Court Filings

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed Neely Petrie-Blanchard’s conviction for first-degree murder but reversed her mandatory life sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before sentencing. Although Petrie-Blanchard validly waived counsel and proceeded pro se at trial after an adequate Faretta inquiry, the court did not re-offer counsel at the separate, critical sentencing stage. The panel held that failing to renew the offer of counsel at sentencing is fundamental error and requires resentencing with appointed counsel or an explicit waiver.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of J.J.A.’s motion to suppress but reversed the juvenile disposition order adjudicating him delinquent for possession of a firearm by a minor. The appellate court found the disposition order failed to state the statutory maximum penalty and did not award or specify predisposition credit for time served, as required by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.115(d)(2). Because the commitment at issue is effectively determinate (it will end before the department’s authority expires), the court ordered the trial court to enter a corrected disposition specifying the maximum penalty and the amount of credit.

The Washington Supreme Court decided whether RCW 9.94A.640 permits a person who remains incarcerated on a separate conviction to seek vacation of earlier convictions and whether applicants must present evidence of rehabilitation. The court held that the statute’s time bars require release from complete confinement on all convictions before the statutory crime-free period runs, so a person never released into the community is ineligible. The court also held, following State v. Hawkins, that courts must consider evidence of rehabilitation and that applicants should present such evidence for a court to exercise its discretion. The case is remanded consistent with that ruling.

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant Eugene Cobbins' November 30, 2023 conviction following a guilty plea to multiple charges, holding that his custodial statements were knowingly and voluntarily made and not subject to suppression. The court rejected his challenge that delayed filing of charges created a right-to-counsel issue because that right had not yet attached and any statutory-arraignment delay claim was unpreserved. However, the court reversed the February 9, 2024 resentencing on two grand larceny convictions because Cobbins was not produced and there is no indication he knew of or waived his right to be present, and remitted the matter for resentencing on those counts.

The Appellate Division reviewed a County Court order that had designated Joshua Stewart a level three sexually violent offender under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act after his New Jersey conviction for promoting child prostitution. The court upheld the risk-point scoring and refused a downward departure, finding the Guidelines had adequately considered mitigating factors. However, the panel held that applying Correction Law § 168-a(3)(b) to label him a "sexually violent offender" was unconstitutional as applied because the underlying New Jersey offense would not qualify as a sexually violent offense under New York law. The court therefore modified the designation to "level three sex offender" and affirmed as modified.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reviewed defendant Andrew Jointe’s challenge to his sentence following guilty pleas to third-degree rape and attempted sex trafficking of a child. The court found the 10-year period of postrelease supervision imposed for the attempted sex trafficking conviction was illegal and reduced it to five years. As modified, the concurrent determinate prison terms of 3.5 years and the remaining 10-year postrelease supervision on the rape conviction were affirmed. The court stated it may correct an illegal sentence even if the issue was not raised below.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reviewed defendant Darrel Greenlee’s appeal challenging the excessiveness of a nine-year determinate sentence (plus five years postrelease supervision) imposed after his guilty plea to first-degree assault. The court exercised its discretion in the interest of justice and reduced the prison term to seven years while leaving the five-year period of postrelease supervision intact. The court cited sentencing excessiveness principles and People v Suitte in concluding the original nine-year term was greater than warranted and therefore modified the sentence accordingly.

The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed George Madison’s challenge to his enhanced sentences for kidnapping, carjacking, robbery, and two identity-fraud counts. Madison argued the trial judge, rather than a jury, made the factual findings that triggered statutory enhancements and that the findings were made by a preponderance standard. The court held that any constitutional error under Erlinger was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the State presented unrebutted evidence at sentencing that plainly supported the enhancements. The court affirmed the enhancements but reversed and remanded to correct errors in the written sentencing order so it matches the oral pronouncements.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal partially reversed and partially affirmed Devonte Baker’s convictions related to multiple tire-slashing incidents. The court held the State failed to prove Baker’s identity for the first incident and failed to prove he was armed for two armed-trespass counts. It reversed counts 1 and 2 (identity insufficiency), reduced counts 4 and 6 from armed trespass to simple trespass, and ordered vacation of counts 8 and 9 from the judgment because they had already been acquitted. The court affirmed convictions for counts 3, 5 (criminal mischiefs), and 7 (stalking), and remanded for amended judgments and resentencing.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Christopher J. Porter’s convictions for sexual battery and related lewd offenses but reversed part of his sentence. The court found the trial judge had orally imposed life imprisonment for the sexual-battery count and concurrent mandatory minimums for two molestation counts, but the written judgment mistakenly listed a 25-year minimum for the sexual-battery count. The court ordered correction of the written sentence to strike the improper 25-year mandatory minimum for the sexual-battery count and also directed removal of misdemeanor costs; it upheld a $65 county ordinance court cost as properly imposed.

