Court Filings

The First District of Texas consolidated two duplicate appeals filed after the trial court granted partial summary judgment and later severed the case, making that interlocutory order final and appealable. The court found the notices of appeal filed in two appellate dockets were identical and stemmed from the same October 2, 2025 severance order, so it granted the unopposed motion to consolidate and ordered the consolidated appeal to proceed under cause number 01-26-00052-CV. Because the appellate record is incomplete, the court declined to set a briefing schedule and dismissed the duplicate appellate docket 01-25-01093-CV.

The Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a no-evidence summary judgment in a multi-vehicle pileup case. The trial court granted summary judgment for the truck driver Mark Richard and his employer Millwood Trucking. The court held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal as to Richard because he died before the judgment and no estate representative was substituted, so the judgment as to him is void and must be vacated. The court nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Millwood Trucking, concluding the plaintiffs produced no evidence of causation or damages against the employer.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to her infant child, E.T. The Department removed the child shortly after birth when both tested positive for amphetamine and later showed Mother’s continued methamphetamine and other drug use, untreated bipolar disorder, failure to complete court-ordered services, and periods of incarceration and mental-health treatment. The court applied the statutory best-interest factors (Holley factors) and concluded that Mother’s instability, ongoing substance use, untreated mental-health issues, and failure to complete services supported a finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Boss Lady Pub and Maria Elena Olvera’s appeal because they filed a notice of appeal but did not pay required appellate filing fees or show entitlement to proceed without payment. The clerk warned them that failure to pay by a specified deadline could result in dismissal; they did not respond or pay. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot on April 20, 2026.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas resolved two related proceedings brought by John D. Ferrara challenging a trial-court denial of his first amended application for post-conviction habeas relief. The court dismissed Ferrara’s direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court did not issue a merits-based writ or hold an evidentiary hearing before signing the denial. The court also denied Ferrara’s petition for writ of mandamus because he failed to show entitlement to extraordinary relief — he did not establish a clear ministerial duty by the trial court or that he lacked an adequate remedy by appeal.

The Sixth Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the conviction of Justin Clayton Goldthrite for retaliation after reviewing the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. Goldthrite argued the State failed to comply with two Texas criminal procedure statutes governing discovery and evidence handling (Articles 38.371 and 39.14). The court applied the same legal standard and analysis it used in a companion appeal and concluded the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial, so the judgment was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed Justin Clayton Goldthrite’s conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon after the trial court denied his motion for new trial. Goldthrite argued the State failed to disclose incident reports under Texas discovery statutes and that those reports affected the voluntariness of his guilty plea and his ability to use relationship evidence. The court applied Texas precedent holding a guilty plea is voluntary if the defendant had sufficient awareness of circumstances and found Goldthrite was aware of the incidents and had questioned the complaining witness, so no error was shown.

