Court Filings

The Texas Court of Appeals (Tenth Appellate District) affirmed Dana Loment Pettigrew’s convictions for two counts of indecency with a child by contact and exposure. Pettigrew challenged admission of extraneous-offense testimony from L.H. under article 38.37 (as-applied facial challenge, Rule 403 balancing, and jury instruction) and claimed his counsel denied him the right to testify at the guilt-innocence phase. The court held the statute was not unconstitutional as applied, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403, the article 38.37 jury instruction was proper, and Pettigrew failed to show prejudice from counsel’s failure to reopen the evidence; thus the convictions and sentences were affirmed.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Stacey Sprung’s pending appeal after Sprung filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion was filed before the court issued a decision, and the court granted it under the governing rule, resulting in dismissal of the appeal. The opinion is a short, per curiam memorandum noting submission and opinion dates and the panel that considered the matter.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a bench-trial judgment awarding Douglas Fuhrman $187,244 plus $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees after he sued his ex-wife, Nancy Fuhrman, for breach of the 2020 agreed divorce decree’s tax-allocation provisions. The trial court found the decree was a valid contract, Douglas performed (Deloitte prepared and filed the 2020 returns), Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share, and Douglas suffered damages. The appellate court held the record (tax returns, expert testimony, decree language) provided legally and factually sufficient support for the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions.

The court dismissed a pending civil appeal after the parties jointly moved to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal arose from the County Court at Law No. 1 in Jefferson County (trial cause No. 25CCCV0301). Because the joint motion was filed before the court issued a decision, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a brief memorandum disposing of the case without further analysis.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Leo Roger Dugas’s appeal of a trial-court take-nothing judgment in a quiet-title suit against Ryan Edward Reuter. Dugas filed an initial brief that lacked legal authority and a corrected brief that failed to comply with numerous appellate rules. After warning and allowing an opportunity to amend, the court determined Dugas did not file a proper brief and proceeded on the clerk’s record, then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court therefore did not reach the merits of the underlying title dispute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s temporary injunction preventing four former CRNA employees from providing CRNA services within 20 miles of any location where they worked for their former employer, Anesthesia Associates, for three years. Anesthesia Associates sued after the CRNAs resigned and began working for a competitor at a local hospital, alleging breach of noncompetition and irreparable harm. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the employer showed a legitimate protectable interest (goodwill, specialized training, credentialing), probable success on the claim at trial, and probable irreparable injury that could not be adequately remedied by money damages.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed Victor Rolando Corpus’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child and indecency with a child. Corpus sought a continuance at trial because subpoenaed psychiatric/hospital records for a State witness had not arrived. The trial court denied the oral motion after efforts to locate the records and the court’s concern that delay could be indefinite. The appeals court held Corpus waived the complaint because the continuance motion was unsworn and, alternatively, that the court did not abuse its discretion because the missing records were not shown to be unexpectedly unavailable or likely to be obtained with a finite delay, and Corpus showed no harm from the denial.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

A Texas appellate court affirmed the convictions of Noel Amador-Castillo for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and attempted indecency with a child by contact. The jury had convicted him of continuous sexual abuse (multiple acts over years) and the lesser-included offense of attempted indecency by breast touching, and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. The court rejected a double-jeopardy challenge because the breast-touching offense is distinct from the acts alleged as predicates for continuous sexual abuse. It also held the victim’s testimony was legally sufficient to support both convictions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to twin children R.H. and E.H. after reviewing an accelerated appeal challenging whether termination was in the children’s best interest. The court applied Texas statutory standards and Holley factors, giving deference to factfinder credibility determinations. It found clear-and-convincing evidence the mother’s persistent methamphetamine use, failure to comply with services and testing, association with an abusive partner, and instability endangered the children and made reunification unsafe. The children were bonded with and well-cared for by their maternal aunt and her husband.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s enforcement order and final judgment enforcing a divorce decree property award in favor of Pamela Sheehan. George Sheehan had spent or moved funds that the divorce decree had awarded from a specific bank account, so the trial court converted the award into a money judgment for $64,601.44 plus $6,200 in attorney’s fees. The appeals court held the enforcement judgment was a permissible enforcement remedy under the Family Code, not an unauthorized modification of the divorce decree, and the award of attorney’s fees was authorized.

