Court Filings

The Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Charles F. Watts’s postconviction petition after a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Watts argued he made a substantial showing of actual innocence, that trial counsel was ineffective for not calling an alibi witness (Terrance Linear), and that postconviction counsel failed to comply with Rule 651(c). The court held the petition was decided after a third-stage hearing, rejected the actual-innocence claim as forfeited for lack of a proper third-stage argument, found no Strickland error because counsel’s choice not to call Linear could be strategic in light of surveillance video, and determined Rule 651(c) claims about second-stage pleading are moot once a claim receives a full evidentiary hearing.

The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed a county court judgment in a criminal/procedural matter. The appeal was brought pro se by Rosea Maria White and was argued on the record from Pinellas County before Judge Diane M. Croff. The panel, in a per curiam decision, unanimously affirmed the lower court’s ruling without published opinion, and the judgment stands as decided by the county court. No additional reasoning or substantive analysis was provided in the published entry.

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, issued a brief per curiam decision affirming the lower court. The appeal was brought by Jennifer Suzanne Waters against the State of Florida following a proceeding in the Circuit Court for DeSoto County. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment without a published opinion, and all three judges concurred. No new legal analysis or changes to the trial-court outcome were announced in this short entry.

The District Court of Appeal, Second District of Florida, considered an appeal by Marquise Devon Ponder from a decision of the Circuit Court for Manatee County. After review, the appellate court issued a brief per curiam decision simply stating 'Affirmed' without opinion, thereby upholding the lower court's judgment. The panel of judges (Kelly, Khouzam, and Sleet) concurred. No further reasoning or discussion was provided in the published entry, and the opinion is subject to possible revision before official publication.

The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the lower court's decision in the appeal brought by Scott Meier against the State of Florida. The panel issued a per curiam opinion on April 17, 2026, concluding that the trial court's judgment should stand. No reasoning or detailed factual findings were provided in the published entry, and three judges (Black, Atkinson, Smith) concurred. The appeal arose from the Manatee County Circuit Court before Judge Frederick P. Mercurio.

The appellate court reviewed a criminal appeal by Markeis Daveon Levatte from a Hillsborough County circuit court decision. After briefing and substitution of counsel, the District Court of Appeal for the Second District issued a per curiam decision affirming the lower court's ruling. The opinion was short and did not include detailed reasoning in the published entry, but the panel concurred and the judgment remained in effect pending any further review or official publication.

The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Yordan Hernandez from a decision of the Hillsborough County Circuit Court. After considering the parties' submissions, the appellate court unanimously affirmed the lower court's ruling. The short per curiam opinion provides the disposition without published reasoning, and the decision is subject to possible revision before official publication.

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reviewed an appeal by A.R. from a decision of the Circuit Court for Pasco County. The appellate court issued a brief per curiam decision affirming the lower court's judgment. No opinion content or underlying facts, issues, or reasoning are provided in the published entry; the court simply announced 'Affirmed' with three judges concurring and noted the opinion is subject to revision before official publication.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a Rule 3.800(a) postconviction claim brought by Deanijah Denson. The court concluded the appeal did not provide a basis for relief under Rule 3.800(a) but left open Denson's ability to seek relief in the underlying circuit court case (2020-CF-002358-A) under Rule 3.850. The opinion cites precedent explaining the proper procedural vehicle for the relief sought and therefore affirms the appellate disposition while directing the appellant to the appropriate remedy in circuit court.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal issued an opinion in a pro se 3.800 postconviction appeal brought by Charles James Skolnick challenging denial of relief in Duval County (Case No. 16-2015-CF-009362-A). The court notes it previously affirmed the trial court's denial and found Skolnick's subsequent filings in this court relating to that case to be repetitive, frivolous, and abusive. The court cautioned that further frivolous pro se filings may trigger sanctions, including prohibition on future pro se filings and referral for prison disciplinary proceedings that could include loss of gain time.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed Stephanie Proffitt’s convictions and rejected her claim that the trial court imposed a vindictive sentence after she declined the State’s plea offer. The court reviewed the record and Wilson factors, finding the trial judge did not initiate plea negotiations, did not depart from the role of an impartial arbiter, and provided reasons for the sentence based on trial evidence and rejection of mitigation. Because the totality of circumstances did not create a presumption of vindictiveness, the appellate court affirmed the sentencing decision.

