Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded. The dispute concerned interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement between M-I L.L.C. and Texas International Terminals (TXIT) about lease and materials-handling payments and removal of equipment. The trial court had added CPI-based price adjustments and ordered M-I to remove certain equipment, relying on extrinsic course-of-dealing evidence. The appellate court held the settlement language was unambiguous, forbade using extrinsic evidence to rewrite the agreement, and concluded the trial court improperly added and altered terms instead of enforcing the agreement as written.

The California Supreme Court held that the Coastal Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction to overturn a San Luis Obispo County grant of a coastal development permit to Shear Development. The Court decided the proper review of the Commission’s jurisdictional claim — which depends on interpreting the county’s certified local coastal program (LCP) — is independent judgment, and no deference was warranted here. Applying the LCP text and extrinsic evidence, the Court concluded the proposed homesite is not in a sensitive coastal resource area and that the Commission’s alternate theory (that jurisdiction exists when a site lists multiple principal permitted uses) is incorrect. The Court reversed and directed issuance of a writ vacating the Commission’s decision and dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The court reviewed an appeal by Y.S., who filed a petition to change her minor child’s name and a sworn Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The trial court ordered her to pay reduced costs of $400 after an interview with county staff, but did not hold a formal oral evidentiary hearing or make detailed findings required by Rule 145. The appellate court concluded the record contained uncontroverted evidence that Y.S. could not afford court costs, that the trial court failed to follow Rule 145 procedures, and therefore reversed the order and directed the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed without paying costs or fees.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed defendant-appellant Joshua Mounts’s felony-murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. Mounts had reopened his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) to claim ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court found trial counsel performed deficiently by abandoning key expert testimony (Dr. Wiens) about histology slides, failing to object to undisclosed expert opinion testimony from Dr. Makoroff, and not objecting to improper prosecutorial remarks in closing. Because those errors undermined confidence in the verdict and appellate counsel should have raised them, the conviction was reversed and the cause remanded.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed part of the First District Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the municipal trial court’s denial of J.B.’s applications to seal five misdemeanor convictions prosecuted by the county. J.B. sought sealing of seven misdemeanor convictions; two prosecuted by the city were sealed by the court of appeals and not appealed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding J.B. had not shown rehabilitation and that the government’s interest in public records outweighed hers. The Court rejected the court of appeals’ substitutions of judgment and novel limitations on what a trial court may consider under R.C. 2953.32.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that Nationwide Energy Partners (NEP), a company that purchases electricity and resells it to apartment tenants using equipment it installs and maintains, is an "electric light company" and therefore a public utility subject to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO). The court concluded tenants qualify as "consumers" under R.C. 4905.03(C) and that NEP is plainly engaged in the business of supplying electricity because it buys power, sets resale prices, bills tenants, and may disconnect service. The Court reversed PUCO’s jurisdictional ruling and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining claims and tariff issues.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted the plaintiff summary judgment to quiet title and declared a 2004 administrator's deed void from the start. The plaintiff had sued after her mother, appointed administrator c.t.a., conveyed decedent's property to herself and the plaintiff as joint tenants, contrary to the decedent's will leaving the property to the plaintiff alone. The appellate court held that because the defendant had Surrogate's Court letters of administration c.t.a., her transfer was cloaked with apparent authority and therefore was voidable (subject to attack), not void ab initio. The cross-motion for summary judgment was denied.

