Court Filings

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of leave allowing Kettering Medical Center (KHBMC) to amend its answer shortly before trial to assert immunity under R.C. 2305.51(B), and it reversed the trial court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment to KHBMC. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the last-minute amendment and reopening discovery because the amendment was untimely, unexplained, and prejudicial. The court also found genuine factual disputes existed about foreseeability, precautions taken, and whether the patient’s conduct constituted an explicit threat, so summary judgment on statutory immunity was improper.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Ninth District and trial court, holding that NC Enterprises did not prove adverse possession of two narrow parcels owned by Norfolk Southern Railway. Although NC Enterprises performed regular lawn and landscape maintenance beginning in 1998 and later erected a fence and drainage in 2000 and 2011, the court concluded the required 21-year period must have begun on or before July 22, 1999. Maintenance alone before the fence was not open and notorious enough to put the title owner on constructive notice, so NC Enterprises failed to meet the open-and-notorious element by clear and convincing evidence.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury complaint brought under New York's Adult Survivors Act (CPLR 214-j). The plaintiff alleged sexual abuse by a Syracuse University employee while he worked at a university-affiliated fraternity house. The court held the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded lack of consent and therefore alleged conduct that would constitute a Penal Law sex offense, so the claims were timely revived under the ASA. The case is remitted to Supreme Court for consideration of other dismissal grounds the lower court did not decide.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a conviction entered after defendant pleaded guilty to weapons and drug possession because the court improperly required defendant to waive his right to appeal as a condition of a court-initiated plea and because the trial court erred in denying suppression of physical evidence. The panel found the waiver invalid and concluded that the prosecution failed to prove defendant voluntarily consented to the frisk and search; body-worn camera footage contradicted the officer's testimony. The plea was vacated, the suppression motion granted, the indictment dismissed, and the case remitted for CPL 470.45 proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a resentencing of Phillip Owens, who had been resentenced after his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The court unanimously concluded the resentence was incorrect as a matter of law and sent the case back to Monroe County Supreme Court for a new resentencing. The opinion is brief and references an identical memorandum issued in a companion appeal, indicating the appellate court found legal error in the prior resentencing proceeding warranting reversal and remand.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted defendant Rochester Rev Holdings summary judgment in a dispute over ownership of real property under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) articles 6 and 15. The court held that defendant failed to meet its initial burden for summary judgment because its own submissions (including a lease with a purchase option and an affidavit indicating knowledge that plaintiff was a tenant) created triable issues of fact about plaintiff's title claims and defendant's counterclaims. The case was sent back with the complaint reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the Chief Administrator of the Courts has the exclusive constitutional authority to appoint Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogates' Courts. The case arose from Erie County Surrogate Acea M. Mosey seeking a declaration that she had appointment power under the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. The court concluded those statute-based appointment provisions are superseded by New York Constitution article VI, § 28 and implementing law and regulations vesting appointment authority in the Chief Administrator because the positions are nonjudicial officers within the Unified Court System.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed claims against The William Powell Company for lack of personal jurisdiction in an asbestos-exposure wrongful-death action. The court held that the defendant, which moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on absence of long-arm jurisdiction, failed to meet its initial burden on the summary judgment standard. Because the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that plaintiff could not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3), the motion was denied and the complaint against The William Powell Company was reinstated.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a lower-court order that denied a final extreme risk protection order (ERPO) against a state correction officer, Mathew J. Galliher. The court held that petitioner New York State Police proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent participated in a violent assault on a restrained inmate that caused serious injury and death, and thus met the statutory definition of a substantial risk of physical harm to others. The Fourth Department concluded the trial court applied the wrong standard and remitted the case for further proceedings consistent with issuance of the ERPO.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Family Court order that dismissed the mother's custody petition and awarded joint custody after the mother failed to appear at a hearing. The court held that Family Court did not adequately ensure the mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her right to counsel before allowing her to proceed pro se. Because the right to counsel in child custody proceedings is fundamental, the court reinstated the mother's petition and remitted the case to Family Court for a new hearing to allow a proper waiver inquiry and further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of Deutsche Bank's summary judgment motion in a mortgage foreclosure. The loan was originated by Ameriquest, later placed into a trust under a pooling and servicing agreement that named Deutsche Bank as trustee, and an assignment to Deutsche Bank was executed in 2009 by the servicer acting under a limited power of attorney. The appellate court held Deutsche Bank met its burden to show standing by producing the assignment and mortgage documents, and directed the trial court to appoint a referee to compute the amount due.