Court Filings

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted Drexel University's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claim against Drexel. The plaintiff was injured at his employer's workplace when equipment fell from a forklift operated by two Drexel students participating in Drexel's cooperative education program. The court held Drexel did not exercise sufficient control over the students' work or conduct to be vicariously liable as an employer or principal, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had granted summary judgment to Remede Consulting Group on damages against employee-defendant Jason Pitter for misuse of a corporate credit card. The court affirmed that Remede proved Pitter's liability on breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty because Pitter had received the corporate card policy, acknowledged it, and used the card for personal expenses without raising a triable issue of authorization. However, the appellate court held the plaintiff did not establish a precise, uncontested sum owed, so summary judgment on damages awarding $135,246.77 was denied and the judgment was reversed on that point.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court foreclosure judgment because the bank never obtained personal jurisdiction over the homeowner. Nationstar served the summons and complaint by leaving them with the homeowner's former attorney, who lacked authority to accept service. The court held the homeowner timely preserved the jurisdiction defense and that service on a former lawyer does not satisfy statutory service rules. Because service was defective, the foreclosure judgment, referee confirmation, and sale direction were vacated and the complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a Supreme Court order that had allowed Con-Kel Landscaping to reargue and then obtain summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claims. The plaintiff slipped on ice in an underground garage and sued Con-Kel, the snow-removal contractor. The appellate court held Con-Kel improperly raised for the first time on a reargument motion the argument that the plaintiff would be precluded from testifying (and thus could not make a case). Because reargument cannot present new legal theories or facts not previously offered, the reargument should have been denied and the grant of summary judgment vacated. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had denied a CPLR article 78 petition by the Westchester Plaza Tenants Coalition challenging DHCR determinations that upheld a Rent Administrator's decision permitting an owner to modify pool and related facilities. The court found the DHCR's conclusion that the pool was not an essential service was arbitrary and capricious because the record showed the landlord maintained the pool on May 29, 1974, and charging fees for club membership alone did not remove the facility from the regulatory definition of essential services. The matter is remitted to DHCR for a new determination consistent with the opinion.

The Appellate Division reversed a Family Court finding that the father willfully violated a child support order and vacated the related commitment order, remitting the case for a new hearing. The court concluded the father was deprived of his statutory and constitutional right to counsel because the Support Magistrate failed to secure a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver or to inquire about assigning new counsel after the father's assigned lawyer was relieved. Because the record shows the father protested lack of counsel and lacked basic understanding of proceedings, reversal was required regardless of the merits.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to defendants Eric and Leslie Gulkis in a personal injury action alleging liability under General Obligations Law § 11-100. The plaintiff claimed he was assaulted by an underage guest, Hellerman, at a party hosted at the Gulkis defendants' home and alleged the hosts unlawfully furnished alcohol to the minor. The appellate court held the hosts showed the minor was not intoxicated at the time of the assault and the plaintiff produced no evidence of intoxication, so the statutory claim against the hosts fails as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed a fraud, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing complaint against Madison Realty Capital and related defendants. The lower court had dismissed the action based on a release in a forbearance agreement and for failure to plead fraud, but the appellate court held the plaintiffs could amend as of right and that their amended complaint raised questions of fact whether the release was unfairly obtained and whether defendants made intentional misrepresentations to induce the plaintiffs to enter agreements. Accordingly, the defendants' CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss was denied.

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment on liability in a slip-and-fall personal injury case. The defendant failed to timely answer the complaint; when he served a late answer the plaintiff rejected it and moved for default judgment. The trial court had compelled the plaintiff to accept the late answer, but the appellate court found the defendant did not show a reasonable excuse for the delay (his counsel had no personal knowledge and the insurer’s affidavit was inadequate) and thus the trial court abused its discretion.

