Court Filings

The Superior Court reversed a Philadelphia County trial court order that had denied Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick’s petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale of real property. The panel held that the restitution order imposed in Montgomery County remained a criminal sentencing matter under the sentencing court’s continuing jurisdiction and that the procedures in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728 vested the county clerk (not a private victim) with authority to transmit certified restitution judgments for docketing. Because the Philadelphia filing and resulting judgment were outside the authorized procedure and thus void ab initio, the court struck the Philadelphia judgment and reversed the denial of the petition to set aside the sale.

The Superior Court opinion (dissenting) addresses a dispute over a Philadelphia sheriff’s sale of property owned by Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick after a transferred civil judgment for restitution in favor of victim Otar Kosashvili. The Majority vacated the sale for jurisdictional defects; Judge Kunselman dissents and would have affirmed. He reasons that once a criminal restitution order is reduced to a civil judgment and entered by a prothonotary, the victim is the real party in interest and may transfer and enforce that judgment in another county. He also finds the Owners waived most procedural objections (notice, postponement, price) and that the record does not support setting aside the sale.

The Superior Court affirmed the Orphans’ Court decree that denied Jacob Singer’s petition to compel burial arrangements for his father, Irvin Michael Singer. The Orphans’ Court had stayed burial pending a hearing after Jacob alleged his brother and executor, David Singer, planned a private burial and excluded siblings. The Superior Court held that a valid will appointed David as executor and expressly directed burial in the family plot, and that Section 305 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code is subject to a decedent’s valid will. Because the will gave the executor authority over burial, Jacob’s majority-next-of-kin argument failed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a contract is governed by the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (HICPA), a consumer may rescind the home-improvement contract within three business days by giving actual notice of cancellation to the contractor even if that notice is not in writing. The Office of Attorney General sued Gillece for refusing to honor timely oral or other non-written cancellations; the trial court granted partial summary judgment and issued an injunction, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded HICPA’s specific, later-enacted consumer-protection rescission rule controls over any general written-notice language in the older UTPCPL.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Gillece’s argument that a consumer’s oral cancellation of a home-improvement contract is ineffective unless followed by written notice. The court concluded that the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law are meant to protect consumers, and that requiring written follow-up would undermine that purpose when a seller knows a consumer asked to cancel. The court therefore held sellers must honor an oral cancellation for contracts covered by the home‑improvement law and emphasized best practices of documenting cancellations in writing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order on April 30, 2026, resolving an appeal brought by Elliot-Todd Parker Koger and Todd Elliott Koger Sr. (the "Koger Family") against multiple state entities and officials including the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency and county court officers. The Supreme Court issued a short per curiam order that simply states the Commonwealth Court's decision is affirmed, without extended opinion or additional reasoning in this document. The procedural posture shows this appeal follows the Commonwealth Court's September 5, 2025 order in a matter previously litigated and identified at this Court's earlier docket entries.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court and trial court orders dismissing Clearfield County’s lawsuit against construction professionals as time-barred by the 12-year construction statute of repose, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536. The County argued the common-law doctrine nullum tempus (no time runs against the sovereign) should toll the repose period, but the Court held nullum tempus cannot be used to defeat a statute of repose. Because a statute of repose abolishes causes of action after a fixed period and is not subject to tolling, the County’s claims, filed decades after construction finished, were jurisdictionally barred.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision that the Borough of West Chester’s municipal “stream protection fee” is a local tax, not a fee for service. The Borough had enacted the charge to fund stormwater management and compliance with federal and state stormwater regulations; universities (PASSHE and West Chester University) challenged it as an unlawful tax on exempt entities or as an improper fee. The Court held the Borough acted in its public capacity, providing a general public benefit and lacking a voluntary contractual relationship with property owners, so the charge functions as a tax from which the universities are immune.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice in this concurring and dissenting opinion would reverse the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that West Chester Borough’s stormwater ‘‘stream protection fee’’ is a tax exempting the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (West Chester University). The justice reasons the University voluntarily uses the Borough stormwater system, receives a discrete benefit from that use, and therefore could be required to pay a fee rather than be immune as a sovereign entity. Because the Commonwealth Court did not analyze whether the charge is proportional to the benefit received, the justice would remand for further factual development on proportionality.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania justice concurs in part and dissents in part from the majority in an appeal by the Borough of West Chester concerning a municipal stormwater charge imposed on the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education and West Chester University. The justice agrees that the lower court correctly assigned the burden of proof to the Borough on cross-motions for summary judgment, but disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that the charge is a tax. The justice would hold the charge is a fee because it funds a service that benefits the University, can reasonably be allocated by impervious surface area, and may cover costs reasonably related to operating and maintaining stormwater management.

