Court Filings

The Appellate Division reviewed a Family Court order that found a mother abused and neglected her child. The court unanimously vacated the abuse finding against the mother but affirmed the neglect finding. The court concluded the father, who lived with the family, inflicted excessive corporal punishment and sexual abuse, and the mother knew or should have known and failed to protect the child. The appellate court also upheld a neglect finding based on the mother's threat to the child with a knife, by conforming the pleadings to the proof, but found the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the mother committed abuse.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Bronx Supreme Court order that denied US Bank's motion to confirm a Referee's report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and granted defendant Moises Merino's cross-motion to toll mortgage interest for certain multi-year periods. The court found the Referee relied solely on a servicer employee's affidavit and attached records that lacked sufficient attestation or identifying marks tying them to the plaintiff or a particular servicer, so confirmation was improper. The court also held the lender caused lengthy delays in the referee process that prejudiced Merino, warranting equitable tolling of interest.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of Joseph Pena's amended petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York and NYPD officers. The court held Pena failed to prove the City had actual knowledge of the essential facts of his negligence claim within 90 days of accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter. The submitted evidence — an accident report and an alleged incomplete notice served after the deadline — did not show the City knew the facts supporting his theory that an NYPD high-speed chase caused the collision, and Pena also failed to show the City was not prejudiced by the delay.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court’s May 17, 2024 order that modified a 2015 Texas custody and visitation order and granted the mother sole physical and legal custody. The court held that, under New York’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), New York lacked authority to modify a prior Texas custody order because Texas retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and the father continues to reside in Texas. The court also found that Family Court failed to properly invoke temporary emergency jurisdiction because it did not communicate with the Texas court or limit the duration of its order, so the order was vacated and the case remanded for proper UCCJEA procedures.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment confirming a partial final arbitration award that required petitioners to pay respondent $1,123,644.48. Petitioners had sought to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her powers and misinterpreted contract rights to advancement and indemnification. The appellate court held that judicial review is extremely limited, that the arbitrator’s contract interpretation was rational and within the scope of her authority under the JAMS rules, and that petitioners did not show a violation of public policy or any clear excess of power warranting vacatur.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had vacated an arbitration award in a dispute between transit employees and the New York City Transit Authority. The appellate court held the arbitrator acted within his authority, properly reviewed the process by which the Medical Review Officer reached and then altered his drug-test determination, and found improper influence by the employer's representative. The panel concluded the award did not violate public policy and reinstated the arbitration award, denying the Authority's cross-motion to vacate and granting the petition to confirm.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court judgment confirming a final arbitration award in favor of MLN New York Inc. and denying Jinong Liu's cross-petition to vacate the award. The court held that the arbitrator reasonably relied on testimony from multiple employee witnesses that Liu misreported hours, shifted blame to the majority shareholder, attempted to induce employees to sue the company for a kickback, and otherwise acted disloyally. The court found these facts supported findings that Liu was a faithless servant and breached fiduciary duties, and rejected Liu's manifest-disregard and insufficiency arguments.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order that denied petitioner Elisabeth Kepley’s motion for leave to vacate a prior dismissal and denied her request to file additional papers. The court found that Kepley had previously abused the judicial process by bringing meritless litigation and that the proposed additional papers were irrelevant to the issues already decided. The First Department concluded the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to permit further filings and denied the requested relief, while awarding costs to the respondents.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's May 27, 2025 order dismissing Angel S. DuBose's CPLR article 78 petition seeking to compel the Department of Investigation (DOI) to investigate alleged criminal conduct while she worked at the NYC Public Advocate's Office. The court held mandamus is unavailable because the DOI's decision whether to investigate is discretionary under the City Charter, and the DOI rationally directed DuBose to report the allegations to the police. The court also affirmed denial of DuBose's motion to recuse the assigned Justice.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted a union's petition to confirm a 2023 arbitration award in full. The lower court had denied part of the petition and modified the award to strike a cease-and-desist order. The appellate court held that CPLR 7510-a(a), which requires confirmation of public-sector arbitration awards unless a timely motion to vacate or modify is made within 90 days, applied and that the respondent did not move within that period. The court also rejected the argument that the statute excludes unions from its coverage.