Court Filings

The Georgia Court of Appeals issued an order on April 13, 2026, denying Maria Theresa Pagano's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal in her case against Citizens Bank, N.A. The order is brief and procedural: the court considered the emergency motion and declined to grant a stay. No accompanying opinion explaining the court's reasoning or factual findings was provided in the document.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Progressive Mountain Insurance Company’s attempt to appeal a trial court order awarding attorney fees as a discovery sanction because the order was not final. The trial court reserved the amount of fees for a later hearing, so the case remained pending below. Progressive did not seek interlocutory review under the statutory procedure (OCGA § 5-6-34(b)) by obtaining a certificate of immediate review. Because Progressive failed to follow the required interlocutory appeal steps, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by plaintiffs Whitney Garland and Thomas Nichols from a trial-court order awarding attorney fees to defendant Provectus Unum, LLC. The plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed their contract lawsuit, but the trial court reopened the case because Provectus had a pending counterclaim for fees and then awarded fees under Georgia law. The Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals of fee awards under OCGA § 9-15-14 must proceed by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(10), and the plaintiffs did not follow that procedure.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed L. Lin Wood’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The underlying civil trial court entered a $9,661,177 judgment for the plaintiffs and granted a supersedeas bond on November 5, 2025. Wood filed a motion for reconsideration on November 12 and a notice of appeal on December 9, 2025. The Court held that the notice of appeal was untimely as to the November 5 order because it was filed 34 days later, and that the later denial of the reconsideration motion is not directly appealable and does not extend the appeal deadline.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Brittany Jackson's appeal from a judgment in favor of Bay Street Homes arising from a dispossessory action because Jackson filed her notice of appeal 21 days after the trial court's order denying her motion for new trial, instead of within the seven-day deadline that applies to dispossessory cases. The court explained that although possession became moot, the underlying action remained a dispossessory proceeding seeking past-due rent, so the special seven-day appeal window under OCGA § 44-7-56 controlled. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the court lacked authority to hear the appeal.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals dismissed Nicole Potts' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Potts had challenged a municipal-court order that adopted a magistrate's decision dismissing a landlord's forcible entry and detainer action against her. The magistrate dismissed the action without prejudice, finding Potts' purported "lifelong lease" defective and that the landlord's notice to vacate was defective. The appellate court held the municipal order was not a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 because the dismissal without prejudice left the parties in the same position as before the suit and did not affect Potts' substantial rights.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Portage County Court of Common Pleas judgment for plaintiff Fred Molai against the Standing Rock Cemetery Board of Trustees. After a jury awarded Molai $10,000 for breach of contract and $90,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on punitive damages and attorney fees based on R.C. 2744.05(A). The appellate court held Molai waived a facial constitutional challenge by not raising it below and found the statutory prohibition on punitive damages applicable to this public cemetery, so exclusion of that instruction was not an abuse of discretion.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Kirtland Country Club (KCC) in a suit by Sandy and Kevin Donovan challenging noise from KCC’s skeet shooting range. The Donovans alleged nuisance and negligence based on loud gunfire; KCC argued it was immune under R.C. 1533.85 because it substantially complied with the Division of Wildlife noise rules (Ohio Adm.Code 1501:31-29-03) and had a conditional use permit. The court held the statutory immunity and compliance with the administrative noise standard defeated the claims and found no genuine issue of negligence, so summary judgment for KCC was affirmed.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Logan County Common Pleas Court's dismissal of Jeremy L. Larrick’s appeal of a workers’ compensation denial. Larrick appealed the Industrial Commission’s refusal to allow him to participate in the state fund after the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation denied his claim. The trial court ordered a more definite statement and dismissed his R.C. 4123.512 complaint because he never identified specific medical conditions that had been presented to the Commission. The appeals court held a claimant must identify the specific conditions raised administratively to proceed in common pleas court.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Stark County Probate Court’s finding that attorney Gerald B. Golub was in indirect civil contempt for failing to return $43,560 he paid himself in attorney fees from four related estates without prior probate-court approval. The appellate court held the contempt finding was proper because the May 15, 2024 order requiring return of the fees had been previously affirmed and disallowed for further review, and Golub made no effort to comply or seek court approval or other relief. The court concluded the probate judge did not abuse her discretion and that coercive remedies (periodic payments, execution) were appropriate.

