Court Filings

The Cuyahoga County Probate Court appointed an independent, non‑interested attorney as successor trustee of the Gary L. Bryenton Declaration of Trust after the named successor declined and a proposed beneficiary appointment was disputed. Barbara Bryenton had filed a notice appointing herself and her daughter Elisabeth as co‑trustees, but the court struck that notice, found conflicts among beneficiaries (notably Susan’s allegations of bias), and, after a short hearing with no sworn evidence, appointed a neutral trustee. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and that the probate court followed the statutory priority for filling trustee vacancies.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of medical-malpractice claims against Dr. Faisal Quereshy. Plaintiffs had originally filed suit in May 2022 and obtained extensions to file a required affidavit of merit, but failed to timely produce one. After refiling in November 2023 and receiving another 90-day extension, plaintiffs again missed the deadline and later attempted to cure the defect by filing an amended complaint with an affidavit. The court held that Civ.R. 10(D)(2)’s strict extension limits control and plaintiffs’ late affidavit could not cure the deficiency, so dismissal was proper.

The Ohio Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Belmont County Common Pleas Court’s grant of a civil stalking protection order (CSPO) sought by Petitioner D.F. against Respondent Melissa Starkey. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Starkey engaged in a pattern of conduct—social media posts, a threatening phone call to a bar owner, and related statements—that caused D.F. to reasonably believe Starkey would cause physical harm or mental distress. The appellate court held the evidence was legally sufficient, the trial court’s credibility findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the five-year duration was not an abuse of discretion.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determinations that the Hendersons’ attempts to abandon severed mineral rights under Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act were ineffective. Plaintiffs (heirs and assignees of John W. Means and Wolf Run II, LLC) sought declaratory judgment and quiet title to minerals under 160 acres. The court concluded the Hendersons failed to exercise reasonable diligence in locating mineral holders (they did not search Stark County records where holder addresses existed), so notice by publication was improper and abandonment failed. The court therefore affirmed quiet-title judgments for the plaintiffs and two defendant-holders (Means and Doxzen).

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of appellants' request for a second temporary injunction seeking to stop the homeowners association's election to amend its declaration to allow sale of a subdivision park. Appellants (residents) had a prior temporary injunction preventing sale of Thrush Ridge Park and sued for declaratory and injunctive relief; the Association held an election and appellants sought to enjoin it. The appeals court concluded the record lacked the evidentiary exhibits from the injunction hearing, so the appellants failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's civil commitment of Jose Arredondo, Jr. after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator. Arredondo appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a jury instruction telling jurors to treat expert testimony "just like any other testimony." The appellate court held the requested instruction would effectively single out the State's sole expert and thus improperly comment on the weight of the evidence, contrary to Davidson v. Wallingford and Texas procedural rules, so the refusal was not an abuse of discretion.

The court of appeals affirmed the municipal-court judgments awarding Asbury Woods Senior Apartments $659.23 for unpaid rent, late fees, and a utility payment after defendant Gloria Render objected to the magistrate’s decision. The court found: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Render’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration because the court’s March 28, 2025 judgment was final; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a utility-transfer form despite Render’s claim the signature was forged, because the factfinder could compare signatures; and (3) Asbury’s damages claim was separate from the eviction claim, so dismissing the eviction did not require dismissal of the damages claim.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Canton Municipal Court's judgment granting DNW Properties possession of rental premises and denying tenant David Tucker a jury trial in a forcible entry and detainer action. DNW served termination notices and filed the eviction complaint; Tucker was served and filed a jury demand after the statutory deadline. The appellate court held that R.C. 1923.09(A) — which requires a jury demand on or before the return day of the summons in forcible entry and detainer proceedings — is constitutional and that Tucker waived his jury right by failing to timely demand it.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Adams County Court's February 5, 2025 judgment granting Joyce Mapes a forcible entry and detainer (eviction) against Ewing “Toby” Gibbs and denying Gibbs' counterclaim asserting ownership under a $45,000 land contract. Gibbs argued the county court lacked jurisdiction and the case should have been transferred to the common pleas court. The appellate court reviewed jurisdiction de novo, relied on statutes authorizing county courts to decide contract-based equitable remedies, and followed precedent holding such courts may adjudicate contract enforcement tied to a possession action, so no transfer was required.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction that would have enjoined a family planning provider from offering abortion services at a parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs. The CC&Rs were adopted and recorded in 1991 by the Tulare Local Hospital District and expressly prohibited abortion clinics within the Tulare Medical Center development. The court held the prohibition is unenforceable because (1) the District’s adoption and recording of the CC&Rs is government action that interferes with the fundamental right of reproductive choice under the California Constitution and (2) Civil Code section 53, read with section 531 and the Unruh Act, voids recorded covenants that indirectly limit property use because of a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act (the decision to have an abortion).

