Court Filings

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Suffolk County Comptroller in an action converted from a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The court held that Suffolk County may assess hotel and motel occupancy taxes under chapter 523, article II of the Suffolk County Code on the plaintiff’s Fire Island rental property for stays of under 30 consecutive days. The court reasoned that the state enabling statute grants broad authority to impose an occupancy tax and that the statutory and local definitions of “hotel or motel” are sufficiently broad to include the plaintiff’s short-term rentals.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the trial court's March 7, 2022 order granting defendant Dr. Cassandra B. Simmons summary judgment and dismissing the medical malpractice and lack-of-informed-consent claims against her. The court concluded Simmons met her initial burden by submitting expert affirmation, records, and depositions showing no departure from the standard of care and that she disclosed risks, benefits, and alternatives. The plaintiff's opposing expert was deemed conclusory, speculative, and failed to address Simmons's expert's specific assertions, so no triable issue of fact was shown.

The Appellate Division affirmed a jury verdict and judgment awarding Lueray Dowdy damages for injuries from a slip-and-fall at the Brooklyn Hospital Center cafeteria. The jury found the hospital 60% at fault and the plaintiff 40% at fault, and awarded substantial sums for past and future pain and suffering and future medical expenses. The court rejected the hospital's posttrial challenges to the liability finding, fault apportionment, damages awards, and request for a collateral source hearing, but it modified the judgment to delete a provision directing payment of an attorney fee directly from the defendant to the plaintiff's counsel.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's order denying the defendants' motion to vacate a May 25, 2023 judgment and an August 22, 2022 stipulation of settlement in favor of Diesel Funding, LLC. The dispute arose from a receivables-purchase agreement where the lender purchased future receivables for $850,000 and could debit daily sales until receiving $1,274,150; parties later agreed to a settlement that allowed the plaintiff to enter judgment on default. The court concluded the transaction was not a usurious loan because repayment was not absolutely fixed and the agreement included daily-percentage payments, reconciliation procedures, and no finite term or bankruptcy-triggered default.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's order granting the City of New York's motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal-injury claim. The plaintiff said she tripped in a pothole in a crosswalk; the City showed it had no prior written notice of the specific defect under the City's Pothole Law. The court found the Big Apple map entries did not put the City on notice of a defect at the exact location of the fall, and the plaintiff did not raise a triable issue that the City created the defect or that an exception applied.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order denying Brooklyn 7 Realty, Inc.'s late renewal motion to reopen and vacate a 2019 foreclosure judgment. Brooklyn 7 sought leave in 2023 to renew its opposition to confirmation of a referee's report, to vacate the foreclosure and dismiss the complaint as time-barred, or to amend its answer to assert a statute-of-limitations defense. The court held the renewal motion was untimely because it was made long after the judgment was entered and after the deadline to appeal had passed, so the lower court properly denied the motion without reaching the parties' other arguments.

The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' consolidated personal-injury claims against defendant Montgomery Realty Associates. After a liability trial, the jury found for Montgomery; the plaintiffs moved to set aside that verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, but the trial court denied the motion. The appellate court held there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict because the fire resulted from the contractor's means and methods (use of a torch) rather than a defective condition of the building, so the landlord was not liable as a matter of law under the general rule for independent contractors and applicable exceptions did not apply.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's January 22, 2024 order in a mortgage foreclosure action brought by Bank of America against Muhammad and Zubaida Sarwar. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment on the complaint as to the Sarwars, struck two affirmative defenses/counterclaims alleging a fraud/conspiracy and that bank employees facilitated illegal activity, and ordered reference. The appellate court agreed that Muhammad was precluded from testifying because he failed to complete his deposition as directed, declined to consider his affidavit, and found the defendants failed to raise a triable issue that the named bank employees had actual or apparent authority to bind the bank. Costs were awarded to the bank.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a lower court judgment that Amtrust North America must defend Authority Fleet Services and related plaintiffs in an underlying personal-injury lawsuit arising from a September 30, 2022 construction accident. The court held that the underlying complaint, liberally construed, reasonably suggested a possibility of coverage under the employer's workers' compensation and employers' liability policy, triggering the insurer's broader duty to defend. Because Amtrust failed to show there was no possible factual or legal basis for indemnity, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment requiring Amtrust to defend the insureds.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal of Mansoor Alam's claim against the State of New York. Alam had sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for intentional infliction of emotional distress after New York City Department of Social Services accepted his Medicaid application but required a monthly spenddown, which he said left him unable to cover living expenses. The court held the claim necessarily required review of an administrative agency determination and therefore fell outside the Court of Claims' subject-matter jurisdiction; such challenges must be pursued in Supreme Court by an Article 78 proceeding.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of the defendants' motion to vacate a default judgment and for a protective order. The plaintiff obtained a judgment after the defendants failed to appear or oppose a summary-judgment-in-lieu-of-complaint motion seeking rent and damages under a commercial lease and guaranty. The defendants later moved under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the November 2020 judgment and under CPLR 5240 to vacate restraining notices on bank accounts; the court found their excuses for default unreasonable and declined to disturb the restraining notices because they were needed to secure enforcement of the judgment.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reviewed Jason M. Rivera’s pro se appeal from a decision by the Circuit Court for Manatee County. After considering the record and briefs, the panel issued a per curiam decision affirming the lower court’s judgment. The opinion contains no extended written reasoning and simply affirms the trial court decision. All three judges concurred and the mandate leaves the trial court’s ruling in place.

