Court Filings

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application filed by Fulton County Sheriff Patrick Labat seeking review of a trial court order that denied his summary-judgment immunity defense in a lawsuit by Ralph Gershom challenging a sheriff's deed. The court concluded the superior-court order is directly appealable under new OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(15), effective July 1, 2025, so an interlocutory application was unnecessary. Because Sheriff Labat already filed a notice of appeal docketed as Case No. A26A1678, the Court dismissed the duplicative application as superfluous and directed further filings to proceed under the existing appeal number.

The Appellate Division dismissed plaintiff David Gennett's appeal challenging Supreme Court's refusal to fix his second attorney Ronald Benjamin's charging lien before the case concluded. The case had settled while the appeal was pending, making the request for an immediate fee determination moot. The appellate court also held that whether the second attorney's compensation should be measured by quantum meruit instead of the contingency agreement is not yet ripe because Supreme Court has not resolved the fee allocation and has placed a portion of settlement funds in escrow pending that determination. The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Ernest Garcia’s appeal from a December 4, 2025 judgment because his March 5, 2026 notice of appeal was untimely and he failed to provide a required reasonable explanation or file a motion for extension of time after the court ordered him to do so. The court concluded the late notice could only be excused by an implied extension under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 if Garcia supplied a reasonable explanation, which he did not, so the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal and dismissed it under Rule 42.3(a).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Minor sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment, but the appellate court concluded such a denial is an interlocutory order not immediately appealable. The court also noted the clerk’s record did not include an order denying the motion, and that Minor failed to respond to an order to show cause about jurisdiction. Because the appeal was from a non-appealable interlocutory ruling and procedural requirements were not met, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor's appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for a default judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that denials of default judgments are ordinarily interlocutory and not appealable before entry of a final judgment. The court ordered Minor to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal. The decision rests on Texas law that interlocutory orders denying default judgment cannot be appealed until the underlying case is finally resolved.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Latoya Lavasiee Hopkins’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County for want of prosecution because she repeatedly failed to file her appellate brief or request extensions despite notices and a court order. The appellate court gave deadlines and warnings under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure but Hopkins did not respond. Because she did not comply with the court’s order to file a brief by the specified date, the court exercised its authority to dismiss the appeal.

The court dismissed an appeal by Ivie Fenoi-Lynch for lack of jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch filed a notice of appeal from a justice court judgment, but the appellate record shows the case continued in the county court at law and no final judgment was signed by that county court. The Fourth Court of Appeals explained it only has jurisdiction over appeals from district or county courts in its district and only over final judgments; a notice of appeal from a justice court does not invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch’s response to a show-cause order did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed EFT Express SA de CV's appeal from a Webb County district court for want of prosecution because the clerk's record was not filed and the appellant failed to pay the fee required for preparing the record. The appellate court notified the appellant and ordered a written explanation, but the appellant did not respond by the deadline. Citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court dismissed the appeal and taxed appellate costs against the appellant.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Capital Fund I, LLC’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had entered a default judgment against Capital Fund but expressly labeled it interlocutory. The plaintiff then obtained a severance order moving the entire dispute against Capital Fund (both defaulted and still-pending claims) into a new cause. The appellate court concluded that severing the entire case did not convert the interlocutory default judgment into a final, appealable judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed McGarvey-Wilkins’s appeal from a Georgia State-Wide Business Court order denying her request to proceed as an indigent. The appellant repeatedly failed to file a compliant affidavit of indigency, pay the filing fee, or provide an adequate certificate of service despite the Court’s orders to do so. Because she did not file a timely initial brief and did not show good cause for the defaults required by Court of Appeals Rule 23(a), the Court dismissed the appeal for noncompliance with procedural rules.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thelma Peake's late request to file her appellate brief after the deadline and quashed her appeal in a dispute over Shaun Griffith’s nomination petition for Pennsylvania’s 3rd Congressional District. The court acted on an application for leave to file the brief nunc pro tunc and concluded the application must be denied. Because Peake failed to file a timely brief, the Court ended the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying nomination-petition dispute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruben Dario Almela’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and also granted attorney’s fees but did not set the fee amount, so the order did not resolve all claims or parties and was not a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court previously questioned jurisdiction and gave Almela time to show cause; he did not respond. Because the judgment was not final and Almela failed to justify appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terry Akwue’s appeal from a small claims judgment because his notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court entered final judgment on September 26, 2025; Akwue filed a motion for new trial which extended his deadline to December 26, 2025, but he did not file his notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction for a late-filed notice, gave Akwue notice that the appeal would be dismissed, received no response, and therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Christina Keller's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, because she failed to provide or pay for the reporter’s record and then failed to file her appellate brief by the court-ordered deadline. The court notified Keller of the missing reporter’s record and limited consideration to issues not requiring that record, gave her time to file a brief, warned that dismissal could follow, and received no response. The court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed this interlocutory appeal because the parties informed the court they reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss. Both parties agreed to bear their own appellate costs, counsel signed the motion, and no cross-appeal was filed. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs taxed against the parties who incurred them, and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Antique Fields’ application for discretionary review of a magistrate court writ of possession because the application was filed too late. The magistrate court entered judgment on 2026-02-27, and Antique Fields filed for review on 2026-03-24, which exceeded the seven-day deadline for filing under Georgia law. The Court explained that its jurisdiction to review magistrate court orders exists only after review by a state or superior court, and because the application was untimely and filing deadlines are jurisdictional, the Court could not transfer the matter and therefore dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeals denied Thomas Jones’ request for a writ of mandamus seeking to force Judge Lisa L. Sadler to serve him with an entry of dismissal and to rescind a bill for court costs. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that the duty to serve judgment and note service on the docket lies with the clerk of court under Civ.R. 58(B), not with the judge. The court also held Jones has an adequate remedy at law (e.g., Civ.R. 60(B) or appeal) and thus cannot meet mandamus requirements.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Progressive Mountain Insurance Company’s attempt to appeal a trial court order awarding attorney fees as a discovery sanction because the order was not final. The trial court reserved the amount of fees for a later hearing, so the case remained pending below. Progressive did not seek interlocutory review under the statutory procedure (OCGA § 5-6-34(b)) by obtaining a certificate of immediate review. Because Progressive failed to follow the required interlocutory appeal steps, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by plaintiffs Whitney Garland and Thomas Nichols from a trial-court order awarding attorney fees to defendant Provectus Unum, LLC. The plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed their contract lawsuit, but the trial court reopened the case because Provectus had a pending counterclaim for fees and then awarded fees under Georgia law. The Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals of fee awards under OCGA § 9-15-14 must proceed by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(10), and the plaintiffs did not follow that procedure.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed L. Lin Wood’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The underlying civil trial court entered a $9,661,177 judgment for the plaintiffs and granted a supersedeas bond on November 5, 2025. Wood filed a motion for reconsideration on November 12 and a notice of appeal on December 9, 2025. The Court held that the notice of appeal was untimely as to the November 5 order because it was filed 34 days later, and that the later denial of the reconsideration motion is not directly appealable and does not extend the appeal deadline.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Brittany Jackson's appeal from a judgment in favor of Bay Street Homes arising from a dispossessory action because Jackson filed her notice of appeal 21 days after the trial court's order denying her motion for new trial, instead of within the seven-day deadline that applies to dispossessory cases. The court explained that although possession became moot, the underlying action remained a dispossessory proceeding seeking past-due rent, so the special seven-day appeal window under OCGA § 44-7-56 controlled. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the court lacked authority to hear the appeal.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals dismissed Nicole Potts' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Potts had challenged a municipal-court order that adopted a magistrate's decision dismissing a landlord's forcible entry and detainer action against her. The magistrate dismissed the action without prejudice, finding Potts' purported "lifelong lease" defective and that the landlord's notice to vacate was defective. The appellate court held the municipal order was not a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 because the dismissal without prejudice left the parties in the same position as before the suit and did not affect Potts' substantial rights.

