Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for ISI Contracting, Inc. in Robert Huber’s trespass suit arising from a TxDOT highway project adjacent to Huber’s restaurant. ISI had claimed immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 97.002, arguing it complied with contract documents. The appellate court held ISI failed to conclusively prove every statutory element: Huber sought loss-of-use and lost-profit damages not barred by the statute, some alleged harms arose from ISI’s activities rather than a contract-related condition or defect, and ISI did not conclusively show compliance with contract documents material to any alleged condition or defect. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals of the Ninth District of Texas affirmed a county court’s final eviction judgment for landlord Matthew Twombly against pro se tenant Marcus Thirstrup. Thirstrup appealed the denial of his emergency motion for continuance filed the day of trial, claiming a medical inability to appear. The appellate court found the notice of appeal timely and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion because Thirstrup knew of his condition days earlier, failed to timely seek relief, did not contact the court, and did not appear at trial. A due-process challenge to the docket control order was not preserved for appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for AZZ, Inc. in a breach-of-contract case. Southeast Texas Industries (STI) sued multiple AZZ entities for defective galvanizing and obtained a jury verdict and judgment against AZZ, Inc. for $4,539,468.25 plus fees and interest. On appeal AZZ, Inc. argued there was no evidence it was the entity that contracted with STI. The court held the evidence was legally insufficient to show AZZ, Inc. (rather than the Beaumont galvanizing entity) agreed to galvanize the pipe, so the verdict against AZZ, Inc. could not stand and STI takes nothing from AZZ, Inc.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Adelide Perez Ybarra’s appeal of the denial of her petition for expunction because she failed to file the required docketing statement and failed to pay the $205 filing fee despite being notified twice and given deadlines. The clerk first warned her that both were due by March 2, 2026; after noncompliance the clerk extended a final deadline of March 16, 2026. Because neither requirement was satisfied, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow the clerk’s directives.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Johnny Lamonte Phillips’s appeal for want of prosecution because he failed to pay the required clerk’s record costs and filing fee and did not make payment arrangements or respond to the court’s notices. The clerk’s record was due December 22, 2025, but was not filed. The court notified Phillips in March 2026 about unpaid clerk’s-record costs and earlier instructed him in January and February 2026 to remit a $205 filing fee; he did not comply within the time allowed, so the court dismissed the appeal under its rules.

The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rockport-Fulton Independent School District (RFISD). Don Jackson Construction appealed after RFISD sought a declaratory judgment that it retained governmental immunity from Don Jackson’s contract and related claims arising from Hurricane Harvey repairs arranged through the Regional Pool Alliance (RPA). The court held RFISD kept its immunity because there was no evidence that RFISD’s board or superintendent ever approved or voted to adopt the Interlocal Agreement or otherwise authorized the RPA to contract on RFISD’s behalf, so the contracts were not “properly executed” on RFISD’s behalf under Texas law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment vacating an arbitration award in a workplace-injury dispute. Cynthia Love won a large award from an arbitrator after suing her former employer, Kaspar Ranch Hand Equipment, but the trial court vacated that award after Kaspar petitioned under the Federal Arbitration Act. The appellate court held vacatur was proper because the arbitrator failed to include factual findings and legal conclusions expressly required by the parties’ arbitration agreement, so she exceeded her contractual authority under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). The court rejected Love’s other challenges and affirmed denial of attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeals reversed a post-answer default judgment awarding over $27 million to William Carrell and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was entered after appellants’ counsel withdrew days before trial and appellants did not appear. The court held appellants’ failure to appear was due to mistake or accident (not conscious indifference) because there was no reliable evidence appellants received actual notice of the trial setting after counsel’s withdrawal and substitute counsel lacked authority/adequate time to prepare. Because the lack of notice defeated the default, a new trial was required.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted an agreed motion to dismiss an appeal brought by Sandra Flores and Anita M. Flores against Propel Tax and Javier Hernandez. The parties told the court they resolved their dispute and asked for dismissal. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, dismissed the appeal, taxed the appellate costs to the appellants, and declined to consider any motion for rehearing because the appeal was dismissed at the parties' request.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District dismissed Constance Benavides’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Cameron County because she failed to meet appellate procedural requirements. The clerk’s record was overdue, and Benavides did not file the required docketing statement or inform the court that she paid or arranged to pay the clerk’s fee or was entitled to proceed without payment. After notice and a court order giving her ten days to comply, she did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and a court order.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA), 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b)(4), preempts the Texas franchise tax as applied to American Airlines’ 2015 transportation revenues (baggage fees, passenger ticket sales, and freight). The trial court had awarded American a refund of $107,577.04 (plus interest) for baggage-fee tax and denied the Comptroller’s counterclaim to tax additional transportation revenues. The court held that, as applied to those revenues, the franchise tax functions as a tax on gross receipts and is therefore barred by the AHTA.