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to multiple defendants and reinstated the City of Rome’s amended complaint. The City sued after a chlorine gas leak at a new water filtration facility damaged property; defendants were involved in design and construction. Supreme Court had held the plant operator’s removal of a frosted chlorine tank was a superseding, unforeseeable event absolving defendants. The appellate court ruled defendants failed to prove that the operator’s conduct broke the causal chain, so summary judgment was improper and issues of foreseeability must go to a factfinder.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in full. Plaintiff sued for breach of an option agreement that allegedly gave him an exclusive right to repurchase company interests; he attempted to exercise the option in November 2023. The court held the written option was clear and expired on December 31, 2020 (and could only be extended by plaintiff before that date), so the attempted exercise was untimely and there was no breach. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative strained reading that the option barred any sale or never expired.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendants in a medical malpractice case and granted a new trial. Plaintiffs alleged the radiologist defendant failed to identify a potentially cancerous abnormality on chest X-rays. The court held the trial judge erroneously gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction, which is appropriate only when a doctor chooses among several medically acceptable alternatives. Because the evidence showed only an alleged failure to meet the standard of care (a failure to diagnose), giving that charge risked confusing the jury and was not harmless, requiring reversal and reinstatement of the complaint.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered against Access Dental Management, LLC (ADM) in favor of June’s Boutique, LLC. June attempted service on ADM by first trying the named agent at a Dallas address, then seeking substitute service via the Texas Secretary of State. The court held the record did not demonstrate ADM’s registered agent or registered address matched the Dallas address used for service, and the Secretary of State’s certificate did not establish the forwarding address required by statute. Because strict service requirements were not met, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and the default judgment is void.

The court reversed a jury verdict awarding noneconomic and exemplary damages to Candace Williams after finding that her malpractice claim was based solely on the emotional harms of an unplanned pregnancy that arose from a doctor’s failure to perform a tubal ligation. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Noe v. Velasco (2024), the court held that pregnancy-related noneconomic harms (including mental anguish from deciding to terminate) are not legally compensable because pregnancy is inseparable from bringing about a child’s life. Because Williams offered no other compensable damages, the judgment was reversed and judgment rendered that she take nothing.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of class certification in Stewart v. Farmers Insurance. The plaintiff insured’s vehicle was declared a total loss and Farmers invoked a court-ordered, binding appraisal provision in the policy. The appraisal produced a higher actual-cash-value award, which Farmers paid. The appellate court held that because the appraisal award resolved the plaintiff’s individual contract claim before class certification, the controversy was moot and the entire action — including class claims — had to be dismissed. The court declined to apply the “pick-off” exception because the payment resulted from an enforceable contractual appraisal, not a unilateral settlement tactic.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a capital defendant cannot use Civ.R. 60(B) to reopen a prior state postconviction judgment; instead, R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 provide the exclusive statutory mechanism for collateral attacks on criminal convictions or sentences. The court reversed the appellate court’s decision that permitted Hill to proceed under Civ.R. 60(B) and remanded for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of error. The court reasoned that postconviction relief is a special statutory proceeding and the Civil Rules are clearly inapplicable where the legislature has prescribed an exclusive remedy.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Delaware County contempt order that jailed Dominic Anusionwu for seven days with a $1,200 purge for failing to pay child support. The court held that because imprisonment was a likely outcome, the trial court was required to ensure Anusionwu either had appointed counsel or knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel via a formal colloquy. The Superior Court found the trial court erred by not conducting that waiver inquiry or determining indigency at the March 12, 2025 hearing and remanded the matter for compliance with the applicable procedures.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's partial denial of defendants' summary judgment motion and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to diagnose Cushing's syndrome, but defendants' expert attested that care met the standard and there was no biochemical or pathological evidence of Cushing's or an ACTH-secreting tumor during defendants' treatment. Plaintiffs' expert did not meaningfully rebut defendants' causation evidence or address 2019 surgical pathology, so plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue on causation.