The District Court of Appeal, Second District of Florida, affirmed the circuit court's decision in a case brought by Nancy M. Gavrilis, as personal representative of the Estate of John Monteforte, and intervenor Stylianos Gavrilis, against appellee Sabrina Hayes. The appeal challenged the lower court's ruling; the appellate panel issued a short per curiam opinion simply stating 'Affirmed.' No opinion text explaining reasoning or issues is included in the document, and the judges concurred. The decision leaves the circuit court's judgment intact.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's decision in a civil dispute between appellant Katalin Fodor and appellee Krisztian Gonda. The appeal was taken to the district court from the Pinellas County Circuit Court, and the appellate panel, writing per curiam, concluded that the lower court's ruling should stand. No extended opinion, reasoning, or factual discussion was provided in the published disposition beyond the court's one-line affirmance and concurrence by the three judges.

The appellate court reviewed an appeal by Stephanie Candace Moure Cramer from a Sarasota County circuit court decision in a dispute against Brendan Walker. The Second District issued a brief per curiam opinion on April 29, 2026, concluding only that the lower court's judgment should be affirmed. No published reasoning, factual background, or legal analysis appears in the opinion beyond the single-word disposition and concurrence by all three judges, and the opinion is subject to revision before official publication.

The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the county court's decision in favor of Hillsborough County Animal Control. Maurice F. Bayless, appearing pro se, appealed a county court judgment; the appeals court reviewed the matter and concluded there was no reversible error. The per curiam opinion provided no extended discussion and simply affirmed the lower court's ruling, with judges Morris, Atkinson, and Labrit concurring. No detailed factual or legal reasoning appears in the published entry.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a County Court decision in a case between appellant Shella Lucien and appellee Pablo Martinez Ruiz. The appellate court, writing per curiam, concluded that Lucien failed to provide an adequate record for appellate review. Citing Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, the court explained that without a sufficient record it cannot resolve factual disputes or determine that the trial judge misapplied the law, so reversal is not warranted.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in a civil case between appellant Kazi Ahmed and appellee Krzysztof Duszka. The appeal arose from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, and both parties appeared pro se. The per curiam opinion is brief and simply states the appeal is affirmed without published reasoning in the opinion. The ruling is subject to possible change if a timely motion for rehearing is filed.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a non-final circuit court order in a civil case where appellant Fernando Costantini Gomes sought to pursue punitive damages under Florida’s vulnerable-adult statutes. The panel held that the statutory framework permits a vulnerable adult to recover actual and punitive damages for abuse, neglect, or exploitation, but a plaintiff must make a reasonable showing in the record (or by proffer) that the defendant’s conduct amounted to intentional misconduct or gross negligence to justify punitive damages. Applying those standards, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a dispute between Emilie Gonzalez and others (appellants) and Maria Del Pilar Alvarez (appellee). The appellate court concluded the record was insufficient to overturn the lower court and deferred to the trial judge's exercise of discretion. Citing precedent, the court explained that without a trial record the appellate court cannot resolve factual disputes or find an abuse of discretion, so the lower court's ruling stands.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a non-final circuit court order in a civil case between appellant Carlos A. Zarraluqui and appellees Fetes & Events, Inc., et al. The appeal arose from a 2023 Miami-Dade County proceeding and was argued by counsel for both sides. The appellate court issued a brief per curiam decision, simply stating 'Affirmed,' without published opinion or extended reasoning in this document. The judgment affirms the lower court's non-final ruling, and the mandate will follow after disposition of any timely motion for rehearing.

