Court Filings

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied Elizabeth Weston's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial-court matter originating in Comal County. The opinion is a brief memorandum order disposing of the original proceeding and denying the requested extraordinary relief under the appellate rules. No extended reasoning or factual discussion is provided in the published entry; the court issued the denial and cited the appellate rule governing disposition of such petitions.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) denied Andrew Silva's petition for a writ of mandamus and his emergency motion for temporary relief. Silva sought to stop a county-constable eviction after a writ of possession issued, arguing the eviction turned on a bona fide title dispute and that a Rule 736 order was given improper preclusive effect. The court held Silva failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7(a) by filing a two-page letter without required headings, record, certification, or legal citations, and therefore could not meaningfully review his conclusory claims. Because Silva did not show entitlement to extraordinary relief, the petition was denied and the emergency motion denied as moot.

The court considered a mandamus petition from JPMorgan Chase challenging a trial court order that sanctioned Chase and held it in contempt for failing to comply with a trustee appointment order and a subpoena for trust records. The appellate court found the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Chase and that the subpoena was valid, but concluded the trial court abused its discretion in three respects: (1) imposing discovery sanctions against a non-party under rules that apply only to parties, (2) assessing a $750,000 criminal contempt fine that exceeded the $500 statutory cap, and (3) ordering contempt fines payable to the private trustee rather than to the court. The court partially granted mandamus, vacating the $6,700 and $750,000 awards and directing the trial court to modify the contempt fine to $500 payable to the court.

The court considered an appeal by the State and two state agencies seeking dismissal of claims by landlord 8317 Cross Park, LLC arising from a lease termination notice. The court held that the landlord’s breach-of-lease and declaratory-judgment claims against the State, Texas Facilities Commission (TFC), and Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) are barred by sovereign immunity and were dismissed. The court also dismissed the landlord’s ultra vires claim against HHSC deputy executive commissioner Rolland Niles. The court affirmed jurisdiction over and preserved the landlord’s ultra vires claim against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak for alleged violations of TFC regulations, and remanded for further proceedings on those surviving claims.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) considered Justin Randall Jones’s petition for a writ of mandamus and an emergency motion to stay a Denton County district court matter. After review, the court denied both the petition for mandamus and the emergency motion to stay. The memorandum opinion is per curiam and provides no extended reasoning or discussion of the merits; it simply states that relief is denied and the motions are dismissed on April 21, 2026.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals considered Harold Dammon McCray’s original petition for a writ of mandamus and his request for emergency temporary relief arising from a proceeding in the County Court at Law of Cooke County. The appellate court reviewed the filings and denied both the petition for mandamus and the emergency temporary relief. The court issued a brief per curiam memorandum opinion without publishing extended reasoning, delivering its decision on April 21, 2026.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) considered a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by A.Y. seeking relief from an order of the 271st District Court of Wise County (trial court No. CV25-03-218). After review, the appellate court denied the petition and refused to grant mandamus relief. The memorandum opinion is per curiam and does not elaborate the reasoning beyond the denial; the court simply announces that relief is denied and issues no written opinion expanding on its conclusion.

