Court Filings

The Superior Court vacated and remanded the defendant Dwayne Eric Lee’s sentence because the trial court imposed no jail time for a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). The Commonwealth appealed the sentence as illegal; the court interpreted the statutory phrase “shall be sentenced . . . to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days” to require an indeterminate sentence with a mandatory 60-day minimum and a 90-day maximum. Because the trial court imposed zero days, the sentence was illegal and must be vacated for resentencing consistent with the statutory range.

This is a dissenting opinion in a Pennsylvania Superior Court criminal appeal. The dissent argues the majority misapplied precedent and statutory rules in interpreting 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). Relying on Commonwealth v. Glover (1959) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756, the dissent contends the statute prescribes a maximum sentence range of 60 to 90 days and that any minimum cannot exceed half the chosen maximum. The dissenter would vacate the majority’s sentencing interpretation and remand for resentencing consistent with Glover and section 9756 (maximum 60–90 days; minimum no more than half the maximum).

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the lower court's denial of Eastmore Owners Corp.'s motion to dismiss three causes of action brought by tenant Blanche Zelmanovich. The court held that Zelmanovich plausibly pled housing discrimination and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under federal, state, and city fair housing and human rights laws. Her complaints about inaccurate noise reports, temporal proximity between notice of default and notice of her disability, differential treatment of a neighbor, and a psychologist's letter supporting an emotional support dog were sufficient at the pleading stage to create inferences of discrimination and failure to engage in an interactive accommodation process.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Christina Ventura's appeal from a Bronx Supreme Court order that granted defendant Ahmed summary judgment dismissing her complaint for lack of a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d). The appellate court held the order was entered against plaintiff for failure to timely respond (a default), so the order was not appealable as of right. The proper procedure was to move to vacate the default and then appeal any denial. Because of that procedural defect, the court did not reach Ventura's substantive arguments on the motion's merits.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed a contempt finding against plaintiff-wife for allegedly failing to transfer funds under this Court's March 20, 2025 order. The court held that the contempt adjudication was an improvident exercise of discretion and vacated the contempt finding because the prior order lacked a clear deadline for transfer and the motion court did not make required findings that the wife's conduct impaired the husband's rights. The court otherwise affirmed the lower court's order as to issues not challenged on appeal.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's partial denial of defendants' summary judgment motion and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to diagnose Cushing's syndrome, but defendants' expert attested that care met the standard and there was no biochemical or pathological evidence of Cushing's or an ACTH-secreting tumor during defendants' treatment. Plaintiffs' expert did not meaningfully rebut defendants' causation evidence or address 2019 surgical pathology, so plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue on causation.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed two judgments against Brandon Monegro. The court affirmed a January 18, 2024 conviction (amended April 10, 2024) for second-degree assault and a May 7, 2024 guilty plea conviction for third-degree assault, including the sentences. The court held that disorderly conduct was properly included in the Superior Court Information as a joinable lesser non-inclusory offense related to the same act charged in the felony complaint. Because the earlier conviction was affirmed, the defendant's argument that his later plea should be vacated as dependent on a reversal is moot.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a resentencing judgment that sentenced defendant Marques McGeachy to an aggregate term of 16 years. The court reviewed the trial court's denial of youthful offender treatment and found that, although McGeachy was technically eligible, the sentencing court properly considered the relevant factors and reasonably exercised its discretion to deny youthful offender status. The panel noted McGeachy’s participation with a violent gang, multiple shootings, and violent conduct over months involving multiple victims as reasons supporting the denial and the sentence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a 2019 Bronx County conviction and sentence of Michael Mable, who pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon and was sentenced as a second felony offender to 2½ to 5 years. The court declined to review Mable’s claim that his plea was involuntary because he failed to preserve the issue at the plea colloquy and the narrow exception allowing late review did not apply. The court also alternatively held that the record contains no evidence casting doubt on the voluntariness of the plea.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Keyshawn Kitchens' convictions for first- and second-degree assault and the concurrent seven-year sentences. The court found Kitchens failed to preserve statutory speedy trial and prosecutorial-misconduct claims and declined to review them in the interest of justice, but alternatively rejected those claims on the merits. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to convict, finding Kitchens the initial aggressor and that the victim was unarmed, with testimony corroborated by surveillance and other witnesses; jury credibility determinations were upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that had found defendant J.P. to presently suffer from a dangerous mental disorder and committed him to a secure psychiatric facility for six months. The court held that although the initial hearing met statutory and due process requirements despite the examining witnesses not testifying, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to meaningfully challenge the People's examiner reports, secure the examiners' testimony, obtain a defense expert, or present any defense evidence. The matter is remitted for a new CPL 330.20(6) hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Diondre Holman’s conviction following a guilty plea to fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon and his three-year probation sentence, but modified the judgment by striking the probation condition requiring payment of the mandatory surcharge and related fees. The court concluded Holman validly waived his right to appeal, which foreclosed review of his excessiveness challenge, but allowed review of his challenge to the legality of the probation condition and found that requirement unrelated to rehabilitation or public safety. Holman’s facial challenge to the "good moral character" licensing provision was unpreserved and declined in the interest of justice.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had dismissed the indictment against defendant Diamond Haggan under CPL 30.30. The People had filed a certificate of compliance for discovery and the court held that the prosecution was not required to obtain third-party employment and medical records as part of initial automatic discovery, so withholding them did not invalidate the certificate. Although the People improperly withheld a victim entity report as duplicative, there was no bad faith and the People had otherwise met their discovery obligations, so the dismissal was improper and the indictment was reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed defendant Yanil Heredia Gomez’s guilty plea and probation sentence for attempted second-degree assault. The court found Gomez validly waived his right to appeal, barring review of his excessive-sentence and certain as-applied constitutional challenges, but it reviewed nonconstitutional challenges to probation conditions. The court modified the sentence by striking several specific probation conditions (including warrantless drug searches, support of dependents, gang-association limits, electronic monitoring, ignition interlock, MTA ban, and cannabis prohibition) as unsupported by the record, and otherwise affirmed the conviction and probation sentence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Jesse Faulkner's conviction for second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and his sentence of 3½ years plus five years of postrelease supervision. The court rejected Faulkner's unpreserved Second Amendment challenge and declined to review it in the interest of justice. Alternatively, the court held he had standing to bring a facial challenge but failed to show New York's "good moral character" licensing requirement was invalid under Bruen. His ineffective-assistance claim was held unreviewable on direct appeal and, in any event, meritless because the claim had little chance of success.

