Court Filings

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of plaintiff Moises Ramirez's motion for partial summary judgment on a Labor Law § 240(1) claim against 2500 Webb LLC. The court found that genuine issues of fact remained about which object struck the plaintiff (horizontal versus vertical pipe/post), whether that object was a target of disassembly when the injury occurred, and whether a safety device was available that would have prevented the accident. Because these disputed facts are material to liability under Labor Law § 240(1), summary judgment was properly denied.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Khalil Wisdom's conviction after a jury trial for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and the concurrent 12-year sentences imposed as a second violent felony offender. The court also affirmed the denial of his CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment alleging ineffective assistance and newly discovered evidence. The court concluded counsel provided effective representation under state and federal standards, any alleged failures did not prejudice defendant given overwhelming video and other evidence, and the trial court properly declined various jury instructions and a new-evidence hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Yordani Urena’s conviction following a guilty plea to second-degree assault and the three-year probation sentence, but modified the probation by striking fees and mandatory surcharge. The court declined to review an unpreserved facial constitutional challenge to a probation condition restricting association and places, and alternatively rejected the challenge on the merits. The court found the association/frequenting condition reasonably necessary given the violent nature of the offense, but concluded that imposing court fees and the mandatory surcharge was not related to rehabilitation and therefore removed that condition.

The Appellate Division, First Department, reviewed defendant Julsean Thompson’s conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to first-degree custodial interference. The court unanimously modified the trial court’s judgment by reducing Thompson’s term of imprisonment from two-to-four years to 1 1/3-to-3 years as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, finding the original sentence excessive. In all other respects the judgment was affirmed, leaving the conviction and other components of the trial court’s decision intact.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx County judgment that had convicted Angel Rivas, upon a guilty plea, of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and sentenced him to five years probation. The court struck six specific probation conditions because they were not reasonably related to Rivas's rehabilitation or necessary to ensure he would lead a law-abiding life. The court reasoned there was no evidence supporting dependence-support, gang affiliation, substance abuse, mental-health treatment, or ignition-interlock requirements, and the People did not oppose removing several of the conditions.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Bronx County Supreme Court's June 14, 2021 judgment in People v. Gonzalez. Carlos Gonzalez appealed his conviction and sentence; the appellate panel reviewed the arguments, found the sentence was not excessive, and unanimously affirmed the trial court judgment. The court provided no extended opinion or new legal rule, simply announcing affirmation and referring appellant's counsel to the court's rule § 606.5 regarding appellate practice matters.

The First Department unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's order dismissing Yolanda Murray's complaint against Planned Parenthood as time-barred and for failure to state a viable claim. The court held Murray's claims arising from alleged 1996 misconduct did not fall within the Adult Survivors Act because the complaint did not allege criminal conduct enumerated by that statute, and the Child Victims Act revival window had already closed. The court also found that, even on the merits, Murray failed to plead facts showing Planned Parenthood's knowledge of the provider's dangerous propensities, control over the local affiliate, or any valid alter-ego theory, and there was no evidence of judicial bias.

The Appellate Division, First Department granted the Attorney Grievance Committee's motion for reciprocal discipline and suspended attorney Tamar Toledano from the practice of law in New York for four months, effective 30 days from the order. The suspension follows Toledano's consent to a four-month USPTO suspension for violating USPTO trademark signature and conduct rules, and her admission in a USPTO settlement that she permitted non-signatories to sign trademark filings and failed to timely notify clients about a referring firm's fraud. The court found New York rules substantially similar and imposed reciprocal discipline on consent.

The First Department granted the Attorney Grievance Committee's motion for reciprocal discipline and publicly censured attorney Barbara Jayne Resnick. Connecticut previously publicly reprimanded Resnick after she admitted holding herself out as an attorney while administratively suspended there for failing to pay client security fees. The New York court found no defects in the Connecticut proceeding, determined the misconduct would also violate New York Rule 5.5(a), and concluded that a public censure in New York is appropriate and consistent with the sanction imposed in Connecticut and First Department precedent.

