Court Filings

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas denied Randall Bolivar’s pro se petition for a writ of mandamus in a Cameron County district court case. Bolivar asked the appellate court to order the trial court to perform ministerial duties of setting, hearing, and ruling on pending matters. The appellate court concluded Bolivar failed to show both a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and the lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and he also did not supply a sufficient record as required by the mandamus rules. For these reasons, the petition was denied.

The court granted a petition for writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its January 7, 2026 order that allowed a defendant to add four third-party defendants late in a long-running ownership and fraud dispute. The appellate court held the trial judge abused his discretion because adding new parties at that stage—after nearly five years of litigation and many prior trial settings—would unreasonably delay the case; the trial court’s ruling to vacate the March 23, 2026 setting was the primary harm. The court found the proposed third parties were not indispensable and that the delay was not reasonable under the case history.

The Texas Thirteenth Court of Appeals reviewed Homer Esquivel Jr.’s appeal after the trial court revoked his deferred-adjudication community supervision and adjudicated him guilty of two controlled-substance and firearm offenses, sentencing him to concurrent ten-year terms. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no arguable grounds for appeal; the court conducted an independent review, found no reversible error, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court corrected the judgment to reflect that Esquivel pled true to count 14 (not 15), granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and explained appellant’s rights to seek discretionary review.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered against Access Dental Management, LLC (ADM) in favor of June’s Boutique, LLC. June attempted service on ADM by first trying the named agent at a Dallas address, then seeking substitute service via the Texas Secretary of State. The court held the record did not demonstrate ADM’s registered agent or registered address matched the Dallas address used for service, and the Secretary of State’s certificate did not establish the forwarding address required by statute. Because strict service requirements were not met, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and the default judgment is void.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Walter Green Jr.’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Green had previously been convicted of continuous family violence and later filed an Article 11.07 habeas application challenging his conviction and sentence. The trial court recommended dismissal as a subsequent application and forwarded its findings to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which dismissed the application. Green attempted to appeal the trial court’s findings that were sent to the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the appellate court concluded it lacks jurisdiction over postconviction matters and dismissed the appeal after Green failed to show grounds to proceed.

The court reversed a jury verdict awarding noneconomic and exemplary damages to Candace Williams after finding that her malpractice claim was based solely on the emotional harms of an unplanned pregnancy that arose from a doctor’s failure to perform a tubal ligation. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Noe v. Velasco (2024), the court held that pregnancy-related noneconomic harms (including mental anguish from deciding to terminate) are not legally compensable because pregnancy is inseparable from bringing about a child’s life. Because Williams offered no other compensable damages, the judgment was reversed and judgment rendered that she take nothing.

The Second District Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Reginald Munoz’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after being warned twice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited the appellant’s noncompliance with Rule 42.3(c) and related rules, and referenced the Texas Supreme Court’s 2015 fee order. The court ordered Munoz to pay all costs of the appeal and issued a per curiam memorandum opinion dismissing the case on April 23, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Michael Dean Samuelson’s pro se appeal from his convictions for theft and possession with intent to deliver because the trial-court certifications, which Samuelson signed, state his case was a plea bargain and that he has no right of appeal. The court gave Samuelson until March 27, 2026 to show grounds to continue the appeal and received no response. Relying on the trial-court certifications and applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent, the panel dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits.

The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment declaring valid and enforceable a 2018 contract conveying a 25% interest in income-producing property to two law firms (later assigned to HPGM, LLC). Price’s attempt to defeat summary judgment relied on untimely, stricken amended pleadings and did not respond with evidence to many no-evidence challenges to her originally pleaded claims and defenses. The court also upheld the award of approximately $300,000 in attorney’s fees to HPGM, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion given HPGM’s billing records and counsel’s testimony about rates, services, and the receivership and bankruptcy work that advanced the declaratory claim.

The court dismissed pro se appellant Isabelle Edwards’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Edwards sought review of the trial court’s August 5, 2025 order granting KFS Lewisville LLC’s motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a and awarding attorneys’ fees, but the trial court expressly stated the fee amount had not yet been determined and that its order was not final. The appellate court concluded the order neither finally disposed of every claim nor was an appealable interlocutory order, so the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction after Edwards failed to respond to the court’s notice to show grounds to continue the appeal.