The First Department affirmed defendant Jamar Carr’s conviction following a guilty plea to fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon and three years of probation, but modified the sentence by striking several probation conditions. The court found Carr validly waived most appellate rights, which barred review of his excessive-sentence and many constitutional claims, but allowed review of a Second Amendment challenge and several statutory challenges to probation conditions. The court rejected the Second Amendment claim and upheld certain conditions as reasonably related to rehabilitation, while striking fees, drug testing/treatment conditions, and a gang-association restriction as unsupported by the record.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by Supreme Court, Bronx County (Marsha D. Michael, J.) on May 31, 2022. Derwin Blanks appealed his conviction and sentence. After briefing and argument, the appellate court found the sentence imposed was not excessive and therefore affirmed the lower court's judgment in full. The decision is a short, unanimous order without extended opinion, primarily addressing the proportionality of the sentence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Shawn Batista’s conviction and sentence for attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, but exercised its interest-of-justice power to vacate the mandatory surcharge and fees imposed at sentencing. The court held Batista validly waived his right to appeal, which barred his as-applied constitutional and excessive-sentence claims, and found his preserved facial challenge to New York's age-based restriction on gun licensing failed on the merits under Bruen and controlling state precedent. The People did not oppose vacatur of the fees, so those monetary assessments were removed.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Durell Anderson’s conviction and sentence from Supreme Court, New York County. Anderson appealed a June 29, 2023 judgment; after argument, the appellate court reviewed the record, found the sentence not excessive, and denied relief. The opinion is brief: the court entered a unanimous order affirming the lower court’s judgment and referred defense counsel to the court’s Rule 606.5. No extended opinion or new legal holdings were published.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court, Bronx County's denial of defendant Federal 53 Inc.'s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff alleged his vehicle struck a tow truck's detached front bumper; Federal 53 argued plaintiff was solely at fault because the tow truck was legally stopped. The appellate court found Federal 53 did not eliminate material factual issues, pointing to authenticated photographs that raised questions whether the tow truck's bumper protruded into the plaintiff's lane in violation of a local regulation and whether that condition proximately caused the collision. A later order granting leave to reargue was dismissed as academic.

