Court Filings

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order denying the plaintiff's motion to hold the defendant in civil contempt, to obtain retroactive child support, and for counsel fees. The parties had a 2009 stipulation requiring annual child support increases tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), but they later executed a 2011 amendment that modified the child support provision and did not include the CPI increase. The court held the CPI provision was no longer in effect and the plaintiff failed to prove prejudice from the defendant's alleged failure to produce tax returns, so a contempt hearing was not required.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed two Supreme Court orders in a personal injury action arising from a 2015 construction-site accident. The court upheld the denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to add Skanska Civil Northeast, Inc., finding the plaintiff did not satisfy the relation-back test because Skanska USA and Skanska Northeast were not united in interest. The court also affirmed denial of the plaintiff's renewal motion. Finally, the court affirmed denial of Skanska USA's renewed cross-motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff showed discovery might uncover evidence to oppose the motion based on public materials Skanska USA had disseminated.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order denying defendant Kathy McElroy's pre-answer motion to dismiss an amended mortgage foreclosure complaint or, alternatively, to compel plaintiff's counsel to produce proof of authority to commence the action. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its servicer's assistant vice president and a limited power of attorney showing the servicer was authorized to act and that the law firm had been retained to begin the foreclosure. The court held those submissions sufficiently established the law firm's authority, so dismissal and compelled production were properly denied.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment and modified the dismissal order by treating the defendant's motion as a request for declaratory relief and granting it. The court held that the plaintiffs' one-day-old, prematurely filed default motion was properly denied, and that, even accepting the plaintiffs' allegations, there is no legal basis to declare them released from their mortgage because the defendant's failure to produce a chain of title does not itself free them from the loan. The case is remitted for entry of a judgment declaring the defendant's entitlement to that declaration.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted defendant Aileen Betances' renewed summary judgment motion dismissing the amended complaint against her in a personal injury action. Plaintiffs alleged their vehicle was struck from the rear and that the defendant owned or operated the offending vehicle. The court held the defendant made a prima facie showing that she and her vehicle were not involved in the accident, and the plaintiffs' opposing papers failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so dismissal was appropriate.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of medical-malpractice and wrongful-death claims against two groups of individual and corporate defendants (the Sullivan defendants and the Ramapo defendants) as time-barred. The plaintiffs had added those providers to an existing action years after the decedent's death; the court held the statute of limitations had expired and the plaintiffs failed to show that relation back applied. Although the claims arose from the same event and the new defendants shared an interest with the hospital, the plaintiffs could not show the new defendants had timely notice that they should have been sued.

The Second District Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of certiorari from plaintiffs Carolyn Hoskins and Lolita Johns challenging a trial court order that dismissed without prejudice their direct-liability medical-malpractice claim against Women's Care of Florida for failure to satisfy presuit notice under chapter 766. The appellate court concluded the petitioners failed to show the required irreparable harm from the without-prejudice dismissal. Because certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and jurisdictional prerequisites were not met, the court dismissed the petition without addressing the trial court's legal ruling on presuit notice.

The Second District Court of Appeal dismissed Neelam Uppal’s petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a Pinellas County circuit court decision. The petition named multiple respondents including a condominium association, management companies, mortgage entities, and individual defendants. The court issued a short per curiam order simply stating “Dismissed” without extended reasoning, and three judges concurred. The filing indicates counsel appearances for some respondents and no appearance for others; the opinion is subject to revision before official publication.