The Appellate Division, First Department, reviewed defendant Julsean Thompson’s conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to first-degree custodial interference. The court unanimously modified the trial court’s judgment by reducing Thompson’s term of imprisonment from two-to-four years to 1 1/3-to-3 years as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, finding the original sentence excessive. In all other respects the judgment was affirmed, leaving the conviction and other components of the trial court’s decision intact.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx County judgment that had convicted Angel Rivas, upon a guilty plea, of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and sentenced him to five years probation. The court struck six specific probation conditions because they were not reasonably related to Rivas's rehabilitation or necessary to ensure he would lead a law-abiding life. The court reasoned there was no evidence supporting dependence-support, gang affiliation, substance abuse, mental-health treatment, or ignition-interlock requirements, and the People did not oppose removing several of the conditions.

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant Jonathan Sanchez’s convictions for second-degree murder, second-degree attempted murder, and three counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, but reduced his sentence in the interest of justice. The court upheld a protective order that kept a witness’s identity from defendant until shortly before trial, rejected challenges to identification and jury-selection rulings (including a Batson claim), and found the evidence legally sufficient and not against the weight of the evidence. Because the aggregate sentence was excessive compared to codefendants and the defendant’s youth, the court reduced the attempted-murder sentence to a 15-year determinate term, producing a new aggregate of 40 years to life.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed Troy William Armstrong’s convictions for multiple counts of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. The State conceded that one count (Count II), charging sexual battery under section 794.011(2)(a) based on 'union' with the victim’s anus by the defendant’s mouth, required proof of penetration and there was no evidence of anal penetration. The court reversed Count II on that basis, affirmed the remaining convictions, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that partial reversal.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed a probation revocation and five-year prison sentence imposed on Carliovis Bandera-Valier. The court affirmed the finding that Bandera-Valier violated probation, concluding the earlier Faretta (self-representation) inquiry was adequate for the violation hearing. However, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before sentencing as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5). The court certified conflict with a Fifth District decision that treated similar error as harmless.

The Court of Appeals reviewed Deandre Brooks’s appeal after the trial court adjudicated him guilty of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous; Brooks did not file a pro se response. The appellate court conducted an independent review, found no reversible error, but identified a nonreversible clerical error in the judgment’s listed court costs. The court modified the judgment to reflect $404 in costs, affirmed the judgment as modified, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.

The First Department affirmed defendant Jamar Carr’s conviction following a guilty plea to fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon and three years of probation, but modified the sentence by striking several probation conditions. The court found Carr validly waived most appellate rights, which barred review of his excessive-sentence and many constitutional claims, but allowed review of a Second Amendment challenge and several statutory challenges to probation conditions. The court rejected the Second Amendment claim and upheld certain conditions as reasonably related to rehabilitation, while striking fees, drug testing/treatment conditions, and a gang-association restriction as unsupported by the record.

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed most of Calvin Sneed’s convictions for the 2017 fatal shooting of Gregory Jones but found merger and sentencing errors. The court rejected Sneed’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to two prosecutor remarks during closing argument, concluding those remarks were permissible inferences from the evidence and that objections would have been meritless. However, the court held that two firearm convictions (Counts 7 and 8) should have merged with Count 9, vacated those convictions and sentences, and remanded for correction of the sentence summary to reflect the proper 15-year term for Count 9.

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed Alex Khalil Smith’s appeal of his 2022 convictions for malice murder and related offenses arising from the July 8, 2020 shooting death of Cassandra Arnold. The Court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the convictions—pointing to motive from a shorted drug deal, cell-phone location data placing Smith at the scene near the time of the shooting, incriminating phone calls, and gunshot-residue on clothing and a mask. However, the Court vacated and remanded the trial court’s denial of Smith’s motion for new trial because the trial court failed to exercise and state its discretion under Georgia’s general grounds for a new trial.