The appellate court reviewed Marie Fleurima's appeal from a Broward County circuit court final judgment. Because Fleurima did not provide a trial transcript and the offered statement of the evidence lacked the trial court's required approval under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(5), the Fourth District limited its review to errors apparent on the face of the final judgment and found none. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment. The opinion cites Edman v. Edman as controlling precedent and notes the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Christopher Garner’s writ petition after the California Victim Compensation Board rejected his request for compensation under Penal Code section 4900. Garner had his 2007 murder conviction vacated and resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6, and he sought compensation for time served beyond the revised sentence. The Board denied the claim because Garner did not allege an "erroneous conviction" as required by section 4900 — his original conviction was lawful under the law in effect at the time — and the Board permissibly used a regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 642) to screen and dismiss legally deficient claims without a hearing. The court held the statute and regulation were correctly applied and valid.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court award of attorney fees to environmental group Raptors Are the Solution under California’s private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5). Raptors sued the Department of Pesticide Regulation over its renewals and reevaluation decisions for certain rodenticides. Two trade associations (CropLife and RISE) intervened to defend the Department and were held jointly and severally liable for fees along with other defending parties. The appellate court found the associations had asserted direct pecuniary interests when seeking intervention, actively participated in the litigation, and therefore qualified as opposing parties eligible to share fee liability. The court also upheld the trial court’s fee calculation and refusal to apportion liability among defenders.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County trial court’s grant of summary judgment to BMI Federal Credit Union and its award of attorney fees after Carl Medley sued over the repossession and sale of his Audi. The trial court found Medley’s claims—fraud, waiver based on prior acceptance of late payments, emotional distress, and punitive damages—unsupported by admissible evidence, and granted BMI its deficiency, fees, and costs. The appellate court agreed that the loan’s anti-waiver language allowed BMI to accept late payments without forfeiting its rights, that BMI validly repossessed and sold the vehicle, and that Medley failed to rebut BMI’s evidence.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed a municipal-court judgment awarding William R. Meek $4,160 against Gino Collins for an incomplete fence installation and return of materials. Collins appealed pro se arguing the damages award lacked competent proof and was against the weight of the evidence. The appeals court held Collins failed to provide a transcript or an approved substitute of the bench hearing, so the court could not review the factual record and must presume the trial court acted properly. For that reason the appellate court affirmed the judgment.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the municipal court’s rulings that tenants Nedra Bloor and Wayne Reed could deposit rent with the clerk and that the escrowed rent should not be released to landlord Alan Barnes. The tenants had notified Barnes of multiple repair issues (roof leaks, mold, loose fixtures, exposed wiring, floor problems) and deposited rent after giving notice. The trial court found the tenants were current on rent when they initiated escrow and that Barnes failed to remedy the conditions. The appeals court upheld the credibility findings and applied Ohio landlord-tenant statutes to affirm the return of the escrowed funds to the tenants.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of plaintiff Moises Ramirez's motion for partial summary judgment on a Labor Law § 240(1) claim against 2500 Webb LLC. The court found that genuine issues of fact remained about which object struck the plaintiff (horizontal versus vertical pipe/post), whether that object was a target of disassembly when the injury occurred, and whether a safety device was available that would have prevented the accident. Because these disputed facts are material to liability under Labor Law § 240(1), summary judgment was properly denied.

The First Department unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's order dismissing Yolanda Murray's complaint against Planned Parenthood as time-barred and for failure to state a viable claim. The court held Murray's claims arising from alleged 1996 misconduct did not fall within the Adult Survivors Act because the complaint did not allege criminal conduct enumerated by that statute, and the Child Victims Act revival window had already closed. The court also found that, even on the merits, Murray failed to plead facts showing Planned Parenthood's knowledge of the provider's dangerous propensities, control over the local affiliate, or any valid alter-ego theory, and there was no evidence of judicial bias.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Harvey's personal-injury complaint arising from a May 2020 motor vehicle accident. Defendants (the New York Foundling Hospital and others) presented expert reports and MRI comparisons showing plaintiff's cervical, lumbar, and right-shoulder conditions were preexisting, chronic, and degenerative from a prior March 30, 2019 crash, not caused by the 2020 accident. The court held plaintiff's expert failed to meaningfully dispute the prior-accident causation, so she could not meet the statutory threshold for a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d).