The Appellate Division, First Department granted the Attorney Grievance Committee's motion for an immediate interim suspension of attorney William John Lloyd King. The court found uncontroverted documentary evidence — bank records and King's written admission — that he converted or misappropriated $17,420 in a client's funds to satisfy a gambling addiction. The court rejected King's request for diversion or a disability suspension, concluding his misconduct posed an immediate threat to the public and that addiction-based mitigation, restitution, or brief recovery efforts do not prevent an interim suspension pending any formal charges.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a lower court order that had remanded an NYC Housing Authority denial of a remaining family member (RFM) grievance. The petitioner, Eric Camacho, sought succession after his aunt (the tenant) died; NYCHA denied his claim because he did not meet the policy requirement of at least 12 months of continuous authorized occupancy prior to the tenant's death. The court held NYCHA's denial had a rational basis, rejected hardship and estoppel arguments, and found that a later change in NYCHA policy would not have altered the outcome.

The First Department reviewed a motion in a class-action landlord-tenant case where defendants sought disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel for an alleged conflict arising from counsel's prior representation of several former building owners. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding defendants had waived the conflict claim, and concluded the record was incomplete to decide disqualification. The court therefore ordered plaintiffs' counsel to produce itemized files related to the prior representation so defendants can assess whether an actual conflict exists, and otherwise affirmed the lower court's denial of immediate disqualification and dismissal.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Harvey's personal-injury complaint arising from a May 2020 motor vehicle accident. Defendants (the New York Foundling Hospital and others) presented expert reports and MRI comparisons showing plaintiff's cervical, lumbar, and right-shoulder conditions were preexisting, chronic, and degenerative from a prior March 30, 2019 crash, not caused by the 2020 accident. The court held plaintiff's expert failed to meaningfully dispute the prior-accident causation, so she could not meet the statutory threshold for a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d).

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a lower court order denying the insurer Mountain Valley Indemnity Company's summary judgment motion to dismiss an insureds' fire-damage complaint. The insurer argued the dwelling was a three-family property (allowing a coverage disclaimer) based on the basement configuration, while the insureds said it was two-family and the basement was shared family space. The court found disputed facts about the basement's physical separation, usage, and the investigator's qualifications, so summary judgment was improper and the case must proceed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s dental malpractice complaint against the Deol defendants. Plaintiff sued for injuries from root canals performed by an endodontist, Dr. Taggar, who practiced at premises operated by the Deol defendants. The court concluded Taggar was an independent contractor, not an employee, and the Deol defendants neither controlled his professional work nor actually supervised him, so they are not vicariously or directly liable. Plaintiff’s opposition lacked admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order dismissing plaintiff Varma's complaint against Allstate and Wayne LeVan. The court held the complaint was barred by res judicata because the claims — challenging termination and asserting breach based on the same agency agreement and incorporated supplement — either were raised or could have been raised in an earlier action between the same parties. The court also held that the prior dismissal and the denial of leave to amend had preclusive effect because the new complaint mirrors the proposed amended pleading previously rejected on the merits.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury complaint brought under New York's Adult Survivors Act (CPLR 214-j). The plaintiff alleged sexual abuse by a Syracuse University employee while he worked at a university-affiliated fraternity house. The court held the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded lack of consent and therefore alleged conduct that would constitute a Penal Law sex offense, so the claims were timely revived under the ASA. The case is remitted to Supreme Court for consideration of other dismissal grounds the lower court did not decide.

The defendant appealed from a Supreme Court (Onondaga County) order denying his motion to vacate a default judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. While the appeal was pending, the defendant and plaintiff’s attorney signed a stipulation of discontinuance in February 2026. The Appellate Division consequently dismissed the appeal without costs on April 24, 2026. The court did not reach the merits of the underlying motion to vacate because the parties stipulated to discontinue the action.

The Appellate Division dismissed an appeal and cross-appeal in an Erie County civil action between Sycamore Maple Family Ltd. Partnership and James F. Jerge. The parties filed a stipulation of discontinuance on April 2, 2026, and the court ordered the appeals dismissed without costs on April 24, 2026. No opinion on the merits was issued because the case was discontinued by the parties.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed a lower court order denying plaintiff Jeremiah Smith's motion for leave to amend his complaint against the City of Buffalo, its police department, and unnamed officers. The appeal challenged Supreme Court (Erie County)'s November 12, 2024 decision refusing permission to amend, but the appellate court found no reversible error and denied relief. The appellate decision is brief and affirms the trial court's exercise of discretion without further elaboration in the slip opinion.