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted plaintiff Kelvin Goode leave to enter a default judgment against Bespoke Motor Group, LLC and Bentley Long Island, LLC in a breach of contract action. The court found service on an employee identified as a "service consultant" was proper under the rules for serving limited liability companies, the defendants failed to timely answer, and the plaintiff provided proof of service and the defendants' default. Because the defendants did not show a reasonable excuse for the default, the court granted default judgment without reaching the merits of any asserted defenses.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted defendant Aileen Betances' renewed summary judgment motion dismissing the amended complaint against her in a personal injury action. Plaintiffs alleged their vehicle was struck from the rear and that the defendant owned or operated the offending vehicle. The court held the defendant made a prima facie showing that she and her vehicle were not involved in the accident, and the plaintiffs' opposing papers failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so dismissal was appropriate.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court judgment that pierced the corporate veil to hold South Dade Dealership liable for a default judgment against CarX Depot. Line 5 had obtained a default judgment against CarX for unpaid finance-and-insurance (F&I) funds and sought to collect from South Dade as an alleged alter ego or mere continuation. The appellate court found the evidence insufficient to show South Dade dominated CarX or that CarX’s separate corporate existence ceased, and it concluded there was no relay-style continuation into SDT Cars. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for South Dade.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a default final judgment entered in a small claims case because the defendant, a self-represented litigant, had notified the trial court before a pretrial conference that she could not attend due to a death in her family. The trial court entered default when she did not appear and later denied her motion to continue. The appellate court found that the denial was an abuse of discretion because the reason was unforeseeable, not suggestive of delay, and the default deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Fifth District reversed the circuit court’s summary denial of ground four of Christopher Owens’s Rule 3.850 postconviction motion and remanded for further proceedings. Owens had alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor comments during voir dire that arguably commented on his constitutional right to remain silent. The panel found the record attached below still lacked sufficient context to evaluate prejudice under Strickland and therefore did not conclusively refute Owens’s claim, so the court ordered either an evidentiary hearing or additional records be attached to the denial order.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any attorney may be discharged, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the contractual percentage after discharge. Because the referring attorney was discharged, she is limited to a modified quantum meruit recovery for services actually performed prior to discharge and within the scope of the agreement. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine reasonable recovery under those principles.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her before final settlement. The court held a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any other lawyer, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the agreed contractual percentage once discharged. Instead, where a client discharges counsel without cause the attorney may recover only the reasonable value of services performed before discharge, capped by the contract (modified quantum meruit). The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate an appropriate quantum meruit award limited to pre-discharge, in-scope work.

The Third District reversed a trial court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The dispute arose from a wrongful-death case where the client had signed an agreement dividing fees between lead counsel (Podhurst) and referring counsel (Frexes). The appellate court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney and that discharge limits the referring attorney to recovery under a modified quantum meruit for work performed before discharge. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate reasonable compensation limited to services rendered before the January 28, 2019 discharge and within the contract’s scope.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Studebaker Health Care Center’s motion to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to grant the motion. The dispute arose after employee J. Asencion Santana signed three arbitration-related onboarding documents and later sued for wage-and-hour and representative Labor Code claims, including a PAGA claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement invalid because of alleged conflicts among the documents and unconscionability. The appellate court held the documents, read together, showed a clear mutual intent to arbitrate employment disputes; ambiguities did not defeat arbitration; and any unenforceable PAGA waiver should be severed rather than voiding the entire agreement.

The First District of Texas reversed the trial court’s order that had halted an arbitration between Humphries Construction Corporation (HCC) and Highland Village-related entities, holding the trial court erred in finding HCC waived its contractual right to arbitrate by using the courts. The appellate court concluded, after reviewing the litigation and discovery conduct, that Highland Village failed to show HCC clearly intended to relinquish arbitration. The court denied Highland Village’s collateral requests for mandamus relief challenging denials of a protective order, motion to quash a third-party subpoena, and sanctions, finding no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for a law firm in a legal-malpractice suit. Plaintiff DePina sued the firm for failing to timely pursue property-damage claims against a railroad after repeated flooding of his land. The firm obtained summary judgment arguing the underlying nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had run before representation. The appellate court held the record did not show as a matter of law the nuisance was permanent because flooding was sporadic, contingent on heavy rain and culvert condition, and thus created fact issues for a jury. The case is remanded.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Smart Venture Capital’s appeal and ruled that the trial court erred in denying Smart Venture’s motion to set aside a default judgment. The Association sued the property owners and added Smart Venture (a secured creditor) but failed to effect service on Smart Venture’s registered agent. The court held the certified-mail evidence lacked a required postmark and there was no proof Smart Venture received or signed for the mailing, so service was not perfected and the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Stanley Randolph’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after police detained and searched him. Officers found Randolph sitting in a parked sedan in a high-crime cul-de-sac at night, blocked the car, and required the occupants to exit; officers later saw a backpack with suspected marijuana and then searched. The appellate court held the encounter was a detention requiring particularized, objective suspicion, which the record did not supply prior to the restraint, so the stop and subsequent evidence collection were unlawful and suppression was required.