The appellate court reviewed a foreclosure action by Associated Bank against defendants including John Morrison. The court held that a 1995 quitclaim deed conveyed immediate title to Morrison and his siblings as tenants in common while reserving a life estate to the grantor, Rosa McShan. Because McShan had the authority to encumber only her life estate, the 2007 mortgage only attached to that life estate and was extinguished on her death. The court reversed the trial court’s grant of foreclosure and vacated related orders as to Morrison’s interest, but it affirmed denial of Morrison’s Consumer Fraud Act claim.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of defendant 494 Eighth Avenue LLC’s summary judgment motion in a personal-injury sidewalk-trip case. Plaintiff said she tripped on an uneven sidewalk near a disassembled police barricade and testified the height differential was about one to one-and-a-half inches. The court held the defendant failed to show the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law because the submitted photos and affidavit were inconclusive and the superintendent’s estimate was not a measured fact. Plaintiff’s testimony and possible violation of the NYC Administrative Code created questions of fact for trial.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's May 21, 2025 order and granted Mary Trump's motion to compel discovery from Donald Trump in a breach-of-settlement-agreement case. Mary Trump asserted an affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement based on alleged false asset valuations in a 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that because the requested materials relate to that affirmative defense they are discoverable under CPLR 3101(a), which requires liberal disclosure of matter material and necessary to prepare for trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower court order in a malpractice/insurance dispute. It dismissed the third cause of action against Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC) but otherwise affirmed denial of motions to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged facts supporting a punitive-damages demand against MLMIC and that the legal-malpractice claim against defense counsel Marshall Dennehey and Kevin Ryan should proceed because the complaint plausibly alleges breach of care and causation tied to a failure to inform the insured of settlement offers and a conflict of interest.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment after a nonjury trial in a lease dispute between Rose Group Park Avenue LLC (tenant) and Third Church Christ, Scientist of New York City (landlord). The court held that the lease's audit provisions limit the landlord to auditing only the prior lease year and bar audits seeking information from earlier years; directed certain payroll records be included in future audits; required return of the landlord's protested payment except for amounts the court found due from the tenant's affiliate; and upheld various declaratory and injunctive rulings concerning weekday use, occupancy rights, equipment use, alterations, signage, and auditorium setup. The court grounded its decision in the express lease language and prior appellate rulings interpreting those provisions.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment holding the plaintiff liable on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The plaintiff testified he slipped on gravel and fell into an unguarded trench up to 10–12 feet deep alongside a building foundation; the trench had a makeshift pathway but no guardrail. The court found this testimony uncontradicted and held defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact or justify the absence of a guardrail as necessary to the work. The judgment for plaintiff on liability was therefore upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a lower court order requiring petitioner Harold Peerenboom to reimburse Marvel Entertainment, LLC for reasonable production expenses incurred in responding to a subpoena. The court held that under New York's CPLR the party seeking discovery must pay a nonparty's reasonable production costs, and that such costs can include third-party vendor charges and attorneys' fees. The court also upheld the trial court's reductions to requested attorney rates and rejected petitioner's reliance on federal balancing tests and arguments that certain withholding-related costs were categorically unrecoverable.

The First Department unanimously affirmed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that required the Archdiocese of New York to produce certain documents (with specified redactions) and denied the Archdiocese's request to vacate that order or to obtain a protective order. The court held that evidence about the Archdiocese's patterns or practices in responding to allegations of clergy sexual abuse is discoverable because it could show a deliberate, repetitive practice of silencing accusations and therefore bear on the Archdiocese's negligence in the plaintiff's specific abuse claim. The appellate court rejected the Archdiocese's other arguments without discussion.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Gordon Grubb's slip-and-fall complaint against the City of New York. The City showed it lacked prior written notice of the specific dangerous condition at the Madison Avenue and East 52nd Street crosswalk as required by the New York City Administrative Code. The court held that the records plaintiff cited did not amount to a written acknowledgment of the particular defect and that plaintiff's allegations did not raise triable issues or satisfy exceptions to the written-notice rule, so dismissal was appropriate.