A jury convicted Tyriq Bradford of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Bradford appealed, arguing the trial court erred by admitting three out-of-court statements by the six-year-old victim identifying him, over hearsay and confrontation objections. The court concluded the statements were admissible as excited utterances and also were non-testimonial, and that the victim’s presence and limited testimony at trial satisfied confrontation requirements. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion on hearsay and the Confrontation Clause was not violated, the conviction was affirmed.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Tenth Appellate District) affirmed Dana Loment Pettigrew’s convictions for two counts of indecency with a child by contact and exposure. Pettigrew challenged admission of extraneous-offense testimony from L.H. under article 38.37 (as-applied facial challenge, Rule 403 balancing, and jury instruction) and claimed his counsel denied him the right to testify at the guilt-innocence phase. The court held the statute was not unconstitutional as applied, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403, the article 38.37 jury instruction was proper, and Pettigrew failed to show prejudice from counsel’s failure to reopen the evidence; thus the convictions and sentences were affirmed.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed Victor Rolando Corpus’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child and indecency with a child. Corpus sought a continuance at trial because subpoenaed psychiatric/hospital records for a State witness had not arrived. The trial court denied the oral motion after efforts to locate the records and the court’s concern that delay could be indefinite. The appeals court held Corpus waived the complaint because the continuance motion was unsworn and, alternatively, that the court did not abuse its discretion because the missing records were not shown to be unexpectedly unavailable or likely to be obtained with a finite delay, and Corpus showed no harm from the denial.

A Texas appellate court affirmed the convictions of Noel Amador-Castillo for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and attempted indecency with a child by contact. The jury had convicted him of continuous sexual abuse (multiple acts over years) and the lesser-included offense of attempted indecency by breast touching, and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. The court rejected a double-jeopardy challenge because the breast-touching offense is distinct from the acts alleged as predicates for continuous sexual abuse. It also held the victim’s testimony was legally sufficient to support both convictions.

The First District of Texas affirmed Nicholas Darris Marshall’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine. Marshall pleaded guilty after the State waived two enhancement paragraphs; evidence at sentencing included police testimony, lab results showing 2.1152 grams of methamphetamine, and Marshall’s own testimony about how the drugs came to be in his car. The court held Marshall failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment challenge and, even if preserved, the sentence—being within the statutory 2–20 year range—was not grossly disproportionate under the relevant precedent.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order revoking Q.W.’s probation and committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for seven years. The juvenile had been placed on probation after pleading true to two counts of aggravated robbery. The State sought modification alleging truancy, a positive marijuana test, and unlawful carrying of a handgun. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Q.W. violated probation, including committing a new-law offense by being found with a handgun in a vehicle, and concluded the evidence supported revocation.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed Reginald Dewayne Taylor’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine (4–200 grams) and the jury’s punishment verdict of 35 years’ imprisonment. The court rejected Taylor’s three appellate challenges: (1) the trial court properly denied his motions to suppress because the search-warrant affidavits and reasonable inferences supplied a substantial basis for probable cause to search two residences and vehicles; (2) Instagram records were properly authenticated through a records certificate and corroborating testimony and circumstances; and (3) including a limiting instruction listing all permissible Rule 404(b) purposes was not reversible error and in any event benefited Taylor. The court affirmed the judgment.

