Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied Barbara Ann Johnson’s petition for a writ of mandamus filed April 8, 2026. The court reviewed the petition and record and concluded Johnson did not meet the standards required for mandamus relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The opinion is brief, states the denial without extended discussion, and notes the underlying case is pending in the 131st Judicial District Court of Bexar County before Judge Nicole Garza.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio granted a joint motion to dismiss and dismissed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Flex, and Amazon.com Services, LLC. The petition was originally filed March 10, 2026, and the court had set an April 7, 2026 deadline for responses. After the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss, the court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and dismissed the mandamus proceeding. No merits decision was reached.

A jury convicted Gabriel Gallegos of continuous sexual abuse of a child and two counts of indecency with a child. On appeal to the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio), Gallegos argued the evidence was insufficient for one indecency count, alleged multiple jury-charge errors, and contested assessment of court costs. The court upheld the convictions, finding Amy Doe’s outcry and other evidence sufficient for the indecency conviction, that any potential jury-charge defects did not cause the egregious harm required to reverse unpreserved errors, and that Gallegos forfeited his complaint about the court-cost inquiry by not objecting at sentencing.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Edward Arnold Few’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure. Few challenged multiple trial rulings — late disclosure of cell-phone extraction reports, admission of photos/videos from phones, hearsay/outcry testimony, extraneous-offense testimony, a ChildSafe interview video excerpt, and a double-jeopardy claim. The court rejected each argument, finding Few waived many objections by failing to timely and specifically object at trial, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the applicable evidentiary rules and statutory provisions, and that the two convictions punished distinct acts involving different body parts (anus vs. genitals).

Justice Meza dissents from the court’s judgment in Carlos Zepeda Gonzales’s appeal for online solicitation of a minor. She agrees with the disposition reached but would abate and remand for the trial court to clarify and, if necessary, reform its written judgment. The written judgment contains inconsistent or omitted findings (unchecked registration box, wrong or missing fine/costs/fees, and no clear Chapter 62 registration pronouncement), while the record shows the trial court orally referenced an inapplicable 42A.054 (formerly 3g) finding. Because of these irreconcilable conflicts, she would send the case back to correct the record and ensure mandatory registration findings are properly made and reflected.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment sentencing Carlos Zepeda Gonzales to nine years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine after the court adjudicated guilt on an online solicitation of a minor conviction following violations of deferred adjudication. Gonzales argued his sentence was excessive, that the court improperly made a “42A” finding affecting parole, and that the court failed to inquire into his ability to pay costs. The appellate court found each complaint forfeited for failure to object at trial and explained that, even if preserved, the sentence was within the statutory range and not grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment convicting Paul Dillon Brown of possession with intent to deliver fentanyl and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Brown argued the appointment order incorrectly found he could pay for counsel and that his life sentence was cruel and unusual. The court held no modification to the appointment order was needed because Brown later retained private counsel and was not ordered to pay appointed-counsel fees. The Eighth Amendment claim was not considered because Brown failed to present his motion for new trial to the trial court, so the issue was unpreserved.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the conviction of Jacoby Latraille Brown, who pleaded guilty to failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements and was sentenced to eight years in prison. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no nonfrivolous appellate issues; the court independently reviewed the record and found no reversible error. The court did find nonreversible errors in the bill of costs: a prematurely assessed $60 time-payment fee, which it struck under Dulin, and a contested assessment of $682.50 in attorney fees, which the concurrence would also delete but the majority did not.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking Gary Ladale Criston's community supervision for possession offenses and sentencing him to five years' imprisonment with a $1,550 fine. Criston had originally pleaded guilty to possessing less than one gram of cocaine and received a ten-year sentence suspended in favor of five years' community supervision. After the State alleged multiple violations, the trial court found the allegations true and revoked supervision. Counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no arguable appellate issues; the appellate court independently reviewed the record and found no reversible error, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and affirmed.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services' petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed its motion for temporary emergency relief as moot. The court issued a short memorandum opinion resolving the original mandamus proceeding from Travis County without further opinion. The denial means the appellate court declined to order the lower court or official to take the specific action the Department sought; the emergency motion was unnecessary following that disposition.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied Elizabeth Weston's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial-court matter originating in Comal County. The opinion is a brief memorandum order disposing of the original proceeding and denying the requested extraordinary relief under the appellate rules. No extended reasoning or factual discussion is provided in the published entry; the court issued the denial and cited the appellate rule governing disposition of such petitions.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) denied Andrew Silva's petition for a writ of mandamus and his emergency motion for temporary relief. Silva sought to stop a county-constable eviction after a writ of possession issued, arguing the eviction turned on a bona fide title dispute and that a Rule 736 order was given improper preclusive effect. The court held Silva failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7(a) by filing a two-page letter without required headings, record, certification, or legal citations, and therefore could not meaningfully review his conclusory claims. Because Silva did not show entitlement to extraordinary relief, the petition was denied and the emergency motion denied as moot.

