the recorded interrogation after an initial waiver. It concluded Morris did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his federal right to counsel at the relevant point, so suppression under the federal Constitution was not required.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), a statutory restriction that limited who could file undervaluation complaints based on arm’s-length sales occurring before (but not after) the tax lien date and exceeding specified thresholds, violated Ohio’s constitutional requirement that property be taxed by a uniform rule. The court found the provision systematically and intentionally departed from uniform valuation by treating some properties as immune from complaint. The court severed the unconstitutional clause, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, reversed the Board of Tax Appeals decisions, and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while certifying a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ order that vacated a county board of revision decision and remanded to dismiss a taxpayer’s complaint. The court held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) — a statutory condition barring third-party valuation complaints unless the property sold in an arm’s-length transaction before the tax lien date and the sale price exceeded listed value by 10% and a monetary threshold — violates Ohio’s constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. The court severed that subsection, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, and certified a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), finding an Ohio statute, R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), unconstitutional because it allowed different treatment of parcels for valuation complaints and thus violated the state constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. Appellant Bahorek had filed a complaint challenging a neighbor’s valuation; the county Board of Revision dismissed it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The appellate court held that the statute’s conditions on who may file and when (arm’s-length sale before the lien date and a 10%/threshold sales test) create systematic departures from uniform valuation, so the court severed that subsection, reversed the BTA, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District Court of Appeals and remanded the case. The dispute involved C.E., an unmarried former partner who sought legal parental recognition of three children born to P.S. through artificial insemination. The First District had directed the trial court to determine whether the couple "would have been married" but for Ohio's pre-Obergefell ban on same-sex marriage and to apply R.C. 3111.95(A) if so. The Supreme Court held R.C. 3111.95(A) applies only to married spouses and that Obergefell and Pavan do not authorize retroactively rewriting that statute to cover unmarried couples.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI) because officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to extend a traffic stop and administer field sobriety tests. Ingram was pulled over for an unlit rear license plate, admitted having a drink earlier, and officers testified to smelling alcohol from the vehicle, but there was no erratic driving, no notable eye or speech impairment, and body-cam statements conflicted about odor and signs of impairment. The appellate court held the totality of circumstances did not justify prolonging the stop, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court order that had set aside a default judgment entered for Shelter Mutual Insurance Company against Dajuan Henry Jones. SMIC had obtained default judgment after certified-mail service to an address; Jones later moved to vacate the judgment claiming improper service, mistaken identity, and that he only learned of the case months later. The appeals court found Jones presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service but was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the service issue; it also held Jones’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was untimely and remanded for denial of relief under that rule and for a hearing only on service.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of leave allowing Kettering Medical Center (KHBMC) to amend its answer shortly before trial to assert immunity under R.C. 2305.51(B), and it reversed the trial court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment to KHBMC. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the last-minute amendment and reopening discovery because the amendment was untimely, unexplained, and prejudicial. The court also found genuine factual disputes existed about foreseeability, precautions taken, and whether the patient’s conduct constituted an explicit threat, so summary judgment on statutory immunity was improper.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Ninth District and trial court, holding that NC Enterprises did not prove adverse possession of two narrow parcels owned by Norfolk Southern Railway. Although NC Enterprises performed regular lawn and landscape maintenance beginning in 1998 and later erected a fence and drainage in 2000 and 2011, the court concluded the required 21-year period must have begun on or before July 22, 1999. Maintenance alone before the fence was not open and notorious enough to put the title owner on constructive notice, so NC Enterprises failed to meet the open-and-notorious element by clear and convincing evidence.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of class certification in Stewart v. Farmers Insurance. The plaintiff insured’s vehicle was declared a total loss and Farmers invoked a court-ordered, binding appraisal provision in the policy. The appraisal produced a higher actual-cash-value award, which Farmers paid. The appellate court held that because the appraisal award resolved the plaintiff’s individual contract claim before class certification, the controversy was moot and the entire action — including class claims — had to be dismissed. The court declined to apply the “pick-off” exception because the payment resulted from an enforceable contractual appraisal, not a unilateral settlement tactic.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a capital defendant cannot use Civ.R. 60(B) to reopen a prior state postconviction judgment; instead, R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 provide the exclusive statutory mechanism for collateral attacks on criminal convictions or sentences. The court reversed the appellate court’s decision that permitted Hill to proceed under Civ.R. 60(B) and remanded for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of error. The court reasoned that postconviction relief is a special statutory proceeding and the Civil Rules are clearly inapplicable where the legislature has prescribed an exclusive remedy.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed defendant-appellant Joshua Mounts’s felony-murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. Mounts had reopened his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) to claim ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court found trial counsel performed deficiently by abandoning key expert testimony (Dr. Wiens) about histology slides, failing to object to undisclosed expert opinion testimony from Dr. Makoroff, and not objecting to improper prosecutorial remarks in closing. Because those errors undermined confidence in the verdict and appellate counsel should have raised them, the conviction was reversed and the cause remanded.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed part of the First District Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the municipal trial court’s denial of J.B.’s applications to seal five misdemeanor convictions prosecuted by the county. J.B. sought sealing of seven misdemeanor convictions; two prosecuted by the city were sealed by the court of appeals and not appealed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding J.B. had not shown rehabilitation and that the government’s interest in public records outweighed hers. The Court rejected the court of appeals’ substitutions of judgment and novel limitations on what a trial court may consider under R.C. 2953.32.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that Nationwide Energy Partners (NEP), a company that purchases electricity and resells it to apartment tenants using equipment it installs and maintains, is an "electric light company" and therefore a public utility subject to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO). The court concluded tenants qualify as "consumers" under R.C. 4905.03(C) and that NEP is plainly engaged in the business of supplying electricity because it buys power, sets resale prices, bills tenants, and may disconnect service. The Court reversed PUCO’s jurisdictional ruling and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining claims and tariff issues.

