Court Filings

The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed a criminal appeal by Darryl Johnson from a Pinellas County circuit court under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). The panel issued a short, per curiam decision affirming the lower court's judgment. No opinion elaborating reasoning or issues was published; the decision notes concurrence by three judges and that the opinion may be revised before official publication.

The appellate court reviewed a pro se appeal by Jesse Cleveland Harrell from a DeSoto County circuit court criminal proceeding under the Florida rules for collateral review. The Second District issued a short per curiam disposition and affirmed the lower court’s decision without published opinion. The court provided no extended reasoning in the order and the panel concurred. The mandate affirms the circuit court’s judgment or order as challenged by Harrell, leaving the trial-court outcome intact.

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in an appeal by Dondre R. Hale against the State of Florida. The appeal was taken under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Pinellas County circuit court before Judge Philip J. Federico. The appellate panel issued a per curiam decision—joined by Judges Northcutt, LaRose, and Rothstein-Youakim—simply stating 'Affirmed' without further published opinion and noted the opinion may be revised prior to official publication.

The court reviewed an appeal by C.H. challenging the actions of the Department of Children and Families and the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program in a dependency matter involving children J.H. and G.B. After considering the record and arguments, the district court issued a brief per curiam decision affirming the lower court's ruling. The decision affirms the circuit court's handling of the dependency-related proceedings without further comment, and the panel of three judges concurred. No additional factual findings or legal analysis are included in the published entry.

The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Jason Funk from a Hillsborough County circuit court criminal postconviction or sentencing matter under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). The court, in a per curiam decision, affirmed the lower court's ruling. No published opinion or additional reasoning was provided in the order; the panel (Kelly, Morris, and Guard, JJ.) concurred and the decision is subject to revision before official publication.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a criminal matter. Appellant Bruce Cowart appealed a decision from the Circuit Court for Manatee County, represented by the public defender, with the State of Florida represented by the Attorney General. The appellate court issued a per curiam opinion on April 22, 2026, summarily affirming the lower court's ruling without published opinion and with three judges concurring. No additional reasoning or factual detail was provided in the published entry.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in a criminal postconviction appeal. The appeal was taken under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from a Hillsborough County circuit court order, and the appellate panel issued a brief per curiam opinion simply stating: Affirmed. All three judges concurred. No further explanation or published reasoning was included in the opinion as filed on April 22, 2026.

The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed Jermaine Antwane Brown, Jr.'s appeal from a Pinellas County circuit court criminal postconviction order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). The panel, in a brief per curiam decision, affirmed the lower court's ruling. No extended reasoning or factual discussion is provided in this opinion; the court simply announced affirmance and noted the opinion may be revised before official publication.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the appellant Timothy Joseph Ferguson's challenge in three criminal cases. The panel issued a short per curiam opinion, relying on precedent to hold that the defendant was not entitled to an express written explanation for the denial of a motion to downward departure from sentencing. The court cited Venter v. State to support its view that due process does not require a specific explanation for such denials and therefore found no reversible error.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court judgment that pierced the corporate veil to hold South Dade Dealership liable for a default judgment against CarX Depot. Line 5 had obtained a default judgment against CarX for unpaid finance-and-insurance (F&I) funds and sought to collect from South Dade as an alleged alter ego or mere continuation. The appellate court found the evidence insufficient to show South Dade dominated CarX or that CarX’s separate corporate existence ceased, and it concluded there was no relay-style continuation into SDT Cars. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for South Dade.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the county court’s final judgment and its denial of Robert Vidal’s motion for new trial in a case brought by Barclays Bank Delaware. The appellate court held Vidal failed to preserve the claimed errors, did not provide an adequate record for appellate review, and did not show reversible error. The court relied on precedent requiring an adequate trial record to evaluate factual and legal claims on appeal and therefore found no basis to disturb the lower court’s rulings.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's revocation of Jason Brandon Mervil's probation. The court held that the evidence supporting revocation was sufficient because the hearsay presented at the probation revocation hearing was corroborated by non-hearsay evidence and an experienced officer's opinion on identification was permissible. The panel relied on prior Florida decisions establishing that hearsay may be used at revocation hearings only when supported by non-hearsay proof and that trained officers may opine about controlled substances. The judgment below is therefore affirmed.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Henry Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault with a firearm, burglary of a conveyance while armed, and resisting an officer without violence. The court held that pretrial exclusion of public statements by Governor DeSantis and the county sheriff about the right to bear arms and tough-on-crime rhetoric was not an abuse of discretion because those generalized statements were not relevant to Wilson’s subjective belief or the objective reasonableness required by Florida’s defense-of-property statute. The court did remand for the trial court to enter separate written sentences for each count to conform to its oral pronouncements.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a default final judgment entered in a small claims case because the defendant, a self-represented litigant, had notified the trial court before a pretrial conference that she could not attend due to a death in her family. The trial court entered default when she did not appear and later denied her motion to continue. The appellate court found that the denial was an abuse of discretion because the reason was unforeseeable, not suggestive of delay, and the default deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded a final judgment for the property owner against Berman Construction arising from a fire that destroyed a home during renovation. The trial court had denied the contractor’s requested interrogatory asking whether the contractor was excused from performance under a contract risk-of-loss clause allocating certain perils to the owner. The appeals court held the denial was an abuse of discretion because the affirmative defense tied to section 15.9 was unresolved and the jury should have been able to decide whether the fire was caused by an owner-borne peril, such as arson or other events beyond the contractor’s reasonable control.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's rulings in a criminal prosecution of Luis Enrique Juarbe. The appellate panel concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other-act evidence under Florida's child-molestation evidence statute and related precedent, and that the trial court's handling of evidentiary and mistrial issues was within its broad discretion. The court relied on statutory language and controlling case law addressing admissibility, relevance, similarity, remoteness, and the doctrine of opening the door to support its decision to affirm.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the defendant George Walton’s criminal conviction. The court reviewed whether the evidence was legally sufficient and applied the established standard: viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, asking whether a rational factfinder could have found the crime’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing Florida precedent, the panel concluded the State presented competent, substantial evidence to support the verdict and denied Walton’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the plaintiff's motion to certify that its decision conflicts with other Florida district court opinions. The court expressly certified conflict with three identified decisions from other districts involving Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company and related insurers. The opinion simply identifies the conflicting cases and certifies the question of conflict for resolution by the Florida Supreme Court, noting the matter is not final until disposition of any timely rehearing. No substantive merits ruling is made in this order.

