Court Filings

The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court exceeded its authority by directing the Department of Corrections (DOC) to credit the defendant, Jonathan Lynn Stansell, with time served beginning January 26, 2022, for burglary and theft convictions where Stansell was not arrested on those charges until January 12, 2025. The court held the sentencing judge misdirected the correctional custodian because only the custodian/DOC computes credit for time served under state law. The panel vacated the portion of the sentencing orders that set the starting date for credit and remanded to remove that language.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendants' direct appeal in a dispossessory (eviction) matter for lack of jurisdiction. Realistry Acquisitions obtained de novo judgment and a writ of possession in superior court after the magistrate court dismissed the case. The defendants filed post-judgment motions that were denied, then filed a notice of appeal 15 days after entry of the superior court judgment. The Court of Appeals found the appeal defective because the defendants should have used discretionary-appeal procedures for de novo superior-court review and because the notice of appeal was untimely under the seven-day deadline for dispossessory appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Elizabeth Jordan’s pro se appeal from a September 11, 2025 trial-court order concerning contempt and attorney-fee rulings because Jordan was still represented by counsel when she filed her notice of appeal. The court explained that a litigant cannot both proceed pro se and be represented by an attorney, and that a counsel withdrawal must be ordered by the trial court before a pro se filing can be effective. Because Jordan’s pro se notice of appeal was therefore a nullity, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to withdraw the appeal in case A26A0693, Ralph Van Pelt, Jr. v. Community and Southern Bank (successor to First National Bank of Georgia). The court released jurisdiction back to the trial court upon issuance of the order. The decision is administrative and dispositional: the appeal was terminated at the appellant's request and control over the case returned to the lower court.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by Tyrone Eric Taylor-Shorter challenging a trial court’s orders in a child support action brought by the Georgia Department of Human Services. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because appeals in domestic relations matters, including actions to establish parental support obligations, must be pursued by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Because Taylor-Shorter did not follow the discretionary-appeal procedure, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits of his challenges.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Sonya Chandler Anderson's appeal for failure to prosecute. The appellant did not comply with the Court's notice of docketing or Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) requiring an enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days of docketing, nor with a subsequent order to file those documents by April 27, 2026. Because the required filings were not received, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and ordered it dismissed under applicable Court of Appeals rules.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Sandra Capouch’s appeal from a trial court order that granted defendants’ motion to open default and motion to dismiss. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Capouch filed her notice of appeal 34 days after the trial court’s October 29, 2025 order, but Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days. The court relied on the filing deadline statute and precedent holding timely filing is an absolute jurisdictional requirement, and it accepted the clerk’s endorsement as the operative filing date.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jerome Locke’s appeal challenging the trial court’s dismissal of his 2024 request for credit for time served. Locke had pled guilty in 2018 and was sentenced to 20 years with 12 to be served in confinement. The trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the Department of Corrections computes credit under OCGA § 17-10-12. The Court of Appeals held the appeal improper because the correct remedy is a mandamus action against prison officials; a motion filed in the criminal case is a nullity and not appealable.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant Hardy Foods, LLC's motion to withdraw its appeal in the case against Mackenzie Morgan. The court released jurisdiction back to the trial court effective upon receipt of the order, meaning the appellate matter is terminated and further proceedings will occur in the trial court. The decision is procedural: the court accepted the voluntary withdrawal and took no action on the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the City of Sandy Springs' motion to withdraw its appeal in the case against the City of Atlanta. By allowing withdrawal, the Court released jurisdiction back to the trial court effective upon receipt of this order. The document is a short procedural court order effectuating the appellant's request rather than a merits decision.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed Deair R. Wray’s convictions for murder, felonious assault, and improperly discharging a firearm after a jury trial in Summit County. The court reviewed Wray’s four assignments of error — sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight, jury-question instruction, and speedy-trial claim — and found no reversible error. The court held the testimony of cooperating witnesses, GPS ankle-monitor data, victim and neighbor testimony, and other evidence permitted the jury to find Wray was the shooter. The court found counsel waived the speedy-trial claim and that credibility disputes did not merit reversal.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Summit County Common Pleas Court's judgment against Dezmond Gainer. Gainer pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea deal to trafficking in cocaine with forfeiture specifications and possession of a fentanyl-related compound; other charges were dismissed. After sentencing to 5 to 7.5 years and forfeiture orders, Gainer obtained leave for a delayed appeal. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding no nonfrivolous issues exist and moved to withdraw; Gainer indicated he prefers to raise an ineffective-assistance claim in post-conviction proceedings. The appellate court independently reviewed the record, found no meritorious direct-appeal issues, granted counsel's motion, and affirmed.

