Court Filings

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the City of Atlanta's application for an interlocutory appeal in the case City of Atlanta v. William Neal. The order permits the appellant to file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order date (April 28, 2026) and directs the Clerk of State Court to include this order in the record sent to the Court of Appeals. The court's action is procedural—allowing review before final judgment—rather than resolving the underlying merits of the dispute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ashlee Mock’s application for interlocutory review of the trial court’s order striking her answer in a civil forfeiture case because the application was filed late. The trial court struck Mock’s answer on January 7, 2026, and issued a certificate of immediate review on January 20, 2026. Mock filed her application in this Court 28 days after that certificate, but Georgia law requires an application be filed within ten days of the certificate. Because the timeliness requirement is jurisdictional, the court had to dismiss the untimely application.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by Robert Stafford and Icon Studios, LLC because the Court previously denied their application for discretionary appeal and that denial constituted an adjudication on the merits, barring a second direct appeal. The case arose after Heritage purchased property at foreclosure, obtained a writ of possession in magistrate court, and brought a dispossessory action; Icon and Stafford sought superior-court review but the superior court dismissed the petition and Stafford’s motion to join. The Court held that the prior denial precludes relitigation and thus the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this direct appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Gary D. James's appeal for failure to file his brief and enumerations of error by the deadline set under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) and a subsequent court order. The court had given James until 4:30 P.M. on April 27, 2026, to file the required materials and warned that failure to comply would result in dismissal. Because James did not comply, the court dismissed the appeal and cited Tolbert v. Tolbert as authority supporting dismissal for noncompliance with appellate deadlines.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County trial court’s grant of summary judgment to BMI Federal Credit Union and its award of attorney fees after Carl Medley sued over the repossession and sale of his Audi. The trial court found Medley’s claims—fraud, waiver based on prior acceptance of late payments, emotional distress, and punitive damages—unsupported by admissible evidence, and granted BMI its deficiency, fees, and costs. The appellate court agreed that the loan’s anti-waiver language allowed BMI to accept late payments without forfeiting its rights, that BMI validly repossessed and sold the vehicle, and that Medley failed to rebut BMI’s evidence.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), a statutory restriction that limited who could file undervaluation complaints based on arm’s-length sales occurring before (but not after) the tax lien date and exceeding specified thresholds, violated Ohio’s constitutional requirement that property be taxed by a uniform rule. The court found the provision systematically and intentionally departed from uniform valuation by treating some properties as immune from complaint. The court severed the unconstitutional clause, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, reversed the Board of Tax Appeals decisions, and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while certifying a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ order that vacated a county board of revision decision and remanded to dismiss a taxpayer’s complaint. The court held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) — a statutory condition barring third-party valuation complaints unless the property sold in an arm’s-length transaction before the tax lien date and the sale price exceeded listed value by 10% and a monetary threshold — violates Ohio’s constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. The court severed that subsection, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, and certified a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), finding an Ohio statute, R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), unconstitutional because it allowed different treatment of parcels for valuation complaints and thus violated the state constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. Appellant Bahorek had filed a complaint challenging a neighbor’s valuation; the county Board of Revision dismissed it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The appellate court held that the statute’s conditions on who may file and when (arm’s-length sale before the lien date and a 10%/threshold sales test) create systematic departures from uniform valuation, so the court severed that subsection, reversed the BTA, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed a municipal-court judgment awarding William R. Meek $4,160 against Gino Collins for an incomplete fence installation and return of materials. Collins appealed pro se arguing the damages award lacked competent proof and was against the weight of the evidence. The appeals court held Collins failed to provide a transcript or an approved substitute of the bench hearing, so the court could not review the factual record and must presume the trial court acted properly. For that reason the appellate court affirmed the judgment.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the municipal court’s rulings that tenants Nedra Bloor and Wayne Reed could deposit rent with the clerk and that the escrowed rent should not be released to landlord Alan Barnes. The tenants had notified Barnes of multiple repair issues (roof leaks, mold, loose fixtures, exposed wiring, floor problems) and deposited rent after giving notice. The trial court found the tenants were current on rent when they initiated escrow and that Barnes failed to remedy the conditions. The appeals court upheld the credibility findings and applied Ohio landlord-tenant statutes to affirm the return of the escrowed funds to the tenants.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District Court of Appeals and remanded the case. The dispute involved C.E., an unmarried former partner who sought legal parental recognition of three children born to P.S. through artificial insemination. The First District had directed the trial court to determine whether the couple "would have been married" but for Ohio's pre-Obergefell ban on same-sex marriage and to apply R.C. 3111.95(A) if so. The Supreme Court held R.C. 3111.95(A) applies only to married spouses and that Obergefell and Pavan do not authorize retroactively rewriting that statute to cover unmarried couples.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that cast vote records (CVRs) — digital spreadsheet reports of votes generated by a county’s tabulating equipment — are not the "contents" of ballot boxes or voting machines under Section 308 of the Election Code and therefore are subject to public disclosure. The dispute arose from a Right-to-Know request to Lycoming County for CVRs from the 2020 general election, which had been denied as exempt. The Court concluded CVRs are documents/reports generated by tabulators (automatic tabulating equipment), not the physical ballots in ballot boxes or the voting machines that let voters mark and verify votes.