The Fifth District reversed the circuit court’s summary denial of ground four of Christopher Owens’s Rule 3.850 postconviction motion and remanded for further proceedings. Owens had alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor comments during voir dire that arguably commented on his constitutional right to remain silent. The panel found the record attached below still lacked sufficient context to evaluate prejudice under Strickland and therefore did not conclusively refute Owens’s claim, so the court ordered either an evidentiary hearing or additional records be attached to the denial order.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any attorney may be discharged, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the contractual percentage after discharge. Because the referring attorney was discharged, she is limited to a modified quantum meruit recovery for services actually performed prior to discharge and within the scope of the agreement. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine reasonable recovery under those principles.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her before final settlement. The court held a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any other lawyer, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the agreed contractual percentage once discharged. Instead, where a client discharges counsel without cause the attorney may recover only the reasonable value of services performed before discharge, capped by the contract (modified quantum meruit). The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate an appropriate quantum meruit award limited to pre-discharge, in-scope work.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in a civil dispute between appellant Marylou Elaine Muscillo and appellee Gilles P. Cournoyer. The opinion, issued April 22, 2026, is per curiam and brief, stating only the disposition without published reasoning. The appellate court declined to reverse or remand the lower court's decision, leaving the trial court's ruling in place subject to any timely rehearing motion. No further factual or legal explanation appears in the opinion.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a nonfinal order from the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court in a civil appeal brought by Joseph Johel Pineda and others against Ricky Enrique De Cespedes. The appellate court issued a per curiam opinion on April 22, 2026, and concluded the lower court's order should stand. The opinion is brief, notes the appeal number and counsel, and states the judgment as "Affirmed." No further reasoning or factual discussion is provided in the published docket entry.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a criminal postconviction appeal brought by Ira Lee Pickett. The appeal was filed under the Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure governing appeals in criminal cases from nonfinal orders or specified postconviction rulings. The panel issued a short per curiam opinion on April 22, 2026, summarily rejecting Pickett's challenge and leaving the lower court's ruling intact. No extended opinion, reasoning, or separate opinions were published with the affirmation.

The Third District reversed a trial court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The dispute arose from a wrongful-death case where the client had signed an agreement dividing fees between lead counsel (Podhurst) and referring counsel (Frexes). The appellate court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney and that discharge limits the referring attorney to recovery under a modified quantum meruit for work performed before discharge. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate reasonable compensation limited to services rendered before the January 28, 2019 discharge and within the contract’s scope.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a final injunction for protection against domestic violence entered by the circuit court. The appellant, proceeding pro se, claimed his lawyer had documents not presented at the hearing, but he failed to provide a trial transcript or statement of the proceedings. Because the appellate record lacked the testimony and evidence necessary to evaluate factual and legal claims, the court relied on binding precedent that an inadequate record requires affirmance and therefore affirmed the lower court's judgment.

The Court of Appeal affirmed appellant Dylan James Hardy’s convictions and eight-year split sentence following guilty pleas to multiple firearm offenses. Hardy mounted facial Second Amendment challenges to California statutes banning assault-weapon activity, possession of a short-barreled shotgun, possession of a silencer, large-capacity magazine activity, and unlawful handgun transfer without a licensed dealer. The court rejected those challenges, holding short-barreled shotguns, silencers, and large-capacity magazines are not arms protected by the Second Amendment and that the assault-weapon and transfer regulations do not meaningfully burden the core right to keep and bear arms. The judgment was affirmed and certified for publication.

The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to reverse its summary denial and order the superior court to reconsider petitioner Aimee Bobo’s request for misdemeanor diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95. Bobo had been charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter after running a red light and killing another driver. The trial court denied diversion solely because her negligent conduct caused a death. The appellate court held that denial based only on facts inherent in the offense improperly ignored the statute’s rehabilitative purposes and thus was an abuse of discretion.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Studebaker Health Care Center’s motion to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to grant the motion. The dispute arose after employee J. Asencion Santana signed three arbitration-related onboarding documents and later sued for wage-and-hour and representative Labor Code claims, including a PAGA claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement invalid because of alleged conflicts among the documents and unconscionability. The appellate court held the documents, read together, showed a clear mutual intent to arbitrate employment disputes; ambiguities did not defeat arbitration; and any unenforceable PAGA waiver should be severed rather than voiding the entire agreement.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services' petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed its motion for temporary emergency relief as moot. The court issued a short memorandum opinion resolving the original mandamus proceeding from Travis County without further opinion. The denial means the appellate court declined to order the lower court or official to take the specific action the Department sought; the emergency motion was unnecessary following that disposition.