The court reversed a juvenile delinquency judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The juvenile, D.W.R., had been adjudicated for gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition based principally on testimony from a developmentally disabled adult, N.O. The state moved to dismiss the appeal as moot after community supervision ended; the court denied that motion because the adjudication still carries a firearms disability. The court concluded N.O. was incompetent to testify because he lacked a basic understanding of truth, so admitting his testimony was prejudicial. Because the evidence (including the admitted testimony) was nonetheless sufficient, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with law.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals reviewed a bench trial where Yangtze Railroad Fasteners sued Ohio Valley Trackwork (OVT) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment over about $40,000 for delivered railroad materials. The court found Yangtze proved the contract and delivery, but the trial court had concluded OVT was not liable because payment was misdirected to a third party after fraudulent email instructions. The appeals court held the trial court’s decision on breach of contract was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed that portion, and remanded for further proceedings while affirming the unjust enrichment judgment portion not appealed.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court (Bronx County) and granted plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society's motion to confirm a Referee's report and enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court found the Referee's report was substantially supported by the affidavit of the plaintiff's corporate counsel for its loan servicer, which detailed the borrower's full payment history, established default as of October 1, 2008, and set forth the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest. The court relied on precedent permitting business records and servicer-calculated amounts when properly supported.

The Court of Appeals held that defendant's written speedy-trial motion under CPL 30.30(1)(b), filed on the day trial was to begin, was timely and provided reasonable notice to the People. The Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court's summary refusal to consider the motion as untimely and for lack of notice. Because the motion complied with the specific statutory deadline in CPL 170.30(2) and included detailed calculations of chargeable days, the Court reversed and remitted the case for further proceedings on the motion so the People may be given a fair opportunity to respond and the trial court may exercise its discretion how to proceed.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that dismissed multiple burglary, theft, and identity-theft charges after a defendant, Keena Landrine, was placed on mental health diversion. Although Landrine made substantial progress while in custody, the appellate court held the diversion statute requires defendants to substantially comply with diversion conditions before charges may be dismissed. Landrine repeatedly violated diversion requirements—relapsing on drugs, refusing recommended detox/treatment, and committing dozens of new criminal offenses—so the trial court abused its discretion by finding satisfactory performance. The matter is remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed charges.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a wage-and-hour suit by Adam Martinez against Sierra Lifestar, Inc. Martinez alleged Lifestar excluded nondiscretionary bonuses (notably EMS Week bonuses) when calculating the regular rate of pay, underpaying overtime, double time, and meal/rest premiums for about 135 employees. The trial court denied certification because it found Martinez’s claim was not typical, reasoning he might be uniquely subject to a defense that his EMS Bonus was a gift or discretionary. The appellate court held that defense was not unique to Martinez and remanded for further class-certification proceedings.

The Clermont County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for homeowners Vernon and Meredith Hubbard in a home-remodeling dispute. The Hubbards had obtained a $108,000 judgment against TFB Development, LLC and two individuals, Lenny (Leonard) Weber and Sandra Davis. The appellate court held the Hubbards did not produce admissible summary-judgment evidence showing Weber or Davis were parties to the written contract or otherwise individually liable, because the contract identified TFB (not the individuals) as the contractor and contained an integration clause. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed a trial court’s order detaining defendant Quadajah Johnson pending trial on six first-degree murder counts under the Pretrial Fairness Act and remanded for the trial court to set conditions of release. The panel majority found the State failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Johnson posed a continuing, unmitigable danger to any person or the community. The court emphasized her limited nonviolent criminal history, cooperation with police, a prior protective order against the victim, her pregnancy, and the prospect that conditions (including a firearms ban) could mitigate risk. A dissent would have affirmed detention.

The Appellate Division held that New Jersey's Ski Act applies to snow tubing. The court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment for Ski Campgaw Management LLC, concluding the Act displaces common-law negligence claims where it applies. Because plaintiff failed to show the operator had actual or constructive notice of the deceleration mat being bunched up (a condition the statute requires notice of before liability attaches), Campgaw was entitled to summary judgment. The court remanded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order that dissolved prejudgment writs of garnishment obtained by Texas Global Equity Fund XII (TGE) against 22 entities believed to owe money to Breckenridge Development 2019 (BD19). TGE had sued BD19 for unpaid loan principal and interest after BD19 failed to provide required financial reports, repay a prior Frost Bank loan as required, and cure defaults. The appeals court held TGE proved the statutory grounds for garnishment (the debt was liquidated, due and unpaid; BD19 lacked sufficient property to satisfy it; and the garnishment was not sought to injure BD19), and BD19 failed to prove extrinsic grounds to dissolve the writs. The court reinstated the writs and remanded for further proceedings.