The court dismissed an appeal from a county court-at-law involving matters concerning M.P. and A.P. because the appellant failed to pay the required $205 filing fee after her claim of indigence was rejected by the trial court. The appellate court gave notice and a deadline to pay, warned dismissal would follow under the appellate rules, and the fee was not paid by the deadline. The court denied as moot the appellant's pending motions and ordered the appellant to pay all costs of the appeal.

The court granted the father's request to dismiss his own appeal in a child custody case. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the child and filed to terminate parental rights; instead the parties reached an agreed judgment appointing the Department permanent managing conservator while mother and father remained possessory conservators. The father, incarcerated at the time, initially appealed but after new appellate counsel secured a hearing and the father waived his motion for new trial and the appeal, he moved to dismiss the appeal, which the court granted under the appellate rules.

The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because her notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court signed the final order on 2025-06-24, and the notice of appeal was required within 20 days (by 2025-07-14) for this accelerated appeal pathway. Mother did not file her notice until 2026-03-17, and she did not respond to the court's request to show grounds to retain the appeal. Because no timely notice or extension was filed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals of the Second Appellate District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s December 10, 2025 order terminating Father’s parental rights to A.M. The Department of Family and Protective Services had petitioned to terminate under multiple statutory grounds. Father challenged one predicate ground and alleged due-process defects in the Department’s timelines and service plan, but he did not challenge the other independent predicate findings or preserve the service-plan complaint for appeal. Because at least one unchallenged statutory ground and the best-interest finding supported termination, the appellate court affirmed.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals considered Charles Wayne Wilson’s original petition for a writ of mandamus and his request for temporary relief arising from the 235th District Court of Cooke County (trial court no. CV25-00201). In a per curiam memorandum opinion, the appellate court denied both the petition and the motion for temporary relief without an extended opinion. The court delivered its decision on April 23, 2026, leaving the trial court’s matters undisturbed and denying extraordinary relief from the appellate court.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Gene Anthony Tutt’s convictions and 38-year sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and occlusion assault. Tutt complained on appeal that (1) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements to an officer as hearsay and (2) the State failed to prove he was the same person convicted of two prior felonies used to enhance punishment. The court held the victim’s statements were admissible as excited utterances and that documentary evidence (judgments, identification numbers, social security number, booking/ten-print records) and fingerprint comparison sufficiently linked Tutt to the prior Missouri convictions.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed Rae Neel’s suit against the City of Hurst for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Neel sued after tripping on an uneven section of public sidewalk and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The appeals court held the sidewalk condition was not a “special defect” and, under the premises-defect standard, Neel’s own deposition showed she knew of the sidewalk’s condition before the fall, defeating her claim of lack of knowledge and preserving the City’s immunity.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Carolyn Rodriguez’s conviction for hindering an official proceeding by disorderly conduct (Tex. Penal Code § 38.13). Rodriguez argued the statute was unconstitutional, the court erred in quashing a subpoena for County Judge Tim O’Hare, the jury charge was defective, and the evidence was insufficient. The court rejected her facial and applied First Amendment challenges, found no abuse of discretion in quashing O’Hare’s subpoena, determined the jury charge contained one harmless omission in mental-state wording but no reversible error, and held the evidence (including an audiovisual recording and deputy testimony) was sufficient to support the conviction.