The Court dismissed William Berry Waters III’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed on his behalf by a non-lawyer and Waters failed to cure the deficiency by filing a signed amended notice after being notified. Texas law prohibits non-lawyers from representing others or preparing pleadings, and a notice of appeal filed in a representative capacity by a non-attorney is ineffective. The clerk repeatedly asked Waters to file a signed amended notice but he did not do so, so the court dismissed the appeal under its procedural rule allowing dismissal for failure to comply with rules or clerk notices.

The Court dismissed Practical Technology, Inc.'s interlocutory appeal because the notice of appeal and appellant's brief were signed only by a person who is not a licensed attorney. The same non-attorney had previously filed a mandamus petition in this Court and the Court had dismissed that petition for lack of an attorney appearance. The Court gave Practical Technology time to respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss and rejected a late-filed extension because it was submitted by the same non-attorney. Because no licensed attorney ever appeared and no cure was shown, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Adelide Perez Ybarra’s appeal of the denial of her petition for expunction because she failed to file the required docketing statement and failed to pay the $205 filing fee despite being notified twice and given deadlines. The clerk first warned her that both were due by March 2, 2026; after noncompliance the clerk extended a final deadline of March 16, 2026. Because neither requirement was satisfied, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow the clerk’s directives.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Johnny Lamonte Phillips’s appeal for want of prosecution because he failed to pay the required clerk’s record costs and filing fee and did not make payment arrangements or respond to the court’s notices. The clerk’s record was due December 22, 2025, but was not filed. The court notified Phillips in March 2026 about unpaid clerk’s-record costs and earlier instructed him in January and February 2026 to remit a $205 filing fee; he did not comply within the time allowed, so the court dismissed the appeal under its rules.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted an agreed motion to dismiss an appeal brought by Sandra Flores and Anita M. Flores against Propel Tax and Javier Hernandez. The parties told the court they resolved their dispute and asked for dismissal. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, dismissed the appeal, taxed the appellate costs to the appellants, and declined to consider any motion for rehearing because the appeal was dismissed at the parties' request.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District dismissed Constance Benavides’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Cameron County because she failed to meet appellate procedural requirements. The clerk’s record was overdue, and Benavides did not file the required docketing statement or inform the court that she paid or arranged to pay the clerk’s fee or was entitled to proceed without payment. After notice and a court order giving her ten days to comply, she did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and a court order.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal filed on behalf of corporate entities because a nonlawyer cannot represent entities in court. After notifying the parties that an attorney must represent the corporations, counsel who filed an amended notice of appeal withdrew and no new attorney entered an appearance or filed a brief. The court concluded the entities failed to comply with directives to obtain counsel and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court orders.