Court Filings

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a wrongful-death/negligent security appeal. The panel held there was no genuine dispute of material fact that would allow a jury to find the defendants owed or breached a legally cognizable duty to prevent the criminal act that caused the decedent’s death. The court relied on Florida summary-judgment standards and precedent distinguishing foreseeability as part of duty and proximate cause, concluding the record did not impose liability on the landowner under current law.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s denial of Blue Origin’s motion to compel arbitration of former employee Craig Stoker’s employment claims. The court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable because it was an adhesion contract presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and substantively unconscionable because it was overbroad, lacked mutuality, waived jury trial, and barred representative claims including PAGA-style claims. Because multiple defects tainted the agreement and severance would not cure the one-sided scheme, the court held the arbitration clause unenforceable and affirmed denial of the petition to compel arbitration.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Citizens Against Marketplace Apartment/Condo Development’s petitions challenging the City of San Ramon’s approval of an infill housing project at Marketplace Center and the city’s finding that the project was categorically exempt from environmental review under CEQA. Citizens argued the project conflicted with the general plan and zoning because a joint “master plan” was allegedly required and the development was not a proper horizontal mixed-use. The court found substantial evidence supported the city’s consistency findings and that CEQA’s in-fill exemption applied, and it upheld the trial court’s award of record-preparation costs to the city.