The court reversed a juvenile delinquency judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The juvenile, D.W.R., had been adjudicated for gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition based principally on testimony from a developmentally disabled adult, N.O. The state moved to dismiss the appeal as moot after community supervision ended; the court denied that motion because the adjudication still carries a firearms disability. The court concluded N.O. was incompetent to testify because he lacked a basic understanding of truth, so admitting his testimony was prejudicial. Because the evidence (including the admitted testimony) was nonetheless sufficient, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with law.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals reviewed a bench trial where Yangtze Railroad Fasteners sued Ohio Valley Trackwork (OVT) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment over about $40,000 for delivered railroad materials. The court found Yangtze proved the contract and delivery, but the trial court had concluded OVT was not liable because payment was misdirected to a third party after fraudulent email instructions. The appeals court held the trial court’s decision on breach of contract was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed that portion, and remanded for further proceedings while affirming the unjust enrichment judgment portion not appealed.

The Clermont County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for homeowners Vernon and Meredith Hubbard in a home-remodeling dispute. The Hubbards had obtained a $108,000 judgment against TFB Development, LLC and two individuals, Lenny (Leonard) Weber and Sandra Davis. The appellate court held the Hubbards did not produce admissible summary-judgment evidence showing Weber or Davis were parties to the written contract or otherwise individually liable, because the contract identified TFB (not the individuals) as the contractor and contained an integration clause. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a misdemeanor charge against Nathan Hake for illegally disposing of construction and demolition debris and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court had dismissed the charge as unconstitutionally vague, focusing on terms like “disposal,” “storage,” “temporary period,” and “substantially unchanged.” The appellate court held that the statutory and regulatory definitions give fair notice and are not impermissibly vague as applied to Hake’s alleged conduct (digging a pit, burying construction debris and household waste), so the dismissal was improper.

The State of Ohio appealed two Lucas County trial-court judgments that allowed cash seized in investigations to be applied toward fines imposed on defendant Shakur Ishmail Shabaa. The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that (1) $122 forfeited through a civil forfeiture consent judgment could not be used to pay criminal fines because R.C. 2981.12(G) expressly forbids using forfeited property to pay fines; and (2) $4,460 that Shabaa forfeited by plea agreement could not be applied to his fines because the trial court lacked authority to alter the parties’ negotiated plea terms that specified disbursement to the State and Sylvania Township Police.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kenneth Humphries Jr.’s 2025 misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction. Humphries had been indicted in 2025 for offenses arising from an August 2020 incident; his trial counsel moved to dismiss for preindictment delay but did not argue the two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. The State conceded counsel’s failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense was ineffective assistance. The appellate court agreed with the concession, found the conviction must be reversed, and remanded for further proceedings, rendering the weight-of-evidence claim moot.

The Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City of Euclid’s motion to dismiss a negligence complaint. Frederico sued the city after a tree fell from private property onto his car, alleging the city owned and failed to maintain the tree. The appellate panel held that under Ohio law the city is generally immune from tort liability unless an exception applies, and the complaint did not plead facts showing the tree was an “obstruction” on the roadway as required to overcome immunity. Because the complaint could not state a viable exception, dismissal was required.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kaelyn Smith’s felony-murder judgment because the trial court failed to complete statutorily required notice and form under Ohio’s violent-offender law (Sierah’s Law, R.C. 2903.41 et seq.) before sentencing. Smith had pleaded guilty to felony murder with a firearm specification; the parties and judge discussed the violent-offender form and defense counsel waived reading the paperwork, but the record does not contain an executed form or an affirmative on-the-record advisement. Because the trial court did not provide the required pre-sentencing notice, the appellate court found plain error and ordered further proceedings for proper notice and signature.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed the municipal court's denial of a victim's request for restitution and remanded for a restitution hearing. Defendant Adam Winkle had pleaded guilty/no contest to several driving-related offenses after side‑swiping multiple cars while intoxicated. Victim M.L. submitted a victim impact statement with documentation that she paid a $500 insurance deductible for damage to her vehicle. The appellate court held the trial court erred in refusing restitution based on the existence of insurance and directed a hearing to determine restitution for the deductible.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed Patricia Hauser’s municipal-court conviction for theft and discharged her. Hauser pleaded no contest after the State recited facts that she left a bar without paying a $69.33 tab when her credit card was declined. The appellate court held the State’s explanation of circumstances affirmatively showed the bar owner consented to her possession of the drinks when he served them, which negated an essential element of the charged theft offense. Because the explanation could not support the conviction under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), the court reversed and discharged Hauser.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary judgment for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). The dispute concerned whether a $120 fee for an independent medical reviewer that BWC included in its subrogation demand was released by a prior settlement. The appellate court held the settlement’s release of subrogation rights did not bar Thomas’s claim for reimbursement because the fee was not part of the statutory subrogation interest and BWC was statutorily required to pay costs of medical reviews itself. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the convictions of Travis Ratcliff because the trial court misinformed him at his plea-change hearing about the nature and maximum length of the prison terms he faced. Ratcliff had pleaded guilty to seven counts, including two second-degree felonies that, under Ohio law after the Reagan Tokes Act, carry mandatory indefinite sentences. The trial judge told Ratcliff those counts carried definite two-to-eight year terms and the written plea form repeated that error. The appeals court concluded this was a complete failure to comply with Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) and vacated the pleas without requiring a showing of prejudice.

The Court of Appeals reversed a Warren Municipal Court order that denied the State leave to dismiss an aggravated menacing charge against Christopher Glover. The municipal court refused dismissal despite the prosecutor’s detailed statement that the named victim (A.H.) did not see a gun and did not fear Glover, two on-scene officers could not corroborate aggravated menacing, and the defendant joined the dismissal request. The appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion by substituting a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry for the narrow leave-of-court review required when a prosecutor seeks dismissal.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s dismissal of Thomas Coddington’s complaint seeking return of equipment allegedly wrongfully withheld after his father’s death. The trial court had dismissed the case as time-barred by the probate creditor-claim statute, R.C. 2117.06. The appellate court held that Coddington’s allegation of ownership and wrongful withholding places his claim outside the probate presentment requirement, so the trial court erred to the extent it dismissed under R.C. 2117.06. The case is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of other defenses the trial court did not address.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, vacated, and remanded a trial court order that granted R.T.’s petition to seal a 2003 federal conviction. The appeals court held that a state trial court may only order sealing of records that are maintained by Ohio state agencies under R.C. 2953.32, and cannot compel federal agencies to seal or disregard federal conviction records. Because the trial court’s order used broad boilerplate language (directing all official records sealed and directing service on federal and state agencies), the appellate court found the order exceeded the court’s limited authority and remanded for a more specific hearing narrowly identifying which state-maintained records, if any, may be sealed.