The First District of Texas granted Radial Power Asset, LLC’s unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal after the parties settled all disputes and the settlement was finalized. Because the appeal became moot and the appellee did not oppose dismissal, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The court relied on precedent and the appellate rules that require vacatur and dismissal when a case becomes moot.

The First District of Texas denied a mandamus petition filed by May Kue and Youssef Ezzat challenging a county court’s final judgment in an eviction case. The relators asked the court to issue an emergency stay blocking a writ of possession, further proceedings in the underlying eviction, and release of registry funds. The Court of Appeals denied the petition and all related emergency motions and stay requests without granting the requested relief.

The Texas Court of Appeals (First District) denied Kevin Henry's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial court order that granted an opponent's motion to compel discovery in a pending civil case (Derrick Dees v. Kevin Henry et al.). The appellate court concluded mandamus relief was not warranted and dismissed any outstanding motions as moot. The opinion is a short per curiam memorandum without extended factual or legal discussion, and it leaves the trial court's order intact.

The Texas First Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Anant Kumar Tripati challenging a trial court order that granted a motion to dismiss in an underlying suit against YESCARE Corp. and others. The appellate court concluded mandamus relief was not warranted and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The opinion is brief and issued per curiam, listing the underlying district-court cause and judge but providing no extended reasoning or factual detail.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Esdras Pineda’s suit against his workers’ compensation carrier, National Specialty Insurance Company, and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had granted the insurer’s plea to the jurisdiction, finding Pineda’s pro se petition did not show he exhausted administrative remedies or identify the appeals-panel decisions that aggrieved him. The appeals court held the defects in Pineda’s petition were curable because the insurer’s plea and attached evidence showed Pineda had appealed the administrative law judge’s decisions to the appeals panel and that the appeals panel allowed those decisions to become final, so Pineda should be allowed to amend his pleadings.

The First District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s rulings in favor of the lender (Cardinal) and the appraisal company (CFour). Gaston bought a house that had a septic tank and well, but the appraisal incorrectly listed public water and sewer. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cardinal and CFour and Cardinal later nonsuited its third-party and cross claims. The appellate court held Gaston failed to raise a fact issue on negligent misrepresentation because she could not justifiably rely on the appraisal: seller disclosures, FHA/HUD warnings, the appraisal’s stated intended user (the lender), and Gaston’s own home inspection undercut her reliance claim. The court also held the nonsuit was effective when filed and did not prejudice other parties.

The Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a trial court order that granted Tonya Hill’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Steven and Rayma Benedict’s petition to modify the parent-child relationship. Because the trial court’s order did not address Hill’s separate request for attorney’s fees and expressly stated it was making no ruling on relief requested by Hill, the appellate court found the order’s finality ambiguous. The appellate court therefore abated and remanded the case to the trial court for clarification or entry of a final order and set a deadline for supplemental records to be filed in the appellate court.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a of a private-nuisance lawsuit filed by nearby landowners seeking injunctive relief and damages to stop construction and operation of a planned 200-megawatt lithium-ion battery storage facility on neighboring property. The court held the landowners’ pleading—alleging imminent risk from thermal-runaway fires, inadequate local emergency response, factual allegations of lease and tax-abatement steps, and concrete threats of harm—sufficient to state a cognizable negligence-based nuisance claim and to seek prospective injunctive relief. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied a petition asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus to control proceedings in a Travis County case. The court also lifted a previously entered stay of the underlying trial-court proceedings. The court issued a short memorandum opinion denying relief under the appellate rules and returning the case to the trial-court process, without further comment or substantive analysis in this brief disposition.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, Texas) reviewed sanctions entered against Genevieve Glasgow in a post-divorce civil case brought against her former husband. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in awarding monetary attorney’s fees because the evidence did not meet the required showing of reasonable and necessary fees, reversed the portion awarding fees, affirmed the remaining sanctions (including dismissal with prejudice of remaining claims), and remanded solely for redetermination of attorney’s fees. The court found the declarations and spreadsheets submitted did not detail particular services, who performed them, when, or the time reasonably required.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal filed on behalf of corporate entities because a nonlawyer cannot represent entities in court. After notifying the parties that an attorney must represent the corporations, counsel who filed an amended notice of appeal withdrew and no new attorney entered an appearance or filed a brief. The court concluded the entities failed to comply with directives to obtain counsel and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court orders.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal on April 9, 2026. Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. initially appealed a trial-court judgment but later obtained full relief when the trial court granted its post-judgment omnibus motion and entered a take-nothing judgment; Rush Truck moved to dismiss its portion of the appeal, which the court granted. The court also dismissed Ronald Joe Andrus, Jr.’s portion of the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court directives after his counsel did not respond to requests, failed to pay filing fees, and failed to request or pay for the clerk’s record.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal by Robert Berleth and his firm challenging the trial court’s denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under Texas Rule 91a. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because Berleth, a court‑appointed turnover receiver, is not a "governmental unit" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 51.014(a)(8) and 101.001(3), so he cannot bring an interlocutory appeal. The court relied on statutory text and precedent distinguishing uniquely governmental organs from privately appointed receivers whose authority is limited to satisfying a specific judgment.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order admitting Kara Watson’s will to probate as a muniment of title. The will was offered about nine years after Kara’s 2014 death; an interested party argued the proponent was in default for failing to probate within the four-year statutory period. After a bench trial the court found the proponent, Kara’s daughter Mary Gale, exercised reasonable diligence and had valid excuses (including caregiving duties, serious health problems, and lack of awareness of the need to probate). The appellate court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support that finding and affirmed.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that a creditor seeking recognition of a foreign-country money judgment under the state’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (ch. 6.40A RCW) must, absent general or specific personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in Washington, show that the debtor has property in Washington. The case arose after an English court entered judgment for Alterna against SpiceJet and Alterna sought recognition in King County. The Court reasoned recognition is not purely ministerial and that constitutional due process requires a jurisdictional nexus for recognition actions when personal jurisdiction is lacking.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal filed by Rikayat Lawal in case number A26D0407, seeking review of a trial court matter assigned LC number 25DD000869. The court issued a short order on April 9, 2026, denying the application for discretionary appeal. No further reasoning or analysis is provided in the document; it is a ministerial denial entry from the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

The Georgia Court of Appeals issued an order on April 9, 2026 denying an emergency motion by Westchester Place Homeowners Association and related parties. The appellants had asked for a supersedeas (stay) of injunctive relief and for the appointment of a receiver while their appeal is pending. The court refused those emergency requests, leaving the lower-court injunctive relief and the absence of a receiver in place pending further proceedings.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reviewed a breach-of-contract suit in which SPM obtained judgment against guarantor Brinker after tenant Romano’s defaulted and vacated leased premises. The court reversed the trial court in part and remanded. It held that the lease did not expressly abrogate the landlord’s duty to mitigate damages, so mitigation was required as a matter of law once SPM retook possession. Because there are disputed facts about whether SPM made reasonable mitigation efforts, the case was sent back for a factfinder to determine mitigation and the correct damages. The court also remanded the unresolved attorney-disqualification motion for the trial court to decide on the merits.

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated a domestic-violence civil protection order (DVCPO) that a Cuyahoga County domestic-relations magistrate had entered against G.S. following a full hearing. The court reviewed the record and concluded the petitioner, R.S., failed to present sufficient, credible evidence by a preponderance that she was in danger of domestic violence. Because the appellate court found the evidence inadequate—R.S.’s uncorroborated testimony, impeachment by exhibits, and competing testimony and exhibits from G.S.—the DVCPO was vacated and the case remanded for notification that the order is no longer in effect.