Court Filings

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's May 21, 2025 order and granted Mary Trump's motion to compel discovery from Donald Trump in a breach-of-settlement-agreement case. Mary Trump asserted an affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement based on alleged false asset valuations in a 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that because the requested materials relate to that affirmative defense they are discoverable under CPLR 3101(a), which requires liberal disclosure of matter material and necessary to prepare for trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed defendant Mauro Vivar's conviction for attempted assault in the second degree, vacated his guilty plea, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The court found Vivar's appellate-waiver invalid because the trial court failed to explain appellate rights separately from rights lost by pleading guilty and relied only on defense counsel to confirm the written waiver. The court also held the suppression court should have granted Vivar's motion to suppress custodial statements to the arresting officer, and that that error was not harmless because the statements could have affected his decision to plead.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted petitioner Junarian Walker's motion for counsel fees under CPLR 8601. Walker, an incarcerated person in a residential mental health unit, had a 120-day special housing sanction imposed after threats; Supreme Court annulled the sanction as violating the HALT Act and SHU Exclusion Law but denied fees, finding the state's position substantially justified and citing special circumstances. The appellate court held the state's position was not substantially justified and no special circumstances made a fee award unjust, so the case is remitted to determine the fee amount.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must apply a deferential standard when reviewing the New York City Water Board’s rates for voluntary “excess water.” The court concluded that DEC should assess whether the Water Board’s excess-water rates serve the Board’s economic and public policy goals and have a rational basis, rather than applying the statutory “fair and reasonable” test used for entitlement water. The court granted DEC’s motion for summary judgment and modified the judgment accordingly.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court's denial of a motion to vacate an order of protection entered by default against Jonathan U. The Family Court had removed respondent's counsel from the courtroom when Jonathan failed to appear for an in-person hearing and declined available alternatives (such as allowing a virtual appearance). The appellate court held that this conduct deprived respondent of the fundamental right to be heard, so the default order of protection was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Appellate Division reversed part of a divorce judgment that enforced a 2015 postnuptial agreement and remitted the case for a hearing. The defendant had sought to set aside the agreement, alleging limited English, that his lawyer did not review the document and was later disbarred for fraud, and that he thought he was signing a business document. The appellate court found triable issues about whether the agreement was fair and about the circumstances of its execution, so the trial court's denial without a hearing could not stand and a new hearing is required to determine whether the postnuptial agreement should be set aside.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Supreme Court and granted defendant Joan Crema-Samalya's pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against her. The plaintiff sued Crema-Samalya after property restoration work allegedly performed by Five Boro Fire Restoration was found deficient, asserting claims for violation of General Business Law § 349 and fraud. The appellate court held the complaint failed to plead any materially misleading consumer-oriented conduct under GBL § 349 and did not plead fraud with the required particularity, so dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) was appropriate.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence defenses in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff had asserted his vehicle was stopped for about 10 seconds at a red light when the defendants' vehicle struck him from behind. The court found that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a presumption of negligence by the rear driver, and the defendants failed to present admissible evidence of a non-negligent explanation (such as an unanticipated brake failure), so the plaintiff met his prima facie burden.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division reversed a medical-malpractice judgment for a child born extremely premature after concluding the trial court erred by allowing a neurologist to testify that the defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the mother's preterm labor caused the child's later autism. Applying New York's Frye standard, the court held the proffered causation theory rested on observational associations and speculative inference rather than generally accepted scientific principles linking prematurity or low birth weight to autism. Because that testimony was improperly admitted, the court ordered a new trial and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal as academic.