Court Filings

The Texas Court of Appeals (First District) denied Kevin Henry's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial court order that granted an opponent's motion to compel discovery in a pending civil case (Derrick Dees v. Kevin Henry et al.). The appellate court concluded mandamus relief was not warranted and dismissed any outstanding motions as moot. The opinion is a short per curiam memorandum without extended factual or legal discussion, and it leaves the trial court's order intact.

The Texas First Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Anant Kumar Tripati challenging a trial court order that granted a motion to dismiss in an underlying suit against YESCARE Corp. and others. The appellate court concluded mandamus relief was not warranted and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The opinion is brief and issued per curiam, listing the underlying district-court cause and judge but providing no extended reasoning or factual detail.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Esdras Pineda’s suit against his workers’ compensation carrier, National Specialty Insurance Company, and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had granted the insurer’s plea to the jurisdiction, finding Pineda’s pro se petition did not show he exhausted administrative remedies or identify the appeals-panel decisions that aggrieved him. The appeals court held the defects in Pineda’s petition were curable because the insurer’s plea and attached evidence showed Pineda had appealed the administrative law judge’s decisions to the appeals panel and that the appeals panel allowed those decisions to become final, so Pineda should be allowed to amend his pleadings.

The First District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s rulings in favor of the lender (Cardinal) and the appraisal company (CFour). Gaston bought a house that had a septic tank and well, but the appraisal incorrectly listed public water and sewer. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cardinal and CFour and Cardinal later nonsuited its third-party and cross claims. The appellate court held Gaston failed to raise a fact issue on negligent misrepresentation because she could not justifiably rely on the appraisal: seller disclosures, FHA/HUD warnings, the appraisal’s stated intended user (the lender), and Gaston’s own home inspection undercut her reliance claim. The court also held the nonsuit was effective when filed and did not prejudice other parties.

The Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a trial court order that granted Tonya Hill’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Steven and Rayma Benedict’s petition to modify the parent-child relationship. Because the trial court’s order did not address Hill’s separate request for attorney’s fees and expressly stated it was making no ruling on relief requested by Hill, the appellate court found the order’s finality ambiguous. The appellate court therefore abated and remanded the case to the trial court for clarification or entry of a final order and set a deadline for supplemental records to be filed in the appellate court.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a of a private-nuisance lawsuit filed by nearby landowners seeking injunctive relief and damages to stop construction and operation of a planned 200-megawatt lithium-ion battery storage facility on neighboring property. The court held the landowners’ pleading—alleging imminent risk from thermal-runaway fires, inadequate local emergency response, factual allegations of lease and tax-abatement steps, and concrete threats of harm—sufficient to state a cognizable negligence-based nuisance claim and to seek prospective injunctive relief. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied a petition asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus to control proceedings in a Travis County case. The court also lifted a previously entered stay of the underlying trial-court proceedings. The court issued a short memorandum opinion denying relief under the appellate rules and returning the case to the trial-court process, without further comment or substantive analysis in this brief disposition.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, Texas) reviewed sanctions entered against Genevieve Glasgow in a post-divorce civil case brought against her former husband. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in awarding monetary attorney’s fees because the evidence did not meet the required showing of reasonable and necessary fees, reversed the portion awarding fees, affirmed the remaining sanctions (including dismissal with prejudice of remaining claims), and remanded solely for redetermination of attorney’s fees. The court found the declarations and spreadsheets submitted did not detail particular services, who performed them, when, or the time reasonably required.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal filed on behalf of corporate entities because a nonlawyer cannot represent entities in court. After notifying the parties that an attorney must represent the corporations, counsel who filed an amended notice of appeal withdrew and no new attorney entered an appearance or filed a brief. The court concluded the entities failed to comply with directives to obtain counsel and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court orders.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal on April 9, 2026. Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. initially appealed a trial-court judgment but later obtained full relief when the trial court granted its post-judgment omnibus motion and entered a take-nothing judgment; Rush Truck moved to dismiss its portion of the appeal, which the court granted. The court also dismissed Ronald Joe Andrus, Jr.’s portion of the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court directives after his counsel did not respond to requests, failed to pay filing fees, and failed to request or pay for the clerk’s record.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal by Robert Berleth and his firm challenging the trial court’s denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under Texas Rule 91a. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because Berleth, a court‑appointed turnover receiver, is not a "governmental unit" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 51.014(a)(8) and 101.001(3), so he cannot bring an interlocutory appeal. The court relied on statutory text and precedent distinguishing uniquely governmental organs from privately appointed receivers whose authority is limited to satisfying a specific judgment.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order admitting Kara Watson’s will to probate as a muniment of title. The will was offered about nine years after Kara’s 2014 death; an interested party argued the proponent was in default for failing to probate within the four-year statutory period. After a bench trial the court found the proponent, Kara’s daughter Mary Gale, exercised reasonable diligence and had valid excuses (including caregiving duties, serious health problems, and lack of awareness of the need to probate). The appellate court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support that finding and affirmed.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals granted a joint motion by AusPro Enterprises, L.P. and MMK Holdings, L.P. (doing business as Planet K) and the City of Cedar Park to abate (pause) the appeal for 30 days so the parties can finalize a settlement that requires city council approval. The court ordered the parties to file either a motion to dismiss, a motion to reinstate, or a status report (or a motion to extend the abatement) by May 8, 2026. The appeal remains abated until further court order.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of appellants' request for a second temporary injunction seeking to stop the homeowners association's election to amend its declaration to allow sale of a subdivision park. Appellants (residents) had a prior temporary injunction preventing sale of Thrush Ridge Park and sued for declaratory and injunctive relief; the Association held an election and appellants sought to enjoin it. The appeals court concluded the record lacked the evidentiary exhibits from the injunction hearing, so the appellants failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ra Hermes Velthra’s appeal challenging a trial court’s finding that he could pay court costs. Velthra sought review under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g) after a February 26, 2026 hearing, but the appellate court concluded Rule 145(g) does not permit a standalone interlocutory appeal. The court ordered Velthra to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he submitted the indigency order but no final judgment in the underlying case. Lacking jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal on April 8, 2026.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance and dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The suit arose after a Washington resident insured by an Ohio-based, non-Texas-licensed insurer was injured in San Antonio and sued in Texas over denial of underinsured motorist benefits. The court held Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice, so Texas courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate the contract dispute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Joy Cherie Kilgore’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief related to an underlying case in Bexar County District Court. The court considered Kilgore’s petition and an incorporated emergency motion for temporary relief filed April 6, 2026, and concluded she was not entitled to mandamus relief under the Texas appellate rules. Because the requested extraordinary relief was denied, the court also denied the emergency motion as moot. No written opinion explaining detailed reasoning was issued—this is a brief disposition under the appellate rules.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's civil commitment of Jose Arredondo, Jr. after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator. Arredondo appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a jury instruction telling jurors to treat expert testimony "just like any other testimony." The appellate court held the requested instruction would effectively single out the State's sole expert and thus improperly comment on the weight of the evidence, contrary to Davidson v. Wallingford and Texas procedural rules, so the refusal was not an abuse of discretion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case. The Lalondes sued to enforce a 2021 written agreement to buy a tract of land; Tortuga Ranch counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement was void or unenforceable. The appellate court held Tortuga Ranch could not obtain summary declaratory relief because its counterclaim was a mirror-image challenge duplicating the pending breach-of-contract suit, so Tortuga Ranch failed to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court also reversed the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees and declined to render partial summary judgment for the Lalondes because that relief would be interlocutory.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default divorce judgment that resolved conservatorship, possession and access to the parties’ child, child and spousal support, property division, and attorney’s fees. Christopher Carpenter filed a motion for new trial (or to reform the judgment) supported by his and his attorney’s affidavits explaining that an email of the petition failed to reach counsel, causing the missed answer. The court held that Christopher met the Craddock elements (excusable failure to answer, meritorious defense, and no unfair delay or prejudice) and concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion.

The court dismissed Bianca Fox's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fox, pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge a January 30, 2026 turnover order, but the clerk’s record contains only two interlocutory orders from that date — denial of her motion for protection and an order to comply with a subpoena — neither of which is an appealable final judgment or an authorized interlocutory appeal. The court gave Fox an opportunity to show cause why the appeal should proceed; she did not respond, so the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals granted appellant Todd Colter’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal against Ubican Global, Inc., because the parties settled. The court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and ordered that any other pending motions be dismissed as moot. No written opinion was issued; the panel issued a short per curiam memorandum disposing of the appeal on the agreed dismissal.

The First District of Texas dismissed Kenneth Steven Isbell’s appeal from a Harris County district court because he failed to pay or arrange payment for the clerk’s record fee and did not respond to the court’s notice that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring payment or arrangement and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, also denying as moot any pending motions. The decision was issued as a brief memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel.

The First District of Texas dismissed Dominique Cunningham’s appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of her suit against Justice of the Peace Steve Duble because Cunningham repeatedly failed to file an appellate brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court struck her noncompliant briefs, gave her opportunities and extensions to file a corrected brief, and found her March 16, 2026 submission still deficient in essential content and formatting. Because she failed to cure the briefing defects, the court struck the corrected brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Nikki Arnold’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County because she failed to file her appellate brief. The brief was due February 11, 2026; the court notified Arnold on February 18 that she had until March 2 to respond or face dismissal for want of prosecution. No brief or extension motion was filed, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Jillian Warren’s appeal for want of prosecution because she failed to file her appellant brief, which was originally due March 2, 2026, and did not respond to the court’s notice requiring a satisfactory response by March 23, 2026. The court invoked Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and entered dismissal on April 7, 2026. No substantive merits decision was reached because the appeal was dismissed for procedural noncompliance.