Court Filings

The court dismissed relator Atravion Preston’s mandamus action seeking public records from the Lorain Correctional Institution and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The magistrate concluded, and the court adopted that recommendation, that Preston failed to file with his complaint the written affirmation required by amended R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Because the statute mandates dismissal if that affirmation is not filed, the court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss, denied as moot the motion to strike, and dismissed the action without reaching the merits or statutory-damages arguments.

The First District Court of Appeals dismissed Charles Greenlee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Greenlee, a pro se incarcerated litigant, had sought relief under Civ.R. 60(B) from a March 3, 2025 trial-court dismissal of his claims against Walmart, arguing his amended complaint should have been deemed filed earlier under the prison-mailbox rule. The appeals court held the March 3 dismissal was not a final order because it left claims against municipal defendants pending and did not include a Civ.R. 54(B)/54(B)/no-just-reason-for-delay certification; therefore the trial court’s April 24 denial of his motion was not appealable.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Brian K. Woofter’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Woofter, criminally charged in municipal court for purchasing and selling alcohol to minors, had the charge dismissed and then sought return of six cases of alcohol seized by the sheriff. The trial court denied his motion but said it could be reconsidered if Woofter produced proof of purchase. The appellate court held that the denial was not a final, appealable order because it anticipated further action and did not affect a substantial right or foreclose effective relief on the motion.

The court dismissed Hasan Howard’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a Lake County judge’s failure to quash a warrant or promptly hold a community-control violation hearing while Howard remains in federal custody. The judge granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), concluding Howard cannot show a clear legal right to relief because Ohio law tolls community control while an offender is confined, and the interstate detainer statute does not require a prompt hearing for probation or community-control violations. The court also relied on due-process precedent holding no right to an immediate hearing before custody on the detainer has occurred.

The court dismissed H&S Investment Properties, LLC’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to force the Ashtabula County Auditor to change the owner name on the county tax list to match an affidavit recorded under R.C. 5301.252. The court held that the recorder’s affidavit statute does not itself create a right to change tax-roll entries and that the auditor’s duty under R.C. 319.28 is to compile the tax list, not to alter it based on a recorded affidavit. Because Relator cannot show a clear legal right or corresponding clear legal duty by the auditor, mandamus relief was unavailable and the petition was dismissed; the summary-judgment motion was denied as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Thomas Crain’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Crain had appealed from post-trial documents related to a magistrate’s decision and a later trial-court entry adopting that decision. The appellate court found the filings attached to the notice of appeal were irregular: the magistrate’s paper was a dispositive magistrate’s decision, and the trial-court paper merely incorporated that decision but did not itself enter a separate, signed judgment specifying relief. Because the trial court failed to enter a final, independent judgment determining all claims, the appeal cannot proceed.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by James and Cynthia Lundeen and Sir Isaac Newton Enterprises seeking to force Cuyahoga Common Pleas Judge Sherrie Miday to vacate her order dismissing the Lundeens’ counterclaim for false-light invasion of privacy. The court held Judge Miday had subject-matter jurisdiction after the case was transferred to common pleas court and that any error in her ruling would make the judgment voidable, not void, meaning mandamus was not an appropriate remedy because an appeal is an adequate remedy at law. The court also declared the Lundeens vexatious litigants and barred pro se filings without leave.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Monica G. Justice’s request for a writ of mandamus that would have ordered the Franklin County clerk to serve her a July 22, 2025 amended sentencing entry. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the State’s motion to dismiss because Justice, an incarcerated pro se relator, failed to comply with statutory procedural requirements for inmate litigants. Specifically, she did not file the required affidavit listing prior civil actions, did not provide the certified inmate-account statements/affidavit of indigency needed to waive fees, and did not caption the petition in the name of the State on her relation.

The court denied Sterling Robinson’s request for a writ of mandamus seeking an order that Judge Jaiza N. Page vacate his criminal judgment. Robinson argued the trial court’s judgment was void because he withdrew his consent to the proceedings. The magistrate recommended and the court agreed that a criminal judgment is not a “consent judgment” and that a defendant’s alleged refusal or withdrawal of consent does not deprive a common pleas court of subject-matter jurisdiction over felony charges. Because Robinson failed to allege a clear legal right or a clear legal duty owed by the judge, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals dismissed Mao Ju’s mandamus action seeking to force a Xenia Municipal Court magistrate to further process her citizen criminal affidavit charging her former spouse with interference with custody. The court held that the magistrate properly reviewed the affidavit and determined it did not establish probable cause for a misdemeanor, and that Ohio statutes do not require the magistrate to docket the affidavit, assign a case number, refer misdemeanor allegations to a prosecutor, or hold a formal probable-cause hearing. Because Ju could not show a clear legal right or a mandatory duty owed by the magistrate, the writ was denied.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal from an April 2, 2026 trial-court entry requiring the State to disclose exculpatory evidence. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s order was interlocutory and not a final, appealable order under Ohio law. The court also concluded, alternatively, that Jones lacked standing because the trial court’s ruling granted him the relief he sought, so he was not an aggrieved party. All pending motions were ruled moot and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Jones had appealed a March 13, 2026 trial-court entry denying his motions to dismiss a death-penalty specification. The appellate court held the denial was an interlocutory order that did not qualify as a final, appealable order under Ohio law and R.C. 2505.02(B), so it could not be reviewed now. Because no final judgment disposed of all claims, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were overruled as moot.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals denied Frederick Mundt’s application for reconsideration and request for en banc review of its prior opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition under Ohio’s serious mental illness (SMI) statute. The court reaffirmed that Mundt had clinical diagnoses of Bipolar Disorder and Schizoaffective Disorder but found the record lacked sufficient evidence that those conditions significantly impaired his capacity to make rational judgments at the time of the offense. Because the trial court reasonably credited the state expert’s interpretation of Mundt’s conduct, the panel found no basis to overturn or rehear the decision.

