Court Filings

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruben Dario Almela’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and also granted attorney’s fees but did not set the fee amount, so the order did not resolve all claims or parties and was not a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court previously questioned jurisdiction and gave Almela time to show cause; he did not respond. Because the judgment was not final and Almela failed to justify appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terry Akwue’s appeal from a small claims judgment because his notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court entered final judgment on September 26, 2025; Akwue filed a motion for new trial which extended his deadline to December 26, 2025, but he did not file his notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction for a late-filed notice, gave Akwue notice that the appeal would be dismissed, received no response, and therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus from Anjeneya Vijay Cheruvu, who sought to overturn a March 19, 2026 trial-court order holding him in contempt for possession or access in a Fort Bend County child-protection case. Cheruvu argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the contempt order. The appellate court concluded he did not meet the heavy burden required for mandamus relief, so it refused to direct the trial court to vacate the contempt order and dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a trespass to try title suit. Houston International Management & Trade, Inc. (HIM) claimed ownership of 23 commercial lots by adverse possession, but a jury found HIM had not possessed the property peaceably and adversely for the statutory period and instead found a verbal management agreement existed between HIM and the record owners (the Peacock parties). The court held there was some evidence supporting the jury’s findings, rejected HIM’s challenges to JNOV, new trial claims, and factual-sufficiency complaints, and affirmed the hold that the Peacock parties own the properties.

The First District of Texas dismissed Christina Keller's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, because she failed to provide or pay for the reporter’s record and then failed to file her appellate brief by the court-ordered deadline. The court notified Keller of the missing reporter’s record and limited consideration to issues not requiring that record, gave her time to file a brief, warned that dismissal could follow, and received no response. The court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed this interlocutory appeal because the parties informed the court they reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss. Both parties agreed to bear their own appellate costs, counsel signed the motion, and no cross-appeal was filed. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs taxed against the parties who incurred them, and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Anderson & Associates, PLLC seeking to overturn a trial court order of December 5, 2025 that redistributed an attorney fee award. The court explained mandamus requires showing both that the trial court abused its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or that the order is void. The court concluded the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, withdrew its prior order requesting responses from the real parties in interest, and denied the petition and emergency relief.

The Court dismissed William Berry Waters III’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed on his behalf by a non-lawyer and Waters failed to cure the deficiency by filing a signed amended notice after being notified. Texas law prohibits non-lawyers from representing others or preparing pleadings, and a notice of appeal filed in a representative capacity by a non-attorney is ineffective. The clerk repeatedly asked Waters to file a signed amended notice but he did not do so, so the court dismissed the appeal under its procedural rule allowing dismissal for failure to comply with rules or clerk notices.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reversed the county court’s no-evidence summary judgment that had dismissed Samantha Lopez’s claim that she and Felix Lengyel were informally married. Lopez alleged an informal marriage based on an agreement to be married, living together, and holding themselves out as married. The appeals court found Lopez presented more than a minimal amount of evidence on (1) an agreement to be married (her deposition and hearing testimony that they agreed to represent themselves as married to permit travel to Canada) and (2) holding out (testimony that family, housekeepers, and others treated them as married and that they represented to the Canadian government they were married). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court dismissed Practical Technology, Inc.'s interlocutory appeal because the notice of appeal and appellant's brief were signed only by a person who is not a licensed attorney. The same non-attorney had previously filed a mandamus petition in this Court and the Court had dismissed that petition for lack of an attorney appearance. The Court gave Practical Technology time to respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss and rejected a late-filed extension because it was submitted by the same non-attorney. Because no licensed attorney ever appeared and no cure was shown, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.