The Appellate Division reviewed a Family Court order that found a mother abused and neglected her child. The court unanimously vacated the abuse finding against the mother but affirmed the neglect finding. The court concluded the father, who lived with the family, inflicted excessive corporal punishment and sexual abuse, and the mother knew or should have known and failed to protect the child. The appellate court also upheld a neglect finding based on the mother's threat to the child with a knife, by conforming the pleadings to the proof, but found the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the mother committed abuse.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Bronx Supreme Court order that denied US Bank's motion to confirm a Referee's report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and granted defendant Moises Merino's cross-motion to toll mortgage interest for certain multi-year periods. The court found the Referee relied solely on a servicer employee's affidavit and attached records that lacked sufficient attestation or identifying marks tying them to the plaintiff or a particular servicer, so confirmation was improper. The court also held the lender caused lengthy delays in the referee process that prejudiced Merino, warranting equitable tolling of interest.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of Joseph Pena's amended petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York and NYPD officers. The court held Pena failed to prove the City had actual knowledge of the essential facts of his negligence claim within 90 days of accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter. The submitted evidence — an accident report and an alleged incomplete notice served after the deadline — did not show the City knew the facts supporting his theory that an NYPD high-speed chase caused the collision, and Pena also failed to show the City was not prejudiced by the delay.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court’s May 17, 2024 order that modified a 2015 Texas custody and visitation order and granted the mother sole physical and legal custody. The court held that, under New York’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), New York lacked authority to modify a prior Texas custody order because Texas retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and the father continues to reside in Texas. The court also found that Family Court failed to properly invoke temporary emergency jurisdiction because it did not communicate with the Texas court or limit the duration of its order, so the order was vacated and the case remanded for proper UCCJEA procedures.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment confirming a partial final arbitration award that required petitioners to pay respondent $1,123,644.48. Petitioners had sought to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her powers and misinterpreted contract rights to advancement and indemnification. The appellate court held that judicial review is extremely limited, that the arbitrator’s contract interpretation was rational and within the scope of her authority under the JAMS rules, and that petitioners did not show a violation of public policy or any clear excess of power warranting vacatur.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had vacated an arbitration award in a dispute between transit employees and the New York City Transit Authority. The appellate court held the arbitrator acted within his authority, properly reviewed the process by which the Medical Review Officer reached and then altered his drug-test determination, and found improper influence by the employer's representative. The panel concluded the award did not violate public policy and reinstated the arbitration award, denying the Authority's cross-motion to vacate and granting the petition to confirm.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court judgment confirming a final arbitration award in favor of MLN New York Inc. and denying Jinong Liu's cross-petition to vacate the award. The court held that the arbitrator reasonably relied on testimony from multiple employee witnesses that Liu misreported hours, shifted blame to the majority shareholder, attempted to induce employees to sue the company for a kickback, and otherwise acted disloyally. The court found these facts supported findings that Liu was a faithless servant and breached fiduciary duties, and rejected Liu's manifest-disregard and insufficiency arguments.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order that denied petitioner Elisabeth Kepley’s motion for leave to vacate a prior dismissal and denied her request to file additional papers. The court found that Kepley had previously abused the judicial process by bringing meritless litigation and that the proposed additional papers were irrelevant to the issues already decided. The First Department concluded the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to permit further filings and denied the requested relief, while awarding costs to the respondents.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's May 27, 2025 order dismissing Angel S. DuBose's CPLR article 78 petition seeking to compel the Department of Investigation (DOI) to investigate alleged criminal conduct while she worked at the NYC Public Advocate's Office. The court held mandamus is unavailable because the DOI's decision whether to investigate is discretionary under the City Charter, and the DOI rationally directed DuBose to report the allegations to the police. The court also affirmed denial of DuBose's motion to recuse the assigned Justice.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted a union's petition to confirm a 2023 arbitration award in full. The lower court had denied part of the petition and modified the award to strike a cease-and-desist order. The appellate court held that CPLR 7510-a(a), which requires confirmation of public-sector arbitration awards unless a timely motion to vacate or modify is made within 90 days, applied and that the respondent did not move within that period. The court also rejected the argument that the statute excludes unions from its coverage.