The court affirmed Thurmell Maley’s conviction for public indecency after a bench trial where an officer observed her with her pants and underwear pulled down, urinating at a busy bus stop. The officer’s testimony and body-worn camera showed her exposed buttocks in an area with heavy pedestrian and vehicle traffic, satisfying the statute’s requirement that the conduct was likely to be viewed by and affront others. Because the trial court’s journal entry mistakenly listed the offense as a third-degree misdemeanor, the case is remanded for a clerical correction to reflect a fourth-degree misdemeanor conviction.

The Ohio First District Court of Appeals affirmed Demarius Jester’s conviction for resisting arrest (R.C. 2921.33(A)). The municipal court struck Jester’s motion to suppress as untimely; the appellate court held that striking the motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion because the motion was filed after the Crim.R. 12(D) deadline and the State’s late disclosure of additional body-worn camera footage occurred after the motion was filed. The court also upheld admission of an officer’s testimony about computer-generated warrant information as non-hearsay evidence of the officer’s belief, and found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

The court affirmed the municipal-court judgments dismissing misdemeanor charges against Darryl Brown because his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. Brown was arrested November 8, 2024; discovery problems (a missing 9-1-1 call) and the State’s delayed response led to multiple continuances and a motion to compel. The trial court found the State caused significant delay, sanctioned the State, and ultimately dismissed the complaints after calculating that more than 90 days had run. The appellate court held the continuances necessitated by the State’s discovery failures were chargeable to the State and affirmed.

The First District Court of Appeals dismissed Charles Greenlee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Greenlee, a pro se incarcerated litigant, had sought relief under Civ.R. 60(B) from a March 3, 2025 trial-court dismissal of his claims against Walmart, arguing his amended complaint should have been deemed filed earlier under the prison-mailbox rule. The appeals court held the March 3 dismissal was not a final order because it left claims against municipal defendants pending and did not include a Civ.R. 54(B)/54(B)/no-just-reason-for-delay certification; therefore the trial court’s April 24 denial of his motion was not appealable.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments against Samantha Huff. Huff had pleaded guilty in three consolidated Richland County cases (drug possession, failure to comply with police, and OVI) and later admitted violations of community control after pleading guilty to a first-degree heroin possession charge. She argued her plea was involuntary because she had professed innocence and the court failed to perform an enhanced inquiry for an Alford plea, and that the probation violation was unsupported. The appellate court found the record showed a knowing, voluntary plea with a factual basis and sufficient evidence to revoke community control, so it affirmed.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s orders adopting an independent auditor’s recommendations about the Power-Purchase-Agreement (PPA) Rider for AEP Ohio for 2018–2019. OCC and OMAEG argued the commission erred in finding the PPA Rider costs prudent, violated due process by denying a subpoena for a commission staff member, and applied the wrong standard for auditor independence. The Court held the commission reasonably credited evidence that a must-run strategy for OVEC coal units was prudent when chosen, that denial of the subpoena did not prejudice the parties because other witnesses covered the issues, and that the commission properly found no undue influence on the auditor.

The Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s denial of pretrial release for Toni R. Kelly, who was charged with multiple methamphetamine delivery offenses. The trial court found Kelly dangerous and concluded no conditions could mitigate the threat. The appellate court held the lower court erred because the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that no combination of conditions (for example, inpatient treatment followed by GPS/home confinement) could mitigate any danger. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine appropriate conditions of release.