The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully terminated Texas Ranger Robert Christopher Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s high school in which he threatened counselors and other officers while carrying his badge, handcuffs, and a firearm. Callaway claimed his conduct was caused by PTSD and sued for disability discrimination under the Texas Labor Code. The Court held that Section 21.105 excludes from Chapter 21 protection disabilities that impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform the job, and concluded Callaway’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to perform DPS duties, so his discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

The Texas Supreme Court decided that a 1984 pole-attachment contract between Spectrum (successor) and CPS Energy incorporates later-enacted statutory limits on pole-attachment rates. The Court held the agreement’s clear promise to “at all times observe and comply with . . . all laws” and that the contract is “subject to” such laws means legislative changes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations become enforceable under the contract. Because CPS charged and collected higher rates from Spectrum while collecting less from AT&T, Spectrum may pursue its breach-of-contract claim alleging violations of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its new-trial order and enter judgment on an 11–1 defense verdict in a medical-negligence suit. After a jury found Dr. Lapuerta not liable for Jose Torres’s eventual ray amputation, the trial court granted a new trial based on perceived error in a “loss of chance” jury instruction and possible juror confusion. The Supreme Court held the trial court misapplied controlling Texas law about loss-of-chance instructions, noted an improper juror letter that could have influenced the result, and concluded the record did not show the instruction probably caused an improper judgment.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H-E-B in a slip-and-fall premises-liability case. The plaintiff slipped on a clear liquid puddle in a grocery aisle and sued H-E-B, alleging the store knew or should have known of the hazard. The Court held that to raise a fact issue on constructive notice a plaintiff must present some evidence about how long the dangerous condition existed at the time and place of injury. Because the record lacked any evidence on the puddle’s duration, H-E-B could not be charged with constructive knowledge and summary judgment was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court resolved a dispute over how to value a nonparticipating royalty reserved in a 1960 deed. The court held the deed’s phrase “produced from the above described acreage” fixes the valuation point at the wellhead, and the phrase “free of cost forever” refers only to exemption from exploration and production costs. Because the deed lacks language shifting valuation to processed, downstream sales or expressly adding postproduction costs to the royalty base, postproduction costs may be deducted from downstream proceeds to determine the value of the raw minerals at the well. The court reversed the court of appeals and rendered partial summary judgment for the operator, remanding for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

Justice Young filed a short opinion respecting the Court’s denial of rehearing in a petition for review concerning the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). He explains that the Court has rarely authoritatively construed TUFTA and that many lower and federal courts have had to make independent interpretations. Justice Young concluded this particular case is a poor vehicle to resolve the broader statutory question—whether terminating a contract right to future payments can be a fraudulent transfer—because the record is highly fact-specific. For those reasons the Court denied rehearing and declined to take the case for further guidance on TUFTA.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for ISI Contracting, Inc. in Robert Huber’s trespass suit arising from a TxDOT highway project adjacent to Huber’s restaurant. ISI had claimed immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 97.002, arguing it complied with contract documents. The appellate court held ISI failed to conclusively prove every statutory element: Huber sought loss-of-use and lost-profit damages not barred by the statute, some alleged harms arose from ISI’s activities rather than a contract-related condition or defect, and ISI did not conclusively show compliance with contract documents material to any alleged condition or defect. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals of the Ninth District of Texas affirmed a county court’s final eviction judgment for landlord Matthew Twombly against pro se tenant Marcus Thirstrup. Thirstrup appealed the denial of his emergency motion for continuance filed the day of trial, claiming a medical inability to appear. The appellate court found the notice of appeal timely and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion because Thirstrup knew of his condition days earlier, failed to timely seek relief, did not contact the court, and did not appear at trial. A due-process challenge to the docket control order was not preserved for appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for AZZ, Inc. in a breach-of-contract case. Southeast Texas Industries (STI) sued multiple AZZ entities for defective galvanizing and obtained a jury verdict and judgment against AZZ, Inc. for $4,539,468.25 plus fees and interest. On appeal AZZ, Inc. argued there was no evidence it was the entity that contracted with STI. The court held the evidence was legally insufficient to show AZZ, Inc. (rather than the Beaumont galvanizing entity) agreed to galvanize the pipe, so the verdict against AZZ, Inc. could not stand and STI takes nothing from AZZ, Inc.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Adelide Perez Ybarra’s appeal of the denial of her petition for expunction because she failed to file the required docketing statement and failed to pay the $205 filing fee despite being notified twice and given deadlines. The clerk first warned her that both were due by March 2, 2026; after noncompliance the clerk extended a final deadline of March 16, 2026. Because neither requirement was satisfied, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow the clerk’s directives.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Johnny Lamonte Phillips’s appeal for want of prosecution because he failed to pay the required clerk’s record costs and filing fee and did not make payment arrangements or respond to the court’s notices. The clerk’s record was due December 22, 2025, but was not filed. The court notified Phillips in March 2026 about unpaid clerk’s-record costs and earlier instructed him in January and February 2026 to remit a $205 filing fee; he did not comply within the time allowed, so the court dismissed the appeal under its rules.

