Court Filings

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court grant of summary judgment in a malicious-prosecution suit brought by attorney Brian Detrick against his former client, Keiko Shimada. Shimada had voluntarily dismissed a prior malpractice case and moved for summary judgment, claiming the dismissal was motivated by the statute of limitations (a procedural ground that would bar malicious prosecution). The trial court relied on Shimada’s English-language declaration, but the appellate court held that because Shimada cannot read or speak English the declaration was incompetent absent evidence identifying and qualifying the interpreter/translator and an attestation that the translation accurately reflected Shimada’s words. The judgment for Shimada was reversed and the summary-judgment motion must be denied.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG) in a negligence suit after a bicyclist was struck by SCPMG employee Dr. Brittany Doremus while she was driving to work. The court held SCPMG met its initial burden by submitting uncontradicted deposition evidence that Doremus was on an ordinary morning commute and not performing work when the collision occurred, shifting the burden to the plaintiff, who failed to produce admissible evidence creating a triable issue. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that occasional work-from-home status converted home into a second worksite on the day of the accident.

The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Hensel Phelps and remanded for further proceedings. AVL, a supplier/installer of vehicle emissions testing equipment, sought a declaratory judgment that its claims for payment were not barred by the Contractors State Licensing Law because its equipment did not “become a fixed part of the structure” under Business and Professions Code section 7045. The appellate court held the factual question whether the goods became part of the structure is for a trier of fact; competing expert declarations and voluminous record evidence created a triable issue, so summary judgment was improper.

The Court of Appeals dismissed two consolidated direct appeals by Google, LLC and its employee Laura Revenko seeking review of a trial court order compelling them to comply with deposition notices and subpoenas in a divorce case. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because discovery orders in domestic relations cases listed in OCGA § 5-6-35 must be pursued by discretionary application, even if the order otherwise meets the collateral order criteria for immediacy. Because Google and Revenko did not file the required application for appeal, the appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an application for interlocutory appeal by guardians of a minor bitten by a dog because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was untimely. After the trial court granted summary judgment for the homeowner (Jerry) on March 10, 2026, the court issued the required certificate only on April 2, 2026 — 23 days later. Because Georgia law requires the certificate be issued within ten days of the order and that requirement is jurisdictional, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the application. The plaintiffs must wait for a final judgment to pursue appeal rights.

The Court of Appeals transferred an interlocutory application from Elizabeth Noell challenging the as-applied constitutionality and interpretation of Georgia's Equitable Caregiver Statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1, to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Noell argued the statute must require that the biological parent (her) — not merely the other parent — foster or support a third party’s parental relationship with her children. The trial court rejected that argument, finding the statute requires only that “a parent” foster the relationship. Because the case involves an unsettled constitutional question and the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, the Court of Appeals transferred the matter for disposition.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Vernard K. Carter, Jr.'s appeal from a superior court writ of possession because the appeal was subject to discretionary-appeal procedures. The case began as a dispossessory action in magistrate court, was reviewed de novo by the superior court, and then appealed directly to this Court. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because Carter did not follow the statutory discretionary-appeal process required for appeals from superior-court de novo reviews of magistrate-court rulings (OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1) and controlling precedent). The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Mason Municipal Court's dismissal of Mirkomil Noziljon's small-claims suit against dentist Doktor Hasan seeking a $5,000 refund. After a bench trial before a magistrate, the court found credible testimony and a billing/credit receipt showing a $5,000 refund had been processed to a credit card provided at the office. The magistrate acknowledged a name discrepancy on the receipt but concluded Noziljon failed to meet his burden. The appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing post-trial evidence and that the judgment was not against the weight of the evidence.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision denying Gregory Myers a court-ordered certificate of title for a 1970 Chevrolet Nova. Myers had sought title after buying property at a sheriff's sale where the car had been stored, but the trial court found he did not acquire the vehicle by operation of law under R.C. 4505.10. The court concluded title remained with the decedent, Elvin Potter, and that disputes over ownership of the decedent's personal property are for the probate court. The appellate court affirmed dismissal of Myers' petition with prejudice.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants in a premises-liability suit. Appellant Irene Wunderle sued after falling stepping into a boutique and suffering serious eye injuries, claiming the threshold had an indistinct step down that was not open and obvious. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact: the step was small but visible, the store was well-lit, nothing obstructed her view, and no unusual attendant circumstances existed to distract her. Because the condition was open and obvious, the owners owed no duty to warn.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Dennis Tilton's filing titled a "Complaint and Intent to File Petition for Post-Conviction Relief". Tilton had been convicted in Willoughby Municipal Court and later filed his postconviction claim in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. The appeals court held the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction because Ohio law requires R.C. 2953.21 petitions be filed in the sentencing court (the municipal court). Citing Ohio precedent, the court concluded municipal-court misdemeanants must seek relief through other procedures in the sentencing court, so dismissal was proper.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trumbull County Common Pleas judgment ordering the condominium association and unit-owner defendants to specifically perform a 2014 settlement agreement requiring stabilization and restorative work on a shared wall. The trial court had granted plaintiff Owen summary judgment on enforceability after finding no competent evidence that the agreement was mutually rescinded or impossible to perform. The court limited Owen’s liability to her original pro rata share of estimated 2014 costs and denied attorney fees. The appeals court found no error in granting specific performance.