The First Department affirmed the trial court's posttrial dismissal of Forrest Equities' complaint seeking coverage under a title insurance policy issued by Old Republic. Plaintiffs bought a Bronx building after an explosion and alleged the insurer should cover losses from vacate orders, relocation and emergency repair liens, and related litigation. The court held the policy did not provide coverage because the alleged enforcement actions and liens were not recorded in the public recording system required by the policy, and a lis pendens or vacate order alone did not make title unmarketable. Contract terms and exclusions controlled.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a New York County Supreme Court order in a dispute over a loan agreement. The court held that plaintiff Arena Vantage stated breach of contract claims against guarantors but not against the Deal Agent (CoVenture — Vantage Credit Opportunities GP, LLC). The panel found the loan agreement expressly made the Deal Agent's enforcement duties discretionary and contingent on directions from the Required Lenders, so no mandatory contractual breach was alleged. By contrast, guarantors made unconditional payment promises, so the breach claim against them may proceed. The court otherwise affirmed the lower court's rulings.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's dismissal under CPLR 3211 of all claims in plaintiff Belina Anderson's complaint against multiple defendants. The court held Anderson's derivative claims failed because she did not plead a required pre-suit demand or futility, her individual fiduciary-duty and nuisance claims did not allege fraud, self-dealing, or unconscionability and were barred by the business judgment rule or arose from contract duties, and her declaratory-judgment and direct claims were speculative or lacked factual support. The court rejected Anderson's procedural challenge under CPLR 2219(a).

The First Department dismissed an appeal by defendant-appellant Danielle Statuto from a Supreme Court order that denied her CPLR 2221(d) motion for leave to reargue. The appellate court held the order denying reargument is not appealable as of right and declined to treat her notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal. The court cited precedent and distinguished circumstances where a notice may be converted into a leave application, finding no extraordinary circumstances here, and therefore dismissed the appeal as taken from a nonappealable paper.

The Appellate Division reversed part of Supreme Court's order and granted the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add a negligence claim against the school district. The plaintiff, a former student who was struck on the head in class in 2019, had sought to add negligence after depositions showed the teacher testified the contact was accidental. The trial court had denied the amendment as unexplained delay and prejudicial; the appellate court found no undue delay or surprise, held the proposed negligence claim was not plainly meritless, and concluded the district would not suffer the type of prejudice that justifies denial.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reviewed a combined CPLR article 78 petition and plenary action challenging a school board's termination of a bus driver, James Shara, and related claims of retaliatory discharge and constitutional violations. The court upheld Supreme Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss the retaliation claim under Civil Service Law § 75-b and the § 1983 due-process/freedom-of-association claim as sufficiently pleaded, and rejected the defendants' collateral estoppel argument because they did not provide the PERB record. But the court reversed as to claims brought against individual school officials, concluding plaintiff failed to plead their personal involvement. The order was otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of Gravity Ciders, Inc.'s pre-note-of-issue motions for summary judgment on three counterclaims. Gravity had asked the court to declare unenforceable a contract provision awarding Copeland Holdings a 5% ownership interest (plus another 5%) and to win on a conversion/replevin claim over a corporate book. The court found genuine factual disputes and legal issues (including whether Alcoholic Beverage Control Law provisions render the ownership-transfer clause void) that precluded summary judgment, and held return of the corporate book while the motion was pending defeated replevin but left conversion contested.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed part of a Court of Claims judgment and held that the State can be liable for the alleged rectal intrusion by correction officers. Claimant had been allowed to file a late claim for assault and battery but the Court of Claims declined to consider sexualized conduct under the law of the case. This Court found that the law of the case did not bind it and that the alleged rectal intrusion was sufficiently connected to officers' duties to survive the late‑claim screening and to support vicarious liability. The case is remitted for recalculation of damages.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed part of a Supreme Court order that had denied a nursing assistant's motion to compel two internal incident reports (RL6 forms) and granted the hospital a protective order. The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination and retaliation after reporting safety concerns. The court held the hospital failed to carry its burden to show the reports were privileged under New York Education Law § 6527(3) or the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, because there was no proof the reports were actually part of a medical peer‑review or submitted to a patient safety organization. The case was otherwise affirmed.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed Woodforest National Bank's appeal from a final judgment because the bank failed to pay required filing fees and failed to arrange or pay for the clerk's record. The court repeatedly notified the appellant, sent invoices and a certified bill of costs, and warned the appeal would be dismissed if fees were not paid or arrangements made. The appellant did not respond or show indigency, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the applicable appellate rules.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment for county officials. Plaintiff Nelson sought mandamus and declaratory relief to force Polk County officials to assign 911 addresses and a street name for lots in his subdivision, claiming a statutory exemption from platting and that officials acted unlawfully. The appellate court held Nelson failed to plead or prove he submitted the required plat, exemption request, or addressing application (or that officials denied one), so he did not show officials failed to perform any ministerial duty. Because governmental immunity was not waived, the court dismissed his claims.