The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rockport-Fulton Independent School District (RFISD). Don Jackson Construction appealed after RFISD sought a declaratory judgment that it retained governmental immunity from Don Jackson’s contract and related claims arising from Hurricane Harvey repairs arranged through the Regional Pool Alliance (RPA). The court held RFISD kept its immunity because there was no evidence that RFISD’s board or superintendent ever approved or voted to adopt the Interlocal Agreement or otherwise authorized the RPA to contract on RFISD’s behalf, so the contracts were not “properly executed” on RFISD’s behalf under Texas law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment vacating an arbitration award in a workplace-injury dispute. Cynthia Love won a large award from an arbitrator after suing her former employer, Kaspar Ranch Hand Equipment, but the trial court vacated that award after Kaspar petitioned under the Federal Arbitration Act. The appellate court held vacatur was proper because the arbitrator failed to include factual findings and legal conclusions expressly required by the parties’ arbitration agreement, so she exceeded her contractual authority under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). The court rejected Love’s other challenges and affirmed denial of attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeals reversed a post-answer default judgment awarding over $27 million to William Carrell and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was entered after appellants’ counsel withdrew days before trial and appellants did not appear. The court held appellants’ failure to appear was due to mistake or accident (not conscious indifference) because there was no reliable evidence appellants received actual notice of the trial setting after counsel’s withdrawal and substitute counsel lacked authority/adequate time to prepare. Because the lack of notice defeated the default, a new trial was required.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted an agreed motion to dismiss an appeal brought by Sandra Flores and Anita M. Flores against Propel Tax and Javier Hernandez. The parties told the court they resolved their dispute and asked for dismissal. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, dismissed the appeal, taxed the appellate costs to the appellants, and declined to consider any motion for rehearing because the appeal was dismissed at the parties' request.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District dismissed Constance Benavides’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Cameron County because she failed to meet appellate procedural requirements. The clerk’s record was overdue, and Benavides did not file the required docketing statement or inform the court that she paid or arranged to pay the clerk’s fee or was entitled to proceed without payment. After notice and a court order giving her ten days to comply, she did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and a court order.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA), 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b)(4), preempts the Texas franchise tax as applied to American Airlines’ 2015 transportation revenues (baggage fees, passenger ticket sales, and freight). The trial court had awarded American a refund of $107,577.04 (plus interest) for baggage-fee tax and denied the Comptroller’s counterclaim to tax additional transportation revenues. The court held that, as applied to those revenues, the franchise tax functions as a tax on gross receipts and is therefore barred by the AHTA.

The First District of Texas granted Radial Power Asset, LLC’s unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal after the parties settled all disputes and the settlement was finalized. Because the appeal became moot and the appellee did not oppose dismissal, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The court relied on precedent and the appellate rules that require vacatur and dismissal when a case becomes moot.

The First District of Texas denied a mandamus petition filed by May Kue and Youssef Ezzat challenging a county court’s final judgment in an eviction case. The relators asked the court to issue an emergency stay blocking a writ of possession, further proceedings in the underlying eviction, and release of registry funds. The Court of Appeals denied the petition and all related emergency motions and stay requests without granting the requested relief.