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Family Court order granting the petitioner nonparent guardianship of A.G., a child placed with the petitioner at birth in August 2018, and dismissed the parents' petitions for custody. The court found the petitioner demonstrated extraordinary circumstances and had been the child’s exclusive caregiver, meeting the child’s needs and fostering a strong bond. The parents had only sporadic or supervised contact, failed to provide financial support or stable housing, and did not show they could plan for the child's return. The court held the guardianship was in the child’s best interests.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Lisa Johnson's personal-injury complaint arising from a slip-and-fall at defendants' bowling alley. The court held the appeal was properly considered on the merits despite a procedural argument about appeal timing, but found no admissible evidence that any specific negligent condition (such as excessive oiling or waxing) caused the fall. Because causation could only be based on speculation, defendants met their burden and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so the dismissal was upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order granting plaintiff Luis Gavilanes summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1) against defendant 919 Ground Lease LLC and others. The court held that the evidence shows defendants’ negligence in failing to provide proper fall protection — plaintiff was directed to climb cross-pipes without a harness tie-off and could not secure his harness — and that this was a proximate cause of his injury. The court also found defendant translations insufficiently certified but that factual disputes about ladder availability did not defeat liability.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Jacob Adekola’s appeal from Supreme Court orders that granted Deutsche Bank’s motions for a default judgment, an order of reference, confirmation of a referee’s report, and a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court held Adekola lacked standing to appeal because he failed to appear in the underlying action before filing his notice of appeal and therefore was not an aggrieved party. Because the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, the panel did not reach the merits of Adekola’s arguments for relief.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of defendant Isabella Geriatric Center’s motion to dismiss a wrongful-death complaint brought after a resident contracted COVID-19 and died. The court held that defendant did not establish entitlement to immunity under the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act because, while two statutory prerequisites were satisfied (it was a health care facility providing COVID-related services), there were triable issues about whether the facility acted in good faith and whether its conduct rose to gross negligence. A post-death health department citation suggesting policy noncompliance was central to the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower-court order denying summary judgment to the landlord-defendants on their counterclaim for unpaid rent. The court held defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment that plaintiffs owe use-and-occupancy damages for the period October 2020 through March 2021, when plaintiffs returned to and lived in the apartment after elevator service was restored. The court otherwise affirmed the denial of summary judgment because disputed facts remain about defendants' alleged fraudulent inducement, whether plaintiffs were partially constructively evicted or unreasonably rejected alternative housing, and whether plaintiffs ratified the lease.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment for New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and reinstated Janice Campbell's medical malpractice complaint. The suit alleges surgeons lacerated the plaintiff's bladder during pelvic surgery. The appellate court found that plaintiff's expert affidavit raised a triable issue by opining surgeons deviated from the standard of care by failing to perform a retrograde bladder fill, which would have better delineated bladder margins given substantial pelvic adhesions. The court held this claim was included in the bill of particulars, so dismissal was improper.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the foreclosure judgment entered for Bank of America against defendant Nicholas Sands. The court confirmed the Referee's report on the amount due because the bank submitted admissible business records and supporting filings, and Sands failed to produce proof of payments or raise evidentiary objections. The court found any failure to calendaring a post-report hearing did not prejudice Sands. It declined to review a separate challenge to service of a 90-day notice because Sands had abandoned that issue by not appealing the prior order or raising it below. The court also held the loan was not a protected "home loan."

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx Supreme Court order on a Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The court affirmed that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment and defendants were not entitled to dismissal as to Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a) because the grinder lacked a visible guard, the employer had notice, and the unguarded tool was necessary for the work. The court reversed as to Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1), holding that provision is too vague to support liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The remainder of the lower court's order was affirmed.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Supreme Court order concerning deposition priority in a multi-plaintiff civil case. The court held that defendants who filed a pre-answer motion preserved their CPLR 3106(a) priority to take party depositions and plaintiffs needed court leave to depose defendants before the defendants' time to answer expired. The Appellate Division also ruled that defendants are entitled to depose each individual plaintiff (all 27), not just 10, because each sues in his individual capacity and the Commercial Division presumptive limit can be altered. Nonparty depositions and document discovery may proceed as scheduled.