The court reviewed an appeal by Oliver Perry Harris from the trial court’s revocation of his deferred adjudication and seven-year sentence after the court found a supervision violation true. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. After its independent review, the appellate court found no arguable grounds for reversal but identified an unsupported $1,743.00 reparations assessment in the written judgment and related inmate trust withdrawal order. The court deleted that reparations assessment from the judgment and the withdrawal order, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of guilt and three-year prison sentence for Joey Sullivan. Sullivan had been placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to evading arrest with a vehicle. The State later petitioned to adjudicate, alleging Sullivan fled from a peace officer; after a hearing the trial court found the violation true, adjudicated guilt, and imposed sentence. Sullivan’s appointed appellate attorneys concluded the appeal was frivolous, submitted an Anders brief, and the court agreed there were no arguable grounds for relief.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed Tyler Stafford’s convictions and sentences after he pleaded guilty in three Cuyahoga County cases, including a third-degree count for having weapons while under disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Stafford argued the statute was facially unconstitutional based on this court’s prior Philpotts decision and that counsel was ineffective for advising the plea. The court held Philpotts had been stayed by the Ohio Supreme Court when Stafford pled, so the statute remained valid; and the record did not show counsel was deficient or that Stafford suffered prejudice. The convictions and aggregate sentence were affirmed.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Lorinzo Sampson’s total 36-month prison sentence after he pled guilty to attempted having weapons while under disability in two separate cases. The court rejected Sampson’s claims that the trial judge was biased, that the sentence was unlawful, and that he was improperly denied the right to hire counsel. The court found the judge’s courtroom comments and scheduling decisions did not demonstrate bias, that the record shows the court considered sentencing statutes and explained its reasons, and that the denial of a last-minute continuance to hire new counsel was a permissible exercise of discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of Marlon Lewis’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle after a traffic stop. Police smelled burnt marijuana, Lewis admitted he had smoked in the car earlier, and an officer then searched the reachable area and found used blunts and a bag containing a firearm. The appellate court concluded that, given Ohio law at the time, smoking marijuana in a vehicle did not constitute a statutory criminal offense for a driver, so there was no probable cause to justify the warrantless search under the automobile exception.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s November 20, 2025 denial of Letwan E. Cherry’s motion to vacate his six-to-nine year prison sentence for trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound. Cherry argued his sentence was void under Apprendi/Alleyne and Ohio authorities, but the appellate court held his sentence was an authorized indefinite term within the statutory range and that judicial factfinding to select a minimum within that range does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Several other challenges raised on appeal were tied to a later post-sentencing motion and thus were not properly before the court.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed Walter Jackson’s convictions and sentence following his March 2023 jury trial and May 15, 2023 sentencing in Scioto County Common Pleas Court. Jackson was convicted on a 12-count indictment (drug trafficking/possession, weapons offenses, and related counts with firearm specifications). He raised five assignments of error including ineffective assistance, absence from trial, failure to merge allied offenses, improper consecutive sentences, and insufficiency/manifest-weight challenges. The court found the record supported the convictions and the consecutive sentences, and that the evidence (including circumstantial evidence and forensic lab results) was sufficient and not against the manifest weight.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that historical cell site location information (CSLI) involves technical and specialized knowledge and therefore must be presented to a jury by a qualified expert under N.J.R.E. 702. The case arose from defendant Jule Hannah’s murder conviction where a detective testified as a lay witness mapping cell towers from phone records; the Appellate Division had reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The Court found CSLI interpretation goes beyond ordinary juror knowledge, that the detective’s lay testimony and the prosecutor’s closing remarks risked misleading the jury, and that limiting instructions were insufficient to cure the error.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Robert F. Whitbeck Jr.'s convictions for multiple sexual and related offenses after a jury trial. Whitbeck was convicted of third-degree rape, first-degree criminal sexual act, first-degree attempted rape, criminal obstruction of breathing, second-degree unlawful imprisonment, and criminal contempt, and sentenced to aggregate prison terms and postrelease supervision. The court held the guilty verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence, deferring to the jury's credibility findings given the victim's testimony, corroborating observations by the victim's daughter, and defendant's text messages that included apparent admissions. Claims of trial error and ineffective assistance were rejected as either unpreserved or unsupported by the record.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Nsikak K. Okure’s conviction and sentence after he pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting. Okure entered a plea agreement specifying concurrent prison terms (no less than 7–21 to no more than 8–24 years for the homicide count and 2⅓–7 years concurrent for leaving the scene) and waived his right to appeal. The court rejected his sole claim—that the within-agreement sentence was harsh—holding that his valid, unchallenged appeal waiver bars review of that challenge.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant David Host’s conviction and 25-years-to-life sentence after he pleaded guilty to first-degree murder for a break-in that resulted in two deaths. Host had waived appeal rights, but the court considered his preserved claim that the plea was involuntary. The court found his claim unpreserved because he did not make a postallocution motion and that no statements during the plea proceeding raised significant doubt about voluntariness. Even on the record, the court concluded mental-health history did not undermine the plea, and the appellate waiver bars a challenge to sentence severity.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Jonathan Guerin’s 2019 convictions and prison sentence following his guilty plea to multiple driving-related offenses arising from an April 2018 incident. The court held that challenges to the voluntariness of the plea and to counsel’s effectiveness were unpreserved because defendant did not move to withdraw his plea after allocution, and no statements during the plea colloquy triggered the narrow exception to preservation. The court also found the excessiveness claim moot because defendant has reached his sentence's maximum expiration and is incarcerated on a separate conviction.