Court Filings

The Texas Court of Appeals granted habeas relief to James Robert Lawson, IV, holding that a capias order issued August 29, 2025, in a child-support enforcement proceeding was void because it was entered after Lawson removed the underlying case to federal court. The court explained that once a defendant files a proper notice of removal and files it in the state court, the state court loses jurisdiction and must not proceed further unless the federal court remands. Because the capias was entered during the removal period and before remand, the court ordered the trial court to vacate the capias and related orders.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and TD Ameritrade, Inc. challenging a lower-court action in Travis County. The court issued a short memorandum opinion simply stating the petition is denied and citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No extended reasoning or factual background appears in the document; the decision is a procedural denial of extraordinary relief rather than a merits ruling on underlying claims.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Alisa Ann Golz and dismissed her emergency motion for temporary relief as moot. The court issued a short memorandum opinion without extended discussion, simply directing that the petition be denied and the temporary relief motion dismissed under the appellate rules governing emergency pleadings and relief. No further reasoning or factual findings are stated in the published entry.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Tamer F. Morsi on April 23, 2026, challenging proceedings in a Bexar County district court case. The appellate court held that Morsi did not show the trial court clearly abused its discretion or violated a duty imposed by law, nor that he lacked an adequate appellate remedy. Because the petition failed to meet the high standard for extraordinary relief, the court denied the mandamus petition and found the request for temporary relief moot.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury conviction of Ronald Wayne Stivers, Jr. for failing to register as a sex offender. Stivers argued the trial court erred by admitting a prior Illinois conviction as extraneous-offense evidence and that its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value. The court held the prior conviction was admissible to prove Stivers knew of his duty to register — a required mental-state element — and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The opinion also sua sponte corrected the judgment to cite Article 62.102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed EZ Automotive and Towing SVC LLC's appeal from the trial court's summary judgment because the judgment was not final or appealable. Recaman Auto Group obtained summary judgment on its declaratory-judgment claim about ownership of a Chevrolet Silverado, but the trial court expressly left Recaman's request for attorney’s fees undecided. Because the fee claim remained pending and the order lacked finality language, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas struck Kevin McBride’s appellate brief for failure to substantially comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure after multiple notices and an opportunity to cure. McBride’s March 30, 2026 brief was deficient—containing conclusory, bulleted statements without citation to the record or legal authority—so the court treated the filing as if no brief had been filed and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court explained that liberal construction of procedural rules does not require the court to perform a party’s legal research or factual hunting.

The court reviewed an appeal by Y.S., who filed a petition to change her minor child’s name and a sworn Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The trial court ordered her to pay reduced costs of $400 after an interview with county staff, but did not hold a formal oral evidentiary hearing or make detailed findings required by Rule 145. The appellate court concluded the record contained uncontroverted evidence that Y.S. could not afford court costs, that the trial court failed to follow Rule 145 procedures, and therefore reversed the order and directed the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed without paying costs or fees.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District) denied Levi Hardy’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a successor judge’s order granting a new trial in a divorce case after a three-day bench trial. Levi argued the successor judge (who did not preside over the bench trial) abused discretion by granting a new trial without receiving evidence or stating reasons. The court declined to extend Texas mandamus precedent that allows merits review of new-trial orders after jury trials to new-trial orders following bench trials, concluding extraordinary circumstances were not shown and that a prompt retrial here outweighed the harms of interlocutory review.

The El Paso Court of Appeals denied a petition for mandamus seeking to overturn a probate court order disqualifying attorney Tony Aguilar from representing the estate of Judith Wheatley. The court held that Aguilar’s deposition and other evidence showed he was likely an essential fact witness about how six deeds conveying the Poki Roni Ranch came to be in Judy’s possession. Because his testimony could be necessary and adverse to Travis’s estate, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in disqualifying him under the advocate-witness rule. The court therefore refused to grant extraordinary mandamus relief.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its new-trial order in a personal-injury case. The trial court had granted a new trial after a jury found the defendant did not negligently cause a rear-end collision. The appeals court held the new-trial order was facially insufficient because it relied improperly on the idea that negligence was conclusively shown (a basis for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not a new trial) and failed to explain how the evidence undermined the jury’s finding as required for a factual-sufficiency-based new trial.

