Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Capital Fund I, LLC’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had entered a default judgment against Capital Fund but expressly labeled it interlocutory. The plaintiff then obtained a severance order moving the entire dispute against Capital Fund (both defaulted and still-pending claims) into a new cause. The appellate court concluded that severing the entire case did not convert the interlocutory default judgment into a final, appealable judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant A.C.'s attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.C., proceeding pro se, filed an application for a protective order and appealed after the trial court orally denied relief; the court later signed an order denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation. Because A.C. acknowledged that related proceedings (a foreign custody/support registration from Ohio and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship) remain pending, the appellate court concluded the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable under Texas law, and A.C. did not respond to a show-cause order.

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, granted appellant Chadwick Edward Lambert’s joint motion to dismiss his criminal appeal. The motion was signed by Lambert and his appellate counsel and cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). Because the motion complied with the rule, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The decision is a brief memorandum opinion filed April 14, 2026, and the dismissal was entered on appellant’s motion.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruben Dario Almela’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and also granted attorney’s fees but did not set the fee amount, so the order did not resolve all claims or parties and was not a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court previously questioned jurisdiction and gave Almela time to show cause; he did not respond. Because the judgment was not final and Almela failed to justify appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terry Akwue’s appeal from a small claims judgment because his notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court entered final judgment on September 26, 2025; Akwue filed a motion for new trial which extended his deadline to December 26, 2025, but he did not file his notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction for a late-filed notice, gave Akwue notice that the appeal would be dismissed, received no response, and therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Terran Doral Green’s appeal of the trial court’s February 24, 2026 denial of his pro se pretrial habeas application as moot. Green, who had filed a pro se habeas application challenging a limitations issue while represented in the trial court, was denied in a handwritten ruling. By the time of appeal, he had been convicted and sentenced (judgment signed March 4, 2026), so he was no longer in pretrial confinement. Because the habeas relief sought was tied to pretrial release, the court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Christina Keller's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, because she failed to provide or pay for the reporter’s record and then failed to file her appellate brief by the court-ordered deadline. The court notified Keller of the missing reporter’s record and limited consideration to issues not requiring that record, gave her time to file a brief, warned that dismissal could follow, and received no response. The court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed this interlocutory appeal because the parties informed the court they reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss. Both parties agreed to bear their own appellate costs, counsel signed the motion, and no cross-appeal was filed. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs taxed against the parties who incurred them, and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The City of Edinburg filed a petition for writ of mandamus claiming the trial court abused its discretion by freezing discovery deadlines. The city later moved to withdraw the petition because the parties reached an agreement about the disputed discovery, rendering the mandamus request moot. The court treated the withdrawal as a motion to dismiss, found the matter moot under controlling authority, and dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus.

The Court dismissed William Berry Waters III’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed on his behalf by a non-lawyer and Waters failed to cure the deficiency by filing a signed amended notice after being notified. Texas law prohibits non-lawyers from representing others or preparing pleadings, and a notice of appeal filed in a representative capacity by a non-attorney is ineffective. The clerk repeatedly asked Waters to file a signed amended notice but he did not do so, so the court dismissed the appeal under its procedural rule allowing dismissal for failure to comply with rules or clerk notices.

The Court dismissed Practical Technology, Inc.'s interlocutory appeal because the notice of appeal and appellant's brief were signed only by a person who is not a licensed attorney. The same non-attorney had previously filed a mandamus petition in this Court and the Court had dismissed that petition for lack of an attorney appearance. The Court gave Practical Technology time to respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss and rejected a late-filed extension because it was submitted by the same non-attorney. Because no licensed attorney ever appeared and no cure was shown, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.

The Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed Thomas Dione Moore's petition seeking mandamus relief because the challenged district court (the 20th District Court of Milam County) lies outside the geographic jurisdiction of the Tenth Court. The court explained it lacks writ jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a court located in a different appellate district under the cited statutory provisions, and therefore the petition cannot proceed in this court. The opinion was delivered April 9, 2026.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas dismissed Louis Benjamin Vargas's appeal from a municipal court judge's denial of a habeas corpus petition because the court lacked jurisdiction. Vargas had pleaded no contest to a speeding complaint, paid the fine and costs, and filed his appeal in this appellate court instead of the statutorily required county court at law. The Court explained that appellate review of municipal court judgments lies in the county court at law unless the fine exceeds $100 and the county court affirms or the sole issue is the constitutionality of the statute, neither of which applied here.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ethan Frederick Hill’s appeal from the denial of his habeas corpus petition under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.072 because his notice of appeal was untimely. Hill filed a motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal under Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming late receipt of the trial court’s December 1, 2025 order. The court held the civil-rule extension does not apply to criminal appeals from article 11.072 denials, the applicable deadline was 30 days under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Hill’s notice was filed late, so the court lacked jurisdiction and denied the extension motion.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Adelide Perez Ybarra’s appeal of the denial of her petition for expunction because she failed to file the required docketing statement and failed to pay the $205 filing fee despite being notified twice and given deadlines. The clerk first warned her that both were due by March 2, 2026; after noncompliance the clerk extended a final deadline of March 16, 2026. Because neither requirement was satisfied, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow the clerk’s directives.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Johnny Lamonte Phillips’s appeal for want of prosecution because he failed to pay the required clerk’s record costs and filing fee and did not make payment arrangements or respond to the court’s notices. The clerk’s record was due December 22, 2025, but was not filed. The court notified Phillips in March 2026 about unpaid clerk’s-record costs and earlier instructed him in January and February 2026 to remit a $205 filing fee; he did not comply within the time allowed, so the court dismissed the appeal under its rules.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted an agreed motion to dismiss an appeal brought by Sandra Flores and Anita M. Flores against Propel Tax and Javier Hernandez. The parties told the court they resolved their dispute and asked for dismissal. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, dismissed the appeal, taxed the appellate costs to the appellants, and declined to consider any motion for rehearing because the appeal was dismissed at the parties' request.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District dismissed Genie Delia Cavazos’s pro se appeal for want of prosecution after she repeatedly failed to comply with the clerk’s requests to pay the filing fee and to cure defects in her notice of appeal. The court sent five notices between October 28, 2025 and March 19, 2026 but received no response. Because Cavazos did not diligently prosecute the appeal or follow procedural rules, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the appellee’s motion to dismiss as moot.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District dismissed Constance Benavides’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Cameron County because she failed to meet appellate procedural requirements. The clerk’s record was overdue, and Benavides did not file the required docketing statement or inform the court that she paid or arranged to pay the clerk’s fee or was entitled to proceed without payment. After notice and a court order giving her ten days to comply, she did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and a court order.

The First District of Texas dismissed appellant Dayanara Danae Baker’s attempted appeal of a 2010 prostitution conviction because the notice of appeal was filed fifteen years after judgment and the trial-court certification from 2010 stated she had no right to appeal. Baker, pro se, also sought appointment of counsel and asked the court to consider waiving fees to aid access to employment, housing, and records, but the court explained an untimely appeal is not a proper vehicle for fee relief. Because the court lacked jurisdiction over the belated appeal, the appeal and pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Texas Department of Insurance filed an original proceeding in the Seventh Court of Appeals to challenge the denial of its motion to quash a subpoena in an underlying Lubbock County case. While the petition was pending, the Department and the plaintiff (Real Party in Interest, Traci Johnson) resolved their discovery dispute by a Rule 11 agreement, and the Department filed a notice that it intended to withdraw its petition. Because the parties settled and the relator withdrew its challenge, the court dismissed the Department's original proceeding without deciding the subpoena issue on the merits.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal filed on behalf of corporate entities because a nonlawyer cannot represent entities in court. After notifying the parties that an attorney must represent the corporations, counsel who filed an amended notice of appeal withdrew and no new attorney entered an appearance or filed a brief. The court concluded the entities failed to comply with directives to obtain counsel and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court orders.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed Scott Crow’s appeal from his 2015 guilty plea and twenty-year sentence for third-degree felony driving while intoxicated. Crow filed a second pro se notice of appeal nearly ten years after sentencing, which the court found untimely under the appellate rules. The court also relied on the trial-court certification showing this was a plea-bargain case in which Crow waived any right of appeal. Because the notice was untimely and the certification precludes an appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal on April 9, 2026. Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. initially appealed a trial-court judgment but later obtained full relief when the trial court granted its post-judgment omnibus motion and entered a take-nothing judgment; Rush Truck moved to dismiss its portion of the appeal, which the court granted. The court also dismissed Ronald Joe Andrus, Jr.’s portion of the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court directives after his counsel did not respond to requests, failed to pay filing fees, and failed to request or pay for the clerk’s record.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal by Robert Berleth and his firm challenging the trial court’s denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under Texas Rule 91a. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because Berleth, a court‑appointed turnover receiver, is not a "governmental unit" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 51.014(a)(8) and 101.001(3), so he cannot bring an interlocutory appeal. The court relied on statutory text and precedent distinguishing uniquely governmental organs from privately appointed receivers whose authority is limited to satisfying a specific judgment.

The Court dismissed Bobbie Hall Wooldridge’s appeal of a guilty plea conviction for possession of methamphetamine because the trial court certified this was a plea-bargain case in which Wooldridge had no right to appeal. Wooldridge pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and received the agreed three-year sentence. The appellate court found no statutory or procedural basis to continue the appeal, noting the certification was signed by the defendant, defense counsel, and the judge, and that the record supported the certification.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Stephen Kay Thorp Jr.’s criminal appeal because the trial-court certification states this was a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right to appeal. The clerk’s record confirms the sentence did not exceed the prosecutor’s recommendation and there is no written pretrial motion, trial-court permission to appeal, or statute authorizing the appeal. The court gave Thorp an opportunity to supply an amended certification but none was filed, so the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Samantha Ann Marie Vargas's appeal challenging a December 8, 2025 order that modified her community supervision to include a 30-day jail sanction (with credit for time served). The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an order that alters conditions of community supervision, relying on controlling precedent. The panel ordered dismissal after Vargas failed to show a basis for continuing the appeal when asked to show cause.