The court dismissed Brenton Autwavious Smith’s appeal from his murder conviction because the trial court certified this was a plea-bargain case in which the defendant has no right of appeal. The appellate court gave Smith a month to show grounds to continue the appeal after notifying him of the certification, but he did not respond. Because the trial-court certification showing no right to appeal was part of the record and Smith had waived appeal rights in his plea paperwork, the appellate court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The court considered Anthony Lopez’s appeal after the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing his dram-shop, respondeat superior assault, negligence, and gross-negligence claims against CBE Extreme Nightlife FW, LLC (Old School Texas). The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Lopez’s negligence and gross-negligence claims because they were preempted by the Texas Dram Shop Act and affirmed dismissal of the respondeat superior assault claim because Lopez failed to challenge every ground supporting summary judgment. The court reversed summary judgment on the dram-shop claim, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that Lopez’s extreme intoxication proximately caused his eye injury, and remanded for further proceedings.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. Highland Village Management (HVM) had obtained a temporary injunction preventing appellants from using or transferring funds or property allegedly taken from HVM. Appellants argued on appeal that HVM failed to prove irreparable injury and that newly revealed facts required dissolution. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the original injunction and found appellants presented no new evidence or changed circumstances at the dissolution hearings, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dissolve the injunction.

The First District of Texas dismissed Star Construction Services, Sandra Scherer (d/b/a Star Construction Services), and Robert Scherer’s appeal because the appellants neither established indigence nor paid required appellate fees and failed to respond to the court’s notice. The court cited Texas rules and statutes governing fee payment and its authority to dismiss for nonpayment and failure to prosecute. Because appellants did not timely explain why they should not pay or actually pay the fees, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded. The dispute concerned interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement between M-I L.L.C. and Texas International Terminals (TXIT) about lease and materials-handling payments and removal of equipment. The trial court had added CPI-based price adjustments and ordered M-I to remove certain equipment, relying on extrinsic course-of-dealing evidence. The appellate court held the settlement language was unambiguous, forbade using extrinsic evidence to rewrite the agreement, and concluded the trial court improperly added and altered terms instead of enforcing the agreement as written.

The Chief Justice issued a concurring opinion in a mandamus original proceeding emphasizing that the petition contains citations and quotations that appear to be fabricated by artificial intelligence. The opinion warns that submitting briefs with nonexistent or misrepresented authorities—whether produced by AI or not—constitutes a serious breach of candor under Texas appellate rules and applicable case law, and may prompt corrective actions such as striking the brief or reporting counsel to the State Bar. The concurrence urges attorneys to verify AI-generated research and quotations before filing.

The Texas First Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Paula M. Miller challenging a Fort Bend County Democratic Party Chairwoman’s determination that Miller was ineligible for the general election. The court explained that the relator bears the burden to file a complete appellate record demonstrating entitlement to mandamus relief under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7(a). Because Miller did not file a complete record, the court denied mandamus relief and dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas denied Houston Pipe Line Company LP's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction. The appellate court declined to disturb the trial court's decision, lifted its prior stay issued October 7, 2025, and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The court issued a short per curiam memorandum opinion denying relief without extended discussion.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Blackbuck Petroleum PropCo I LLC and AGP Energy Services LLC from a trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The parties executed a mediated settlement and a signed settlement, release, and confidentiality agreement that expressly resolved all past and present claims, including the pending appeal, and required dismissals with prejudice. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; appellants did not oppose. The court granted the unopposed motion and dismissed the appeal, taxing costs against the appellants.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a dispute between John Dickerson and Atlas Sand Company, LLC after the parties jointly moved to dismiss. The parties agreed each would bear their own appellate costs as permitted by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court granted the joint motion and dismissed the appeals without reaching the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial-court judgment ordering specific performance of a written buy-sell agreement requiring Joann Crawford to convey a parcel to Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC (an assignee of Trails End). The trial court found Buffalo Creek ready, willing, and able to perform, that Crawford breached the contract and conveyed the property with knowledge of the pending suit and lis pendens, and it adjusted the sale proceeds for liens, taxes, life-estate compensation, costs, and fees. The appellate court presumed the trial record supported the findings (Crawford failed to timely request the reporter’s record) and found no reversible error in the trial court’s award or its accounting adjustments.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Jewlian Smith's petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed as moot his emergency request for a temporary stay of trial-court proceedings. The appellate court, in a short memorandum opinion, concluded that relief by writ was not warranted and that the requested temporary stay was moot because circumstances no longer required emergency intervention. The opinion was issued as an original mandamus proceeding arising from Travis County and was filed April 23, 2026.