The Appellate Division reversed two Supreme Court orders that had granted Deutsche Bank summary judgment and an order of reference in a mortgage foreclosure against Andrew Benson. The bank submitted affidavits about mailing required 90-day RPAPL 1304 notices; a later affidavit said the servicer mailed the notices in-house, but an earlier affidavit had stated a third-party vendor did the mailings. The court found the contradiction created a triable issue about strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 and that the plaintiff’s counsel’s reply did not cure the discrepancy, so summary judgment was improper.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted summary judgment dismissing a negligence complaint against defendant Kathleen P. Wallace. The plaintiff alleged injuries from a facial treatment Wallace performed while employed by David's New Beginnings, LLC. The appellate court held that Wallace was not entitled to dismissal simply because the employer might be vicariously liable; an employee can be personally liable for torts even if the employer is also liable. Because Wallace did not meet her initial summary judgment burden, the court denied her motion.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a trial court order and granted summary judgment to defendants Dr. Steven Athanail and Lutheran Medical Center in a medical malpractice suit. The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to timely diagnose and treat a colonic perforation after a May 2016 hospital admission, but the defendants produced expert proof showing no departure from the standard of care. The plaintiff's opposing expert offered only conclusory and speculative assertions and failed to confront the defendants' experts with specific, record-supported reasoning, so no triable issue of fact existed.

The Third District reversed a final summary judgment of foreclosure entered for Miami Beach Townhomes because the trial court never adjudicated the homeowner-appellant Steven Kwartin’s pending affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The Association proved overdue assessments and obtained a judgment liquidating the amount due, but the judgment did not rule on Kwartin’s claims that he had tendered payment, that the Association rejected payments, and that it breached duties. The appellate court followed precedent holding a foreclosure judgment is premature and reversible when interrelated defenses and counterclaims remain unresolved.

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court order that denied Hartford’s motion to dismiss MSP Recovery’s second amended complaint. MSP had sued for a pure bill of discovery and declaratory relief under Florida’s motor-vehicle no-fault statute, alleging the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over Hartford. The trial court found Hartford had abandoned its jurisdictional defense, but the appellate court held Hartford did not abandon that defense and, applying a recent controlling precedent (USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. MSP Recovery Claims), concluded the long-arm jurisdictional allegations were insufficient. The case is dismissed and remanded with directions to dismiss the action.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court order that summarily denied Traves Malcolm’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion claiming newly discovered evidence (a previously unknown 20-year plea offer). The appellate court agreed the motion was facially deficient because it lacked a proper oath and did not include an affidavit from trial counsel as required by rule 3.850(c)(7) (or explain why one could not be obtained). Because the trial court denied the motion without giving Malcolm an opportunity to amend those defects, the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a three-year injunction for protection against stalking that the trial court had entered for the Wife against the Girlfriend. The appellate court held the evidence did not show the two separate, legally distinct instances of harassment required by Florida law: the October 23 barrage of messages constituted a single episode, and the other alleged acts (two social-media posts and one child-support text) were either isolated or served legitimate purposes. The court also found the communications did not objectively cause the high level of emotional distress the statute requires.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court order denying dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ruth sued nonresident trustee Dunham Trust Company (DTC) in Florida for breach of fiduciary duties related to a trust created by a Florida resident. The court held DTC’s acceptance of a successor co-trusteeship and routine communications to a beneficiary who later moved to Florida were insufficient to show that DTC purposefully availed itself of conducting business in Florida. Because DTC’s administration occurred in Nevada and contacts with Florida were tied to unilateral acts of the settlor/beneficiary, due process was not satisfied.

The appellate court reversed a county court order denying the landlord’s motion to dismiss or transfer a security-deposit suit for improper venue. The complaint showed the leased property, tenancy, and a prior eviction action were all in Hillsborough County and did not allege any office or agent of the landlord in Palm Beach County. Because the plaintiff did not plead a sufficient basis for selecting Palm Beach County, the Fourth District held venue is proper in Hillsborough County and remanded with directions to grant the motion and transfer the case there.