The Washington Court of Appeals reviewed Harlan Blackburn’s convictions for multiple counts of incest and child rape. The court held that police violated his state constitutional privacy rights by obtaining hotel and purchase data without a warrant, but that the admission of that evidence was harmless. It reversed one conviction (Count 8 for incest in the first degree) for insufficient evidence as to the specific dates charged, affirmed the other convictions, and remanded for resentencing on Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 because the combined confinement and community custody terms exceeded statutory maximums. The court explained which testimony supported each upheld conviction and the basis for the sentencing remand.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded after reviewing Brandon Johnson’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Johnson, convicted in 1995 of murder and related offenses, argued his petition showed actual innocence and satisfied the cause-and-prejudice standard for claims that police misconduct undermined identifications and that Brady violations occurred. The court found Johnson presented a colorable actual innocence claim and a colorable due-process claim based on evidence of a pattern and practice of detective misconduct that could have affected eyewitness identifications, so it reversed the denial and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed rejection of the Brady claim under controlling precedent.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of John Anthony Bertsch and Jeffery Lee Hronis for the 1985 murder, rape, and kidnapping of Linda Canady. The court affirmed the death sentence for Bertsch but reversed Hronis’s death sentence and remanded for further penalty-phase proceedings because Hronis was allowed to represent himself at penalty phase without the trial court applying current law assessing competency to self-represent. Both defendants’ convictions remain affirmed. The court also vacated any remaining unpaid balances of $10,000 restitution fines under the statutory 10-year enforcement limit and ordered amended abstracts of judgment.

The court reviewed Antonio Lee Grey’s appeal after the trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of attempted assault of a family/household member with a prior conviction, and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. The State conceded the sentence was illegal because attempted assault (as an attempt to a third-degree felony) is a state jail felony with a statutory maximum of two years. The court held the sentence exceeded the authorized range, reversed the punishment portion of the judgment, remanded for a new punishment hearing within the proper statutory range, and otherwise affirmed the conviction.

The court reviewed Cierra Snow’s appeal of her domestic-violence conviction for punching her ten-year-old daughter after an argument. The appeals court held that Snow’s use of force was not reasonable parental discipline because she presented no evidence to meet her burden and the video showed a harmful blow. The court affirmed the conviction and rejected Snow’s argument that she should have been charged only under the child-endangering statute. However, the court found the trial court failed to credit Snow for one day of jail time and remanded solely to correct that sentencing credit.

The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals reviewed Johnnie J. Wappner’s convictions for felonious assault, felony murder, and reckless homicide following a jury trial. The court held that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense-of-others for Wappner’s intentional act of striking the victim and on accident for his separate act of shooting the victim; both defenses could apply to different acts alleged by the prosecution. Because that instructional error was not harmless and affected Wappner’s felonious assault and felony murder convictions, those convictions were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial as to those counts; the reckless homicide conviction was affirmed.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals reviewed Jeremy Long’s convictions for multiple sex offenses against minors following a jury trial in Crawford County. The court held that the trial judge improperly allowed the prosecutor to amend two rape counts just before trial in a way that changed the identity of the charged offenses, so those two convictions (Counts 1 and 3) were reversed. The court affirmed Long’s remaining convictions (one rape count, three rape counts as renumbered, and two gross-sexual-imposition counts) because the evidence was not so weak or inconsistent that the jury clearly lost its way. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

A Wayne County jury convicted Brodey I. Murbarger of first-degree murder for the death of Megan Nichols; the court sentenced him to a 50-year term with 3 years of mandatory supervised release. On appeal Murbarger argued the court erred by denying a change of venue and funding for a phone-survey expert, that he was entitled to a Miller/Harris-type hearing because he was a young adult at the time of the crime, and that multiple murder convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and most rulings, held the venue and expert denials were not an abuse of discretion, declined to grant a Miller-type remedy on direct appeal, but vacated two duplicate murder convictions and ordered the mittimus corrected.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s rulings in the death-penalty case of State v. Myers. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow Myers to file a motion for a new trial, but it reversed the trial court’s grants of a new trial and of postconviction relief. The appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion and applied incorrect legal standards when it granted a new trial based on recently obtained DNA and forensic critiques, and the court lacked jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief because it failed to follow statutory gatekeeping procedures and applied the wrong legal tests.

The Superior Court reviewed a trial court’s pretrial evidence rulings in the Commonwealth’s vehicular homicide prosecution of Joshua A. Rivera. The panel affirmed some exclusions and reversed others: it upheld exclusion of body-camera audio and a Facebook video, but reversed the exclusion of non-numeric lay descriptions of driving by certain eyewitnesses and reversal of the exclusion of drug-related items found in Rivera’s impounded vehicle. The court reasoned that in a criminal case where the prosecution must prove state of mind, lay witnesses may give contextual, non-numeric testimony about driving, and items found pursuant to a lawful warrant were relevant and not rendered inadmissible by the time gap while the car was impounded.

Three brothers were tried jointly and convicted of sexual offenses against a single complainant from events when she was a minor. The Superior Court reversed Damien’s sentence because the Commonwealth failed to specify the date of his alleged offense with sufficient particularity. The Court reversed Rian’s sentence and ordered a new trial because consolidation of his trial with Damien’s was an abuse of discretion and prosecutorial closing remarks improperly invited guilt by association. The Court affirmed Sean’s convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing because his convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and indecent assault must merge for sentencing.