The court granted the parties' agreed motion to dismiss the appeal and the plaintiff's underlying claims with prejudice. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing Appellant Eric Erdeljac's claims against appellees Kalahari Development LLC, KR Acquisitions, LLC (d/b/a Kalahari Resorts & Conventions), and Gerson Velasquez with prejudice, dismissed the appeal with prejudice, and denied as moot any other pending motions. Court costs are taxed against the party incurring them. No opinion was issued.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed William Mitchell Keen’s conviction and nine-year sentence for indecency with a child. Keen’s court-appointed appellate lawyer filed an Anders brief saying there were no arguable grounds for reversal, and Keen filed a pro se brief. The appeals court conducted a full review of the record, the Anders brief, and the pro se brief, found no reversible error or arguable grounds for appeal, and declined to appoint new counsel for further briefing. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals reviewed an appeal from the revocation of Tiffany Rhae Whittley’s community supervision for a third-degree felony conviction (intentional injury to a child). The trial court found multiple supervision violations, revoked probation, and sentenced her to three years confinement. Counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal is frivolous; Whittley did not file a pro se response. The appellate court reviewed the record, found no nonfrivolous issues, corrected the trial court’s judgment to reflect the four violations actually found (a, b1, d, p), and affirmed the judgment as modified.

The Texas court denied the relator's petition for a writ of mandamus and all related emergency and ancillary requests. The court considered the petition, an emergency motion for temporary relief, the State's response, a motion to amend the petition, and a motion for transcript, and concluded none warranted relief. The court also lifted its prior stay of trial-court proceedings, allowing the underlying criminal case to proceed in the trial court.

The Court of Appeals denied Morgan Alyse Foster's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a probate court order about control and disposition of a decedent's remains and dismissed her emergency request to stay that order as moot. Foster had sought to prohibit cremation and preserve the remains pending appellate review, but the opposing party asserted the cremation had already occurred before the petition was filed. Because the emergency relief sought was moot, the court declined to grant mandamus and denied the request for costs and attorney's fees by the real party in interest.

The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Raymond T. DeMeritt’s motion to terminate child-support withholding. DeMeritt, declared the father in a 1985 legitimation decree, sought termination claiming he had overpaid and that garnishment was improper. The Office of the Attorney General submitted accounting reports showing DeMeritt owed arrears and interest; the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found DeMeritt owed $30,990.57 as of January 6, 2025. The appeals court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, noting DeMeritt failed to rebut the OAG’s accounting or meet his burden of proof.

The court dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by David Disraeli challenging a justice court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration clause. The Third Court of Appeals concluded it lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a justice of the peace or justice court unless issuance is necessary to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction, and the relator did not show that necessity. Because the jurisdictional prerequisite was not met, the court dismissed the mandamus petition and all pending motions as moot.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Sean Harper’s appeal from his conviction for failing to comply with sex-offender registration requirements because the trial-court certification in the record indicated Harper waived his right to appeal. The clerk’s record showed a not-guilty plea and a jury verdict of guilty, while a separate punishment plea agreement limited appeals and contained Harper’s written waiver. The court reviewed both clerk’s and reporter’s records, concluded the certification did not show a right to appeal, gave Harper an opportunity to supply an amended certification, and dismissed the appeal after no amended certification or response was filed.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ram Country of Fort Stockton, LLC’s interlocutory appeal from a county court’s order appointing an arbitrator because the court lacks jurisdiction to review orders that merely appoint an arbitrator under the Federal Arbitration Act. Ram Country alternatively asked the court to treat the filing as a petition for a writ of mandamus; the court considered that request but denied mandamus because Ram Country failed to show it lacked an adequate appellate remedy and did not meet procedural certification requirements. The court relied on Texas precedent holding appointment orders are not appealable interlocutory orders.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-answer default judgment entered by the County Court at Law No. 10 in Bexar County in favor of Investment Retrievers, Inc. The Rodriguezes, appearing pro se, challenged the default judgment on three grounds: violation of due process, the absence of a hearing, and that their SSI benefits are exempt from execution. The appeals court found the record showed proper service and compliance with rules for default judgments, that damages may be proved by affidavit without oral testimony, and that the appellants failed to support or cite authority for their exemption claim, so there was nothing preserved for review.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Nathaniel Armed Melendez Jr.’s conviction and 70-year sentence for murder. Melendez argued the evidence was insufficient to show he acted intentionally or knowingly, his trial counsel was ineffective for several omissions, and the prosecutor made improper remarks in closing. The court found the evidence—Melendez firing ten rounds into a small apartment, injuring multiple people and fleeing—permitted a rational jury to infer intent or knowledge. The record did not show deficient trial performance or preserved prosecutorial error, so the conviction was affirmed.

The Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Luis Alonzo Perez Jr.’s conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. Perez argued (1) the evidence was insufficient, (2) the trial court erred by admitting extraneous-offense evidence, and (3) the court improperly allowed witnesses to describe how the incident affected them. The court found the record supported that Perez forced part of his body into a home while holding and using a knife, threatening the victim, and that prior misconduct evidence and impact testimony were admissible and not unduly prejudicial. The conviction and 14-year sentence were affirmed.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Lawrence Jeanpierre's appeal against Discover Bank for want of prosecution. Jeanpierre repeatedly missed the briefing deadline, filed a late brief and an amended brief that violated the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and failed to file a compliant second amended brief or request further extensions after the court struck his filings and set deadlines. Because he did not file a timely, compliant brief or request an extension, the court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment granting Castroville State Bank a judicial foreclosure against Lance and Kerry Meyer after the Meyers defaulted on loans secured by deeds of trust. The Bank moved for a hybrid summary judgment and no-evidence dismissal of the Meyers’ affirmative defenses; the trial court granted final summary judgment. The appellate court held the Meyers (pro se) failed to raise fact issues or provide admissible, properly cited record evidence to defeat summary judgment and waived other complaints, so the foreclosure judgment stands.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment sentencing Jacob Wayne Peek after he entered an open plea of no contest to indecency with a child by sexual contact. Peek was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, to run consecutively to a separate thirty-year sentence for an aggravated sexual assault conviction that is not at issue here. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting there were no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal; Peek filed a pro se brief and the State responded. The appellate court reviewed the record and briefs, found the appeal frivolous, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and affirmed.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s modification appointing J.A.V.S. as sole managing conservator and C.R. as possessory conservator of two children. The mother, C.R., appealed but repeatedly failed to follow appellate briefing rules, including providing record citations and legal argument. The court struck her initial brief, accepted an inadequate amended brief, and found no reporter’s record for the November 20, 2025 modification hearing, so the appellate record did not show what evidence the trial court considered. Because C.R.’s submissions provided nothing for review, the court affirmed the modification order.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed a probate court's summary judgment that had declared Reynaldo Hernandez’s 2022 will invalid on grounds of forgery. The probate court had accepted a contestant’s handwriting expert affidavit and voided the will despite the document bearing a notarized self-proving affidavit. The appeals court held that a will with a self-proving affidavit carries a statutory presumption of valid execution and that competing competent evidence about the signature created a genuine fact issue. Because summary judgment was improper when credibility and weight of evidence are disputed, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Margaret Hosseini Browder's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied as moot her motion for an emergency stay. Browder filed the habeas petition on April 8, 2026, and an emergency stay motion on April 20, 2026. After considering the petition, motion, and appendix, the court concluded she had not shown entitlement to relief under the applicable appellate rules and therefore denied the petition; because the petition was denied, the stay motion was moot.

The Fourth Court of Appeals denied CPS Energy's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial court's denial of its motion for protective order and the overruling of objections to a subpoena directed at non-party Dimension Energy Services in a pending Bexar County case. The appellate court held CPS Energy failed to preserve necessary factual issues for mandamus review and also noted an adequate alternative remedy exists because Dimension has filed its own protective-order motion in the trial court. The court therefore declined to consider new evidence or arguments raised for the first time on mandamus and denied relief.