The Appellate Division reviewed consolidated appeals by Allstate and GEICO from interlocutory orders that allowed plaintiffs to pursue common-law bad faith and statutory Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA) claims while their underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage disputes remained unresolved. Allstate's appeal was dismissed as moot after the UIM coverage dispute was resolved. As to GEICO, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying GEICO's request to sever and stay discovery on plaintiff Cirelli's bad faith and IFCA claims until the UIM coverage dispute was resolved, because proceeding with expansive bad-faith discovery prematurely would be inefficient and potentially prejudicial. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with that ruling.

The Appellate Division reversed part of a divorce judgment that enforced a 2015 postnuptial agreement and remitted the case for a hearing. The defendant had sought to set aside the agreement, alleging limited English, that his lawyer did not review the document and was later disbarred for fraud, and that he thought he was signing a business document. The appellate court found triable issues about whether the agreement was fair and about the circumstances of its execution, so the trial court's denial without a hearing could not stand and a new hearing is required to determine whether the postnuptial agreement should be set aside.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment in a contract and related action arising from the 2016 sale of a gas station business. The court modified the trial judgment to declare that plaintiff Yong Xu does not own an interest in defendant 401 Foster Gasoline, Inc., and awarded Xu $60,625.63 on his conversion claim against co-defendant Xiao Yan Wang for withdrawing funds from a joint bank account. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The court relied on the asset purchase agreement's clear written terms and the parol evidence rule to reject oral-contract and fraud claims, but found evidence supported Xu's conversion claim against Wang as to funds taken beyond her one-half share of the joint account.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Supreme Court and granted defendant Joan Crema-Samalya's pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against her. The plaintiff sued Crema-Samalya after property restoration work allegedly performed by Five Boro Fire Restoration was found deficient, asserting claims for violation of General Business Law § 349 and fraud. The appellate court held the complaint failed to plead any materially misleading consumer-oriented conduct under GBL § 349 and did not plead fraud with the required particularity, so dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) was appropriate.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence defenses in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff had asserted his vehicle was stopped for about 10 seconds at a red light when the defendants' vehicle struck him from behind. The court found that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a presumption of negligence by the rear driver, and the defendants failed to present admissible evidence of a non-negligent explanation (such as an unanticipated brake failure), so the plaintiff met his prima facie burden.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division reversed a medical-malpractice judgment for a child born extremely premature after concluding the trial court erred by allowing a neurologist to testify that the defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the mother's preterm labor caused the child's later autism. Applying New York's Frye standard, the court held the proffered causation theory rested on observational associations and speculative inference rather than generally accepted scientific principles linking prematurity or low birth weight to autism. Because that testimony was improperly admitted, the court ordered a new trial and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal as academic.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims for specific performance, fraud, and tortious interference and denied the plaintiff's summary judgment motions. The court found that the seller (Gholis) showed it was ready, willing, and able to close by producing a title policy and that the buyer (Scott Randolph, LLC) defaulted by failing to appear at the time-of-the-essence closing, so Gholis may retain the down payment. The court also found Bushwack and Stellberger entitled to dismissal of the fraud and interference claims because key events occurred after the plaintiff sought to terminate the contract.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted Drexel University's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claim against Drexel. The plaintiff was injured at his employer's workplace when equipment fell from a forklift operated by two Drexel students participating in Drexel's cooperative education program. The court held Drexel did not exercise sufficient control over the students' work or conduct to be vicariously liable as an employer or principal, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of Rosario's wrongful-death, fraud, and civil-conspiracy claims against the Town and Village of Mount Kisco. The plaintiff alleged the municipality failed to enforce housing regulations after her adult son died in a basement fire in an illegally converted apartment. The court held the complaint did not plead a special relationship between the municipality and decedent, did not identify a private right of action under the cited statutes, and failed to allege facts showing voluntary assumption of duty, affirmative control, justifiable reliance, or municipal participation in fraud or a conspiracy.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had granted summary judgment to Remede Consulting Group on damages against employee-defendant Jason Pitter for misuse of a corporate credit card. The court affirmed that Remede proved Pitter's liability on breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty because Pitter had received the corporate card policy, acknowledged it, and used the card for personal expenses without raising a triable issue of authorization. However, the appellate court held the plaintiff did not establish a precise, uncontested sum owed, so summary judgment on damages awarding $135,246.77 was denied and the judgment was reversed on that point.