Court Filings

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order granting summary judgment to Lakeview Auto Sales and Service, Inc., and to Herold Motor Cars, Inc. and John C. Herold, and denying RJK Auto Brokers' cross-motion. RJK had purchased nine vehicles from Dream Carz, which never obtained title; RJK then paid Herold Motor to obtain title to eight sold vehicles. The court held the moving defendants showed they had no contract or fraudulent conduct with RJK and that Dream Carz was not an entrustee or a merchant able to pass good title. RJK failed to raise triable issues of fact to avoid dismissal.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal-injury claims against homeowner Kim Eichle and certain claims against third-party defendant Joseph Russo. The plaintiff alleged the infant was injured after being punched outside a New Year's Eve party at Eichle's home and asserted causes of action under New York's Dram Shop statutes and premises liability. The court held Eichle showed she neither served visibly intoxicated guests nor furnished alcohol to minors, and that the infant could not identify whether an icy sidewalk caused his fall, so the plaintiff failed to raise triable issues of fact.

The Appellate Division (Second Department) reviewed the People’s appeal from a Supreme Court order that, after a hearing and reargument, vacated Omarny Williams’s 2017 guilty plea judgment and set aside his sentence. The appellate court reversed the grant to vacate the plea because the plea record showed Williams told the court he was a U.S. citizen, and thus the court’s failure to warn about immigration consequences could be reviewed on direct appeal and was untimely raised. The court affirmed that the sentence must be set aside because the sentencing court failed to properly determine Williams’s eligibility for youthful offender treatment and remitted the case for resentencing.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Kings County Supreme Court judgment adjudicating the defendant a youthful offender after he pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and imposing sentence. The defendant argued that the youthful-offender adjudication violated his Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but the appellate court found those constitutional claims unpreserved for review and declined to decide them in the interest of justice. Consequently, the lower court's judgment was affirmed without addressing the merits of the constitutional challenges.

The Appellate Division reviewed a County Court order that had designated Joshua Stewart a level three sexually violent offender under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act after his New Jersey conviction for promoting child prostitution. The court upheld the risk-point scoring and refused a downward departure, finding the Guidelines had adequately considered mitigating factors. However, the panel held that applying Correction Law § 168-a(3)(b) to label him a "sexually violent offender" was unconstitutional as applied because the underlying New Jersey offense would not qualify as a sexually violent offense under New York law. The court therefore modified the designation to "level three sex offender" and affirmed as modified.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed defendant Jaquan Oden’s conviction for disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20(3) after a jury trial. Oden was acquitted of a separate disorderly conduct count under § 240.20(6) that alleged failure to disperse. The court rejected arguments that the conviction was legally insufficient or against the weight of the evidence because the disputed dispersal order was an element only of the acquitted charge, not the conviction. The court also found defense counsel effective and upheld the denial of a mistrial, concluding the prosecutor’s improper remark was cured by immediate instructions to the jury.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a County Court order designating Daniel Morrison a level three sex offender under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Morrison, convicted after jury trial of first‑degree sexual abuse and two counts of second‑degree murder, argued for a lower risk level based on mitigating factors. The court held the argument was unpreserved because he did not request a downward departure at the SORA hearing, and in any event he failed to meet the legal standard for a downward departure from the presumptive level three classification.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the County Court conviction and sentence of Daryl K. Miller for attempted sexual abuse in the first degree after Miller pleaded guilty. The court found Miller knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal, and that valid waiver bars review of his claim that the sentence was excessive. Because the appeal waiver was valid, the appellate panel declined to review the sentencing challenge and affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the County Court.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the sentence imposed on Mario Lazu after his guilty plea. The defendant appealed only on the ground that the sentence was excessive, but the court concluded he had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal. Because the appeal waiver was valid, the court found it could not consider the challenge to the sentence and therefore affirmed the lower court's June 27, 2023 sentence.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reviewed defendant Andrew Jointe’s challenge to his sentence following guilty pleas to third-degree rape and attempted sex trafficking of a child. The court found the 10-year period of postrelease supervision imposed for the attempted sex trafficking conviction was illegal and reduced it to five years. As modified, the concurrent determinate prison terms of 3.5 years and the remaining 10-year postrelease supervision on the rape conviction were affirmed. The court stated it may correct an illegal sentence even if the issue was not raised below.