The Illinois Appellate Court (Third District) answered two certified questions about the Biometric Information Privacy Act exemption for government contractors. The court held that the exemption does not require a contractor to work exclusively for a state agency or local government. However, the exemption applies only when the contractor’s challenged conduct occurred within the scope of the contractor’s governmental work—i.e., when the contractor was acting as a contractor for the government. The court therefore rejected a purely temporal reading that would exempt all conduct during the existence of a government contract.

The Illinois Appellate Court vacated the trial court's denial of plaintiff Mary Owens’ request to amend her timely post-judgment motion for a new trial after a jury verdict for a nursing home and an independent contractor nurse practitioner. The court held the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider amendments to a timely post-judgment motion until it actually denied that motion, and that the trial court erred by refusing to exercise discretion and instead concluding it lacked jurisdiction. Because that error prevented consideration of the amendment, the court vacated both the order denying leave to amend and the later denial of the new-trial motion, and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo in a foreclosure-related case and denied Wells Fargo's motion. The court held Wells Fargo failed to prove strict compliance with RPAPL 1304's notice requirements because its affiant did not establish knowledge of the third-party vendor's mailing procedures or integration of the vendor's records into the bank's business records. The court also rejected Wells Fargo's claim that the loan was not a covered primary-residence loan, finding plaintiff did not prove the property was never the borrower's primary residence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of plaintiff Moises Ramirez's motion for partial summary judgment on a Labor Law § 240(1) claim against 2500 Webb LLC. The court found that genuine issues of fact remained about which object struck the plaintiff (horizontal versus vertical pipe/post), whether that object was a target of disassembly when the injury occurred, and whether a safety device was available that would have prevented the accident. Because these disputed facts are material to liability under Labor Law § 240(1), summary judgment was properly denied.

The First Department unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's order dismissing Yolanda Murray's complaint against Planned Parenthood as time-barred and for failure to state a viable claim. The court held Murray's claims arising from alleged 1996 misconduct did not fall within the Adult Survivors Act because the complaint did not allege criminal conduct enumerated by that statute, and the Child Victims Act revival window had already closed. The court also found that, even on the merits, Murray failed to plead facts showing Planned Parenthood's knowledge of the provider's dangerous propensities, control over the local affiliate, or any valid alter-ego theory, and there was no evidence of judicial bias.

The First Department reviewed a motion in a class-action landlord-tenant case where defendants sought disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel for an alleged conflict arising from counsel's prior representation of several former building owners. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding defendants had waived the conflict claim, and concluded the record was incomplete to decide disqualification. The court therefore ordered plaintiffs' counsel to produce itemized files related to the prior representation so defendants can assess whether an actual conflict exists, and otherwise affirmed the lower court's denial of immediate disqualification and dismissal.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Harvey's personal-injury complaint arising from a May 2020 motor vehicle accident. Defendants (the New York Foundling Hospital and others) presented expert reports and MRI comparisons showing plaintiff's cervical, lumbar, and right-shoulder conditions were preexisting, chronic, and degenerative from a prior March 30, 2019 crash, not caused by the 2020 accident. The court held plaintiff's expert failed to meaningfully dispute the prior-accident causation, so she could not meet the statutory threshold for a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d).