The Appellate Division reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment about whether two individuals (Maloney and Stern) must indemnify plaintiffs under two paragraphs of limited joinders tied to a joint venture agreement (JVA). The court affirmed the lower court in holding that paragraph (ii) does not obligate Maloney and Stern to indemnify plaintiffs for first-party claims, but it vacated the declaration and denied summary judgment as to paragraph (i) because that paragraph is ambiguous about covering first-party claims. The court relied on Delaware law requiring a clear statement to extend indemnities to first-party claims and found disputed issues of contractual interpretation for paragraph (i).

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of defendant Riding High Dude Ranch's motion for summary judgment in a negligence suit by plaintiff Kerry Small. Small alleged a wrangler negligently pushed her leg over a horse while mounting in June 2021, causing knee injuries requiring surgery. The court found defendant met its initial burden showing Small assumed ordinary risks of horseback riding, but Small raised triable issues that the wrangler applied excessive force in a manner contrary to ranch training and protocols, which could have unreasonably increased the risk and caused her injury. Those factual disputes preclude summary judgment.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Robert W. Randolph’s conviction following his guilty plea to third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. Randolph pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement that included a five-year prison term and a waiver of appellate rights; County Court imposed the agreed sentence. The appellate court found the written and colloquy-based appeal waiver valid, declined to disturb the plea (finding the voluntariness claim unpreserved), and rejected challenges to the People’s certificate of compliance and statutory speedy-trial claims as forfeited or foreclosed by the waiver. A constitutional speedy-trial claim was unpreserved and, on the merits, would not warrant relief.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Anthony Nesbitt’s convictions and sentences following his guilty plea to first-degree criminal contempt, attempted second-degree assault, and second-degree menacing. The court held that Nesbitt’s written appeal waiver was invalid because it failed to clearly explain what collateral challenges survived, so his challenge to sentence was not precluded. On the merits, however, the court found the agreed-upon consecutive sentences lawful and not unduly harsh, declined to modify the sentence in the interest of justice, and noted that any request about a missing letter of support should be made to County Court.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Jose Martinez's conviction and sentence for third-degree robbery after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver. The court found the oral plea colloquy adequately explained the appeal waiver, separate from rights lost by pleading guilty, and that Martinez acknowledged discussing the waiver with counsel and understood its consequences. Because the waiver was knowing and voluntary and Martinez had been informed of the possible prison exposure if he failed interim probation, his challenge to the severity of the sentence was barred.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Jerry Ellington's conviction and agreed-upon sentence after a guilty plea to attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree. Ellington had pleaded guilty in satisfaction of an indictment charging multiple contraband-related offenses and admitted his involvement; County Court imposed a 1½ to 3-year term to run consecutive to his existing sentence. The appellate court found his challenges to plea voluntariness and counsel performance unpreserved and, on the merits, concluded the plea colloquy and record showed the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court also held the agreed sentence was the minimum authorized by law and not excessive.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed County Court's denial of defendant Duane MM.'s 2022 application for resentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). Defendant, convicted in 1996 of two counts of second-degree murder and other property offenses for killings committed when he was 16, argued his history of sexual abuse by his father significantly contributed to the crimes and that his original sentence was unduly harsh. The court found the expert testimony lacked sufficient contact with or records about defendant and offered no nexus to one murder, and defendant's own statement did not tie the abuse to his actions. Because defendant did not prove the required DVSJA factors by a preponderance of the evidence, resentencing was properly denied.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, granted Baidu Xu's motion to be reinstated to the practice of law after a prior suspension in September 2024. The court reviewed Xu's affidavit and the Committee's response and found by clear and convincing evidence that Xu complied with the suspension order and court rules, demonstrated the requisite character and fitness, and that reinstatement served the public interest. The court ordered immediate reinstatement under the Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters governing reinstatement after suspension.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted Attorney Amanda Wurah's motion to be reinstated to the practice of law after a suspension imposed in September 2024. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Wurah had complied with the suspension order and court rules, demonstrated the requisite character and fitness, and that reinstatement served the public interest. Based on those findings and the applicable reinstatement rule, the court ordered that Wurah is reinstated effective immediately.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted Natalie Sirouhi Shahinian's motion to be reinstated to the practice of law after a September 2024 suspension. The court reviewed her affidavit and the Committee's response, found by clear and convincing evidence that she complied with the suspension order and applicable rules, demonstrated the requisite character and fitness, and that reinstatement served the public interest. As a result, the court ordered her reinstatement effective immediately.