The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas' dismissal of Haneef Muhammad’s complaint against PNC Financial Services. Muhammad sued PNC for claims arising from a 2023 bank-branch incident. The trial court granted PNC’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, concluding res judicata barred the claims because Muhammad previously sued PNC in federal court and that court dismissed several claims for failure to state a claim. The appellate court found the federal dismissal on those claims to be an adjudication on the merits under Ohio precedent, so the state action was precluded and the trial court’s dismissal was proper.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Harrison County Court's judgment granting Cedar One Properties possession of rental premises after finding tenant Isis Rudolph breached her lease by failing to pay rent. Rudolph argued various due-process, bankruptcy-stay, and disability-accommodation defects, and contended the bankruptcy court's order lifting the automatic stay was void. The appellate court found many issues involved the federal bankruptcy proceeding (beyond its jurisdiction), noted Rudolph's briefing and record deficiencies (no trial transcript, App.R. violations), and concluded the eviction was authorized because the bankruptcy court had granted relief from the stay limited to pursuing eviction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants-appellees and denial of plaintiffs-appellants’ summary judgment in a foreclosure action. Plaintiffs had executed and recorded a quitclaim deed in 2020 conveying the property to defendants and later sued in 2024 claiming an oral land-sale contract and unpaid installments. The court held plaintiffs lacked standing to foreclose because they held no recorded mortgage or lien, and the deed’s recited consideration barred use of prior oral agreements under the parol evidence and merger-by-deed rules. The judgment dismissing the case was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Lake County Court of Common Pleas’ grant of summary judgment for defendant-attorney David Patterson in Bruce Arnoff’s legal malpractice suit. Arnoff alleged Patterson’s representation in his federal habeas proceedings breached professional duties and caused dismissal of his habeas petition. The appellate court held there were no genuine issues of material fact: Patterson owed a duty but Arnoff failed to produce expert proof of breach or causation, and the federal petition’s untimeliness preceded Patterson’s retention. The court also rejected claims of improper joinder, discovery abuse, denial of jury trial, and judicial bias.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Butler County trial court's adoption of a magistrate's decision awarding Klein Engineering $233,554.95 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Appellants (Thiemann) argued they were denied a fair trial because the magistrate issued its decision 15 months after a bench trial and the first day's proceedings were not recorded. The appellate court held Ohio civil and appellate rules provide remedies (recall witnesses, stipulations, affidavits, or an App.R. 9(C) statement) to reconstruct an unrecorded record, and Thiemann failed to use those procedures in the trial court, so remand or reversal was not warranted.