The Court of Appeals denied Thomas Jones’ request for a writ of mandamus seeking to force Judge Lisa L. Sadler to serve him with an entry of dismissal and to rescind a bill for court costs. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that the duty to serve judgment and note service on the docket lies with the clerk of court under Civ.R. 58(B), not with the judge. The court also held Jones has an adequate remedy at law (e.g., Civ.R. 60(B) or appeal) and thus cannot meet mandamus requirements.

The court dismissed Prince Charles Cotten Sr.’s procedendo petition as moot. Cotten sought an order requiring Franklin County Common Pleas Judge Carl A. Aveni to proceed to judgment in Cotten’s underlying civil case, alleging delay and failure to rule on a motion. The magistrate and appellate panel found the trial judge had already dismissed Cotten’s complaint without prejudice on August 11, 2025 (thereby resolving pending motions), so there was no remaining duty to compel. Because the act Cotten sought had been performed, the procedendo claim was moot and the motion to dismiss was sustained.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals dismissed Nicole Potts' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Potts had challenged a municipal-court order that adopted a magistrate's decision dismissing a landlord's forcible entry and detainer action against her. The magistrate dismissed the action without prejudice, finding Potts' purported "lifelong lease" defective and that the landlord's notice to vacate was defective. The appellate court held the municipal order was not a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 because the dismissal without prejudice left the parties in the same position as before the suit and did not affect Potts' substantial rights.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Trumbull County Children Services Board’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition as moot. The Board had asked the court to force the juvenile judge to comply with the appellate mandate in In re A.W. (which returned legal custody of A.W. to the maternal aunt) and to bar the judge’s ex parte order granting the father temporary custody. After a pretrial conference the parties represented that the aunt now has legal and physical custody in accordance with the mandate and the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry clarifying the record, so the appellate court found the requested relief obtained and dismissed the petition.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Albert DiTomaso’s appeal because the trial court’s judgment was not a final, appealable order. DiTomaso was tried and convicted on six of eight indictment counts, but two counts (one OVI count and an assured-clear-distance minor misdemeanor) were not resolved in the record and were not presented to the jury. Because unresolved "hanging" charges remain, the appellate court concluded it lacks jurisdiction to review the convictions and therefore dismissed the appeal.

The court dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by Davontez Otis seeking an order compelling a judge to calculate jail-time credit in his underlying criminal case. Otis argued the calculation was ministerial and that appeal would be inadequate because his 90-day jail term would expire before appellate review. The court held that the statute governing jail-time credit grants the sentencing court discretion to grant or deny credit, so mandamus is not available to control that discretion; furthermore, an appeal (with a stay request) is an adequate remedy. The writ was dismissed and costs were assessed to Otis.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Jeffrey A. Swiecicki’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Swiecicki appealed a February 6, 2026 magistrate’s decision, but the court determined the decision was not a final, appealable order because the trial court had not yet adopted the magistrate’s decision or entered judgment disposing of all claims. Under Ohio law, only a judge’s final order is appealable; magistrate decisions remain interlocutory until the trial court acts. The court granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss and noted the appellant may appeal after a final judgment is entered in the trial court.

The Court of Appeals reviewed an appeal by Shiviez Montrel Howard from his conviction in Butler County Common Pleas. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding no nonfrivolous issues exist but identified two potential arguable errors and sought permission to withdraw. The appellate court independently reviewed the record, found no prejudicial error or infringement of appellant's rights, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal as wholly frivolous. The court ordered the trial-court mandate issued and costs taxed to appellant.

The Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed Jeremy Richards’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging three pending criminal cases. The court held his claims (false arrest, police and prosecutorial misconduct, due-process violations, double jeopardy, and judicial bias) are not cognizable in habeas corpus, and the petition had multiple procedural defects: failure to attach commitment papers, naming an improper respondent (a judge), and failing to provide the required inmate account certification. Because of these substantive and procedural deficiencies, the court dismissed the petition sua sponte and ordered Richards to pay costs.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reviewed two Parma Municipal Court matters involving Michael C. Dunn. One case (drug charges) resulted in acquittal at trial, so the appeal is dismissed as moot. The court affirmed Dunn’s convictions for multiple traffic violations in the related traffic case. The appellate court held the municipal court had personal jurisdiction over Dunn because he was arrested, arraigned, and voluntarily continued to participate in proceedings, and it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the alleged infractions occurred in Broadview Heights and the traffic ticket satisfied rule requirements.

The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed a disciplinary complaint against Judge John W. Rudduck arising from his personal Facebook activity endorsing his son’s campaign and defending him online. The Board of Professional Conduct had found violations of several judicial-conduct rules and recommended a public reprimand, but the Court held that Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3) — the rule prohibiting judges from publicly endorsing candidates for other offices — is a content-based restriction on political speech that fails strict scrutiny and therefore violates the First Amendment. Because the finding under Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 relied on the invalidated rule, and the Court also found no violation of Jud.Cond.R. 1.3, the complaint was dismissed.