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed defendant Clyde Johnson’s convictions for three counts of forcible touching and one count of third-degree sexual abuse after a jury trial. The court found the defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence unpreserved but, in any event, held the evidence sufficient and the verdict not against the weight of the evidence. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct were rejected. The court also concluded the time period alleged in the forcible touching counts gave the defendant fair notice to prepare a defense.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the sentence imposed on Tyshaun Holloway after his guilty plea. Holloway challenged the sentence as excessive, but the court held that he had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal, and that valid waiver bars appellate review of his excessiveness claim. Because the waiver was valid, the court declined to consider the merits of the sentencing claim and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Supreme Court, Kings County.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the defendant Lucious Griffin’s convictions following a jury trial for multiple drug and paraphernalia offenses and his sentence. Griffin argued the indictment should be dismissed for violation of his statutory speedy-trial rights because the People’s initial certificate of compliance (COC) omitted certain discovery (including a prisoner movement log and pole camera footage). The court held the initial COC was valid because the People exercised due diligence, promptly disclosed the missing log once discovered, and the defense sought no lesser remedy than dismissal. Several other claims were deemed unpreserved for appeal.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reviewed defendant Darrel Greenlee’s appeal challenging the excessiveness of a nine-year determinate sentence (plus five years postrelease supervision) imposed after his guilty plea to first-degree assault. The court exercised its discretion in the interest of justice and reduced the prison term to seven years while leaving the five-year period of postrelease supervision intact. The court cited sentencing excessiveness principles and People v Suitte in concluding the original nine-year term was greater than warranted and therefore modified the sentence accordingly.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the defendant Kwauhuru Govan’s convictions for second-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping following a jury trial. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient and not against the weight of the evidence, rejected constitutional and prosecutorial-misconduct claims as unpreserved or without merit, and found the defendant received effective assistance of counsel. The court relied on the criminalist’s testimony as independent analysis and declined to disturb the jury’s credibility determinations, thus affirming the trial court’s judgment and sentence.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a February 16, 2024 sentence imposed on Darius Drummond following his guilty plea. Drummond challenged the sentence as excessive, but the court held his appellate waiver was valid and therefore bars review of the sentencing claim. Relying on controlling precedent, the court concluded the waiver foreclosed his appeal and affirmed the judgment without reaching the merits of the excessiveness argument.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the defendant Nelson DeJesus's convictions for two counts of attempted first-degree assault and two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon following a jury trial and sentence. The court rejected the defendant's confrontation-clause challenge to admission of two DNA laboratory files and testimony because the testifying analyst generated and analyzed the relevant DNA profiles. The court also found trial counsel was not ineffective and declined to review other unpreserved issues in the interest of justice.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed four Supreme Court, Kings County judgments convicting Johnnie Corbett after his guilty pleas to various felonies and imposing sentences. The court held Corbett knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal, which bars review of his claim that the sentences were excessive and most ineffective-assistance claims. Corbett's challenge that his pleas were unknowing survived the waiver but was unpreserved and without merit based on the plea allocutions and record. The court therefore affirmed all four judgments.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the defendant Angel Berrios's conviction following his guilty plea to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and the sentence imposed by the Supreme Court, Kings County. The court rejected Berrios's challenge to the denial of his suppression motion because he had validly waived his right to appeal; that waiver bars appellate review of the suppression ruling. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the judgment without reaching the merits of the suppression claim.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment enforcing a 2016 judgment against B & A Demolition and related parties. The court dismissed appeals from two interlocutory orders as moot, modified the trial judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' veil-piercing claims, but affirmed the trial court's setting aside of two truck transfers as fraudulent under the Debtor and Creditor Law, and awarded costs to the defendants. The court found insufficient proof that the owner exercised complete domination to pierce the corporate veil, but sufficient evidence and badges of fraud to avoid certain transfers and recover attorneys' fees under the fraudulent conveyance statutes.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order (after reargument) granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' personal injury complaint. The court held the defendants had shown, as a matter of law, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d) and that the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of causation because their expert did not rebut defendants' evidence that the injuries were preexisting and degenerative. The court affirmed on the alternative ground of lack of causation, though it noted some triable issues as to certain injury categories before resolving causation against the plaintiffs.