The Court of Appeals (First District of Texas) denied a petition for writ of mandamus filed April 16, 2026 by Latonya Shand and Renford D. Balfour. The relators asked the court to compel the district court to rule on their combined motion for new trial, stay of judgment, and waiver of bond (allegedly filed March 27, 2026 and heard April 14, 2026). They also sought an emergency stay of execution and foreclosure proceedings in the underlying Harris County case. The court denied the mandamus petition and all related emergency relief.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas denied Beverly Brooks's emergency petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial-court order dated April 13, 2026. Brooks sought to prevent counsel Kirkendall Dwyer, LLP from withdrawing all funds held in the trial court's registry and to secure a portion of the registry funds representing accrued interest. The appeals court declined relief and left the trial court's order intact, which granted withdrawal of the full registry amount to Kirkendall Dwyer and denied Brooks's request for interest funds.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order that dissolved prejudgment writs of garnishment obtained by Texas Global Equity Fund XII (TGE) against 22 entities believed to owe money to Breckenridge Development 2019 (BD19). TGE had sued BD19 for unpaid loan principal and interest after BD19 failed to provide required financial reports, repay a prior Frost Bank loan as required, and cure defaults. The appeals court held TGE proved the statutory grounds for garnishment (the debt was liquidated, due and unpaid; BD19 lacked sufficient property to satisfy it; and the garnishment was not sought to injure BD19), and BD19 failed to prove extrinsic grounds to dissolve the writs. The court reinstated the writs and remanded for further proceedings.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by appellant Ricardo Turullols Bonilla after he moved to dismiss it. The dismissal was granted under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the court issued a short memorandum opinion stating the appeal is dismissed. The decision is procedural: the court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute but terminated appellate review because the appellant withdrew the appeal by motion.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Lewis Carl Hunt’s appeal of his conviction for murder because the trial court certified that the case was resolved by a plea bargain and that Hunt waived his right to appeal. Under Texas appellate rules, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest pursuant to a plea agreement and the trial court certifies no right to appeal (or the defendant waives appeal), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Frank Estrada III’s conviction for one count of violating a protective order. Estrada was tried on three counts (two assault counts and one protective-order violation); the jury acquitted or deadlocked on the assault counts (mistrial and later dismissal) but convicted on the protective-order violation. Estrada challenged the admission of a 911 recording and EMS medical records and the trial court’s granting of the State’s challenge for cause to Juror 53. The court held the evidentiary rulings were not reversible error and that, although the trial court abused its discretion in excusing Juror 53 for cause, that mistake did not harm Estrada’s substantial rights, so the conviction stands.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals denied Brian Keith Melton’s petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Hunt County trial judge to rule on his motion to dismiss counsel. The court explained that mandamus requires showing no adequate remedy at law, a ministerial duty by the trial court, and a sufficient record. Melton failed to provide certified copies of his motion or a request for a ruling as required by the appellate rules, and he offered no authority showing that the trial court’s roughly thirty-day delay was unreasonable. For those reasons the petition was denied.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s judgment that had adjudicated Debrah Elizabeth East guilty of possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine after she violated terms of deferred adjudication community supervision. The State proved she used controlled substances and failed to complete restitution; after a hearing the trial court imposed a nine-month state jail sentence. Appellate counsel found no nonfrivolous issues and filed an Anders brief; the appeals court independently reviewed the record, concluded the appeal was frivolous, and affirmed, granting counsel permission to withdraw.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District of Texas dismissed this appeal because the parties filed a joint notice that they resolved their disputes and moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and entered dismissal. The decision is procedural: no merits ruling was made because the parties voluntarily ended the litigation by settlement and asked the court to close the appeal.

A Lamar County jury convicted Andrew McCarty of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment and the written judgment also included a $50 payment to the Children’s Advocacy Center and listed the offense as a second-degree felony. The Court of Appeals held the oral sentence—life imprisonment with no fine—controls, so the $50.00 entry must be deleted from the written judgment. The court also corrected the degree entry to reflect that the second-degree conviction was enhanced to first degree. The judgment was affirmed as modified.

Justice Busby dissents from the Court’s decision excusing a state agency’s late attempt to withhold records under the Texas Public Information Act. The dispute concerns whether an agency’s post-request question — asking whether the requester sought confidential information — lawfully paused the agency’s ten-business-day deadline to seek an Attorney General opinion before withholding records. Justice Busby argues the question did not narrow the request, was not one of the permitted follow-up inquiries, and cannot restart the statutory clock. He contends the Act requires timely agency action and presumes disclosure when the deadline is missed.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and remanded, holding that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) timely sought an Attorney General opinion under the Public Information Act. Sierra Club had requested a large set of records on July 1, 2019. TCEQ emailed July 2 seeking clarification whether Sierra Club wanted confidential material released or would accept a narrowed response; Sierra Club declined. The Court held the ten-business-day clock began on July 2, the interagency-mail “mailbox rule” made TCEQ’s July 17 submission timely, and therefore TCEQ did not miss the statutory deadline. The case returns to the trial court to decide the merits of TCEQ’s claimed deliberative-process withholding privilege.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. The dispute arose from Platinum Construction’s suit against Copper Creek and Jose Escoffie for theft of services and related claims after key emails and accounting records were missing. The court of appeals had found the trial court’s spoliation jury instruction reversible error and ordered a new trial without first addressing other appellate issues that might have led to rendition. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts must first decide rendition issues and that the court of appeals’ harm analysis was insufficient.