The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Mireyda and Joel Gonzalez’s suit against the City of Vidor. The Gonzalezes claimed the City was vicariously liable for a police officer’s negligent driving that led to a crash, arguing the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) waived immunity because the officer acted recklessly and failed to use his siren. The Court of Appeals held the emergency exception to the TTCA applied: the officer was responding to an emergency, his use of lights but not a siren was justified under statutory exceptions, and the record did not show conscious indifference or reckless disregard that would waive immunity. The City’s plea to the jurisdiction was properly granted.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ronald Sutherland’s suit for want of prosecution. Sutherland had sued Thomas Dean Stewart and Phillip Chapman for falsely reporting a 1966 Ford Mustang stolen and sought sanctions and a default judgment against Stewart for discovery failures. The trial court dismissed the case after Sutherland failed to appear for trial. The appeals court held Sutherland did not challenge the dismissal itself, and interlocutory denials of sanctions or default judgments cannot be reviewed separately once a final dismissal stands, so the dismissal is dispositive.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Jason Kelsey’s petition for a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed final divorce decree that awarded most marital assets to Maria Rocha. Kelsey, who signed the decree while incarcerated and proceeded pro se, claimed fraud, duress, lack of a valid marriage, and mischaracterization of his separate property. The trial court found he failed to prove a meritorious defense or that he was prevented by fraud, official mistake, or wrongful act from presenting a defense, and that his own negligence contributed to the outcome. The appellate court held those findings were supported and reviewed for abuse of discretion, so the denial was affirmed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's order discontinuing reunification services and approving a permanency plan of adoption for two minor children after finding the parents subjected the younger child, A. A., to chronic physical abuse. Medical evidence showed A. A. suffered twelve fractures in various healing stages; a child-abuse pediatrician concluded the injuries resulted from repeated adult-inflicted pulling and twisting. The parents invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege at the nonreunification hearing, and the court drew adverse inferences from that refusal. The appellate court held that the evidence met the clear-and-convincing standard for nonreunification and aggravated circumstances.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals, on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, affirmed the trial court’s ruling that relators’ writ of mandamus alleging inverse condemnation against the City of Cleveland was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The court concluded the cause of action did not accrue until the airport runway expansion at issue was completed in August 2004, because that completion was when all events fixing Cleveland’s alleged liability occurred. Because the relators filed their mandamus petition on August 1, 2008, the court held the action was timely and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of the taking claim.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Euclid Municipal Court’s denial of Malik Dahdouh’s last-minute motion to continue a small-claims trial. The case arose after the plaintiff sued for vehicle damage; the trial was scheduled within the 40-day small-claims deadline. Dahdouh filed a pro se continuance request the day before trial, citing overseas travel, which the magistrate denied. The appellate court held the trial court properly applied the factors governing continuances (including statutory timing, delay length, prejudice to the plaintiff, and the defendant’s contribution to the delay) and did not abuse its discretion in refusing the continuance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Anthony Gingo in his defamation suit against Jane Hanak based on a Yelp review. The appellate court held the challenged statements were false, defamatory per se, and not protected by any qualified privilege; damages (total $245,000, including $145,000 compensatory and $100,000 punitive) and attorney fees were upheld after a hearing. The court also affirmed the trial court’s prior designation of Hanak as a vexatious litigator. The ruling rests on undisputed admissions, admissible record evidence, and the conclusion that the statements alleged criminal conduct and attacks on professional reputation.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Shawn Hamilton's negligence and intentional-tort claims against Ameristone, American Countertops, and employee Noah Troyer. Hamilton was injured at work and sued for negligence, negligence per se, and under Ohio's intentional-tort statute. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings and denied leave to amend because the complaint did not allege deliberate intent to injure, and the employers were covered by the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The appellate court agreed that the pleadings failed to state an actionable intentional-tort claim and affirmed.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Cicorettis’ complaint against A&M Total Restoration. The Cicorettis repeatedly filed complaints captioned as breach of contract but pleaded only negligent, defective, and unworkmanlike performance and failed to attach a written contract or adequately plead contract terms as required by Civ.R. 10(D). The appellate court agreed the complaint failed to state a cognizable breach claim and that negligence/oral-contract claims were time-barred, so dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was proper.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the lower court's denial of Eastmore Owners Corp.'s motion to dismiss three causes of action brought by tenant Blanche Zelmanovich. The court held that Zelmanovich plausibly pled housing discrimination and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under federal, state, and city fair housing and human rights laws. Her complaints about inaccurate noise reports, temporal proximity between notice of default and notice of her disability, differential treatment of a neighbor, and a psychologist's letter supporting an emotional support dog were sufficient at the pleading stage to create inferences of discrimination and failure to engage in an interactive accommodation process.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court, Bronx County's denial of defendant Federal 53 Inc.'s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff alleged his vehicle struck a tow truck's detached front bumper; Federal 53 argued plaintiff was solely at fault because the tow truck was legally stopped. The appellate court found Federal 53 did not eliminate material factual issues, pointing to authenticated photographs that raised questions whether the tow truck's bumper protruded into the plaintiff's lane in violation of a local regulation and whether that condition proximately caused the collision. A later order granting leave to reargue was dismissed as academic.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Bronx Supreme Court order that denied US Bank's motion to confirm a Referee's report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and granted defendant Moises Merino's cross-motion to toll mortgage interest for certain multi-year periods. The court found the Referee relied solely on a servicer employee's affidavit and attached records that lacked sufficient attestation or identifying marks tying them to the plaintiff or a particular servicer, so confirmation was improper. The court also held the lender caused lengthy delays in the referee process that prejudiced Merino, warranting equitable tolling of interest.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of Joseph Pena's amended petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York and NYPD officers. The court held Pena failed to prove the City had actual knowledge of the essential facts of his negligence claim within 90 days of accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter. The submitted evidence — an accident report and an alleged incomplete notice served after the deadline — did not show the City knew the facts supporting his theory that an NYPD high-speed chase caused the collision, and Pena also failed to show the City was not prejudiced by the delay.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment confirming a partial final arbitration award that required petitioners to pay respondent $1,123,644.48. Petitioners had sought to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her powers and misinterpreted contract rights to advancement and indemnification. The appellate court held that judicial review is extremely limited, that the arbitrator’s contract interpretation was rational and within the scope of her authority under the JAMS rules, and that petitioners did not show a violation of public policy or any clear excess of power warranting vacatur.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court judgment confirming a final arbitration award in favor of MLN New York Inc. and denying Jinong Liu's cross-petition to vacate the award. The court held that the arbitrator reasonably relied on testimony from multiple employee witnesses that Liu misreported hours, shifted blame to the majority shareholder, attempted to induce employees to sue the company for a kickback, and otherwise acted disloyally. The court found these facts supported findings that Liu was a faithless servant and breached fiduciary duties, and rejected Liu's manifest-disregard and insufficiency arguments.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order that denied petitioner Elisabeth Kepley’s motion for leave to vacate a prior dismissal and denied her request to file additional papers. The court found that Kepley had previously abused the judicial process by bringing meritless litigation and that the proposed additional papers were irrelevant to the issues already decided. The First Department concluded the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to permit further filings and denied the requested relief, while awarding costs to the respondents.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Lisa Johnson's personal-injury complaint arising from a slip-and-fall at defendants' bowling alley. The court held the appeal was properly considered on the merits despite a procedural argument about appeal timing, but found no admissible evidence that any specific negligent condition (such as excessive oiling or waxing) caused the fall. Because causation could only be based on speculation, defendants met their burden and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so the dismissal was upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order granting plaintiff Luis Gavilanes summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1) against defendant 919 Ground Lease LLC and others. The court held that the evidence shows defendants’ negligence in failing to provide proper fall protection — plaintiff was directed to climb cross-pipes without a harness tie-off and could not secure his harness — and that this was a proximate cause of his injury. The court also found defendant translations insufficiently certified but that factual disputes about ladder availability did not defeat liability.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of defendant Isabella Geriatric Center’s motion to dismiss a wrongful-death complaint brought after a resident contracted COVID-19 and died. The court held that defendant did not establish entitlement to immunity under the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act because, while two statutory prerequisites were satisfied (it was a health care facility providing COVID-related services), there were triable issues about whether the facility acted in good faith and whether its conduct rose to gross negligence. A post-death health department citation suggesting policy noncompliance was central to the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the foreclosure judgment entered for Bank of America against defendant Nicholas Sands. The court confirmed the Referee's report on the amount due because the bank submitted admissible business records and supporting filings, and Sands failed to produce proof of payments or raise evidentiary objections. The court found any failure to calendaring a post-report hearing did not prejudice Sands. It declined to review a separate challenge to service of a 90-day notice because Sands had abandoned that issue by not appealing the prior order or raising it below. The court also held the loan was not a protected "home loan."