The court affirmed the municipal small-claims judgment for defendant Jenna Nelson after a bench trial. Plaintiff Stephanie Milton sued Nelson for breach of contract and civil damages under Ohio cruelty statutes, alleging her adopted mustang lost significant weight and training while boarded with Nelson. The trial court found insufficient evidence that Nelson failed to provide proper nourishment or training, and the appellate court held that the trial court did not lose its way in weighing testimony and evidence. The court also rejected Milton’s claim that the case should have been moved off the small-claims docket, noting Milton chose that forum and sought only $6,000.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Thomas Crain’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Crain had appealed from post-trial documents related to a magistrate’s decision and a later trial-court entry adopting that decision. The appellate court found the filings attached to the notice of appeal were irregular: the magistrate’s paper was a dispositive magistrate’s decision, and the trial-court paper merely incorporated that decision but did not itself enter a separate, signed judgment specifying relief. Because the trial court failed to enter a final, independent judgment determining all claims, the appeal cannot proceed.

The Court of Appeals (Sixth District) denied Jeffrey Don Brock's petition for a writ of mandamus asking the county court judge to rule on his motion to compel an executor's accounting. Brock had demanded an accounting by March 16, 2026, but filed for mandamus on March 10, before that deadline expired. The executor filed a verified accounting on March 13 (with clerk acceptance disputed by Brock). The court held Brock was not entitled to extraordinary relief because he sought mandamus before the accounting deadline and did not show the trial court refused to rule on his later complaints about the accounting.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal brought by Yonbloksis Young against Ontarya Allen-Johnson, personal representative of an estate. The court issued a short per curiam decision affirming the lower court's ruling. No opinion explaining the reasons was published in the decision; the judgment of the circuit court for Escambia County is left intact. The decision is final subject to any timely, authorized rehearing motions under Florida appellate rules.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Foziah Alawi from a decision of the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims concerning a workplace injury claim dated June 7, 2023. The appellate court, in a brief per curiam opinion, affirmed the lower tribunal’s ruling. No extended opinion or new legal analysis is provided in the published entry; the court simply affirmed the underlying decision and noted concurrence by the three-judge panel.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the district’s anti‑SLAPP motion. The Yolo‑Solano Air Quality Management District sued Diamond D General Engineering and Spencer Defty for alleged permitting and air‑quality violations. Diamond and Defty cross‑complained seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the district relied on a secret internal policy (Policy 24) not adopted through required rulemaking. The appellate court held the cross‑complaint challenged the validity of Policy 24 rather than merely the district’s investigative or enforcement acts, so the claims did not arise from protected petitioning or speech and the anti‑SLAPP motion failed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to withdraw their appeal in Seres Capital GA, LLC v. Betty Jean Cook. By granting the motion the appellate court released jurisdiction back to the trial court, meaning the appeal is no longer active before the Court of Appeals and the case returns to the lower court for further proceedings. The order is a ministerial grant of withdrawal rather than a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court and City of Tucker in denying Cox Store Management’s application for a license to operate coin-operated amusement machines (COAMs) at its Idlewood convenience store. The City’s 2022 COAM ordinance bars COAMs within the distance limits that apply to alcohol sales; the store is 80.2 yards from a nearby church. The court held that the enabling statute allows municipalities to impose distance restrictions for COAMs no more restrictive than those for alcohol sales, and that the ordinance’s application to Cox was therefore lawful regardless of the types of alcoholic beverages Cox sells.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court order that had set aside a default judgment entered for Shelter Mutual Insurance Company against Dajuan Henry Jones. SMIC had obtained default judgment after certified-mail service to an address; Jones later moved to vacate the judgment claiming improper service, mistaken identity, and that he only learned of the case months later. The appeals court found Jones presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service but was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the service issue; it also held Jones’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was untimely and remanded for denial of relief under that rule and for a hearing only on service.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for UC Health, LLC in Danielle Drake’s wrongful-termination suit. Drake, an at-will social worker, was fired after she accessed a patient’s protected health information (PHI) without a legitimate business reason while attempting to report a coworker’s suspected HIPAA violation. The court held that UC had an overriding legitimate business justification—enforcement of its strict policy forbidding unauthorized PHI access—and Drake failed to show that termination was pretextual.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court default judgment in favor of Pheasant Ridge Association, Inc. in its foreclosure action against property owner Jeremy Harper for unpaid association assessments. Harper, who was served with the complaint, failed to file an answer or otherwise respond; the Association moved for default judgment and submitted an affidavit of account, its declaration, and its certificate of lien. The appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting default judgment because Harper forfeited defenses by failing to respond and provided no evidence to dispute the Association’s proofs.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of leave allowing Kettering Medical Center (KHBMC) to amend its answer shortly before trial to assert immunity under R.C. 2305.51(B), and it reversed the trial court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment to KHBMC. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the last-minute amendment and reopening discovery because the amendment was untimely, unexplained, and prejudicial. The court also found genuine factual disputes existed about foreseeability, precautions taken, and whether the patient’s conduct constituted an explicit threat, so summary judgment on statutory immunity was improper.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Ninth District and trial court, holding that NC Enterprises did not prove adverse possession of two narrow parcels owned by Norfolk Southern Railway. Although NC Enterprises performed regular lawn and landscape maintenance beginning in 1998 and later erected a fence and drainage in 2000 and 2011, the court concluded the required 21-year period must have begun on or before July 22, 1999. Maintenance alone before the fence was not open and notorious enough to put the title owner on constructive notice, so NC Enterprises failed to meet the open-and-notorious element by clear and convincing evidence.