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that had found defendant J.P. to presently suffer from a dangerous mental disorder and committed him to a secure psychiatric facility for six months. The court held that although the initial hearing met statutory and due process requirements despite the examining witnesses not testifying, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to meaningfully challenge the People's examiner reports, secure the examiners' testimony, obtain a defense expert, or present any defense evidence. The matter is remitted for a new CPL 330.20(6) hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had dismissed the indictment against defendant Diamond Haggan under CPL 30.30. The People had filed a certificate of compliance for discovery and the court held that the prosecution was not required to obtain third-party employment and medical records as part of initial automatic discovery, so withholding them did not invalidate the certificate. Although the People improperly withheld a victim entity report as duplicative, there was no bad faith and the People had otherwise met their discovery obligations, so the dismissal was improper and the indictment was reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court’s May 17, 2024 order that modified a 2015 Texas custody and visitation order and granted the mother sole physical and legal custody. The court held that, under New York’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), New York lacked authority to modify a prior Texas custody order because Texas retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and the father continues to reside in Texas. The court also found that Family Court failed to properly invoke temporary emergency jurisdiction because it did not communicate with the Texas court or limit the duration of its order, so the order was vacated and the case remanded for proper UCCJEA procedures.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had vacated an arbitration award in a dispute between transit employees and the New York City Transit Authority. The appellate court held the arbitrator acted within his authority, properly reviewed the process by which the Medical Review Officer reached and then altered his drug-test determination, and found improper influence by the employer's representative. The panel concluded the award did not violate public policy and reinstated the arbitration award, denying the Authority's cross-motion to vacate and granting the petition to confirm.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment for New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and reinstated Janice Campbell's medical malpractice complaint. The suit alleges surgeons lacerated the plaintiff's bladder during pelvic surgery. The appellate court found that plaintiff's expert affidavit raised a triable issue by opining surgeons deviated from the standard of care by failing to perform a retrograde bladder fill, which would have better delineated bladder margins given substantial pelvic adhesions. The court held this claim was included in the bill of particulars, so dismissal was improper.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed Supreme Court's declaration that Justin Ball is entitled to a civil jury trial to contest administrative charges seeking fines and revocation of his EMT license. The court held that the federal Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated against the states and therefore does not guarantee a civil jury in a state administrative licensure proceeding, and that New York's constitutional jury guarantee does not extend to regulatory license-revocation proceedings rooted in the statutory scheme governing professional licensure. The court granted the Department of Health's motion to dismiss and ended the injunction against the administrative process.

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may not be required, as a condition of a negotiated guilty plea, to waive a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). N.H. accepted a plea conditioned on waiving a § 60.12 hearing; the Court concluded such a waiver is not enforceable and reversed the Appellate Division, remitting the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings. The majority emphasized the DVSJA’s remedial purpose to afford survivor-defendants a judicial opportunity to establish eligibility for alternative, less severe sentences and treated the hearing right as unwaivable in plea bargaining.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, vacated Warren Burgess's guilty plea to misdemeanor criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and remitted the case to Criminal Court for further proceedings. Burgess had pleaded to a misdemeanor after felony counts were crossed out at arraignment, but the accusatory instrument lacked any factual allegation that the recovered firearm was operable — an element required to sustain the weapon possession charge. Because a facially sufficient accusatory instrument is a jurisdictional prerequisite that survives a guilty plea, the Court concluded the misdemeanor information was jurisdictionally defective and could not support the plea.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed Rae Neel’s suit against the City of Hurst for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Neel sued after tripping on an uneven section of public sidewalk and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The appeals court held the sidewalk condition was not a “special defect” and, under the premises-defect standard, Neel’s own deposition showed she knew of the sidewalk’s condition before the fall, defeating her claim of lack of knowledge and preserving the City’s immunity.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded. The dispute concerned interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement between M-I L.L.C. and Texas International Terminals (TXIT) about lease and materials-handling payments and removal of equipment. The trial court had added CPI-based price adjustments and ordered M-I to remove certain equipment, relying on extrinsic course-of-dealing evidence. The appellate court held the settlement language was unambiguous, forbade using extrinsic evidence to rewrite the agreement, and concluded the trial court improperly added and altered terms instead of enforcing the agreement as written.