Court Filings

The Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ directing the Contra Costa County Superior Court to vacate its minute order that denied a petition for mandate brought by four teachers challenging West Contra Costa Unified School District’s staffing practices. The trial court had denied the writ based on the District’s claim it was impossible to fully staff classrooms with credentialed teachers. The appellate court held the District failed to prove it had exhausted statutory procedures (including seeking waivers from state entities) before asserting impossibility, so the defense was premature and the denial of the writ was reversed for entry of an order denying the petition.

The Court of Appeal granted the People’s petition for a writ of mandate and ordered the trial court to vacate its August 12, 2025 denial of an amended statement of disqualification (ASD) and to disqualify Judge Samah Shouka. The People sought disqualification because Judge Shouka had been a Riverside County deputy district attorney in the homicide unit and had participated in staffing and charging decisions relevant to a pending Racial Justice Act evidentiary hearing about whether the district attorney’s office disproportionately files death-penalty or special-circumstance charges. The appellate court concluded that a person aware of those facts might reasonably doubt the judge’s ability to be impartial, requiring disqualification under CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a putative class action against owners of a Red Roof Inn asserting violations of Civil Code § 1940.1. The trial court had denied certification because it believed each class member would need to prove the hotel was their personal “primary residence,” making individualized issues predominant. The appellate court held that the statute requires inquiry into whether the hotel is a “residential hotel” (a hotel-wide question), not individualized proof that each guest treated the hotel as their own primary residence. The case is remanded for reconsideration of class certification.

A jury convicted Jan Curtis Harzan of communicating with and arranging to meet a minor for sexual purposes after he messaged and agreed to meet an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old. Before trial the court ruled evidence of alleged sexual misconduct by Harzan from the 1970s would be excluded in the prosecution’s case-in-chief but could be admitted if Harzan asserted an entrapment defense. To avoid that prejudicial evidence, Harzan declined the entrapment defense and was convicted. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the court’s conditioning of exclusion violated Harzan’s constitutional right to present a defense, though the evidence supporting guilt was otherwise substantial.

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded a judgment confirming a large arbitration award because unresolved factual disputes remain about whether the individuals who filed and prosecuted the suit were authorized to represent the plaintiff limited liability company. The trial court had ordered arbitration and later confirmed the arbitrator’s award for respondent NNN Capital Fund I, LLC. Appellants argued the purported “liquidating trustees” (Tyrone Wynfield and later Mary Jo Saul) lacked standing under the company’s operating agreement, so neither the arbitrator nor the court had jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded the standing question was unresolved and directed the trial court to decide it and then either dismiss or reinstate the arbitration confirmation accordingly.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Victor Valley Community College District in Jessie Walton’s suit alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and related claims. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s curable declaration defect, and erred in holding Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed Government Claims Act notice, and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its summary judgment, grant summary adjudication only on Walton’s Civil Code claim she did not contest, and deny summary adjudication on the remaining claims for trial setting.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment denying The Retail Property Trust’s request to have its Brea Mall property reassessed under Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) based on COVID-19 related closures and restricted access. The assessor summarily denied the trust’s calamity applications, the Assessment Appeals Board upheld that denial, and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (direct or indirect) before reassessment relief is available. The appellate court agreed, finding neither government closure orders nor the virus itself constitute the required physical damage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed as moot the appeal by Sebastian C., who challenged a juvenile court’s denial of his request to transfer from a secure youth treatment facility to his adult sister’s home as a "less restrictive program" under Welfare & Institutions Code section 875. The appellate court concluded that clarification of the statutory meaning was warranted: a family home can qualify as a less restrictive program when supervision and services are provided or coordinated by a community-based nonresidential program. Because Sebastian was later placed in less restrictive settings and the challenged order no longer affects him, the court dismissed the appeal without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in this case.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order allowing the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to enter private properties under California’s precondemnation entry statutes to conduct environmental, cultural, and geological investigations for the Delta Conveyance Project. The court held that those statutes authorize any public entity that is authorized to acquire property by eminent domain to perform such testing without first satisfying separate Water Code “project approval” provisions that apply to commencing a classic condemnation. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve I, finding the statutes constitutionally adequate.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial-court order awarding attorney’s fees to respondent Ponani Sukumar after the court dismissed appellant Afshin Zand’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Zand argued the anti-SLAPP ruling and subsequent fee awards were void or procedurally defective, but the appellate panel held those contentions were meritless, largely barred by law of the case or forfeited, and improper collateral attacks. The panel also found the appeal frivolous and imposed $10,000 in sanctions payable to the clerk, granted Sukumar appellate fees under section 425.16(c)(1) to be fixed on remand, and remanded to determine certain fee amounts.