The Illinois Appellate Court (3rd District) answered a certified question about whether a litigant granted a full fee waiver under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 298 is also entitled to a waiver of court reporter transcript costs. The court held that Rule 298 incorporates the waiver terms of 735 ILCS 5/5-105(a)(1), and following the Second District’s reasoning in In re Marriage of Main, concluded that transcript costs necessary for an appeal fall within the waivable "fees, costs, and charges." The case is remanded for the trial court to identify which transcripts are necessary and to provide them to the appellant without charge.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s dental malpractice complaint against the Deol defendants. Plaintiff sued for injuries from root canals performed by an endodontist, Dr. Taggar, who practiced at premises operated by the Deol defendants. The court concluded Taggar was an independent contractor, not an employee, and the Deol defendants neither controlled his professional work nor actually supervised him, so they are not vicariously or directly liable. Plaintiff’s opposition lacked admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order dismissing plaintiff Varma's complaint against Allstate and Wayne LeVan. The court held the complaint was barred by res judicata because the claims — challenging termination and asserting breach based on the same agency agreement and incorporated supplement — either were raised or could have been raised in an earlier action between the same parties. The court also held that the prior dismissal and the denial of leave to amend had preclusive effect because the new complaint mirrors the proposed amended pleading previously rejected on the merits.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury complaint brought under New York's Adult Survivors Act (CPLR 214-j). The plaintiff alleged sexual abuse by a Syracuse University employee while he worked at a university-affiliated fraternity house. The court held the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded lack of consent and therefore alleged conduct that would constitute a Penal Law sex offense, so the claims were timely revived under the ASA. The case is remitted to Supreme Court for consideration of other dismissal grounds the lower court did not decide.

The defendant appealed from a Supreme Court (Onondaga County) order denying his motion to vacate a default judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. While the appeal was pending, the defendant and plaintiff’s attorney signed a stipulation of discontinuance in February 2026. The Appellate Division consequently dismissed the appeal without costs on April 24, 2026. The court did not reach the merits of the underlying motion to vacate because the parties stipulated to discontinue the action.