The Texas Supreme Court denied review of an appeal in an asbestos wrongful-death case involving Howmet Aerospace and the Burford family. Justice Young concurred in the denial while criticizing the court of appeals for rejecting a prior Texas Supreme Court statement that proof of dose is required even in single-source asbestos-exposure cases. He explained the factual posture (long-term household exposure from a worker’s contaminated clothes), summarized relevant precedent (Havner, Flores, Bostic), and said that although lower courts show confusion, this particular case cannot resolve the dose question because the court of appeals found the plaintiffs had produced sufficient proof of dose. He urged future review in an appropriate case.

The Court of Appeals dismissed William Antoine Thomas’s appeal from a conviction entered pursuant to a plea bargain because the trial-court certification, signed by the judge, Thomas, and his trial counsel, states the case is a plea-bargain case, that the defendant has no right of appeal, and that Thomas waived his right to appeal. The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion, holding the certification deprived it of jurisdiction to hear the appeal under applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent.

A jury convicted Tyriq Bradford of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Bradford appealed, arguing the trial court erred by admitting three out-of-court statements by the six-year-old victim identifying him, over hearsay and confrontation objections. The court concluded the statements were admissible as excited utterances and also were non-testimonial, and that the victim’s presence and limited testimony at trial satisfied confrontation requirements. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion on hearsay and the Confrontation Clause was not violated, the conviction was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator. The State sought forfeiture after R.C. Scott was arrested while driving the Navigator and later pled guilty to evading and third-or-more driving-while-intoxicated charges. The court held the State proved the vehicle was contraband under Chapter 59 because Scott had three prior DWI convictions and used the vehicle in a qualifying felony, and that Scott was an equitable owner despite the vehicle titled to his parents. Because Scott was an owner, the parents could not prevail on the innocent-owner defense.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against appellant Nicholas Lind in a suit by investors M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC. M3 and YO invested in residential development projects run by Serene and Windridge, paid management and construction fees, and sued after projects stalled. Lind was served with the original petition but not the first amended petition; the trial court entered default judgment and later a damages judgment. The appellate court held lack of re-service was not error because the amended petition did not seek more onerous relief, and any challenge to sufficiency of evidence failed because securities claims under the Texas Securities Act do not require proof of loss causation.

The Texas appellate court reinstated an appeal previously suspended by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, reviewed a motion showing the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and concluded the discharge mooted the dispute between John Deere and Bradley Irwin. Because the bankruptcy discharge voided the underlying debt and barred collection, there was no live controversy for the court to resolve. The court therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment and its prior appellate opinion and judgment, and dismissed the case as moot.

The Court of Appeals reviewed James Chadleigh Schrotel’s conviction for misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury against a family member. The court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction but found reversible error in jury selection: a prospective juror (venireperson six) admitted a bias favoring victims of family violence and could not guarantee that bias would not affect his decision. The trial court denied the defendant’s challenge for cause and also denied an additional peremptory strike, resulting in an objectionable juror sitting. Because that denial was erroneous and harmful, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce between Chukwuemeka Carl Runyon and Bianca Bazile Runyon. After a bench trial, the trial court divided the community estate, appointed both parents joint managing conservators, gave the mother the right to determine the child’s primary residence (with a geographic restriction allowing residence in Brazos County or within 50 miles of Orlando, Florida), and ordered father to pay $1,840 per month in child support. The court found no abuse of discretion in the property division, the relocation decision, or the refusal to grant a child-support credit for travel expenses, given the record and applicable family-law standards.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals denied Shawn Eric McGee’s petition for a writ of mandamus filed April 10, 2026. The court issued a short memorandum opinion stating the petition is denied and that motions included with the petition are dismissed as moot. The opinion notes that the relator also attempted to file a notice of appeal in the same document and reminds that a separate notice of appeal must be filed when a proceeding becomes final in the trial court. The decision was delivered and filed April 16, 2026.

The defendant, Ethan Alexander Herrera, appealed a conviction for aggravated robbery. On April 13, 2026, Herrera filed a signed, voluntary motion to dismiss his appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum explaining the dismissal was pursuant to the rule permitting voluntary dismissal when requested by an appellant and properly signed.