The court considered a mandamus petition from JPMorgan Chase challenging a trial court order that sanctioned Chase and held it in contempt for failing to comply with a trustee appointment order and a subpoena for trust records. The appellate court found the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Chase and that the subpoena was valid, but concluded the trial court abused its discretion in three respects: (1) imposing discovery sanctions against a non-party under rules that apply only to parties, (2) assessing a $750,000 criminal contempt fine that exceeded the $500 statutory cap, and (3) ordering contempt fines payable to the private trustee rather than to the court. The court partially granted mandamus, vacating the $6,700 and $750,000 awards and directing the trial court to modify the contempt fine to $500 payable to the court.

The court considered an appeal by the State and two state agencies seeking dismissal of claims by landlord 8317 Cross Park, LLC arising from a lease termination notice. The court held that the landlord’s breach-of-lease and declaratory-judgment claims against the State, Texas Facilities Commission (TFC), and Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) are barred by sovereign immunity and were dismissed. The court also dismissed the landlord’s ultra vires claim against HHSC deputy executive commissioner Rolland Niles. The court affirmed jurisdiction over and preserved the landlord’s ultra vires claim against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak for alleged violations of TFC regulations, and remanded for further proceedings on those surviving claims.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) considered Justin Randall Jones’s petition for a writ of mandamus and an emergency motion to stay a Denton County district court matter. After review, the court denied both the petition for mandamus and the emergency motion to stay. The memorandum opinion is per curiam and provides no extended reasoning or discussion of the merits; it simply states that relief is denied and the motions are dismissed on April 21, 2026.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals considered Harold Dammon McCray’s original petition for a writ of mandamus and his request for emergency temporary relief arising from a proceeding in the County Court at Law of Cooke County. The appellate court reviewed the filings and denied both the petition for mandamus and the emergency temporary relief. The court issued a brief per curiam memorandum opinion without publishing extended reasoning, delivering its decision on April 21, 2026.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) considered a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by A.Y. seeking relief from an order of the 271st District Court of Wise County (trial court No. CV25-03-218). After review, the appellate court denied the petition and refused to grant mandamus relief. The memorandum opinion is per curiam and does not elaborate the reasoning beyond the denial; the court simply announces that relief is denied and issues no written opinion expanding on its conclusion.

