Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of appellants' request for a second temporary injunction seeking to stop the homeowners association's election to amend its declaration to allow sale of a subdivision park. Appellants (residents) had a prior temporary injunction preventing sale of Thrush Ridge Park and sued for declaratory and injunctive relief; the Association held an election and appellants sought to enjoin it. The appeals court concluded the record lacked the evidentiary exhibits from the injunction hearing, so the appellants failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ra Hermes Velthra’s appeal challenging a trial court’s finding that he could pay court costs. Velthra sought review under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g) after a February 26, 2026 hearing, but the appellate court concluded Rule 145(g) does not permit a standalone interlocutory appeal. The court ordered Velthra to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he submitted the indigency order but no final judgment in the underlying case. Lacking jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal on April 8, 2026.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance and dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The suit arose after a Washington resident insured by an Ohio-based, non-Texas-licensed insurer was injured in San Antonio and sued in Texas over denial of underinsured motorist benefits. The court held Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice, so Texas courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate the contract dispute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Kenisha Sharron Simms's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Simms had been placed on deferred community supervision after a plea; the State later moved to adjudicate guilt, and the trial court modified the supervision conditions. The appellate court held that appeals from modifications to deferred adjudication supervision are not authorized by the legislature, cited controlling precedent, gave Simms an opportunity to show cause, received no response, and dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s May 2024 order terminating Mother C.A.’s parental rights to infant G.M.L. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the children after repeated concerns about Mother’s substance use, hazardous home conditions, and a domestic-violence incident. The appeals court held that the Department gave fair notice and presented clear-and-convincing evidence that it made reasonable reunification efforts and that a continuing danger remained in Mother’s home, supporting termination and appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Shawn L. Sanders's petition seeking either a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of prohibition. Sanders filed the petition on March 23, 2026, asking the appellate court to intervene in underlying criminal case No. 2023-CR-3165 in Bexar County. After reviewing the petition and record, the court concluded Sanders did not establish entitlement to the extraordinary relief requested and therefore denied both the mandamus and prohibition petitions without publishing an opinion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Joy Cherie Kilgore’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief related to an underlying case in Bexar County District Court. The court considered Kilgore’s petition and an incorporated emergency motion for temporary relief filed April 6, 2026, and concluded she was not entitled to mandamus relief under the Texas appellate rules. Because the requested extraordinary relief was denied, the court also denied the emergency motion as moot. No written opinion explaining detailed reasoning was issued—this is a brief disposition under the appellate rules.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Goliath Building Services, Inc. and Joshua N. Marsalis challenging proceedings in a Bexar County court. The relators had also sought emergency temporary relief; the court found they had not shown entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief and therefore denied the mandamus petition. Because the mandamus petition was denied, the court also denied the emergency temporary relief motions as moot. The decision is a short per curiam memorandum opinion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's civil commitment of Jose Arredondo, Jr. after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator. Arredondo appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a jury instruction telling jurors to treat expert testimony "just like any other testimony." The appellate court held the requested instruction would effectively single out the State's sole expert and thus improperly comment on the weight of the evidence, contrary to Davidson v. Wallingford and Texas procedural rules, so the refusal was not an abuse of discretion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) denied Camoray Wathen-Escobar’s original petitions for a writ of mandamus and a writ of habeas corpus and denied as moot her emergency motion for temporary relief. The court explained mandamus requires showing a clear abuse of discretion and lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and that the intermediate appellate court lacks jurisdiction over family-code habeas petitions regarding return of a child. After reviewing the petition and record, the court concluded the relator did not meet the standards for relief and therefore denied the petitions.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio considered Alton Crain Jr.'s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking extraordinary relief related to a pending county court case. After reviewing the petition and record, the court concluded Crain did not show entitlement to the requested relief under the appellate rules and denied the petition. The opinion is brief and delivers the disposition without extended analysis or citation to underlying facts or legal authorities.

The court dismissed Gil Rojas III’s appeal because his conviction and thirty-year sentence resulted from a plea-bargain in which the trial court certified he had no right to appeal. The appellate clerk’s record contained the Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and the written plea agreement showing the sentence did not exceed the agreed recommendation. Because the record contained no pretrial written motion preserved for appeal, no trial-court permission to appeal, and no amended certification granting appeal rights, the court concluded it must dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case. The Lalondes sued to enforce a 2021 written agreement to buy a tract of land; Tortuga Ranch counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement was void or unenforceable. The appellate court held Tortuga Ranch could not obtain summary declaratory relief because its counterclaim was a mirror-image challenge duplicating the pending breach-of-contract suit, so Tortuga Ranch failed to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court also reversed the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees and declined to render partial summary judgment for the Lalondes because that relief would be interlocutory.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default divorce judgment that resolved conservatorship, possession and access to the parties’ child, child and spousal support, property division, and attorney’s fees. Christopher Carpenter filed a motion for new trial (or to reform the judgment) supported by his and his attorney’s affidavits explaining that an email of the petition failed to reach counsel, causing the missed answer. The court held that Christopher met the Craddock elements (excusable failure to answer, meritorious defense, and no unfair delay or prejudice) and concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Bryan Keith Gutierrez's filing for lack of jurisdiction. Gutierrez filed a "Motion for Bond Relief" that appeared to challenge bail and seek to quash multiple indictments. The appellate court treated the filing as a notice of appeal but found no final judgment of conviction in the record and noted that courts of appeals lack statutory authority to hear interlocutory appeals on excessive bail or motions to quash indictments. Because the appellant did not respond to an order to show cause, the appeal was dismissed.