The appellate court affirmed the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal of Neighbors Against a Marijuana Dispensary (NAMD)’s administrative-review complaint challenging the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals’ grant of a special use permit to MariGrow to operate a cannabis dispensary. The court held NAMD lacked statutory standing because it failed to show any member owned property within 250 feet, had not entered an appearance and objected at the Board hearing, and the membership evidence NAMD sought to add was outside the administrative record. The court also found no due-process or equal-protection violation and upheld denial of NAMD’s untimely motion to amend.

The court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Anderson & Associates, PLLC seeking to overturn a trial court order of December 5, 2025 that redistributed an attorney fee award. The court explained mandamus requires showing both that the trial court abused its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or that the order is void. The court concluded the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, withdrew its prior order requesting responses from the real parties in interest, and denied the petition and emergency relief.

The Court dismissed William Berry Waters III’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed on his behalf by a non-lawyer and Waters failed to cure the deficiency by filing a signed amended notice after being notified. Texas law prohibits non-lawyers from representing others or preparing pleadings, and a notice of appeal filed in a representative capacity by a non-attorney is ineffective. The clerk repeatedly asked Waters to file a signed amended notice but he did not do so, so the court dismissed the appeal under its procedural rule allowing dismissal for failure to comply with rules or clerk notices.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reversed the county court’s no-evidence summary judgment that had dismissed Samantha Lopez’s claim that she and Felix Lengyel were informally married. Lopez alleged an informal marriage based on an agreement to be married, living together, and holding themselves out as married. The appeals court found Lopez presented more than a minimal amount of evidence on (1) an agreement to be married (her deposition and hearing testimony that they agreed to represent themselves as married to permit travel to Canada) and (2) holding out (testimony that family, housekeepers, and others treated them as married and that they represented to the Canadian government they were married). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court dismissed Practical Technology, Inc.'s interlocutory appeal because the notice of appeal and appellant's brief were signed only by a person who is not a licensed attorney. The same non-attorney had previously filed a mandamus petition in this Court and the Court had dismissed that petition for lack of an attorney appearance. The Court gave Practical Technology time to respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss and rejected a late-filed extension because it was submitted by the same non-attorney. Because no licensed attorney ever appeared and no cure was shown, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.

The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s judgment that had affirmed the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment’s denial of Beacon Media’s permit to erect a freestanding billboard. Beacon applied for a permit, the City initially denied it, then granted it, and an adjacent landowner, Jamestown, appealed to the BZA and succeeded. The appeals court held Jamestown lacked standing under Georgia’s substantial-interest-aggrieved-citizen test because it did not show any special harm unique from other similarly situated property owners. Because Jamestown lacked standing, the court reversed the superior court’s affirmance of the BZA decision.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal by Xiaodong Guan from a civil action (LC No. 25CV000342) and denied the application on April 10, 2026. The order is brief and purely procedural: the court exercised its discretion and declined to grant review, so no merits decision on the underlying dispute between the named parties was made. The denial leaves the lower court's judgment or order intact and concludes this court's involvement unless the applicant pursues another available remedy.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s denial of J.D.’s motion to expunge records of his 2018 involuntary-commitment. The court held that the probate court lacked statutory or inherent authority to expunge those civil commitment records, and that prior appellate decision in the same case prevented relitigation of the inherent-authority argument. The court also rejected J.D.’s statutory claims: the five-day hearing requirement in R.C. 5122.141 did not trigger mandatory expungement because a hearing occurred within the deadline, and R.C. 2953.32 governs criminal-conviction expungement, not civil commitment records.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Xerion Advanced Battery Corp. and Northwoods Blvd., LLC and its denial of summary judgment for Certa Vandalia, LLC. The dispute concerned whether Northwoods’ late payment of a $2,000 cure fee allowed Certa to declare a default and terminate a purchase and sale agreement. The court concluded the contract was ambiguous about whether Certa had to give written notice before declaring a default for failure to pay the cure fee, and the parties’ prior conduct showed Certa had not consistently enforced strict, notice-free defaults. Because Certa failed to give the required notice, Northwoods did not materially breach and forfeiture would be inequitable.

