Court Filings

The Court of Appeals affirmed Cody Tyler Morrow’s conviction for second-degree felony possession of fentanyl after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle. Officers found Morrow unconscious in his running car outside a closed store, smelled and observed marijuana in plain view, and then observed a baggie of hundreds of pills. The court held the officer was performing a community caretaking function in securing aid for an apparently incapacitated person and, based on the officer’s observations and experience, the contraband was in plain view and gave probable cause to seize it.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Capital Fund I, LLC’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had entered a default judgment against Capital Fund but expressly labeled it interlocutory. The plaintiff then obtained a severance order moving the entire dispute against Capital Fund (both defaulted and still-pending claims) into a new cause. The appellate court concluded that severing the entire case did not convert the interlocutory default judgment into a final, appealable judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking Antonio Lee Grey's deferred adjudication community supervision and adjudicating him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Grey had pleaded true to a supervision violation at the revocation hearing; the trial court revoked supervision and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal and moved to withdraw; Grey did not file a pro se brief. The appellate court reviewed the record and concluded the appeal is frivolous and without merit, granted counsel's motion, and affirmed.

The court reviewed Antonio Lee Grey’s appeal after the trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of attempted assault of a family/household member with a prior conviction, and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. The State conceded the sentence was illegal because attempted assault (as an attempt to a third-degree felony) is a state jail felony with a statutory maximum of two years. The court held the sentence exceeded the authorized range, reversed the punishment portion of the judgment, remanded for a new punishment hearing within the proper statutory range, and otherwise affirmed the conviction.

The court reviewed an appeal from a final judgment in which plaintiffs (Decedent’s children) sought a declaratory judgment voiding a lien affidavit filed by appellant Agueda and attorneys’ fees; Blanca intervened claiming a homestead interest in the property. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part: it affirmed the trial court’s power over its interlocutory order, vacated the trial court’s merits declarations about Blanca’s homestead and the declaration voiding the lien, reversed the award of attorneys’ fees against Blanca (rendering judgment she owes nothing), and reversed and remanded the fee award as to Agueda for further proceedings on the fees claim.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant A.C.'s attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.C., proceeding pro se, filed an application for a protective order and appealed after the trial court orally denied relief; the court later signed an order denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation. Because A.C. acknowledged that related proceedings (a foreign custody/support registration from Ohio and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship) remain pending, the appellate court concluded the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable under Texas law, and A.C. did not respond to a show-cause order.

The court affirmed a trial-court judgment forfeiting $8,000 and a 2006 Harley-Davidson to the State under Texas civil forfeiture law. The owner, Chad Wade Spence, argued the trial court abused its discretion by forcing him to trial without material witnesses and that doing so violated his constitutional rights. The appellate court held Spence never properly requested subpoenas — he filed only informal witness lists and failed to complete the clerk’s subpoena request form — and therefore the trial court did not err in proceeding. The court also explained the right to compulsory process is a criminal right and does not apply in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Josue Antonio Gurrola’s conviction for first-degree sexual assault of a child. Gurrola argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from a clinical supervisor at a children’s advocacy center about the victim’s therapy, symptoms, and feelings during the guilt-innocence phase. The appeals court concluded Gurrola failed to preserve that complaint because he did not make contemporaneous, sufficiently specific objections at each contested point or obtain a running objection, so the court declined to address the merits and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Jessica Marklund Johansson. The court issued a short memorandum opinion stating only the denial and citing the appellate rule permitting such disposition. No substantive analysis or factual background appears in the opinion; the denial resolves the original mandamus proceeding brought from Travis County without granting the extraordinary relief sought.

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, granted appellant Chadwick Edward Lambert’s joint motion to dismiss his criminal appeal. The motion was signed by Lambert and his appellate counsel and cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). Because the motion complied with the rule, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The decision is a brief memorandum opinion filed April 14, 2026, and the dismissal was entered on appellant’s motion.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruben Dario Almela’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and also granted attorney’s fees but did not set the fee amount, so the order did not resolve all claims or parties and was not a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court previously questioned jurisdiction and gave Almela time to show cause; he did not respond. Because the judgment was not final and Almela failed to justify appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals of the Seventh District of Texas affirmed Tara Zoe Rios’s conviction for driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. Rios asserted she wanted to represent herself at a pretrial hearing but also demanded trial proceed that day; the visiting judge declined to allow self-representation that day and offered either to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or revisit self-representation later. Rios chose to proceed with counsel and went to trial, where she was convicted. The court held the trial judge did not abuse discretion and Rios effectively waived self-representation; assessed fines and costs were waived for indigence.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terry Akwue’s appeal from a small claims judgment because his notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court entered final judgment on September 26, 2025; Akwue filed a motion for new trial which extended his deadline to December 26, 2025, but he did not file his notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction for a late-filed notice, gave Akwue notice that the appeal would be dismissed, received no response, and therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences of Justin Wayne Ortego, who was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact based largely on text-message evidence recovered by his estranged wife and testimony from the victim. Ortego argued the phone evidence should have been suppressed and that the trial court erred by denying requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court upheld the denial of suppression and concluded there is no general statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right to admit live remote testimony absent a specific statutory exception or proper procedure, so exclusion did not constitute reversible error.