The First District of Texas Court of Appeals granted the appellant's unopposed motion to dismiss an appeal. The appellant had filed a notice of nonsuit and later a motion to dismiss the appeal; the court requested clarification and held the motion for the required period for a response, but none was filed. The court therefore granted the motion, dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision disposed of the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District Court of Texas affirmed William Ordonezhernandez’s conviction and twenty-year sentence for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit another felony. Appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw with an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous and identifying no reversible error. The court independently reviewed the entire record, considered the appellant’s pro se filing, found no arguable grounds for appeal, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court judgment. The court instructed counsel to notify the appellant of the result and his right to seek discretionary review.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by WC 4th and Colorado, LP and WC 4th and Rio Grande, LP for want of prosecution after the appellants failed to file their brief by the extended deadline and did not respond to the court's notice. The court explained the brief was originally due October 27, 2025, an extension to December 1, 2025 was granted, and the appellants failed to file a brief or request a further extension. Because of that failure and no response to a December 11, 2025 dismissal notice, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terrell Samuels’ appeal from a judgment of the County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County, because Samuels failed to timely file an appellant’s brief and did not provide a reasonable explanation after being warned. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing deadlines and the court’s authority to dismiss appeals for failure to prosecute. Any pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ray Jackson's appeal for want of prosecution because Jackson did not establish indigence, did not pay for or arrange payment for the clerk's record, and failed to respond to the court's notice that dismissal was possible. The court invoked the appellate rules permitting dismissal when the clerk's record is not filed due to the appellant's fault and when an appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. All pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The First District of Texas reversed the trial court’s order that had halted an arbitration between Humphries Construction Corporation (HCC) and Highland Village-related entities, holding the trial court erred in finding HCC waived its contractual right to arbitrate by using the courts. The appellate court concluded, after reviewing the litigation and discovery conduct, that Highland Village failed to show HCC clearly intended to relinquish arbitration. The court denied Highland Village’s collateral requests for mandamus relief challenging denials of a protective order, motion to quash a third-party subpoena, and sanctions, finding no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a ten-year sentence imposed on Gracie Ann Mata after she pleaded guilty to third-degree felony DWI with two prior DWI convictions. The defendant argued the sentence was grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court held the claim was forfeited because the defendant failed to raise the proportionality challenge in the trial court, leaving the appellate record insufficient for the fact-intensive proportionality review required by precedent. Because the sentence was within the statutory range and the claim was unpreserved, the court affirmed.

The court dismissed an appeal by Delanie Perkins from a County Civil Court at Law judgment because Perkins failed to file an appellant’s brief by the deadline and did not respond to the court’s notice to file the brief or request an extension. The First District applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that permit dismissal for want of prosecution and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute between Perkins and West Lake Park Apartments.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for a law firm in a legal-malpractice suit. Plaintiff DePina sued the firm for failing to timely pursue property-damage claims against a railroad after repeated flooding of his land. The firm obtained summary judgment arguing the underlying nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had run before representation. The appellate court held the record did not show as a matter of law the nuisance was permanent because flooding was sporadic, contingent on heavy rain and culvert condition, and thus created fact issues for a jury. The case is remanded.

The First District of Texas affirmed Christian Avery Franklyn’s conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The court reviewed whether the trial judge abused discretion by admitting two of Franklyn’s remote prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment while excluding the complainant’s similar remote conviction. The court assumed error in the evidentiary rulings but found any error harmless because the record — including conflicting testimony about intoxication, forensic DNA evidence, discrepancies in witnesses’ accounts, and other credibility-damaging facts — provided fair assurance the rulings did not influence the jury’s verdict.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were untimely. Coleman was convicted and sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year prison terms for sexual assault (cause no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (cause no. 1824734). Texas rules require a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing unless a timely motion for new trial is filed; no such motions were in the clerk’s records and Coleman did not file notices until February 11, 2026. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and denied pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were filed late. Coleman was sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year terms following convictions for sexual assault (case no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (case no. 1824734). Because no motion for new trial was filed and the standard 30-day deadline to appeal expired on October 26, 2025, Coleman's notices filed February 11, 2026 were untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Armando Jesus Pedraza’s conviction and thirty-year sentence for assault on a family member by impeding breathing. Pedraza argued ineffective assistance of counsel at punishment because his lawyer failed to object to the complainant’s testimony about a news article and incorrectly advised him he could both testify and invoke the Fifth Amendment. The court applied the two-part test for ineffective assistance, assumed arguendo some attorney errors but found Pedraza did not prove prejudice—there was not a reasonable probability the sentence would have been more lenient absent the alleged errors given his extensive criminal history and the aggravating evidence presented.