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a lower court order denying the insurer Mountain Valley Indemnity Company's summary judgment motion to dismiss an insureds' fire-damage complaint. The insurer argued the dwelling was a three-family property (allowing a coverage disclaimer) based on the basement configuration, while the insureds said it was two-family and the basement was shared family space. The court found disputed facts about the basement's physical separation, usage, and the investigator's qualifications, so summary judgment was improper and the case must proceed.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by William Martin, independent executor, from a trial-court order that required co-executor Steven Martin to resign or be removed. The appellate court found the appeal moot because Steven formally resigned after the order was entered, so reversing the order would have no practical effect on Steven’s status or estate administration. The court therefore declined to address the parties’ standing and procedural arguments and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a dispute between the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (appellant) and A & B Verma Family, LLC (appellee). The appeal arose from a Volusia County circuit court ruling; the appellate panel issued a brief per curiam opinion affirming the lower court's judgment without published opinion. All three judges concurred. The mandate notes that the decision is not final until any timely post-judgment motions under Florida appellate rules are resolved.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed a nonfinal trial-court ruling in a case where Alan G. Williams, individually and as personal representative of an estate, appealed against Pace Island Owners Association, Inc. The appellate court issued a per curiam opinion on April 28, 2026, simply stating AFFIRMED without published opinion or extended reasoning. The panel of judges (Jay, C.J., Edwards, and Harris, JJ.) concurred, and the judgment is nonfinal pending any timely authorized post-decision motions under Florida appellate rules.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower-court decision in a foreclosure-related appeal brought by Suzanne De Lisi against The Bank of New York Mellon (as trustee). The appellate court issued a short per curiam opinion stating simply "AFFIRMED," with all three judges concurring. No reasoning, factual background, or legal analysis appears in the published entry; the decision confirms the county court's ruling against the appellant and preserves the lower court's result.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in a consolidated appeal (6D2023-3209 and 6D2023-3444) brought by John Daniel Smith against attorneys Kenneth E. Kemp II, Elizabeth Claire Bentley, and the law firm Patrone, Kemp & Bentley, P.A. The opinion is per curiam, dated April 28, 2026, and contains no published reasoning beyond the single-word disposition "AFFIRMED." The panel (Nardella, White, and Smith JJ.) concurred, and counsel for the parties are listed.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed two consolidated appeals from a circuit court order in Osceola County. The appellants, Shawn Michael Simmerer and Charlee McPherson, appearing pro se, sought reversal of the lower court's decision. The appellate court, in a brief per curiam opinion, affirmed the trial court's ruling without published opinion or extended discussion. The panel (Stargel, White, and Brownlee, JJ.) concurred and the opinion notes the time for filing a motion for rehearing has not yet expired.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's judgment in a civil case brought by Robert Lee King, Jr. against Mark S. Brown, M.D., Premier Men's Medical Center of Orlando, LLC, and OPS International, Inc. d/b/a Olympia Pharmaceuticals. The appellate court issued a short per curiam opinion, noting only the affirmance without elaboration. The decision means the trial court's ruling stands and the appellant's grounds for reversal were rejected by the appellate panel. No further reasoning or factual findings are provided in the published entry.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal from the County Court for Orange County in a case brought by Kayla Williams against Darius S. Dantzler. The appellate court, in a per curiam decision dated April 28, 2026, affirmed the lower court's judgment. No published opinion or reasoning is provided in the decision sheet; the court's brief entry simply states the judgment is affirmed and notes the time to file a motion for rehearing has not yet expired.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Emily L. Tanner from a Lee County circuit court decision. The appellate court issued a short per curiam decision on April 28, 2026, simply stating the judgment is AFFIRMED. The opinion contains no published reasoning beyond the affirmance and notes concurrence by the three judges. Counsel appearances are listed for appellant and some appellees, while two corporate appellees made no appearance.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial-court order exonerating a $180,000 bail bond conditioned on payment of extradition costs and later awarding $7,492.40 in extradition expenses to the district attorney. North River (the surety) argued the bond could not be exonerated because the defendant was not physically present when the court acted and that the court lost jurisdiction to order extradition costs. The court held the defendant’s appearance by counsel under Penal Code section 977 satisfied the requirement in section 1305(c)(1) to exonerate the bond, and the court properly ordered extradition costs under section 1306(b).