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded defendant Jose Gerardo Espiritu’s conviction for sexual offenses because the trial court failed to follow the process required by Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 during jury selection. Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who identified herself as a nurse. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s stated reason (that the juror was a nurse) without determining whether that reason was a presumptively invalid ground under section 231.7(e)(10). Because the court did not make the required inquiry into presumptively invalid categories, the appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and ordered the County to meet and confer with the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA) about the County’s decision to outsource security work. PPOA had sought a writ of mandate after ERCOM and the superior court concluded the parties’ memorandum of understanding (MOU) waived PPOA’s bargaining rights as to such reorganization decisions. The appellate court held the MOU did not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the statutory right to meet and confer about outsourcing, because the MOU’s notice and management-rights language was ambiguous and did not explicitly waive MMBA rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for Ghilotti Construction in a suit by ironworker Leonardo Cordero, who was injured while working for subcontractor Camblin Steel on a bridge project. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which presumes a hirer of an independent contractor delegates responsibility for workplace safety to the contractor. The appellate court held California safety regulations (including Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1711) do not create a nondelegable duty that defeats Privette, and Cordero failed to raise a triable issue that Ghilotti retained and exercised control over Camblin’s work in a way that affirmatively contributed to the injury.

The Court of Appeal reviewed a 2024 trial-court proceeding in which the trial court attempted to correct an error on the 2019 abstract of judgment for Victor Lopez Sanchez. The appellate court held that the 2019 error was a clerical mistake (a math/recording error that included county-jail misdemeanor time in the stated state-prison total) and therefore the trial court was not required to conduct full resentencing. The denial of a Romero motion and denial of full resentencing were affirmed. However, the trial court exceeded its authority by altering misdemeanor terms (reducing and making them concurrent), so that portion of the 2024 order was vacated and the case remanded to amend the abstract to reflect the lawful 2019 sentence.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part a trial-court dismissal of an attorney-plaintiff’s lawsuit against Wells Fargo and a branch employee. The court held the complaint failed to state breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and negligent hiring claims because the bank agreement and pleading did not support those theories, and amendment would be futile. But the court concluded the negligent misrepresentation claim survived: the complaint alleged a bank employee told the plaintiff the check had “cleared” despite lacking a reasonable basis and after the plaintiff warned the bank the check might be fraudulent. The dismissal is reversed only as to negligent misrepresentation; all other rulings are affirmed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction that would have enjoined a family planning provider from offering abortion services at a parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs. The CC&Rs were adopted and recorded in 1991 by the Tulare Local Hospital District and expressly prohibited abortion clinics within the Tulare Medical Center development. The court held the prohibition is unenforceable because (1) the District’s adoption and recording of the CC&Rs is government action that interferes with the fundamental right of reproductive choice under the California Constitution and (2) Civil Code section 53, read with section 531 and the Unruh Act, voids recorded covenants that indirectly limit property use because of a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act (the decision to have an abortion).

A jury convicted Jazz Bradley of multiple sexual offenses, including forcible rape of two victims (one aged 16) and unlawful sexual intercourse with another 16-year-old. The trial court imposed heavy sentences under California’s One Strike law, the Habitual Sexual Offender law, and Three Strikes, including consecutive life terms and determinate terms for robbery and unlawful intercourse. On appeal Bradley challenged several sentencing decisions. The court affirmed the judgment but modified it: it rejected the dual-use claim about the robbery upper term, but held that the trial court erred by imposing and staying additional sentences under the Habitual Sexual Offender statute and by imposing stayed additional One Strike terms on the same counts; those stayed/duplicative sentences were stricken.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded. The Gonzalez family sued a California mortuary after a Texas medical examiner misidentified a body, causing the family to bury the wrong person and have their loved one cremated. A jury found for the mortuary on negligence and contract claims, finding the mortuary proved the affirmative defense of impracticability. The court held the defense of impracticability is equitable and must be decided by a judge, not a jury, so the contract verdict is reversed and remanded for a bench determination of the defense and, if necessary, a damages trial. The court affirmed that only the decedent’s wife had standing to sue on the contract.