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the Darke County Common Pleas Court judgment in an administrative zoning appeal. The trial court had reversed the Board of Zoning Appeals as to Building A (finding it properly permitted) and affirmed as to Buildings B and C (finding they lacked agricultural exemptions). The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion regarding Building A — the record showed Surber obtained an agricultural exemption and obtained a refund of the commercial permit fee, voiding the permit — so the Board’s decision as to Building A is reinstated. The trial court’s findings about Buildings B and C were affirmed because their primary uses were nonagricultural.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s dismissal of Thomas Coddington’s complaint seeking return of equipment allegedly wrongfully withheld after his father’s death. The trial court had dismissed the case as time-barred by the probate creditor-claim statute, R.C. 2117.06. The appellate court held that Coddington’s allegation of ownership and wrongful withholding places his claim outside the probate presentment requirement, so the trial court erred to the extent it dismissed under R.C. 2117.06. The case is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of other defenses the trial court did not address.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed a Massillon Municipal Court judgment awarding Mancan, Inc. damages, interest, and attorney fees after Al’s Auto Services defaulted by not timely answering a breach-of-contract complaint. Mancan provided a temporary employee who was hired by Al’s Auto within a 180-day prohibited period; Mancan sued and secured a magistrate’s default judgment after a hearing. Al’s Auto did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision and failed to include a hearing transcript on appeal, so the appellate court reviewed only for plain error and found none, affirming the judgment.

The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully terminated Texas Ranger Robert Christopher Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s high school in which he threatened counselors and other officers while carrying his badge, handcuffs, and a firearm. Callaway claimed his conduct was caused by PTSD and sued for disability discrimination under the Texas Labor Code. The Court held that Section 21.105 excludes from Chapter 21 protection disabilities that impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform the job, and concluded Callaway’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to perform DPS duties, so his discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

The Texas Supreme Court decided that a 1984 pole-attachment contract between Spectrum (successor) and CPS Energy incorporates later-enacted statutory limits on pole-attachment rates. The Court held the agreement’s clear promise to “at all times observe and comply with . . . all laws” and that the contract is “subject to” such laws means legislative changes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations become enforceable under the contract. Because CPS charged and collected higher rates from Spectrum while collecting less from AT&T, Spectrum may pursue its breach-of-contract claim alleging violations of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its new-trial order and enter judgment on an 11–1 defense verdict in a medical-negligence suit. After a jury found Dr. Lapuerta not liable for Jose Torres’s eventual ray amputation, the trial court granted a new trial based on perceived error in a “loss of chance” jury instruction and possible juror confusion. The Supreme Court held the trial court misapplied controlling Texas law about loss-of-chance instructions, noted an improper juror letter that could have influenced the result, and concluded the record did not show the instruction probably caused an improper judgment.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H-E-B in a slip-and-fall premises-liability case. The plaintiff slipped on a clear liquid puddle in a grocery aisle and sued H-E-B, alleging the store knew or should have known of the hazard. The Court held that to raise a fact issue on constructive notice a plaintiff must present some evidence about how long the dangerous condition existed at the time and place of injury. Because the record lacked any evidence on the puddle’s duration, H-E-B could not be charged with constructive knowledge and summary judgment was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court resolved a dispute over how to value a nonparticipating royalty reserved in a 1960 deed. The court held the deed’s phrase “produced from the above described acreage” fixes the valuation point at the wellhead, and the phrase “free of cost forever” refers only to exemption from exploration and production costs. Because the deed lacks language shifting valuation to processed, downstream sales or expressly adding postproduction costs to the royalty base, postproduction costs may be deducted from downstream proceeds to determine the value of the raw minerals at the well. The court reversed the court of appeals and rendered partial summary judgment for the operator, remanding for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

Justice Young filed a short opinion respecting the Court’s denial of rehearing in a petition for review concerning the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). He explains that the Court has rarely authoritatively construed TUFTA and that many lower and federal courts have had to make independent interpretations. Justice Young concluded this particular case is a poor vehicle to resolve the broader statutory question—whether terminating a contract right to future payments can be a fraudulent transfer—because the record is highly fact-specific. For those reasons the Court denied rehearing and declined to take the case for further guidance on TUFTA.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and ordered the County to meet and confer with the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA) about the County’s decision to outsource security work. PPOA had sought a writ of mandate after ERCOM and the superior court concluded the parties’ memorandum of understanding (MOU) waived PPOA’s bargaining rights as to such reorganization decisions. The appellate court held the MOU did not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the statutory right to meet and confer about outsourcing, because the MOU’s notice and management-rights language was ambiguous and did not explicitly waive MMBA rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for Ghilotti Construction in a suit by ironworker Leonardo Cordero, who was injured while working for subcontractor Camblin Steel on a bridge project. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which presumes a hirer of an independent contractor delegates responsibility for workplace safety to the contractor. The appellate court held California safety regulations (including Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1711) do not create a nondelegable duty that defeats Privette, and Cordero failed to raise a triable issue that Ghilotti retained and exercised control over Camblin’s work in a way that affirmatively contributed to the injury.