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted Drexel University's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claim against Drexel. The plaintiff was injured at his employer's workplace when equipment fell from a forklift operated by two Drexel students participating in Drexel's cooperative education program. The court held Drexel did not exercise sufficient control over the students' work or conduct to be vicariously liable as an employer or principal, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had granted summary judgment to Remede Consulting Group on damages against employee-defendant Jason Pitter for misuse of a corporate credit card. The court affirmed that Remede proved Pitter's liability on breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty because Pitter had received the corporate card policy, acknowledged it, and used the card for personal expenses without raising a triable issue of authorization. However, the appellate court held the plaintiff did not establish a precise, uncontested sum owed, so summary judgment on damages awarding $135,246.77 was denied and the judgment was reversed on that point.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court foreclosure judgment because the bank never obtained personal jurisdiction over the homeowner. Nationstar served the summons and complaint by leaving them with the homeowner's former attorney, who lacked authority to accept service. The court held the homeowner timely preserved the jurisdiction defense and that service on a former lawyer does not satisfy statutory service rules. Because service was defective, the foreclosure judgment, referee confirmation, and sale direction were vacated and the complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a Supreme Court order that had allowed Con-Kel Landscaping to reargue and then obtain summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claims. The plaintiff slipped on ice in an underground garage and sued Con-Kel, the snow-removal contractor. The appellate court held Con-Kel improperly raised for the first time on a reargument motion the argument that the plaintiff would be precluded from testifying (and thus could not make a case). Because reargument cannot present new legal theories or facts not previously offered, the reargument should have been denied and the grant of summary judgment vacated. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had denied a CPLR article 78 petition by the Westchester Plaza Tenants Coalition challenging DHCR determinations that upheld a Rent Administrator's decision permitting an owner to modify pool and related facilities. The court found the DHCR's conclusion that the pool was not an essential service was arbitrary and capricious because the record showed the landlord maintained the pool on May 29, 1974, and charging fees for club membership alone did not remove the facility from the regulatory definition of essential services. The matter is remitted to DHCR for a new determination consistent with the opinion.

The Appellate Division reversed a Family Court finding that the father willfully violated a child support order and vacated the related commitment order, remitting the case for a new hearing. The court concluded the father was deprived of his statutory and constitutional right to counsel because the Support Magistrate failed to secure a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver or to inquire about assigning new counsel after the father's assigned lawyer was relieved. Because the record shows the father protested lack of counsel and lacked basic understanding of proceedings, reversal was required regardless of the merits.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to defendants Eric and Leslie Gulkis in a personal injury action alleging liability under General Obligations Law § 11-100. The plaintiff claimed he was assaulted by an underage guest, Hellerman, at a party hosted at the Gulkis defendants' home and alleged the hosts unlawfully furnished alcohol to the minor. The appellate court held the hosts showed the minor was not intoxicated at the time of the assault and the plaintiff produced no evidence of intoxication, so the statutory claim against the hosts fails as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed a fraud, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing complaint against Madison Realty Capital and related defendants. The lower court had dismissed the action based on a release in a forbearance agreement and for failure to plead fraud, but the appellate court held the plaintiffs could amend as of right and that their amended complaint raised questions of fact whether the release was unfairly obtained and whether defendants made intentional misrepresentations to induce the plaintiffs to enter agreements. Accordingly, the defendants' CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss was denied.

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment on liability in a slip-and-fall personal injury case. The defendant failed to timely answer the complaint; when he served a late answer the plaintiff rejected it and moved for default judgment. The trial court had compelled the plaintiff to accept the late answer, but the appellate court found the defendant did not show a reasonable excuse for the delay (his counsel had no personal knowledge and the insurer’s affidavit was inadequate) and thus the trial court abused its discretion.