The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of Pedro Thomas DeLeon Tzul for the murders of Martha and Antonio Garcia and directed a new trial. The trial court had excluded a handwritten note found at the scene—in which the author said he found the victim having sex with her brother and that this filled him with rage—during the People’s case under Evidence Code section 352, effectively forcing Tzul to testify to get the note admitted. The appellate court held the note was highly probative of provocation and should not have been excluded; admission during the People’s case likely would have produced a more favorable result for Tzul.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Lavell Tyrone Player’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The resentencing court, after an evidentiary hearing, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Player was the actual killer (and alternatively a major participant acting with reckless indifference), making him ineligible for resentencing. The appellate panel held that a jury’s earlier “not true” findings on a personal firearm enhancement and robbery special circumstance did not collaterally estop the resentencing court from finding Player was the shooter, relying on People v. Santamaria and subsequent authority. The court also found substantial evidence—principally the testimony of accomplice Walter Fonteno and corroborating witnesses—supports the actual-killer finding.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the family court’s orders vacating a default judgment in a marital dissolution case and denying the petitioner’s request for a statement of decision, then remanded for further proceedings. The court held the default judgment exceeded the relief requested in the form petition because the petition left property division items as “to be determined,” so the entry of a default awarding specific property violated the respondent’s due process right to notice. The court also concluded Family Code set-aside provisions and Code of Civil Procedure section 580 both apply, found the record supported mistake/lack of notice, and directed amendment of the petition and an opportunity to answer.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Pengfei Philip Chi’s petition challenging the DMV’s suspension of his driver’s license after he refused a chemical test following a DUI arrest. Chi argued the DMV hearing officer acted as a prosecutor rather than a neutral adjudicator, violating his due process rights. The appellate court held that the DMV’s post-2022 policy requires hearing officers to act as neutral factfinders who may introduce evidence, ask clarifying questions, and rule on objections, and that combining investigative and adjudicative functions does not, by itself, create an unacceptable risk of bias. Because Chi presented no evidence of a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias, the court affirmed the judgment.

The California Supreme Court reversed the defendant Omar Richard Deen’s death-row conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial. Deen was convicted of murdering his mother and a police chief, and a capital trial proceeded in competency, guilt, sanity, and penalty phases. The Court found reversible error in the trial court’s handling of a defense challenge for cause to a prospective juror (Juror No. 5). The trial court applied an unduly narrow standard, accepted the juror’s self-assessment without properly weighing the totality of circumstances, and failed to make the findings necessary for meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a postjudgment order in a divorce case that awarded the wife $12,500 in attorney’s fees (rather than about $49,000 she sought) after she prevailed on a dispute over the family home. The trial court reduced the requested fees based on the parties’ limited finances, overlitigation, and the reasonableness of the fees. The appellate court held the family law court did not err: when a marital settlement agreement contains a prevailing-party fee clause, the trial court may still consider Family Code factors (including ability to pay) in fixing the amount of fees, and it did not abuse its discretion here.

The Court of Appeal granted Alonzo Devon Melson’s petition for habeas corpus and vacated his conviction for crimes arising from a 2017 gang-related shooting. The court found that two prosecution eyewitnesses gave trial testimony that was false about what they had told police after the shooting, and the prosecutor failed to correct those statements. Defense counsel at the retrial also failed to adequately prepare to impeach those witnesses. Under controlling precedent, the false testimony was material and the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt it did not contribute to the verdict.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court judgment that sustained defendants’ demurrer and dismissed a qui tam claim under the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Relator Jamal Albarghouti filed a sealed complaint alleging false claims involving Los Angeles public entities, served the Attorney General by certified mail, and waited more than 60 days before serving defendants. The trial court held the complaint was improperly unsealed and dismissed it. The appellate court held the CFCA creates a 60-day default seal period that lifts automatically absent a government motion to extend the seal, that failure to allege compliance with the seal rules is not grounds for demurrer, and directed the trial court to overrule the demurrer and proceed.

The Court of Appeal granted The Merchant of Tennis’s petition for extraordinary writ and directed the trial court to modify its curative notice scheme regarding roughly 954 individual settlement agreements (ISAs) obtained by Merchant from putative class members. The trial court had found the ISAs voidable as procured by fraud or coercion and ordered a curative notice advising members they could rescind and join the class without having to immediately return settlement payments (though payments could be offset against any later recovery). The appellate majority concluded the trial court must follow California rescission statutes and preserved the judgment, adding that each side bear its own costs on appeal.

Mallory Harcourt sued Tesla after her toddler climbed into her newly purchased Model X, started it, and the vehicle struck her. She proceeded only on a strict product liability design-defect theory using the consumer expectations test. After Harcourt rested, the trial court granted Tesla's motion for nonsuit, concluding ordinary consumers could not form minimum safety expectations about how the Model X would perform in the unusual scenario of a toddler starting the car, particularly given the vehicle's complex, nonstandard systems. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the consumer expectations test inapplicable and noting Harcourt waived the alternative risk-benefit theory.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of San Rafael in a lawsuit by 16-year-old Kaylin Pagan, a passenger injured when her friend’s car hydroplaned and went down an embankment. Pagan sued the City for a dangerous condition of public property, alleging failures to warn of a sharp wet curve and lack of barriers. The trial court found the roadway’s wet condition and resulting hazard were open and obvious as a matter of law, and Pagan’s later expert theory about a defective pavement surface was not pleaded and relied on inadmissible or unsupported expert opinion. The appellate court agreed and affirmed judgment for the City.