The Appellate Division affirmed a divorce judgment, modifying it to reduce the required life insurance the husband must carry from $750,000 to an amount equal to the remaining unpaid maintenance and allowing a declining term policy. The court upheld the equitable distribution, the sale of marital real estate, the maintenance award (including using the statutory income cap), and the attorney-fee award, rejecting claims of dissipation and insufficient property valuation. The cross-appeal succeeded only on the life-insurance security amount, which the court held should track the unpaid maintenance balance and decline as payments are made.

The Appellate Division dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a divorce action concerning the equitable distribution of marital property. The appeals arose from a September 19, 2024 Supreme Court order in Livingston County that, among other things, distributed the parties' marital assets. The appellate court issued a unanimous order dismissing both matters without costs and referenced a companion memorandum decision in a related appeal. No substantive reversal or modification of the lower court's distribution is contained in this short order.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed an order of the Court of Claims that granted the administrator of Kaazim Freeman’s estate leave to amend her wrongful-death claim against the State and denied the State’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the proposed amendments related back to the original claim for statute-of-limitations purposes because they arose from the same occurrence — Freeman’s unexplained death in state custody — and that the State failed to show prejudice from the delay. Consequently, amendment was properly allowed under CPLR 3025 and CPLR 203(f).

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department unanimously affirmed a March 28, 2025 Oswego County Court order classifying defendant Alexander R. Watros as a Level Two sex offender under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The court reviewed the county court's risk-level determination and found no basis to disturb it. Because the Appellate Division affirmed, the Level Two classification and its attendant registration and community-notification requirements remain in effect.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed defendant Terrell L. Walker's conviction for driving while ability impaired. The court had previously reserved decision and remitted the case to Monroe County Court to resolve whether the People were required to obtain DMV refusal-hearing transcripts or recordings under the statutory discovery and whether any failure violated defendant's speedy-trial rights. On remand the court denied the motion to dismiss, and this court upheld that ruling, concluding the DMV materials were not in the prosecution's possession or deemed to be in possession and thus were not required to be obtained or listed in the certificate of compliance.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a conviction entered after defendant pleaded guilty to weapons and drug possession because the court improperly required defendant to waive his right to appeal as a condition of a court-initiated plea and because the trial court erred in denying suppression of physical evidence. The panel found the waiver invalid and concluded that the prosecution failed to prove defendant voluntarily consented to the frisk and search; body-worn camera footage contradicted the officer's testimony. The plea was vacated, the suppression motion granted, the indictment dismissed, and the case remitted for CPL 470.45 proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed defendant Bounleaung Thanthima’s convictions for predatory sexual assault against a child and endangering the welfare of a child. On appeal the defendant argued the jury heard evidence of oral sexual acts not specifically described to the grand jury, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held the indictment and bill of particulars were broad enough to cover the testimony, found the claimed prosecutorial errors either unpreserved or harmless, and determined defense counsel’s choices were strategic and did not amount to ineffective assistance. The sentence was upheld as not unduly harsh.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a June 25, 2024 judgment convicting Carol Steinagle after she pleaded guilty to second-degree kidnapping (Penal Law § 135.20). The defendant argued on appeal that her plea was not knowing and voluntary and that her sentence was harsh. The court found the claim unpreserved because she did not move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment, declined to review it in the interest of justice, and rejected the claim that the sentence was unduly harsh, so the conviction and sentence were affirmed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed defendant Joseph Serrano’s convictions for second-degree murder and two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The court reviewed the trial record and concluded the guilty verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence, crediting eyewitness testimony supported by ballistics. The court rejected or found unpreserved Serrano’s claims about confrontation, suppression of statements, suggestive identification, grand jury misconduct, discovery sanctions, prosecutorial misconduct, juror misconduct, late expert disclosure, and ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding none warranted reversal or a new trial.

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant Jonathan Sanchez’s convictions for second-degree murder, second-degree attempted murder, and three counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, but reduced his sentence in the interest of justice. The court upheld a protective order that kept a witness’s identity from defendant until shortly before trial, rejected challenges to identification and jury-selection rulings (including a Batson claim), and found the evidence legally sufficient and not against the weight of the evidence. Because the aggregate sentence was excessive compared to codefendants and the defendant’s youth, the court reduced the attempted-murder sentence to a 15-year determinate term, producing a new aggregate of 40 years to life.