The Appellate Division reversed two Supreme Court orders that had granted Deutsche Bank summary judgment and an order of reference in a mortgage foreclosure against Andrew Benson. The bank submitted affidavits about mailing required 90-day RPAPL 1304 notices; a later affidavit said the servicer mailed the notices in-house, but an earlier affidavit had stated a third-party vendor did the mailings. The court found the contradiction created a triable issue about strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 and that the plaintiff’s counsel’s reply did not cure the discrepancy, so summary judgment was improper.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted summary judgment dismissing a negligence complaint against defendant Kathleen P. Wallace. The plaintiff alleged injuries from a facial treatment Wallace performed while employed by David's New Beginnings, LLC. The appellate court held that Wallace was not entitled to dismissal simply because the employer might be vicariously liable; an employee can be personally liable for torts even if the employer is also liable. Because Wallace did not meet her initial summary judgment burden, the court denied her motion.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a trial court order and granted summary judgment to defendants Dr. Steven Athanail and Lutheran Medical Center in a medical malpractice suit. The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to timely diagnose and treat a colonic perforation after a May 2016 hospital admission, but the defendants produced expert proof showing no departure from the standard of care. The plaintiff's opposing expert offered only conclusory and speculative assertions and failed to confront the defendants' experts with specific, record-supported reasoning, so no triable issue of fact existed.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo in a foreclosure-related case and denied Wells Fargo's motion. The court held Wells Fargo failed to prove strict compliance with RPAPL 1304's notice requirements because its affiant did not establish knowledge of the third-party vendor's mailing procedures or integration of the vendor's records into the bank's business records. The court also rejected Wells Fargo's claim that the loan was not a covered primary-residence loan, finding plaintiff did not prove the property was never the borrower's primary residence.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a lower court order that had remanded an NYC Housing Authority denial of a remaining family member (RFM) grievance. The petitioner, Eric Camacho, sought succession after his aunt (the tenant) died; NYCHA denied his claim because he did not meet the policy requirement of at least 12 months of continuous authorized occupancy prior to the tenant's death. The court held NYCHA's denial had a rational basis, rejected hardship and estoppel arguments, and found that a later change in NYCHA policy would not have altered the outcome.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury complaint brought under New York's Adult Survivors Act (CPLR 214-j). The plaintiff alleged sexual abuse by a Syracuse University employee while he worked at a university-affiliated fraternity house. The court held the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded lack of consent and therefore alleged conduct that would constitute a Penal Law sex offense, so the claims were timely revived under the ASA. The case is remitted to Supreme Court for consideration of other dismissal grounds the lower court did not decide.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a conviction entered after defendant pleaded guilty to weapons and drug possession because the court improperly required defendant to waive his right to appeal as a condition of a court-initiated plea and because the trial court erred in denying suppression of physical evidence. The panel found the waiver invalid and concluded that the prosecution failed to prove defendant voluntarily consented to the frisk and search; body-worn camera footage contradicted the officer's testimony. The plea was vacated, the suppression motion granted, the indictment dismissed, and the case remitted for CPL 470.45 proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a resentencing of Phillip Owens, who had been resentenced after his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The court unanimously concluded the resentence was incorrect as a matter of law and sent the case back to Monroe County Supreme Court for a new resentencing. The opinion is brief and references an identical memorandum issued in a companion appeal, indicating the appellate court found legal error in the prior resentencing proceeding warranting reversal and remand.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted defendant Rochester Rev Holdings summary judgment in a dispute over ownership of real property under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) articles 6 and 15. The court held that defendant failed to meet its initial burden for summary judgment because its own submissions (including a lease with a purchase option and an affidavit indicating knowledge that plaintiff was a tenant) created triable issues of fact about plaintiff's title claims and defendant's counterclaims. The case was sent back with the complaint reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the Chief Administrator of the Courts has the exclusive constitutional authority to appoint Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogates' Courts. The case arose from Erie County Surrogate Acea M. Mosey seeking a declaration that she had appointment power under the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. The court concluded those statute-based appointment provisions are superseded by New York Constitution article VI, § 28 and implementing law and regulations vesting appointment authority in the Chief Administrator because the positions are nonjudicial officers within the Unified Court System.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed claims against The William Powell Company for lack of personal jurisdiction in an asbestos-exposure wrongful-death action. The court held that the defendant, which moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on absence of long-arm jurisdiction, failed to meet its initial burden on the summary judgment standard. Because the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that plaintiff could not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3), the motion was denied and the complaint against The William Powell Company was reinstated.