The court dismissed Bianca Fox's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fox, pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge a January 30, 2026 turnover order, but the clerk’s record contains only two interlocutory orders from that date — denial of her motion for protection and an order to comply with a subpoena — neither of which is an appealable final judgment or an authorized interlocutory appeal. The court gave Fox an opportunity to show cause why the appeal should proceed; she did not respond, so the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals granted appellant Todd Colter’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal against Ubican Global, Inc., because the parties settled. The court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and ordered that any other pending motions be dismissed as moot. No written opinion was issued; the panel issued a short per curiam memorandum disposing of the appeal on the agreed dismissal.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas considered a criminal appeal by Kevin Villatoro. The court previously paused the appeal so the trial court could hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Villatoro then moved to reinstate and dismiss his appeal. The appellate court granted his motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The opinion was issued April 7, 2026, and is unpublished.

The First District of Texas court grants the appellant's motion to reinstate and dismiss his criminal appeal. The court had previously paused the appeal for the trial court to hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Because no opinion had issued and the appellant moved to dismiss, the court dismissed the appeal and any other pending motions as moot, citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The First District of Texas dismissed Kenneth Steven Isbell’s appeal from a Harris County district court because he failed to pay or arrange payment for the clerk’s record fee and did not respond to the court’s notice that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring payment or arrangement and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, also denying as moot any pending motions. The decision was issued as a brief memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel.

The First District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her nine-year-old twins and awarding sole managing conservatorship to the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS). The court reviewed an accelerated appeal from a bench trial and found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to show the mother knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions (unsanitary, no utilities, presence of feces and urine, reports of physical abuse) and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court relied on the children’s improved stability and care in their foster home, the mother’s criminal history, repeated positive drug tests, failure to complete services, and prior dangerous living conditions to support its decision.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Grant Allen Nelson from a final divorce decree entered July 7, 2025, after Nelson filed an unopposed motion stating he no longer wished to prosecute the appeal. Because no other party appealed and the motion complied with Texas appellate procedure, the court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision is procedural and does not address the merits of the underlying divorce decree.

The First Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a trial court's modification of a 2016 custody order that named Carolyn Pena sole managing conservator and restricted George E. Saldana’s visitation. Saldana, representing himself, argued the trial was void because a recusal motion was pending, he lacked adequate notice of the trial, and his arrest and detention around trial made the proceedings unfair. The court held that a “tertiary recusal” statute allowed the trial judge to proceed, that the record shows Saldana had actual notice more than 45 days before trial, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial despite the arrest and security incidents.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's adjudication of guilt and 14-year sentence for Gaige Porter after a hearing on the State's motion to adjudicate his deferred-adjudication community supervision. Appellate counsel moved to withdraw under Anders, and the court independently reviewed the record, finding no reversible error. Because the trial court's written judgment did not match its oral findings, the appellate court reformed the judgment to reflect that Porter violated supervision by contacting the complainant, leaving the state without permission, and removing his ankle monitor, then affirmed as reformed and granted counsel's withdrawal.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas granted the appellant Erica Arnez Jackson's motion for voluntary dismissal of her appeal from a judgment of the County Court at Law No. 2, Galveston County (trial court case no. 25-FD-0597). Because no opinion had issued, the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and dismissed any other pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a merits determination.

The First District of Texas dismissed Dominique Cunningham’s appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of her suit against Justice of the Peace Steve Duble because Cunningham repeatedly failed to file an appellate brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court struck her noncompliant briefs, gave her opportunities and extensions to file a corrected brief, and found her March 16, 2026 submission still deficient in essential content and formatting. Because she failed to cure the briefing defects, the court struck the corrected brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.

The First District of Texas affirmed the divorce decree in Ada U. Oguamanam v. Tony Oguamanam. Ada argued on appeal that she was harmed because the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law that she did not receive notice of, preventing her from timely requesting additional findings. The court held that Ada failed to show the required injury — she could have requested additional findings after learning of them or sought abatement but did not — and that the proposed additional findings she identified were largely evidentiary or unnecessary to decide the controlling issues. The judgment is affirmed.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Nikki Arnold’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County because she failed to file her appellate brief. The brief was due February 11, 2026; the court notified Arnold on February 18 that she had until March 2 to respond or face dismissal for want of prosecution. No brief or extension motion was filed, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Jillian Warren’s appeal for want of prosecution because she failed to file her appellant brief, which was originally due March 2, 2026, and did not respond to the court’s notice requiring a satisfactory response by March 23, 2026. The court invoked Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and entered dismissal on April 7, 2026. No substantive merits decision was reached because the appeal was dismissed for procedural noncompliance.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Troy Nguyen's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's alleged failure to rule on his consolidated Rule 306a(4) and 306a(5) motion filed January 20, 2026. The appellate court explained that to obtain mandamus for failure to rule, a relator must show the trial court had a duty to rule, that a demand was made, and that the court failed to rule within a reasonable time. Because the record did not show an unreasonable delay, the court concluded extraordinary relief was not warranted and denied the petition.