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court foreclosure judgment because the bank never obtained personal jurisdiction over the homeowner. Nationstar served the summons and complaint by leaving them with the homeowner's former attorney, who lacked authority to accept service. The court held the homeowner timely preserved the jurisdiction defense and that service on a former lawyer does not satisfy statutory service rules. Because service was defective, the foreclosure judgment, referee confirmation, and sale direction were vacated and the complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order granting Lalezarian Properties, LLC's motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's amended complaint in a slip-and-fall personal injury action. The plaintiff, a security guard who slipped on ice in an underground garage, sued the alleged property owner. The court held that Lalezarian showed it did not own, manage, operate, or control the property and thus cannot be liable for the hazardous condition, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The court therefore properly granted the defendant's motion upon reargument.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a Supreme Court order that had allowed Con-Kel Landscaping to reargue and then obtain summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claims. The plaintiff slipped on ice in an underground garage and sued Con-Kel, the snow-removal contractor. The appellate court held Con-Kel improperly raised for the first time on a reargument motion the argument that the plaintiff would be precluded from testifying (and thus could not make a case). Because reargument cannot present new legal theories or facts not previously offered, the reargument should have been denied and the grant of summary judgment vacated. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had denied a CPLR article 78 petition by the Westchester Plaza Tenants Coalition challenging DHCR determinations that upheld a Rent Administrator's decision permitting an owner to modify pool and related facilities. The court found the DHCR's conclusion that the pool was not an essential service was arbitrary and capricious because the record showed the landlord maintained the pool on May 29, 1974, and charging fees for club membership alone did not remove the facility from the regulatory definition of essential services. The matter is remitted to DHCR for a new determination consistent with the opinion.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order denying Margaret Liu’s motion to vacate a 2018 default judgment awarding Shau Chung Hu $1,480,636.50 in a hybrid proceeding seeking, among other relief, ownership and rescission relating to Lowbet Realty Corp. The Court held Liu’s CPLR 5015(a)(1) motion was untimely because it was made more than one year after service of the judgment, and that her claimed excuse—lack of personal service of the petition—failed because she had filed a notice of appearance and never challenged jurisdiction. The court also rejected relief under CPLR 317 because Liu had appeared in the action.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Family Court order modifying custody and access in related Family Court Act articles 6 and 8 proceedings. After a hearing and an in-camera interview with the child, the Family Court found the father committed assault in the third degree and menacing in the second and third degrees against the child, awarded the mother final decision-making authority, limited the father's parenting time to therapeutic supervised access, denied the father's cross-petition to change custody, and issued a two-year order of protection for the child. The appellate court found no deprivation of the father's right to counsel and found no reversible error.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Family Court order resolving where a child should attend school. The parents, who share joint legal custody and alternate weekly parenting time, could not agree on school district enrollment. After a hearing, Family Court granted the father's petition to enroll the child in the South Huntington Union Free School District and denied the mother's petition to enroll the child in the Hauppauge Union Free School District. The appellate court found the Family Court's best-interests determination had a sound and substantial basis, citing the child's benefit from a diverse environment and likely residential stability with the father.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed an amended Family Court order finding the mother neglected one child by inflicting excessive corporal punishment and derivatively neglected the other child. Appeals challenging the release of the children to the father and the dismissal of the mother's custody and visitation petitions were dismissed as academic because subsequent Virginia proceedings and the expiration of supervision rendered those parts moot. The court upheld the directive that the mother submit to a comprehensive mental health evaluation, finding it to be in the children's best interests and supported by the evidence and credibility findings below.

The Appellate Division, Second Department dismissed a CPLR article 78 proceeding brought by Simon Kinsella challenging a March 18, 2021 Public Service Commission determination that granted South Fork Wind, LLC a certificate for an offshore submarine export cable. The court granted motions by the Commission, Department of Public Service, and South Fork Wind to dismiss because the petitioner failed to timely join South Fork as a necessary party within the 30-day limitations period following the Commission’s final order. Because the defect was jurisdictional under the governing statute and precedent, the court dismissed the proceeding without costs.