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of defendant Riding High Dude Ranch's motion for summary judgment in a negligence suit by plaintiff Kerry Small. Small alleged a wrangler negligently pushed her leg over a horse while mounting in June 2021, causing knee injuries requiring surgery. The court found defendant met its initial burden showing Small assumed ordinary risks of horseback riding, but Small raised triable issues that the wrangler applied excessive force in a manner contrary to ranch training and protocols, which could have unreasonably increased the risk and caused her injury. Those factual disputes preclude summary judgment.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the Workers' Compensation Board's decision awarding benefits for an occupational disease to Samuel Davis, a brick mason who alleged repetitive-trauma injuries to both hands/wrists and knees. The Board credited treating physician Dr. Hecht's opinion linking Davis's long history of repetitive masonry duties to his diagnoses, despite conflicting opinions from the carrier's consultant. The court also upheld a $500 penalty the Board imposed (reduced from $2,500) against the carrier for unilaterally conducting a third deposition of Dr. Hecht while an administrative appeal was pending, finding that the deposition constituted a frivolous proceeding.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of defendants' summary judgment motions in a wrongful-death/medical malpractice suit. Plaintiff sued after her husband presented to the emergency department with left-sided back pain and difficulty breathing and later died of a heart attack four days after discharge. Defendants submitted expert affidavits saying care met the standard and testing would not have changed the outcome; plaintiff produced expert opinions that an EKG and troponin should have been ordered and that timely testing/treatment would likely have prevented death. The court found disputed issues of fact on breach and causation and rejected defendants' claim plaintiff raised a new theory of recovery.

The Court of Appeals held that the federal Graves Amendment preempts New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (which imposed vicarious liability on rental companies) but does not preempt VTL § 370's independent requirement that rental car companies carry minimum amounts of insurance. The court concluded that Section 370, insofar as prior New York precedent read it to require rental companies to provide primary insurance coverage to renters up to the statutory minimums, is preempted by the Graves Amendment's prohibition on vicarious liability; however, the statute’s separate obligation that rental companies maintain specified minimum insurance limits survives. The Appellate Division's order affirming summary disposition was therefore affirmed.

The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment declaring valid and enforceable a 2018 contract conveying a 25% interest in income-producing property to two law firms (later assigned to HPGM, LLC). Price’s attempt to defeat summary judgment relied on untimely, stricken amended pleadings and did not respond with evidence to many no-evidence challenges to her originally pleaded claims and defenses. The court also upheld the award of approximately $300,000 in attorney’s fees to HPGM, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion given HPGM’s billing records and counsel’s testimony about rates, services, and the receivership and bankruptcy work that advanced the declaratory claim.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. Highland Village Management (HVM) had obtained a temporary injunction preventing appellants from using or transferring funds or property allegedly taken from HVM. Appellants argued on appeal that HVM failed to prove irreparable injury and that newly revealed facts required dissolution. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the original injunction and found appellants presented no new evidence or changed circumstances at the dissolution hearings, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dissolve the injunction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial-court judgment ordering specific performance of a written buy-sell agreement requiring Joann Crawford to convey a parcel to Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC (an assignee of Trails End). The trial court found Buffalo Creek ready, willing, and able to perform, that Crawford breached the contract and conveyed the property with knowledge of the pending suit and lis pendens, and it adjusted the sale proceeds for liens, taxes, life-estate compensation, costs, and fees. The appellate court presumed the trial record supported the findings (Crawford failed to timely request the reporter’s record) and found no reversible error in the trial court’s award or its accounting adjustments.