The First District of Texas Court of Appeals granted the appellant's unopposed motion to dismiss an appeal. The appellant had filed a notice of nonsuit and later a motion to dismiss the appeal; the court requested clarification and held the motion for the required period for a response, but none was filed. The court therefore granted the motion, dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision disposed of the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District Court of Texas affirmed William Ordonezhernandez’s conviction and twenty-year sentence for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit another felony. Appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw with an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous and identifying no reversible error. The court independently reviewed the entire record, considered the appellant’s pro se filing, found no arguable grounds for appeal, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court judgment. The court instructed counsel to notify the appellant of the result and his right to seek discretionary review.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by WC 4th and Colorado, LP and WC 4th and Rio Grande, LP for want of prosecution after the appellants failed to file their brief by the extended deadline and did not respond to the court's notice. The court explained the brief was originally due October 27, 2025, an extension to December 1, 2025 was granted, and the appellants failed to file a brief or request a further extension. Because of that failure and no response to a December 11, 2025 dismissal notice, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terrell Samuels’ appeal from a judgment of the County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County, because Samuels failed to timely file an appellant’s brief and did not provide a reasonable explanation after being warned. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing deadlines and the court’s authority to dismiss appeals for failure to prosecute. Any pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ray Jackson's appeal for want of prosecution because Jackson did not establish indigence, did not pay for or arrange payment for the clerk's record, and failed to respond to the court's notice that dismissal was possible. The court invoked the appellate rules permitting dismissal when the clerk's record is not filed due to the appellant's fault and when an appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. All pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The First District of Texas reversed the trial court’s order that had halted an arbitration between Humphries Construction Corporation (HCC) and Highland Village-related entities, holding the trial court erred in finding HCC waived its contractual right to arbitrate by using the courts. The appellate court concluded, after reviewing the litigation and discovery conduct, that Highland Village failed to show HCC clearly intended to relinquish arbitration. The court denied Highland Village’s collateral requests for mandamus relief challenging denials of a protective order, motion to quash a third-party subpoena, and sanctions, finding no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a ten-year sentence imposed on Gracie Ann Mata after she pleaded guilty to third-degree felony DWI with two prior DWI convictions. The defendant argued the sentence was grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court held the claim was forfeited because the defendant failed to raise the proportionality challenge in the trial court, leaving the appellate record insufficient for the fact-intensive proportionality review required by precedent. Because the sentence was within the statutory range and the claim was unpreserved, the court affirmed.

The court dismissed an appeal by Delanie Perkins from a County Civil Court at Law judgment because Perkins failed to file an appellant’s brief by the deadline and did not respond to the court’s notice to file the brief or request an extension. The First District applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that permit dismissal for want of prosecution and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute between Perkins and West Lake Park Apartments.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for a law firm in a legal-malpractice suit. Plaintiff DePina sued the firm for failing to timely pursue property-damage claims against a railroad after repeated flooding of his land. The firm obtained summary judgment arguing the underlying nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had run before representation. The appellate court held the record did not show as a matter of law the nuisance was permanent because flooding was sporadic, contingent on heavy rain and culvert condition, and thus created fact issues for a jury. The case is remanded.

The First District of Texas affirmed Christian Avery Franklyn’s conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The court reviewed whether the trial judge abused discretion by admitting two of Franklyn’s remote prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment while excluding the complainant’s similar remote conviction. The court assumed error in the evidentiary rulings but found any error harmless because the record — including conflicting testimony about intoxication, forensic DNA evidence, discrepancies in witnesses’ accounts, and other credibility-damaging facts — provided fair assurance the rulings did not influence the jury’s verdict.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were untimely. Coleman was convicted and sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year prison terms for sexual assault (cause no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (cause no. 1824734). Texas rules require a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing unless a timely motion for new trial is filed; no such motions were in the clerk’s records and Coleman did not file notices until February 11, 2026. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and denied pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were filed late. Coleman was sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year terms following convictions for sexual assault (case no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (case no. 1824734). Because no motion for new trial was filed and the standard 30-day deadline to appeal expired on October 26, 2025, Coleman's notices filed February 11, 2026 were untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Armando Jesus Pedraza’s conviction and thirty-year sentence for assault on a family member by impeding breathing. Pedraza argued ineffective assistance of counsel at punishment because his lawyer failed to object to the complainant’s testimony about a news article and incorrectly advised him he could both testify and invoke the Fifth Amendment. The court applied the two-part test for ineffective assistance, assumed arguendo some attorney errors but found Pedraza did not prove prejudice—there was not a reasonable probability the sentence would have been more lenient absent the alleged errors given his extensive criminal history and the aggravating evidence presented.

The First District of Texas consolidated two duplicate appeals filed after the trial court granted partial summary judgment and later severed the case, making that interlocutory order final and appealable. The court found the notices of appeal filed in two appellate dockets were identical and stemmed from the same October 2, 2025 severance order, so it granted the unopposed motion to consolidate and ordered the consolidated appeal to proceed under cause number 01-26-00052-CV. Because the appellate record is incomplete, the court declined to set a briefing schedule and dismissed the duplicate appellate docket 01-25-01093-CV.

The Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a no-evidence summary judgment in a multi-vehicle pileup case. The trial court granted summary judgment for the truck driver Mark Richard and his employer Millwood Trucking. The court held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal as to Richard because he died before the judgment and no estate representative was substituted, so the judgment as to him is void and must be vacated. The court nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Millwood Trucking, concluding the plaintiffs produced no evidence of causation or damages against the employer.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to her infant child, E.T. The Department removed the child shortly after birth when both tested positive for amphetamine and later showed Mother’s continued methamphetamine and other drug use, untreated bipolar disorder, failure to complete court-ordered services, and periods of incarceration and mental-health treatment. The court applied the statutory best-interest factors (Holley factors) and concluded that Mother’s instability, ongoing substance use, untreated mental-health issues, and failure to complete services supported a finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest.

The Court of Appeals granted the Department of Labor and Industries’ motion for reconsideration, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a new published opinion. The court held that Cache Valley Electric violated WAC 296-45-255(7) by making expired rubber protective blankets available at a worksite, and therefore reinstated the Department’s citation and penalty for that item. The court also upheld the Board’s serious-violation finding and penalty assessment for an employee operating a chainsaw within the minimum approach distance of an energized line, concluding the Board did not abuse its discretion in weighing the high probability of harm given how close the chainsaw came to the line. The result: the judgment was reversed in part (vacated Board finding on blankets) and affirmed in part (chainsaw violation).

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted an application for interlocutory appeal filed by the Fulton County District Attorney's Office in the matter styled In re Fulton County District Attorney's Office v. Donald John Trump et al. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order and directed the Clerk of Superior Court to include a copy of this order in the record sent to the Court of Appeals. This is an administrative order certifying that the interlocutory appeal is permitted and outlining next procedural steps.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Reginald Charles Harvey’s appeal from various trial-court orders in a dispute with U.S. Nature-Invest Holdings, LLC because the notice of appeal was filed late. The underlying dispute began with the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment in January 2025 and multiple post-judgment motions by Harvey, the last of which the trial court denied on February 6, 2026. Harvey filed his notice of appeal on March 16, 2026 — 38 days after the February 6 order — and the Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory under state law.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kentay Smith’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Smith sought review of post-October 17, 2025 orders after filing a notice of appeal on March 2, 2026. The court held that the controlling final order was entered October 17, 2025, and Smith’s notice of appeal was not filed within the 30-day statutory deadline. The February 19, 2026 order merely stated the case was closed and made no new substantive custody ruling, so it was not appealable. Motions to expedite and for emergency consideration were also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal in Phan v. Lee because appellants failed to file their enumerations of error and brief by the court-imposed deadline and did not request an extension. The appeal had been docketed March 6, 2026, and appellants were required to file within 20 days (by March 26, 2026). Citing Court of Appeals Rules 7 and 23(a) and precedent (Britton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n), the court ordered dismissal on April 21, 2026 for noncompliance with filing requirements.

The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded a trial-court award of $123,740.62 in attorney fees against plaintiff’s counsel in a medical-malpractice case. The trial court had found counsel abused discovery by failing to disclose a post-mortem pacemaker report and awarded fees under OCGA §§ 9-15-14(b) and 9-11-37(d). The appellate court held the report was discoverable and counsel had a duty to supplement, but concluded the § 9-11-37(d) award was invalid because the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it entered that portion of the sanction. The § 9-15-14(b) award was authorized but vacated because the court failed to explain how it calculated the exact fee amount, requiring remand for proper factfinding.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Smart Venture Capital’s appeal and ruled that the trial court erred in denying Smart Venture’s motion to set aside a default judgment. The Association sued the property owners and added Smart Venture (a secured creditor) but failed to effect service on Smart Venture’s registered agent. The court held the certified-mail evidence lacked a required postmark and there was no proof Smart Venture received or signed for the mailing, so service was not perfected and the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.