The Court of Appeals of the First District of Texas affirmed the convictions of Justin Wayne Ortego for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact. Ortego challenged (1) denial of his motion to suppress text-message evidence his former partner, Jennifer, retrieved from his phone and (2) the trial court’s refusal to allow two defense witnesses to testify remotely via Zoom. The court held the phone-search evidence was admissible and that no statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right compelled admission of live remote testimony here, so exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant Justin Wayne Ortego’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact, and the trial court’s sentence (life plus three 20-year terms). The defendant challenged (1) denial of his motion to suppress evidence his wife found on his phone and (2) denial of his requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court held the wife’s search did not trigger suppression and that trial courts have no general, enforceable right to admit live remote testimony absent a rule or statute, so denying Zoom testimony was not an abuse of discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of Justin Wayne Ortego for continuous sexual abuse of a child and three counts of indecency by contact. Ortego challenged (1) the denial of his motion to suppress evidence his wife found on his phone and the trial court’s refusal to give an Article 38.23 jury instruction, and (2) the denial of his requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court held the phone-search evidence was admissible and that there is no general statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right to require live remote testimony in criminal trials absent a specific statutory exception or agreement of the parties, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reviewed Jordan Potts’s conviction for murder and the Anders brief filed by his appointed counsel asserting the appeal is frivolous. After independent review of the full record and noting Potts received notice and the chance to file a pro se response (he did not), the court concluded there are no arguable grounds for reversal. The court affirmed the trial-court judgment sentencing Potts to 45 years, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and directed counsel to notify Potts of the result and file proof of that notice.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights to his six-year-old son, Z.A.A., and leaving the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) as sole managing conservator. DFPS sought termination so the child’s maternal great-grandfather, who had provided long-term stable care and planned to adopt, could become permanent conservator. The court found by clear-and-convincing evidence that DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father and that termination was in the child’s best interest given father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal history, lack of contact, and the child’s improved stability in the great-grandfather’s home.

The Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus from Anjeneya Vijay Cheruvu, who sought to overturn a March 19, 2026 trial-court order holding him in contempt for possession or access in a Fort Bend County child-protection case. Cheruvu argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the contempt order. The appellate court concluded he did not meet the heavy burden required for mandamus relief, so it refused to direct the trial court to vacate the contempt order and dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a trespass to try title suit. Houston International Management & Trade, Inc. (HIM) claimed ownership of 23 commercial lots by adverse possession, but a jury found HIM had not possessed the property peaceably and adversely for the statutory period and instead found a verbal management agreement existed between HIM and the record owners (the Peacock parties). The court held there was some evidence supporting the jury’s findings, rejected HIM’s challenges to JNOV, new trial claims, and factual-sufficiency complaints, and affirmed the hold that the Peacock parties own the properties.

The First District of Texas dismissed Terran Doral Green’s appeal of the trial court’s February 24, 2026 denial of his pro se pretrial habeas application as moot. Green, who had filed a pro se habeas application challenging a limitations issue while represented in the trial court, was denied in a handwritten ruling. By the time of appeal, he had been convicted and sentenced (judgment signed March 4, 2026), so he was no longer in pretrial confinement. Because the habeas relief sought was tied to pretrial release, the court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Christina Keller's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, because she failed to provide or pay for the reporter’s record and then failed to file her appellate brief by the court-ordered deadline. The court notified Keller of the missing reporter’s record and limited consideration to issues not requiring that record, gave her time to file a brief, warned that dismissal could follow, and received no response. The court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed this interlocutory appeal because the parties informed the court they reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss. Both parties agreed to bear their own appellate costs, counsel signed the motion, and no cross-appeal was filed. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs taxed against the parties who incurred them, and denied as moot any pending motions.

The court reviewed Corey Morrell’s suit against the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) after an enforcement order assessing penalties for scrap tires on his land. The trial court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court held that the trial court erred only as to Morrell’s Public Information Act mandamus claim because the TCEQ withheld responsive records and did not prove an exception to disclosure. The court affirmed dismissal of Morrell’s other claims (challenging the order as void/ultra vires and a challenge to a scrap-tire rule) because they were untimely, lacked merit, or lacked standing, and remanded the PIA claim for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals granted appellant Yousif H. Alazzawi’s motion for a new trial after finding that a significant and necessary portion of the reporter’s record was lost or rendered unusable without his fault. The missing material consists primarily of English translations of testimony given in Arabic that the court reporter could not transcribe from Zoom recordings. Because the missing portions are necessary to resolve Alazzawi’s appeal of the divorce decree and the protective order, and the parties could not agree on replacements, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded both the divorce decree and the protective order for a new trial.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The court issued a memorandum order in an appeal from a trial court’s termination of J.H.’s parental rights to R.D. because the court reporter failed to file the reporter’s record by the due date. Noting lack of communication from the reporter, the appellate court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to determine what remains to complete the record, why it is incomplete, how much time is needed, and whether a substitute reporter is required. The trial court must enter orders, include findings in a supplemental clerk’s record, and file that record by April 23, 2026, unless the reporter files the record first.

The court affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Edward Bobby Martinez’s community supervision for indecency with a child by sexual contact and the imposition of his ten-year sentence, but it modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language permitting future assessment of court-appointed attorney’s fees. The court held that Martinez’s refusal to submit to an instant-offense polygraph—required by his sex-offender treatment—constituted a violation of supervision because his Fifth Amendment privilege no longer applied to the final, adjudicated offense. Because Martinez has been found indigent, the court deleted any prospective attorney-fee assessment.