The First District of Texas dismissed Trina Jones's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 for failure to prosecute. The appellant's brief was due January 5, 2026, and after no brief was filed the court notified her on January 22, 2026, that the appeal could be dismissed unless the brief or an extension motion was filed by February 2, 2026. The appellant did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Timothy Williams's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute. Williams failed to file his appellant brief by the February 20, 2026 deadline, did not file the brief or a motion for extension after a March 6, 2026 notice, and did not respond by the March 16, 2026 date given. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under applicable Texas appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a final judgment entered September 30, 2024 because the appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 1, 2025 — more than nine months after the judgment and well beyond the applicable deadlines. The court explained the general 30-day filing deadline, the circumstances that can extend it to 90 days, and the limited procedure for seeking an extension. The appellant was given notice that the appeal appeared untimely and did not respond, so the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction because Brown validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements in each case. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five trial causes, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he understood and waived appeal rights, and the trial court’s judgments reflected the waiver. Because the record affirmatively shows the waivers were knowing and voluntary and Brown admitted the waivers to this Court, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s consolidated appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Brown pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and to aggravated robbery in two others, and in each case he signed plea paperwork and certifications expressly waiving his right to appeal. The court found the trial-court certifications and the record show a knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal and that the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five felony cases, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he gave up his appeal rights, and the judgments expressly state appeal was waived. Because a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver bars appeal absent trial-court permission, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas affirmed Nicholas Darris Marshall’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine. Marshall pleaded guilty after the State waived two enhancement paragraphs; evidence at sentencing included police testimony, lab results showing 2.1152 grams of methamphetamine, and Marshall’s own testimony about how the drugs came to be in his car. The court held Marshall failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment challenge and, even if preserved, the sentence—being within the statutory 2–20 year range—was not grossly disproportionate under the relevant precedent.

Appellants Mark Goloby and Richard Vega sued Harris County commissioners, contending Commissioner Adrian Garcia resigned his county office when the Commissioners Court appointed him to the Gulf Coast Protection District (GCPD) board. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioners Court’s appointment of one of its own members to the GCPD was void under the common-law self-appointment branch of the incompatibility doctrine, so Garcia never lawfully became a GCPD director and therefore did not resign his commissioner seat. Because Garcia remained an official-capacity county officer, governmental immunity barred the claims and the dismissal with prejudice was proper.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Maria Nava Hernandez's appeal from a final judgment entered October 20, 2025, for lack of jurisdiction because her notice of appeal was filed December 12, 2025 — more than the required 30 days and not saved by any timely post-judgment motion or Rule 26.3 extension. The court explained the 30-day deadline, the 90-day extension available only if a timely post-judgment motion is filed, and that the 15-day window to seek an extension under Rule 26.3 had passed. Because the notice was untimely and no jurisdictional basis existed, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District of Texas affirmed a bench-trial judgment quieting title in favor of Linda Jean Willis. Pro se appellant Larry Dean White claimed ownership of a vacant lot by adverse possession after decades of mowing and maintenance, but the trial court found his proof insufficient. The appeals court held White failed to prove a required element—that his possession was hostile and exclusive such that it reasonably notified the true owner. Because the evidence did not establish all elements of adverse possession for the statutory period, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The Texas First District Court of Appeals dismissed Kevin Williams's appeal from a December 8, 2025 judgment because he neither paid required appellate fees nor proved indigence for those costs, and he failed to adequately respond after being notified that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing appellate fees and procedure and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal for failure to comply with fee and response requirements, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed Jim Bob's appeal for failure to pay required appellate fees or to establish indigence. The court previously notified appellant that the appeal would be dismissed unless he either paid the fees or explained in writing why he should not be required to pay them. Because Jim Bob did not respond or pay, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions. The dismissal rested on the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing payment of appellate fees and the court’s authority to involuntarily dismiss for noncompliance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order revoking Q.W.’s probation and committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for seven years. The juvenile had been placed on probation after pleading true to two counts of aggravated robbery. The State sought modification alleging truancy, a positive marijuana test, and unlawful carrying of a handgun. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Q.W. violated probation, including committing a new-law offense by being found with a handgun in a vehicle, and concluded the evidence supported revocation.

The Court of Appeals considered two appeals by John Lewis Jr. challenging a January 5, 2026 commitment to Kingwood Pines and an order authorizing medication. Appellant's counsel filed a notice of dismissal and the court treated it as a motion to dismiss. After abating the appeals for a hearing, the trial court docket showed appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue the appeals because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement and granted the motion, dismissing both appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two appeals brought by John Lewis Jr. challenging (1) a January 5, 2026 writ committing him to Kingwood Pines for up to 45 days and (2) a January 5, 2026 order authorizing medication. Counsel had filed a notice of dismissal, which the court treated as a motion to dismiss. After the court ordered a hearing to confirm whether appellant abandoned the appeals, appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue them because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement, granted the dismissal motion, and dismissed the appeals as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Donald Wayne Herod’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus because it was a collateral attack on his final felony conviction and thus must be pursued through a post-conviction habeas application under Article 11.07 in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The court explained that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging a final felony conviction and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over such post-conviction felony relief. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and any pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.