The Court of Appeal reversed a superior court judgment that had dismissed a Proposition 65 enforcement lawsuit for inadequate pre-suit notice. The plaintiff, a private enforcer, had sent a 60-day notice that identified the organization and provided contact information for its outside counsel rather than a specific internal “responsible individual.” The appellate court followed a recent decision (Pancho Villa’s) and held the regulation requiring a contact for the noticing entity is directory, not mandatory, and that the notice here substantially complied with the regulation’s purposes (informing prosecutors and giving defendants an opportunity to investigate and cure). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), a statutory restriction that limited who could file undervaluation complaints based on arm’s-length sales occurring before (but not after) the tax lien date and exceeding specified thresholds, violated Ohio’s constitutional requirement that property be taxed by a uniform rule. The court found the provision systematically and intentionally departed from uniform valuation by treating some properties as immune from complaint. The court severed the unconstitutional clause, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, reversed the Board of Tax Appeals decisions, and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while certifying a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ order that vacated a county board of revision decision and remanded to dismiss a taxpayer’s complaint. The court held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) — a statutory condition barring third-party valuation complaints unless the property sold in an arm’s-length transaction before the tax lien date and the sale price exceeded listed value by 10% and a monetary threshold — violates Ohio’s constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. The court severed that subsection, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, and certified a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), finding an Ohio statute, R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), unconstitutional because it allowed different treatment of parcels for valuation complaints and thus violated the state constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. Appellant Bahorek had filed a complaint challenging a neighbor’s valuation; the county Board of Revision dismissed it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The appellate court held that the statute’s conditions on who may file and when (arm’s-length sale before the lien date and a 10%/threshold sales test) create systematic departures from uniform valuation, so the court severed that subsection, reversed the BTA, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District Court of Appeals and remanded the case. The dispute involved C.E., an unmarried former partner who sought legal parental recognition of three children born to P.S. through artificial insemination. The First District had directed the trial court to determine whether the couple "would have been married" but for Ohio's pre-Obergefell ban on same-sex marriage and to apply R.C. 3111.95(A) if so. The Supreme Court held R.C. 3111.95(A) applies only to married spouses and that Obergefell and Pavan do not authorize retroactively rewriting that statute to cover unmarried couples.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that cast vote records (CVRs) — digital spreadsheet reports of votes generated by a county’s tabulating equipment — are not the "contents" of ballot boxes or voting machines under Section 308 of the Election Code and therefore are subject to public disclosure. The dispute arose from a Right-to-Know request to Lycoming County for CVRs from the 2020 general election, which had been denied as exempt. The Court concluded CVRs are documents/reports generated by tabulators (automatic tabulating equipment), not the physical ballots in ballot boxes or the voting machines that let voters mark and verify votes.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo in a foreclosure-related case and denied Wells Fargo's motion. The court held Wells Fargo failed to prove strict compliance with RPAPL 1304's notice requirements because its affiant did not establish knowledge of the third-party vendor's mailing procedures or integration of the vendor's records into the bank's business records. The court also rejected Wells Fargo's claim that the loan was not a covered primary-residence loan, finding plaintiff did not prove the property was never the borrower's primary residence.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a lower court order that had remanded an NYC Housing Authority denial of a remaining family member (RFM) grievance. The petitioner, Eric Camacho, sought succession after his aunt (the tenant) died; NYCHA denied his claim because he did not meet the policy requirement of at least 12 months of continuous authorized occupancy prior to the tenant's death. The court held NYCHA's denial had a rational basis, rejected hardship and estoppel arguments, and found that a later change in NYCHA policy would not have altered the outcome.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court grant of summary judgment in a malicious-prosecution suit brought by attorney Brian Detrick against his former client, Keiko Shimada. Shimada had voluntarily dismissed a prior malpractice case and moved for summary judgment, claiming the dismissal was motivated by the statute of limitations (a procedural ground that would bar malicious prosecution). The trial court relied on Shimada’s English-language declaration, but the appellate court held that because Shimada cannot read or speak English the declaration was incompetent absent evidence identifying and qualifying the interpreter/translator and an attestation that the translation accurately reflected Shimada’s words. The judgment for Shimada was reversed and the summary-judgment motion must be denied.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI) because officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to extend a traffic stop and administer field sobriety tests. Ingram was pulled over for an unlit rear license plate, admitted having a drink earlier, and officers testified to smelling alcohol from the vehicle, but there was no erratic driving, no notable eye or speech impairment, and body-cam statements conflicted about odor and signs of impairment. The appellate court held the totality of circumstances did not justify prolonging the stop, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.

The California Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court’s orders terminating a mother’s parental rights to her two young children and remanded for further proceedings. The juvenile court had ended reunification services and set permanency hearings after finding the children likely to be adopted, but the high court held a likelihood-of-adoption finding alone is not enough to terminate parental rights — the court must also make one of the statutory additional findings or find no applicable exception. The Court also held the mother received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to assert her statutory right to reunification services for one child and failed to pursue writ review, requiring vacation of those orders and a new hearing.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court order that had set aside a default judgment entered for Shelter Mutual Insurance Company against Dajuan Henry Jones. SMIC had obtained default judgment after certified-mail service to an address; Jones later moved to vacate the judgment claiming improper service, mistaken identity, and that he only learned of the case months later. The appeals court found Jones presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service but was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the service issue; it also held Jones’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was untimely and remanded for denial of relief under that rule and for a hearing only on service.