The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Defiance County Common Pleas Court’s denial of the Latin American Club of Defiance, Ohio’s motion for relief from an August 16, 2022 default judgment under Ohio Civil Rule 60(B). The LAC argued the judgment should be vacated because the plaintiff secured the default through misconduct and inadequate service after the club had been dormant and its corporate charter cancelled. The appeals court held the trial court reasonably found service by publication appropriate, that the LAC failed to show extraordinary fraud on the court or timely fraud against a party, and therefore did not meet the requirements for relief under the governing Rule 60(B) standards.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant John A. Marre in a foreclosure/lien dispute brought by plaintiff John D. Allen. Allen claimed Marre agreed to pay him $365,000 and filed a UCC financing statement and lien when payment was not made. Marre submitted an affidavit and exhibits showing there was no enforceable contract or security interest, and Allen did not respond to the motion for summary judgment. The appellate court concluded no genuine issue of material fact existed and Marre was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of MAZCleveland and third-party defendant Steven Morris’s renewed motion for sanctions against defendant Sherry Hall under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.51. The appellants sought sanctions claiming Hall’s claims were frivolous and filed to harass, but the trial court determined the renewed motion merely restated previously-decided claims resolved by an agreed judgment. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion: winning on the merits does not by itself prove frivolousness, the statutory standard requires egregious conduct, and the trial court had sufficient familiarity with the prior proceedings to deny a hearing.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against defendant-appellant Armand DiNardo in a dispute over lead-hazard remediation costs following Lofty Holding’s purchase of real property. Lofty served DiNardo by certified mail (returned unclaimed) and then by ordinary mail to a Kenwood Drive address; the clerk’s docket reflected ordinary-mail service and no return showing failure. The trial court held hearings and afforded DiNardo multiple chances to respond; DiNardo failed to appear or rebut service with convincing evidence. The appeals court held service was proper and the default judgment was valid.

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Apex Security Group, Inc. in a negligence suit by pro se plaintiff Joshua Bradley, Sr., who was punched at a Cleveland Browns game. The court concluded Apex did not owe Bradley a duty to prevent the unforeseeable assault under the contract and Ohio law governing private security duties, and Bradley failed to show a genuine issue of material fact. The court also rejected Bradley’s procedural and bias claims, found no abuse in evidence rulings or refusal to grant default judgment, and affirmed the judgment for Apex.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh District’s judgment holding that a 1953 deed reservation of “all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal . . . and other minerals, with the right to mine and remove such coal or other minerals of any vein” did not reserve rights to oil and gas. The trial court had granted summary judgment to the surface owner (Faith Ranch) and the court of appeals affirmed based on extrinsic evidence; the Supreme Court agreed the outcome was correct but held the deed was unambiguous on its face. The Court explained that the reservation’s words (mine/mining, vein, and related phrasing) show an intent to reserve solid, mineable minerals like coal, not migratory oil and gas.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Summit County Common Pleas Court’s order enforcing a settlement between Randy Dean and Pekin Insurance. Dean had sued for underinsured motorist benefits; his former attorney demanded $185,000 and Pekin accepted. Pekin sent settlement documents and a check, but Dean refused to sign. After a hearing with testimony and an email exhibit, the trial court found a valid settlement existed, that Dean’s counsel had authority to settle above $175,000, and that Dean failed to prove incompetence or duress. The appellate court found sufficient evidence supported those findings and affirmed.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Highland County Juvenile Court’s decision denying Derrick Beverly’s objections to an administrative order terminating his child support obligation after the child reached majority. Beverly argued the original 2007 support order was void due to fraudulent or misidentified genetic testing, coercion, lack of notice, and other constitutional defects. The appellate court found Beverly failed to timely object to the original administrative orders and that the juvenile court held multiple hearings and considered his submissions. Because Beverly did not show reversible error or lack of opportunity to be heard, the appeals court affirmed.

Mallory Harcourt sued Tesla after her toddler climbed into her newly purchased Model X, started it, and the vehicle struck her. She proceeded only on a strict product liability design-defect theory using the consumer expectations test. After Harcourt rested, the trial court granted Tesla's motion for nonsuit, concluding ordinary consumers could not form minimum safety expectations about how the Model X would perform in the unusual scenario of a toddler starting the car, particularly given the vehicle's complex, nonstandard systems. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the consumer expectations test inapplicable and noting Harcourt waived the alternative risk-benefit theory.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of San Rafael in a lawsuit by 16-year-old Kaylin Pagan, a passenger injured when her friend’s car hydroplaned and went down an embankment. Pagan sued the City for a dangerous condition of public property, alleging failures to warn of a sharp wet curve and lack of barriers. The trial court found the roadway’s wet condition and resulting hazard were open and obvious as a matter of law, and Pagan’s later expert theory about a defective pavement surface was not pleaded and relied on inadmissible or unsupported expert opinion. The appellate court agreed and affirmed judgment for the City.