The district court reviewed an appeal by Louis Serball from a Pasco County circuit court decision. After considering the record, the appellate panel issued a brief per curiam decision affirming the lower court's judgment. No opinion explaining the court's reasoning was published beyond the simple affirmation, and the appellee did not file an appearance in the appeal. The mandate affirms the trial court's ruling, leaving the circuit court's judgment intact.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court judgment that pierced the corporate veil to hold South Dade Dealership liable for a default judgment against CarX Depot. Line 5 had obtained a default judgment against CarX for unpaid finance-and-insurance (F&I) funds and sought to collect from South Dade as an alleged alter ego or mere continuation. The appellate court found the evidence insufficient to show South Dade dominated CarX or that CarX’s separate corporate existence ceased, and it concluded there was no relay-style continuation into SDT Cars. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for South Dade.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the county court’s final judgment and its denial of Robert Vidal’s motion for new trial in a case brought by Barclays Bank Delaware. The appellate court held Vidal failed to preserve the claimed errors, did not provide an adequate record for appellate review, and did not show reversible error. The court relied on precedent requiring an adequate trial record to evaluate factual and legal claims on appeal and therefore found no basis to disturb the lower court’s rulings.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a default final judgment entered in a small claims case because the defendant, a self-represented litigant, had notified the trial court before a pretrial conference that she could not attend due to a death in her family. The trial court entered default when she did not appear and later denied her motion to continue. The appellate court found that the denial was an abuse of discretion because the reason was unforeseeable, not suggestive of delay, and the default deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded a final judgment for the property owner against Berman Construction arising from a fire that destroyed a home during renovation. The trial court had denied the contractor’s requested interrogatory asking whether the contractor was excused from performance under a contract risk-of-loss clause allocating certain perils to the owner. The appeals court held the denial was an abuse of discretion because the affirmative defense tied to section 15.9 was unresolved and the jury should have been able to decide whether the fire was caused by an owner-borne peril, such as arson or other events beyond the contractor’s reasonable control.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the plaintiff's motion to certify that its decision conflicts with other Florida district court opinions. The court expressly certified conflict with three identified decisions from other districts involving Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company and related insurers. The opinion simply identifies the conflicting cases and certifies the question of conflict for resolution by the Florida Supreme Court, noting the matter is not final until disposition of any timely rehearing. No substantive merits ruling is made in this order.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any attorney may be discharged, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the contractual percentage after discharge. Because the referring attorney was discharged, she is limited to a modified quantum meruit recovery for services actually performed prior to discharge and within the scope of the agreement. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine reasonable recovery under those principles.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her before final settlement. The court held a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any other lawyer, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the agreed contractual percentage once discharged. Instead, where a client discharges counsel without cause the attorney may recover only the reasonable value of services performed before discharge, capped by the contract (modified quantum meruit). The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate an appropriate quantum meruit award limited to pre-discharge, in-scope work.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in a civil dispute between appellant Marylou Elaine Muscillo and appellee Gilles P. Cournoyer. The opinion, issued April 22, 2026, is per curiam and brief, stating only the disposition without published reasoning. The appellate court declined to reverse or remand the lower court's decision, leaving the trial court's ruling in place subject to any timely rehearing motion. No further factual or legal explanation appears in the opinion.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a nonfinal order from the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court in a civil appeal brought by Joseph Johel Pineda and others against Ricky Enrique De Cespedes. The appellate court issued a per curiam opinion on April 22, 2026, and concluded the lower court's order should stand. The opinion is brief, notes the appeal number and counsel, and states the judgment as "Affirmed." No further reasoning or factual discussion is provided in the published docket entry.

The Third District reversed a trial court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The dispute arose from a wrongful-death case where the client had signed an agreement dividing fees between lead counsel (Podhurst) and referring counsel (Frexes). The appellate court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney and that discharge limits the referring attorney to recovery under a modified quantum meruit for work performed before discharge. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate reasonable compensation limited to services rendered before the January 28, 2019 discharge and within the contract’s scope.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a final injunction for protection against domestic violence entered by the circuit court. The appellant, proceeding pro se, claimed his lawyer had documents not presented at the hearing, but he failed to provide a trial transcript or statement of the proceedings. Because the appellate record lacked the testimony and evidence necessary to evaluate factual and legal claims, the court relied on binding precedent that an inadequate record requires affirmance and therefore affirmed the lower court's judgment.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Studebaker Health Care Center’s motion to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to grant the motion. The dispute arose after employee J. Asencion Santana signed three arbitration-related onboarding documents and later sued for wage-and-hour and representative Labor Code claims, including a PAGA claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement invalid because of alleged conflicts among the documents and unconscionability. The appellate court held the documents, read together, showed a clear mutual intent to arbitrate employment disputes; ambiguities did not defeat arbitration; and any unenforceable PAGA waiver should be severed rather than voiding the entire agreement.

The court considered a mandamus petition from JPMorgan Chase challenging a trial court order that sanctioned Chase and held it in contempt for failing to comply with a trustee appointment order and a subpoena for trust records. The appellate court found the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Chase and that the subpoena was valid, but concluded the trial court abused its discretion in three respects: (1) imposing discovery sanctions against a non-party under rules that apply only to parties, (2) assessing a $750,000 criminal contempt fine that exceeded the $500 statutory cap, and (3) ordering contempt fines payable to the private trustee rather than to the court. The court partially granted mandamus, vacating the $6,700 and $750,000 awards and directing the trial court to modify the contempt fine to $500 payable to the court.

The court considered an appeal by the State and two state agencies seeking dismissal of claims by landlord 8317 Cross Park, LLC arising from a lease termination notice. The court held that the landlord’s breach-of-lease and declaratory-judgment claims against the State, Texas Facilities Commission (TFC), and Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) are barred by sovereign immunity and were dismissed. The court also dismissed the landlord’s ultra vires claim against HHSC deputy executive commissioner Rolland Niles. The court affirmed jurisdiction over and preserved the landlord’s ultra vires claim against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak for alleged violations of TFC regulations, and remanded for further proceedings on those surviving claims.

The First District of Texas Court of Appeals granted the appellant's unopposed motion to dismiss an appeal. The appellant had filed a notice of nonsuit and later a motion to dismiss the appeal; the court requested clarification and held the motion for the required period for a response, but none was filed. The court therefore granted the motion, dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision disposed of the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by WC 4th and Colorado, LP and WC 4th and Rio Grande, LP for want of prosecution after the appellants failed to file their brief by the extended deadline and did not respond to the court's notice. The court explained the brief was originally due October 27, 2025, an extension to December 1, 2025 was granted, and the appellants failed to file a brief or request a further extension. Because of that failure and no response to a December 11, 2025 dismissal notice, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terrell Samuels’ appeal from a judgment of the County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County, because Samuels failed to timely file an appellant’s brief and did not provide a reasonable explanation after being warned. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing deadlines and the court’s authority to dismiss appeals for failure to prosecute. Any pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ray Jackson's appeal for want of prosecution because Jackson did not establish indigence, did not pay for or arrange payment for the clerk's record, and failed to respond to the court's notice that dismissal was possible. The court invoked the appellate rules permitting dismissal when the clerk's record is not filed due to the appellant's fault and when an appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. All pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The First District of Texas reversed the trial court’s order that had halted an arbitration between Humphries Construction Corporation (HCC) and Highland Village-related entities, holding the trial court erred in finding HCC waived its contractual right to arbitrate by using the courts. The appellate court concluded, after reviewing the litigation and discovery conduct, that Highland Village failed to show HCC clearly intended to relinquish arbitration. The court denied Highland Village’s collateral requests for mandamus relief challenging denials of a protective order, motion to quash a third-party subpoena, and sanctions, finding no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The court dismissed an appeal by Delanie Perkins from a County Civil Court at Law judgment because Perkins failed to file an appellant’s brief by the deadline and did not respond to the court’s notice to file the brief or request an extension. The First District applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that permit dismissal for want of prosecution and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute between Perkins and West Lake Park Apartments.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for a law firm in a legal-malpractice suit. Plaintiff DePina sued the firm for failing to timely pursue property-damage claims against a railroad after repeated flooding of his land. The firm obtained summary judgment arguing the underlying nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had run before representation. The appellate court held the record did not show as a matter of law the nuisance was permanent because flooding was sporadic, contingent on heavy rain and culvert condition, and thus created fact issues for a jury. The case is remanded.